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INTRODUCTION
This study is a history of American naval arms control following
the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22. It describes the ef-
forts of American leaders—political, military, and social—as well
as those of their contemporaries in the two other postwar great na-
val powers, Britain and Japan, to come to agreement on naval limita-
tion between 1922 and the mid-1930s. I particularly focus on the
years 1927-30, a time when political leaders, statesmen, naval offi-
cers, and various civilian pressure groups in the major naval powers
considered developing new limits on their navies. Americans were
particularly interested in naval arms limitation after the signing of
the Washington treaties, as they already had a small army and the
nation's location meant that only the sea power of other nations
could pose a threat to its security, especially in the Philippine Is-
lands. Memories of the recent world war and a fixation on balancing
national budgets also encouraged limitation. Eventually, these years
saw the convening of two subsequent naval conferences including
the United States, Britain, and Japan, one in Geneva in 1927, the
other in London in 1930.
By analyzing what went wrong at Geneva in 1927, in contrast to
the treaty-producing conferences that preceded and followed it, one
may understand more about how the arms-control process of these
years functioned and why some conferences fared well and others
did not. Geneva stands as an integral event in the history of inter-
war naval arms control—or disarmament, as it was commonly, if
inaccurately, known. Diplomats and navy personnel attending the
conference tried to extend naval arms restrictions and, though they
failed, ironically helped prepare the way for agreements reached at
London three years later. As the depression deepened after the Lon-
don Conference of 1930, more and more countries lost interest in
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disarmament, though new attempts were made periodically until
1936.
This study differs from other accounts of disarmament after 1922
in that it uses a variety of British, American, and Japanese sources
and is really a comparative history of forces and personalities in-
volved with naval disarmament in the United States, Britain, and
Japan, relying to some extent on a bureaucratic-politics model.1 I
examine the activity of politicians and diplomats and their legisla-
tures and departments. These people included Republican leaders in
the United States who considered themselves pragmatists in inter-
national affairs, in contrast to the idealism of Woodrow Wilson's
world vision. An example of their pragmatic approach was their in-
sistence on developing a professional foreign service, similar to the
well-organized British Foreign Office. In London, Labour and Con-
servative leaders ran hot or cold for disarmament, depending on
their attitude and standing in Parliament. These politicians had to
deal with forceful Admiralty officials who oversaw the world's most
mighty navy. In Tokyo, finally, leaders of newly formed party regimes
favored disarmament through the 1920s but had to pay increasing
attention both to the civil war in China, which threatened Japanese
interests, and to the views of the military.
But perhaps more important, I move beyond the narrow confines
of the strictly bureaucratic model to examine the cultural underpin-
nings of the disarmament movement, especially the effect of public
opinion on policymaking in these three societies. Although Realist
scholars have generally downplayed the importance of public opinion
on foreign policy decision-making, recent American and European
scholarship emphasizing the importance of domestic factors in for-
eign policy suggests that public opinion, including that of interest
and social protest groups, does indeed matter.2 I therefore employ a
controlled comparable-cases approach—necessary because polling
data did not become available until the mid-1980s—to examine the
internal elements of nongovernmental groups as well as the political
domestic structures that permitted them to participate in disarma-
ment deliberations.3 In so doing, the interplay between pressure
groups that supported or opposed arms control and those that sought
to influence other citizens, legislators, and leaders of their govern-
ments is highlighted. Opinion toward the disarmament question was
perhaps most divided in the United States where the debate involved
a great number of people, including a number of thriving peace soci-
eties. Opinions ranged from the sentiment of the indomitable former
suffragist leader Carrie Chapman Catt, who declared that she re-
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garded any further obstacle to disarmament as a "tangled ball of yarn,
which we may pull out in order if we get ahold of the right end," to
that of Captain Dudley Knox of the Naval Historical Center, who
attacked the "arm chair pacifists" who opposed naval building.4
Views varied widely in Britain and Japan as well, though for different
reasons.
Historians of interwar arms control have lately focused on
Britain's role: Whitehall's bureaucratic infighting over disarma-
ment, strategy, and naval architecture and technological changes.5
This study also traces, if briefly, the strategic and design arguments
that naval men of Britain and the other naval powers put before
their leaders. Naval plans and premises cannot be overlooked be-
cause they often formed the positions powers took at the various
arms control conferences. These arguments were often ill-under-
stood by politicians, yet to gain domestic goals and achieve interna-
tional accord political leaders had not only to interpret the techni-
cal reports, then accept, reject, or modify them, but also to defend
them against domestic critics and before other powers with compet-
ing testimony from their experts. Small wonder that confusion
arose from time to time.
Ultimately, this study raises important questions about why the
United States and the other naval powers undertook extension of
the Washington system of arms control. How did politicians, mili-
tary leaders, and other interest groups affect this process? Which
individuals or groups were most important? Was naval arms control
wise, particularly between 1927 and 1930? And, most important to
the contemporary reader, what lessons, if any, does the experience
of the interwar period hold for those interested in arms control in
the nuclear era?

1
THE POLITICS OF
DISARMAMENT
The idea of disarmament, that nations might limit their arms and
thereby make themselves more secure than if they possessed more
armaments, flourished in the decade after the First World War.
The Treaty of Versailles had endorsed the idea of collective se-
curity—nations banded together in an international League of
Nations to maintain peace in the world and put forward the idea
of further disarmament. The country that believed most in dis-
armament was the United States (even though it had not joined
the League), and there seemed good reason for such strong belief:
in 1921-22, the Washington Naval Conference had slowed the race
to build capital ships—battleships and carriers—and defined in-
ternational positions in the Far East. Everything pointed toward
more such successes. Wearied by world war and a sharp postwar
depression, Americans ardently desired "normalcy" and were ea-
ger to proceed with disarmament. President Calvin Coolidge was
reducing the national debt and hoped to allay the arms race. For
Europe, the Dawes Plan of 1924 had established a schedule for
payment of German reparations and encouraged Europe's leaders
to believe that the Continent was settling down, that the econom-
ic troubles that followed the world war were coming to an end.
The year 1925 saw the conclusion of the Locarno Accords, an
Anglo-French-German-Italian guarantee of the Franco-German bor-
der. Similarly, peace seemed virtually established in the Far East,
although the simmering Chinese civil war might flare up. Even in
Japan the hostile reaction to the United States Immigration Act of
1924 excluding Japanese from American citizenship did not extin-
guish interest in naval disarmament. Japanese public opinion fa-
vored a strong navy, but continuing budget problems required
economy.
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VERSAILLES AND DISARMAMENT
The fourth of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points of 1918 concerned
arms control—nations coming together to limit their armaments.
But translating this into policy at the Paris Peace Conference after
the war proved difficult, not least because the president himself was
unwilling to make significant reductions in the American navy,
which he believed a necessary support to his pet project, the League
of Nations, also under discussion at Paris. Another of Wilson's her-
alded Fourteen Points complicated matters: point two, dealing with
freedom of the seas, a matter of great interest to the Americans,
considering the recent British blockade, which had obstructed Amer-
ican shipping before American entrance into the war. The British at
Paris were not interested in discussing this point, though they did
bring it up occasionally to score debating points, for they rightly
interpreted any British concessions in this area as meaning the end
of the Royal Navy's hegemony in many parts of the world. Japan, the
third major naval power, did not greatly value Wilson's outline for a
new international order and worried about how any treaty might
affect naval arms control in the Western Pacific, former German
colonies in China, and a relaxation of trade barriers.1
References to arms limitation in the Treaty of Versailles and an
informal arrangement regarding further disarmament between the
British and the Americans emerged from the discussion at Paris. The
Treaty of Versailles made two references to disarmament. Part Five of
the treaty maintained that the arms reduction of Germany—the
army and navy were limited and battleships over 10,000 tons were
prohibited—was intended to set the stage for future international
arms limitation. This meant that many European leaders, on the
prodding of leaders in Berlin, would feel compelled to pursue disar-
mament during the 1920s and 1930s.2 Article 8 of the League cove-
nant, also established by the treaty, played on this theme as well,
stating that international peace required armament reduction to the
lowest level possible to ensure national defenses and that the new
League would oversee plans for making such a reduction. These refer-
ences to disarmament, which leaders would later point to as the basis
of the disarmament campaigns of the interwar years, were only
sketchily outlined and demonstrated the lack of consensus among
nations about the wisdom and method of arms control. The French,
for example, were prone to point out the troubling contradiction be-
tween the two parts of the treaty—that calling for limitation and
that calling for reduction. Which was really meant by the treaty?3
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After an abortive trip to Washington in December 1919 by Lord
Grey of Fallodon, the former British foreign secretary, Lord Robert
Cecil, the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and President
Wilson's adviser, Colonel Edward House, patched together a tempo-
rary understanding. The Americans would slow their arms building
based on the large building plan of 1916 and the British would aban-
don their opposition to the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine as a
point of interest in the League of Nations covenant. Both men
agreed that these measures would permit time for a later, more last-
ing, naval agreement. The question of limitation or reduction, in
short, could wait.4
The Treaty of Versailles therefore set the stage for future disar-
mament talks. The British were interested in negotiations because
they worried about the huge American naval building plan and the
expense of protecting their worldwide empire given their weakened
postwar economic condition. The Americans, less wholeheartedly,
had also endorsed the idea of disarmament, hoping to reap savings
and balance the national budget. Both nations knew that the new
League would not require an international naval force, as that idea
had been rejected in discussions. Finally, as the 1920s dawned, both
nations sensed that somehow the system of collective security envi-
sioned by the new League would probably at some point require
disarmament. But, at least for the Americans, this did not mean
immediate disarmament. President Wilson was more concerned
with the ratification of the treaty, the future of the League, and the
need for a strong American navy to back the League than he was
about immediate disarmament. The Japanese prime minister, Hara
Kei,* although concerned that the conference might restrain Japa-
nese foreign policy in the Far East, accommodated himself to the
new international system and began to think more in global terms,
which included the issue of naval arms control. Nevertheless, Japan
emerged from the experience of Versailles anxious about its role in
the postwar world.5
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
A principal reason for the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22
was a common desire for economy on the part of the three major
* Asian names are used in traditional Asian order, surname first, unless they appear
otherwise in works cited, in which case order follows the published source.
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naval powers—the United States, Britain, and Japan. Navies formed
a large part of national budgets—in postwar Japan the largest part,
in the United States the largest single expenditure. The United
States, to be sure, could afford a naval race, but the Japanese govern-
ment, and even the British, after the huge expenses of the world
war, could not. In the United States and, to a far lesser extent, in
Britain, public opinion was negative toward the cost of munitions;
similar sentiment existed in Japan.
The American government decided to extend invitations to a
disarmament conference in 1921 because political conditions had
changed since Woodrow Wilson's refusal in 1919 and 1920 to con-
sider such a conference. The Republican victory in the presidential
election of 1920 had replaced Wilson with Warren Harding of Ohio,
who was less opposed to disarmament and who sought an issue that
might bolster his position with members of his party. Senator Wil-
liam E. Borah of Idaho had sponsored a resolution calling for the
American government to take the lead in sponsoring an interna-
tional disarmament conference. The argument was even made that
the advent of bombers, capable of destroying battleships at sea (as
demonstrated by Billy Mitchell in 1921 with various naval targets
including an old German battleship), might make battleship limita-
tion possible.6 In addition, Lord Lee of Fareham, the new British
First Lord of the Admiralty, hinted to Washington that time was
running out for a new conference, as the Anglo-Japanese alliance of
1902 was due for renewal soon and disarmament would be harder to
achieve if a new alliance were agreed on by London and Tokyo.7
Whitehall in 1921 was more reluctant than Washington to pro-
ceed with a disarmament conference, a reversal of the American
and British roles at Paris in 1919. British Prime Minister David
Lloyd George was not deeply interested in disarmament and did not
consider it until forced to by the convening of the Imperial Confer-
ence and the impending renewal of the alliance with Japan, a matter
which many in the Cabinet opposed. A majority of the Cabinet ulti-
mately overrode the prime minister's opposition and decided to
postpone discussion of the alliance while engaging in parleys with
Washington.8
Meanwhile Premier Hara had navigated through the Diet (the
legislative body) an arms expansion program that included an ambi-
tious naval building program. Tokyo was not initially much inter-
ested in a disarmament conference but came to change its opinion
because Hara could not sooth American worries about Japan's new
program by diplomacy alone; in addition, a public campaign by
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Ozaki Yukio in the press and in the Diet persuaded more politicians
to call for talks with Washington.9 The Japanese also did not want
to be left out of a disarmament conference if the Americans and the
British were going to participate, as Japan's greatest potential threat
in the Pacific after the war was the United States. The Japanese
worried about America in part because the Anglo-Japanese alliance
of 1902 would soon expire and, although the alliance had weakened
over time, Japanese politicians did not want to abrogate it, leaving
themselves more vulnerable to the U.S. Navy.10 And it was certainly
unclear if the alliance would be renewed. Finally, Hara hoped that a
naval agreement might strengthen his cabinet's ties to the navy
while reducing the power of the army to meddle in foreign affairs.
He might use the conference to enhance civil control over the mili-
tary because the Meiji constitution afforded the military the right
to appeal directly to the throne, leaving the cabinet and premier and
Diet in a weak position. Hara hoped that arms limitation and
warmer personal relations with the admirals could provide the po-
litical leverage he desired.11 At length, the Japanese decided to meet
with the Americans and the British at Washington.
The American delegation to the conference that met beginning
in November 1921 included political leaders and naval officers. Sec-
retary of State Charles Evans Hughes led the delegation, assisted by
naval advisers, including Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the influential and
colorful assistant secretary of the navy, Admiral Robert E. Coontz,
commander in chief of the U.S. fleet, Rear Admirals William V. Pratt
and William A. Moffett, and Captains Frank Schofield and Luke
McNamee.
Taking advice from the navy's General Board, an advisory group
of senior officers responsible for ship design and construction, the
naval experts of the American delegation fashioned a plan that would
leave the U.S. navy stronger than those of other nations. They hoped
that the navy might complete the delayed schedule of ships set by the
naval acts of 1916 and 1918 and achieve parity with Britain in capital-
ship tonnage at a total of 820,000 tons. They also wanted to establish
a 2-1 ratio for cruisers over Japan and a 10-10-5 ratio in other fleet
categories for the United States, Britain, and Japan. They might ac-
cept a ban on construction of capital ships if the right tonnage ratios
in that category were agreed upon. Believing that any limitation
agreement should expire in 1928 (presumably at the end of the Amer-
ican building program), they held privately that it could extend six
more years without harm to American security. Finally, they hoped
to see the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 and op-
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posed any dismantling of fortifications in the western Pacific. Forti-
fications had helped check Japanese strength in the area, a source of
concern since Japanese naval expenditures had increased from $85
million in 1917 to $245 million in 1921.12
But the strong-willed Hughes accepted only some of the ad-
visers' arguments, preferring political agreements, especially on the
Pacific islands and China. Faced with General Board intransigence,
he came to rely on a special board of advisers, including Roosevelt,
Coontz, and Pratt. Coontz and especially Pratt were less opposed to
limitation than members of the board as they were Anglophiles and
paid more attention to the Pacific than did many older officers on
the board.13 Hughes also had determined to maintain his depart-
ment's control of the negotiation. During the conference, the secre-
taries of war and of the navy had invited Hughes to appoint a State
Department representative to sit with the Joint Army and Navy
Board, which had been established in 1903 to coordinate the two
services. He declined, remarking that only the secretary or the un-
dersecretary of state could vouch for questions of national policy
and neither was available for the assignment. He later agreed to
send a representative whenever matters "interwoven with the inter-
national policies of the United States" were under consideration.14
Negotiation at Washington had proceeded smoothly on the lim-
itation of capital ships, even if conversations over other categories of
vessels encountered trouble. Delegates agreed to tonnage limits on
individual ships. Generally they used tonnage to measure strength
because, as the American delegates noted, it provided the simplest
way; gun caliber, age, speed, and armor were usually all related to
tonnage. Moreover, battleship tonnage gave an indication of capacity
in other ship categories, as ratios tied to battleships determined the
numbers of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, aircraft carriers. The greatest difficulty in limiting naval auxil-
iaries involved submarines. At the Washington Conference, the
French insisted on 90,000 tons of submarines. The British therefore
believed that they could not limit cruisers and destroyers, their main
defense against submarines. All the United States could do to resolve
these disagreements was to guarantee security to the French, which
it refused. Instead, Hughes proposed in December 1921 a general lim-
it of auxiliary ships to 10,000 tons and of guns to eight inches, in
accord with advice from the General Board.15
The treaties that came out of the Washington Conference are, of
course, well known. The Five-Power Treaty established ratios in
capital ships of 5-5-3-1.67-1.67 for the United States, Britain, Japan,
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France, and Italy. In addition, all powers would observe a ten-year
holiday from capital-ship building. The treaty limited carriers to
27,000 tons and eight-inch guns, save for two heavier battle cruisers
that the United States could convert and two Hood-class battle-
ships the British could refit. Finally, it incorporated Hughes's sug-
gestion for auxiliary-vessel limits of 10,000 tons and eight-inch
guns. A Four-Power Treaty signed by the United States, Britain,
France, and Japan replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance and stipu-
lated that any signatory engaging in a dispute in the Pacific would,
in the event of diplomatic failure, invite the other signatories to a
conference. A Nine-Power Treaty pledged the five naval powers, to-
gether with other nations interested in the Pacific (Belgium, China,
the Netherlands, and Portugal), to respect the territorial integrity of
China and adhere to the Open Door policy of equal commercial ac-
cess. Delegates initialed agreements that restricted further fortifica-
tion of the signatories' Pacific possessions, in the hope of inducing
the Japanese to accept the agreed-on lower capital-ship ratio.
The Washington Conference hence promised some practical
gains for participants. It ended the race in capital ships and, at least
temporarily, Anglo-American competition. Japanese-American ri-
valry subsided, and the political situation in the Far East stabilized,
at least until the Chinese revolution began spreading north. Because
of the treaties, each naval power tacitly accepted the others' areas of
naval dominance: the British in the North Atlantic, the Mediterra-
nean, and the Suez route to India and the Far East; the Americans in
the Western Hemisphere; the Japanese in the western and northern
Pacific.
The treaties also contained weaknesses. In the eyes of American
navy officers, the Five-Power Treaty did not really offer parity with
Britain, as the Royal Navy would retain superiority in capital ships
through the 1920s. Neither the British nor Americans scrapped all
the capital ships specified but converted some to carriers, so the ten-
year holiday in building was a sham. To employ a metaphor of the
time, the race only slowed from "a fast gallop to a slow trot." Agree-
ments about Pacific fortification rendered defense of the Philippines
nearly impossible. The Nine-Power Treaty proved the "weakest link
in the Washington treaty chain" because it placed much of the re-
sponsibility for protecting China on the U.S. without allowing it the
means. But Hughes and Harding probably realized that Americans
would never pay for the defense of China, or for that matter, of the
Philippines anyway.16
Hughes made the best of the Washington Conference. His goal
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had been to limit the capital-ship race; the alternative had been to
gamble on congressional support for a building program. But he re-
alized that the American public would not approve large arms ex-
penditures. He thus remarked hopefully of the Five-Power Treaty
that it "ends, absolutely ends, the race in competition of naval
armaments."17
A majority of naval officers opposed the treaties. The General
Board concluded that the treaties could prevent aggression against
the continental U.S. and the Panama Canal, but not the Philippines.
Captain Dudley W. Knox expressed the navy's opinion in a column
in the Baltimore Sun, in articles in the Naval Institute Proceedings,
and in a book, The Eclipse of American Sea Power (1922). The treat-
ies, he correctly observed, had undermined the American strategic
position in the western Pacific without a corresponding compro-
mise by the Japanese: the U.S. could no longer defend the Philip-
pines.18 Although Knox's writings did not represent official opinion
about the conference, they did represent the unofficial navy posi-
tion, for articles submitted to Proceedings went through a screening
board of six senior officers, and most authors understood that the
Department of the Navy approved de facto all articles published.19
Captain Schofield, one of the advisers to the conference and a mem-
ber of the General Board, was another vociferous opponent of the
treaties. Indeed, his memo had comprised much of the General
Board recommendations to Hughes before the conference.20 In a se-
ries of articles and speeches Schof ield echoed Knox. Captain Pratt
had played a more active role than any other officer at the confer-
ence and agreed with the strategic and technical objections of Knox
and Schofield but believed that improved political relations in the
Pacific mattered more than any technical difficulties.21
The Senate approved the treaties even though Senator Borah of
Idaho contended that the treaties represented but a first step toward
disarmament. Borah called for the abolition of submarines as well
as for parity in capital ships between France and Japan. Still, such
parity would have upset the British government and probably scut-
tled the accords. Most senators backed the administration, and the
treaties received approval by a large majority, despite debate over
the Four-Power Treaty, which the senators were reluctant to accept
as a substitute for the Anglo-Japanese alliance.22
President Harding gained much from the Washington Confer-
ence. He held off Borah during the negotiation and, on approval of the
treaties, united the Republican party behind his leadership. He could
now turn his attention to such domestic issues as tax revision.23
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Most Americans approved of the Washington treaties, which
garnered praise in the press, especially in the New York Times and
the conservative financial journals. Steel men such as Charles M.
Schwab of Bethlehem Steel and Judge Elbert H. Gary approved of
the government's course during the conference, and most business-
men came to support disarmament because they hoped that govern-
ment economy would bring welcome tax relief at home.24
Organized peace groups, which had done much to promote the
conference, including the World Peace Foundation, the American As-
sociation for International Conciliation, the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, the Women's Peace Society, the Women's
World Disarmament Committee, the Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom, and the Federal Council of Churches of
Christ in America, endorsed the treaties and applauded the Ameri-
can delegation. One group, the International Conference of Women,
headed by Jane Addams, meeting at The Hague in December 1922,
held that universal disarmament by land, sea, and air was necessary
for lasting peace: "In view of modern scientific development there is
no practicable half-way measure in respect to disarmament." But, as
a wry British observer noted, it was natural that American private
groups should admire naval restriction, which promised them finan-
cial relief or moral satisfaction or both.25
It is interesting, particularly in comparison to later naval disar-
mament conferences, that Secretary Hughes arranged to guide public
opinion during the conference by having President Harding appoint
an American Advisory Committee to represent various public view-
points.26 Elihu Root had suggested a group to monitor and influence
public opinion; the committee therefore included prominent citi-
zens, including politicians, defense officials, four women, and Secre-
tary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who was supposed to keep the
politicians in line.27 Pacifists and most other peace group members
were not among those selected. Although the Foreign Policy Associa-
tion and the National Council for the Limitation of Armaments later
attacked the Committee for rejecting contrary views, the Commit-
tee served its purpose for Hughes: it deflected direct public criticism
from him and it prevented independent peace-group interference.
If Harding gained from the conference, so did Prime Minister
Lloyd George. Although not a firm adherent of disarmament, the
nimble Welshman had been able to hold his coalition cabinet to-
gether by giving the chief British delegate in Washington, Arthur
Balfour, leeway in forming a position. Lloyd George had bolstered
his own position while reducing government expenditure (a neces-
10 PEACE AND DISARMAMENT
sary move if his long-cherished welfare reforms were to come), all
the while repairing Anglo-American relations. The treaty had left
Britain the strongest sea power, though weakened in the Far East.28
Lloyd George's achievement was all the more remarkable be-
cause Britons displayed no strong public desire for disarmament.29
Peace groups, although not as strong as in the United States, fo-
cused on the League of Nations rather than on disarmament. The
League of Nations Union (LNU), largest of Britain's peace groups in
the early 1920s, stressed a moderate course and attracted a wide
following, including such members of Parliament as Robert Cecil
and adherents of the still-powerful Liberal party. The LNU pro-
moted arbitration and multilateral disarmament, as well as the
League. But because of links to establishment figures, poor relations
with some Labourites, especially future prime minister J. Ramsay
MacDonald, a refusal to cooperate with other peace organizations,
and an ambiguous stance on the powers of the League, the group
never became politically powerful.30
Hara, as mentioned, had hoped to strengthen his control over the
military and to claim more power for Japan's political parties through
his participation in the Washington Conference. Unfortunately, he
was assassinated on November 4, 1921. Although close relations be-
tween the navy and Hara's successor, Takahashi Korekiyo, did not
develop as Hara had hoped, it was more because of Takahashi's defi-
ciencies as a leader than Hara's miscalculation about the naval
conference.
The treaties received favorable comment in influential Tokyo
dailies and support from the fledgling Japanese peace organizations.
In educational programs aimed at students and members of the
Diet, the largest peace group, the Japanese Peace Society, warmly
applauded the treaties. The chairman of the society, Eiichi Shi-
busawa, emphasized cooperation with the West and used his influ-
ence to urge ratification of the treaties. The other large peace group,
the League of Nations Association of Japan (LNAJ), had even greater
contacts with government leaders, as it depended on business con-
tributions and government subsidies. This was both a strength and a
weakness, for, although LNAJ had access to important people, its
independence was limited; the Foreign Ministry in 1924-25, for in-
stance, contributed 100,000 yen to the organization. In 1922 the
LNAJ urged action on the treaties.31
But the Washington treaties also angered a segment of Japanese
society. The British ambassador to Tokyo reflected that the Japa-
nese seemed to regard the Washington Conference as "a secret coali-
THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT 11
tion between Great Britain and the United States."32 Certainly the
conference had an important effect in creating two competing fac-
tions within the navy (treaty and nontreaty) and in persuading Japan
to turn away from British naval technology toward that of Germany.
More and more Japanese naval personnel traveled to Germany dur-
ing the 1920s rather than visiting Britain as in the days of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance.33
THE CRUISER ISSUE
After the Washington Conference, the so-called treaty cruiser be-
came the leading issue in naval disarmament. In fact, the purpose of
the Geneva Naval Conference held in 1927 and the London Naval
Conference of 1930 was to limit treaty cruisers. Before the cruiser
matter had run its course, it had created much trouble between the
United States and Britain, harmed Anglo-French relations, and in-
volved Japan in a compromise at London that resulted in another
assassination, that of Premier Hamaguchi Osachi, which contrib-
uted to the fall of the last liberal cabinet in pre-1945 Japan.
In discussions during the 1920s, there was no question about
the usefulness of the type of warship known as the cruiser. Since its
appearance in the 1890s, when it was known as the protected or
armored cruiser, it had become more lightly armored, and by the
time of the First World War was primarily a scouting ship for battle-
ship fleets. It displaced from 3,000 tons upward, and normally dis-
placed between 6,000 and 7,500 tons. Yet its armor was strong
enough to withstand hits from other cruisers, it could survive de-
stroyer fire, and it could handle independent tasks. The cruiser
hence could function as a commerce destroyer, a guardian for con-
voys, a minelayer, or even a minesweeper. Given the holiday on bat-
tleship construction dictated by the Five-Power Treaty, cruisers as-
sumed even more importance, as they were not restricted and could
perform various tasks according to each naval power's strategy.
Cruisers assumed greater importance too for the American navy
because of changes in strategy and in fleet strength. Strategists had
constructed their war plan for the Pacific, War Plan Orange, on the
belief that in a war, the Japanese would capture Guam and the light-
ly defended Philippines and remain in the western Pacific.34 Ameri-
cans would respond by sweeping through the Mariana and Caroline
islands to retake the Philippines before moving on to Japan, which
they would blockade if necessary.35 Though older members of the
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General Board disagreed, young officers of the Plans Division of Op-
erations, who served on the important Joint Board Planning Com-
mittee, emphasized that Britain would probably not participate in
an American-Japanese war but that Japan probably would in an
Anglo-American war.36 Reflecting this new concern with security
in the Pacific, the navy had transferred much of its fleet after the
war to this area. Since war with Britain was indeed difficult to
imagine, the Navy needed War Plan Orange and the interests of the
Far East to justify not only a treaty navy, but especially the treaty
cruiser.37 Indeed, the negotiation of the Five-Power Treaty had been
predicated on it.
After the Washington Conference, American navy men began to
reconsider their cruiser needs. British and American cruisers had
usually carried six-inch guns before the war. But after that conflict
many American naval officers began to prefer larger cruisers, if only
because of greater fuel capacity needed for the long cruises in the
Pacific between the few American naval bases. The American navy
had commissioned no cruisers between 1908 and 1923. Many officers
believed that the Omaha-class cruisers, the first of which was due to
be finished in 1923, would prove inadequate because they did not
possess enough range for the long Pacific voyages.38 They also pre-
ferred cruisers heavier than the Omaha to offset Japanese numerical
superiority in light cruisers, which had been constructed during the
war. Japanese naval doctrine favored aggressive action, causing Amer-
ican planners to worry about defense of the nation's Pacific posses-
sions. Curiously, as William Braisted has noted, American planners
never seem to have surmised that perhaps the Japanese were building
because of concern for the great American building plan of 1916.39
American officers also preferred a fast cruiser. Many of the U.S.
Navy's cruisers had been built between 1893 and 1908, and their
slowness rendered them unsatisfactory for offensive operations.
The General Board worried about the speed achieved by new Italian
designs and feared that the Japanese might follow suit. A fast cruiser
might well run circles around the older, slower American variety.
As a consequence, the General Board insisted on a larger propulsive
mechanism.40
American officers pointed to the lessons of the war in regard to
firepower and argued that the weight of shells and the calibers of
guns had provided the means for victory. Admiral Graf von Spee's
squadron, they noted, had been destroyed off the Falkland Islands by
the great rifles of the Invincible and the Inflexible. Commanders of
the British and the German fleets at the Battle of Jutland had agreed
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that the heavier armament of the British ships had been helpful—
even though superior German gunnery had turned that great encoun-
ter into a virtual German victory. Larger cruisers were therefore re-
quired because heavier guns required larger platforms.41 After the
war, most members of the U.S. General Board became alarmed about
British construction of the Hawkins-class cruisers, which displaced
9,750 tons and carried 7.5-inch guns. The board recommended that
new American cruisers possess greater firepower than British treaty
cruisers so the U.S. ships could patrol freely—unless confronted by
pre-treaty British battle cruisers, which carried bigger guns. Sim-
ilarly, board members would allow a larger propulsive mechanism,
thereby permitting more speed than any British or Japanese cruisers.
The General Board easily reached agreement on problems of op-
timum displacement. Board members concluded that a 10,000-ton
cruiser—the heaviest cruiser permissible under the Washington
Five-Power Treaty—should have a range of 10,000 miles and a speed
of thirty-five knots. These specifications would allow for mounting
larger (heavier) guns than the Hawkins class; the U.S. Navy wanted
eight-inch guns. And larger displacement would allow larger fuel
tanks, giving more radius. The Omaha class that so dissatisfied the
board displaced only 7,050 tons.42
Interestingly, the navy had favored cruisers of 10,000 tons even
before the Washington Conference. American officers in London
during the war had been impressed with the Hawkins, designed for
lengthy searches for German commerce raiders. The wartime chief
of naval operations, Admiral William S. Benson, had asked for pro-
posals for a postwar generation of cruisers. The navy department's
planning section suggested a ship similar to the Hawkins, and Rear
Admiral Thomas Badger presented a plan to the General Board in
1920 calling for ten so-called scout cruisers of 10,000 tons. The next
year the board recommended a similar program to the then secre-
tary of the navy, Edwin Denby.43
Given the board agreement on heavier guns, range, and speed,
naval engineers had to wrestle next with the problem of adequate
armor. They had provided several blueprints for the board's report in
1920, including some that called for a cruiser of 8,250 tons and
some for one of 12,000. In 1921, the board asked for protection of
the ship's bridge in a splinter-proof enclosure and suggested little
armor elsewhere, only a waterline belt for the ship's machinery.44
According to the board in 1921, increased firepower would
make up for lack of protection, and at this juncture the board fa-
vored the eight-inch gun. It commissioned studies that noted that
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both six-inch and eight-inch guns had advantages. The six-inch
boasted greater—more rapid—fire. Yet it had less destructive power
because of its lighter shell, could fire no better than that of probable
enemy ships employed on similar duty, and fired less accurately
over 8,000 yards. The eight-inch offered fire superior to enemy ships
employed on similar duty because of its heavier shell and slightly
greater accuracy over 8,000 yards. Fire control around the gunnery
area was as good as that of the six-inch. The disadvantage of the
eight-inch gun lay in less-rapid firing caused by the difference be-
tween hand- and power-loading of shells. A six-inch shell weighed
100 pounds and could be hand-loaded, whereas an eight-inch shell
weighed 250 pounds and had to be machine-loaded. Power-loading
eight-inch shells took much more time than hand-loading six-inch
shells. In brief, the studies concluded what perhaps should have
been self-evident, that the eight-inch gun could achieve fewer hits
than the six-inch but threw more metal. Still, after weighing the
pros and cons, the board came out for the heavier gun—one sus-
pects because it was larger.45
In addition to stressing the tactical advantages of bigger guns,
officers mentioned the moral effect of the heavier cruiser. Such a ship
would encourage cruisers of enemy navies to think twice before en-
gaging. Curiously, the American officers championing what became
known as the heavy cruiser—that is, the cruiser bearing the eight-
inch guns—overlooked a possibility that might have solved their oth-
er problems. The leaders of the U.S. Navy desired a large radius and
speed, but, although they did not mention the fact publicly, they were
concerned about the lightness of the armor on their proposed large
cruisers. They really were trying to pile too much into a fairly small
(even at 10,000 tons displacement) package. Here they might well
have looked again at their desire for the eight-inch gun. The General
Board, unable to imagine Congress building many small cruisers (an
expensive proposition), spent little time exploring the possibilities of
the six-inch gun. The board produced a memo stating that to put six-
inch guns on a 10,000-ton cruiser violated the American principle
held from earliest times, that ships should carry the heaviest arma-
ments possible for their size. The six-inch gun ran counter to "the fact
that in the World War, in every action, the side which had the largest
number of heavier guns was successful." Or, as a captain supposedly
once advised a midshipman: "Boy, if ever you are dining, and after
dinner, over the wine, some subject like politics is discussed, where
men's passions are aroused, if a man throws a glass of wine in your
face, do not throw a glass of wine in his,- throw the decanter."46
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The British Admiralty based its strategy on policies adopted by
the Cabinet in 1919. The Cabinet held it unlikely that a European
war would occur in the next five to ten years, that service levels of
1914 should be maintained, and that guarding imperial trade routes
would be the most important task in the decade to come. British
naval men regarded Japan with more apprehension than they did the
United States when identifying possible threats to trade routes. The
British nevertheless anticipated attacking quickly in American and
Japanese waters in case of world war, destroying the enemy fleets
and securing victory through blockade. But for the short-term fu-
ture, guarding trade routes was most important.47
The British, like the Americans, faced problems of cruiser de-
sign. The Admiralty's decision to build to the Washington Treaty
limits created a host of planning problems for naval engineers. They
also had to deal with gun caliber and armor. By late 1926 they had
begun emphasizing armor over guns.48 Admiral Lord Jellicoe, com-
mander at Jutland, had written in The Grand Fleet that lack of pro-
tection had cost the Royal Navy its victories. The argument had
been made, he continued, that the best defense was offense. 'Al-
though this argument is very true when applied to strategy, the war
has shown its fallacy as applied to materiel. Ships with inadequate
defensive qualities are no match for those which possess them to a
considerably greater degree, even if the former are superior in gun
power."49
British interest in protection also derived from problems in de-
signing a satisfactory eight-inch gun. Engineers had failed to in-
crease the rate of fire, speed of loading, and elevation (between ten
and seventy degrees) of eight-inch guns. In February 1926 the con-
troller of the Admiralty therefore suggested that a smaller caliber for
cruisers might be considered, perhaps in the range of seven or seven
and one-half inches, because, in his opinion, the new Kent- and
London-class cruisers were overbalanced with guns and lacked pro-
tection, especially around magazines. He also naturally wanted to
save money. A report on the eight-inch gun proposed by Lord Forbes,
director of naval ordnance, in October 1926 for the "B" type cruiser
(the last type adopted before the Geneva Conference) listed several
problems encountered since 1922. Guns on the Rents and Londons
had failed to achieve high shell velocity for more than a few rounds.
A longer charge might require redesign of guns and mountings and
decreased magazine- and handling-room space. Worse, a quick re-
design to meet the timetable for the cruisers of the 1926 and 1927
programs was impossible. The director of gunnery development, S.
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Brownrigg, recommended either a new design or more smaller-
caliber guns, since lighter guns had advantage over eight-inch in
deck penetration at closer ranges. He halfheartedly suggested abol-
ishing the eight-inch gun.50
Japanese strategy after the Washington Conference called for
building a fleet as strong as any other fleet in the western Pacific
and, like the British, guarding important parts of the empire as well
as commercial and communication routes. Because of its proximity
and interests in the Pacific, the Japanese regarded the United States
as their most likely enemy and designed their war plans accor-
dingly. In the event of a war, the Japanese would wage surprise at-
tacks on U.S. bases in the Pacific, such as Guam and the Philip-
pines, to capture them before a declaration of war. The American
navy would eventually be defeated, Japanese planners believed, be-
cause the long island hopping required to gain position to attack
Japan itself would give the Japanese navy ample opportunity to
bleed the American fleet dry. To succeed, the Japanese navy would
have to clear American screens and engage in raids before taking on
the remaining American fleet in a decisive battle.51
The Japanese needed cruisers to do this, but they needed ships
capable of raids even more: larger, quicker submarines, destroyers
armed with torpedoes to engage an enemy fleet at night, and carriers
that could launch planes to attack fleet auxiliaries. The large Japa-
nese building plan of 1920 that so worried foreign observers included
twelve cruisers, five gunboats, thirty-two destroyers, twenty-eight
submarines, and two aircraft carriers.52 Yet in designing cruisers the
Japanese encountered some of the same problems as the Americans
and the British, especially in trying to place sufficient firepower and
protection on a ship displacing only 10,000 tons. The Japanese did
not have to worry as much as the Americans about range, of course,
for Japan had many bases within the western Pacific and now con-
trolled the mandated islands which could be used in any war against
the United States.
A TREATY NAVY OR NOT?
Designing cruisers was one thing. Obtaining the money was another.
Whereas the British Parliament and the Japanese Diet had approved
spending for new cruisers between 1922 and 1926, the question arose
whether the American Congress would support such construction—
for cruisers would be very expensive. The American public believed
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that the Washington Conference had rendered further large naval ap-
propriations unnecessary. If indeed the navy needed cruisers, Con-
gress favored keeping the older cruisers in commission, as they were
cheaper and many of them carried heavy guns.
Although congressional big-navy supporters managed to score
some compromises in the appropriation bills of 1922 and 1923, so-
called small-navy advocates, led by Representative Patrick H. Kelley
of Michigan, chairman of the naval subcommittee of the House Ap-
propriations Committee, generally prevailed in holding appropria-
tions below the level recommended by the General Board and Secre-
tary of the Navy Denby.53 When the naval subcommittee sought to
limit the appropriation bill for fiscal 1923, it cut the navy's budget
by one hundred million dollars, trimming the building program and
reducing personnel from 100,000 to 65,000, just over half that of the
British navy and below that of the Japanese. Kelley argued that re-
ducing the size of the navy would not impair its strength. Congress
would still be able to furnish the men and equipment necessary for
the battleships, the air service, sufficient destroyers and subma-
rines, and other auxiliary craft required. He based his proposal on
the assumption that the appropriation figure, double that of the pre-
war navy, would serve the navy well enough. He counted on savings
from ships scrapped according to the Five-Power Treaty of 1921, re-
tirement of surplus destroyers and antiquated cruisers, and elimina-
tion of 254 smaller vessels. The savings, he concluded, would be
more advantageous than a large peacetime navy.54
Navy supporters were soon relating that the condition of the
navy was critical. The reduced appropriations permitted little expan-
sion, modernization, or even maintenance—officers noted that four
battleships broke down during fleet maneuvers in the spring of 1924.
Congress seemed not to care about cruisers. Japan and Britain, mean-
while, were building large cruisers. Japan began building four cruis-
ers of the 10,000-ton Nichi class in 1923, each with twelve eight-inch
guns. That same year the British naval staff recommended seventeen
cruisers of 10,000 tons. The General Board, therefore, asked for six-
teen 10,000-ton cruisers, eight to be laid down in fiscal 1924. Iron-
ically, the board benefited from the Immigration Act of 1924, which,
by excluding Japanese and straining U.S.-Japanese relations, seemed
to diminish anti-navy sentiment in Congress.
At first the House, gladdened by the work of the Dawes Commis-
sion on reparations, passed a resolution that the president should call
a new naval disarmament conference. But naval supporters need not
have worried, for, although Coolidge—Harding's successor after his
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death in 1923—did call for a conference in a broadcast address (April
1924), his proposal was vague and indicated that he would await the
results of the Dawes Commission and a stable European political
situation. The president may have sent up this trial balloon to please
Congress, with which he had been at odds over tax reform, divesting
government plants at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, and new farm leg-
islation.55
Naval champions such as Congressman Burton L. French of
Idaho, the new chairman of the naval subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee, supported an appropriation for fiscal
1925 of $410 million for the navy. Congressman Thomas S. Butler of
Pennsylvania, author of the Naval Act of 1916, also introduced a
cruiser bill to be considered jointly with the appropriations bill.
In addition to these efforts, naval publicists presented Congress
with warnings. William B. Shearer, a gregarious Beau Brummel and
self-proclaimed naval expert with ties to many naval officers (result-
ing from his lobbying for higher navy pay in 1920), charged that oil
reserves were dangerously low and that the U.S. Navy was being out-
built by the two other naval powers. He complained that the range of
U.S. guns was inferior, and that the British enjoyed a 4-1 advantage in
cruisers. Shearer used the 5-5-3 battleship ratio of the Washington
Conference to demonstrate that the navy had deteriorated. He re-
leased tables comparing the fleets of the naval powers (based on ac-
cess to General Board records), testified before congressional com-
mittees, and wrote editorials for such newspapers as the New York
Times. He recommended construction of cruisers and fleet subma-
rines, more oil reserves, more bases, and an increase in navy person-
nel.56 Other writers submitted articles to newspapers and journals
and organized public events for the navy's benefit. William H. Gar-
diner, president of the Navy League, composed a comprehensive re-
port, using General Board records, that detailed weaknesses in ton-
nage, firepower, and men. He established Navy Day on Theodore
Roosevelt's birthday, which included the participation of ships and
bands, together with speeches and fireworks. In the 1920s, Navy Day
underlined the navy's need for cruisers.57
Navy men also attempted to demonstrate that because the
Washington treaties prohibited further fortifications in the Pacific,
the navy would be unable to prevent an attack on the Philippines,
even with three-fifths of its capital ships now in the Pacific, based
at San Diego and Pearl Harbor. Strategists argued that without ships
of sufficient number and range the fleet would not reach the islands
in time to support the army against any Japanese attack.58
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The navy pressed its case with Congress in early May 1924. By
this time Secretary Denby had resigned, disgraced by his transfer of
oil reserves to President Harding's corrupt secretary of the interior,
Albert B. Fall. His replacement was Curtis Wilbur, who, although a
graduate of the Naval Academy, had studied law rather than accept a
commission. He had been chief justice of the California supreme
court and proved effective before Congress in requesting money for
a study of oil reserves to support the conversion of remaining battle-
ships from coal to oil, and for more cruisers and personnel.59 Assis-
tant Secretary Roosevelt also appeared before House and Senate sub-
committees pleading the navy's case. Admiral Coontz made a report
to Congress about the battleships which had broken down during
the fleet's winter maneuvers.60
Opponents fought back. Congressman Thomas L. Blanton of
Texas challenged Shearer's allegations, declaring that the U.S. had
attained parity in battleships and probably in other categories by
means of the Washington treaties and remained well ahead of Japan.
Repeatedly he picked away at navy supporters by asking for defini-
tions of terms, raising questions about points of order, and refuting
the assertions of Congressman James F. Byrnes of South Carolina
and others in favor of the navy program. Reflecting the mood of
many members of the House, he hoped for the gradual elimination
of all naval armament. Fearing an arms race, he argued that the U.S.
should act as a leader of moral forces throughout the world and
avoid naval increases.61
President Coolidge now entered the fray. The slight, sandy-
haired Vermonter was known both for his economy of speech and
for his laissez-faire philosophy. In many ways he was a throwback to
the "shadow presidents" of the late nineteenth century who viewed
themselves more as administrators than as leaders directing legisla-
tion through the Congress. A president, Coolidge believed, drew up
legislation and submitted it to Congress, which then shaped it and
filled in details. He had no particular program and, as a contempor-
ary observer wrote, "followed no gleam, stormed no redoubt."62 He
valued law, order, and thrift and held to his credo when he consid-
ered such foreign affairs as international law, defense, and disarma-
ment. Above all, he wished to avoid competition in arms for he be-
lieved, as did many of his generation, that the world war had come
about because of the arms race prior to 1914. He also thought that
public opinion, properly focused, could help diplomats seek solu-
tions short of war. He therefore took a middle ground, approving the
proposed appropriation but hesitating to increase naval tonnage be-
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cause of concern with economy. He opposed demands that more
cruisers be built immediately. For naval supporters he seemed a
halfhearted ally.63
Congressional approval for construction finally came when the
House passed a bill on March 24, 1924, allocating money both for
battleship modification and for construction of six gunboats for riv-
er duty in China. House passage of the Butler cruiser bill followed in
late May, providing for eight cruisers displacing 10,000 tons and car-
rying eight-inch guns. The Senate passed the regular navy bill and
the Butler bill in December as well, but the latter only as an author-
ization, without appropriations. Although the Congress had been
alarmed by reports of strained relations with Japan, members still
hoped that a disarmament conference might relieve the need to
build.6*
hi contrast to the Americans, the British Parliament did not try
to limit cruiser construction in the first years after the Washington
Conference. Their navy, unlike the American navy, had long stood as
a symbol of the nation's imperial greatness. Its operations, in addi-
tion, were linked with those of other ministries, which had to agree
before cuts could be forced on the Admiralty. Ministries and the Cab-
inet also were preoccupied with such domestic affairs as unemploy-
ment and labor strikes and, in foreign affairs, France's occupation of
the Ruhr and economic distress in Germany and France. Moreover,
many members of Parliament accepted the Admiralty's dictum that
national security required cruisers to guard trade routes and shipping
on the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic.65
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, whose Conservative govern-
ment replaced Lloyd George's coalition in 1923, considered limiting
the navy but settled for a letter to ministers for the armed services
suggesting economic restraint, hi a speech at Plymouth in October
1923, Baldwin announced the building of several cruisers to replace
outdated County-class cruisers. He hoped, he said, that construc-
tion would ease the serious unemployment problem, and he identi-
fied certain hard-hit naval yards where the cruisers might be built.
The fall of the Conservatives in late 1923 did not halt the construc-
tion of cruisers. MacDonald and his short-lived Labour government
only cut the number of cruisers to be built from eight to five.66
The return of Baldwin to power in 1924 saw opposition to cruiser
construction from Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill.
Although a former First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill sought
limits on building because he understood and, more important, was
willing to admit, that the government could not achieve welfare
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reform and also build more cruisers. Further, he saw no threat to
British interests in the Far East that required additional cruisers.
Cabinet members waited for Baldwin to make a decision. A
short, stocky, pug-nosed industrialist who often longed for the
peaceful prewar days, the prime minister was never happier than
when walking in the quiet hills above Aix-en-Provence in the south
of France. He was usually efficient, but complacent, and had no
clear national program. He permitted his cabinet ministers, espe-
cially Sir Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office, much freedom,
with the result that ministers often were at loggerheads. It is also
true that the Cabinet system of government, emphasizing harmony,
together with the multitude of subcommittees working on defense
issues often rendered decision-making responsibility obtuse.67 A
prime minister, ever mindful of parliamentary opinion, did not have
the maneuvering ability of, for example, an American president.
Nevertheless, when confronted with issues requiring decision, Bald-
win used "his natural ability in sliding off a troublesome point" to
avoid resolution, hoping that delay would dispel problems.68
Baldwin found himself between the Admiralty and its opponents.
Concerned for his welfare reforms, he saw the point of Churchill's
argument, but the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Parliamentary
Secretary to the Admiralty were two of his close friends, and both
condemned Churchill's proposals. Baldwin supported a strong na-
tional defense. He had chaired the Committee on Imperial Defense
after Lord Curzon's death, instituted a Joint Planning Committee,
and established the Imperial Defence College.69 Above all, Baldwin
wanted to preserve his Cabinet intact. He guessed that Churchill
would not resign if overruled, but that First Lord of the Admiralty
William C. Bridgeman and other Admiralty officials would.
Baldwin yielded to the Admiralty in July, accepting postpone-
ment in construction of submarines and destroyers and modified
construction for cruisers authorized by former Prime Minister Mac-
Donald, since the Australians, for whom the British provided de-
fense, were building their own cruisers. But he had won grudging
Admiralty acceptance of naval limitation in principle, and the British
hence could begin considering another disarmament conference.70
The Japanese Diet also appropriated money for cruisers, despite
cabinet shuffles, party instability, and cuts in military spending.
Following the assassination of Hara, the former finance minister,
Takahashi, had become premier. An uncharismatic man, he proved
unable to unite the Seiyukai party and resigned in June 1922. Three
premiers followed in rapid succession before Kato Komei of the op-
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position Kenseikai party won election in 1924. Kato sought finan-
cial retrenchment, particularly in military expenditures. The na-
tion's economy was sluggish and the government heavily burdened
by the rebuilding of Tokyo and Yokohama after the disastrous earth-
quake of 1923. The new finance minister, Hamaguchi Osachi, ac-
knowledged that Japan had trimmed its military budget from 1921
to 1923 but held that additional savings were necessary and pro-
posed a cut of fifty million yen from the navy's estimates for 1925,
some of which could be accounted for in retirement of obsolete,
reserve, and training vessels. Hamaguchi tenaciously battled with
naval ministry officials and obtained his figure.71 But Japanese trim-
ming did not extend to the cruiser program.
In spite of cruiser construction, the Japanese moved closer to
disarmament, in large part because of the efforts of Foreign Minister
Shidehara Kijuro, who served from 1924 to 1927 and again from
1929 to 1931. Shidehara, the former ambassador to the United
States during the Washington Conference who had helped craft the
Four-Power Treaty, favored closer ties to the West in order to attract
Western investment and relaxed trade barriers. In so doing, he repre-
sented a link to the former Meiji elite of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries who similarly had looked to the West be-
cause of the prosperity it had afforded Japan.72 Aloof, impatient, and
married to an heir of the Mitsubishi fortune, Shidehara also favored
cooperation with Western countries because he wished, at least un-
til 1925, to tie Japanese noninterventionist policy in China with
that of Britain. When Britain moved to a unilateral policy in 1925,
Shidehara began to lean diplomatically toward the United States.73
By the mid 1920s, then, Japanese leaders showed interest in a
disarmament conference because political stability seemed restored
and public interest in disarmament had increased. People worried
about British plans for fortifying Singapore, for with construction of
cruisers, Britain could threaten Japan.74 Japanese opinion, therefore,
began to favor a disarmament conference that might forestall this
danger.
NEW DISARMAMENT PROSPECTS
Political leaders and peace groups in the United States, Britain, and
Japan desiring discussion of armaments were not long disappointed,
for in December 1925 the United States agreed to participate in
meetings of the so-called Preparatory Commission for a general dis-
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armament conference, called by the League of Nations. The Treaty
of Versailles had stipulated that Germany's virtual disarmament—
its forces limited to a small army and a navy of 100,000 tons with
individual ships of no more than 10,000 tons displacement—was
only a preliminary to a general disarmament of all the nations. Af-
ter the Dawes Commission had arranged a schedule of reparations
payments by Germany, pressure to do something about internation-
al armaments forced the convening of the Preparatory Commission.
Coolidge decided to take part in its work because public opinion
seemed disposed toward disarmament, political stability appeared
to have been achieved in Europe and the Far East, and, of course,
because he hoped to avoid the expenditures that cruiser construc-
tion seemed to require.
The Preparatory Commission came together in late 1925, com-
posed of representatives of members of the League Council and of
specially interested nations. The idea for the commission had come
from two standing League bodies that studied arms control issues.
The Permanent Advisory Committee, established in 1920, advised
the League about armaments of nations applying to the League for
membership. It did little to promote arms control other than to of-
fer expert advice to the League and its commissions. The Tempor-
ary Mixed Commission, established in 1919, examined particular
problems of arms control and studied the state of armament of
member nations. Both had had a part in organizing the Rome Con-
ference of 1924, which discussed further limitation of capital ships,
including those of Soviet Russia.75 The Preparatory Commission
now sought to draft a disarmament convention so that when a gen-
eral disarmament conference might be called, figures would only
have to be inserted into a document which had already been agreed
upon. At commission meetings, the British favored limiting arms
useful for immediate war, especially naval arms, and the French
wanted to limit the power to wage all war, that is, to limit arms of
the land, air, and sea. They could not agree on what to discuss. At
length League officials hoped questions submitted by the Ameri-
cans might break the impasse.
The individual in Washington to whom fell the task of devising
the American stance before the commission was the sixty-nine year
old secretary of state, Frank B. Kellogg, who had replaced Hughes in
1925. A white-haired and somewhat deaf man wary of quick action,
Kellogg was a Minnesota lawyer and had been chosen by Coolidge
because of his contacts in the Senate (in which he had served
a term, 1917-23), and because he had been ambassador to the Court
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of St. James's during the following two years. The president knew
little of foreign affairs and granted his cantankerous secretary con-
siderable freedom, but Kellogg did not take advantage of it: he de-
pended on his advisers, especially those at the West European desk,
to a remarkable degree.
Reluctantly, Kellogg agreed to draw up proposals for the Prepara-
tory Commission, even though he favored separate land, air, and sea
conferences. He of course emphasized limitation of naval arma-
ments. Like many Americans he considered the postwar army of
130,000 men and officers so small that it virtually exempted the
United States from taking interest in armaments on land. He there-
fore suggested a 5-5-3 ratio for auxiliary ships; the Americans sought
to extend the Washington ratios to these vessels. The League adopted
a version of the American plan on December 12, 1925. Soon after-
ward Coolidge agreed to send American representatives to future
meetings of the Commission, surprising Sir Austen Chamberlain,
who believed that the Americans would reject the invitation to at-
tend the meetings of the Preparatory Commission because they re-
mained suspicious of League-sponsored activities.76
By the middle of the 1920s, the signatories of the Washington
treaties therefore moved closer to a new disarmament conference,
as the success of those agreements seemed to indicate that further
naval reduction might be possible. Continuing world peace, eco-
nomic stability, and the possibility of a race in cruiser construction
encouraged the naval powers to attend the meetings of the Prepara-
tory Commission. Delegates would first have to sort out two issues,
however—an American desire for a halt in cruiser construction, and
a French request for a security pact from either Britain or the United
States. No one thought the task easy.
2
THE PREPARATORY
COMMISSION
In agreeing to send American representatives to Geneva, President
Coolidge was only recognizing the existence of what many Ameri-
cans in the 1920s described as a peace psychology, in the phrase of
what then was a new science. There certainly was something of the
sort evident among the American people. It was a remarkable thing,
this so-called peace psychology, for Americans had not suffered
nearly so much as had Europeans during the recent war. American
losses in battle had been fifty thousand soldiers compared to nearly
one million for Britain and nearly twice that many for France. Still,
the psychology existed, there could be no doubt about it, and for
unbelievers there was both the correspondence between congress-
men and their constituents, who deluged Washington in praise of
peace, and newspaper accounts of private peace groups seeking to
assure world peace.
But remembrance of the war was not the only motivation for
many peace groups. Many peace leaders considered themselves pro-
gressives and had been active in advocating various reforms before
the war. Some came to see greater American participation in inter-
national affairs, especially involving the new League of Nations, as
an extension of their earlier domestic work. They saw themselves as
no longer contained by national boundaries; they might now lobby
for progressive and antiwar measures on a global scale.1
One measure that peace groups generally supported was Ameri-
can participation in the League of Nations Preparatory Commission,
which began planning a program in 1925 for a general disarmament
conference. Preparedness groups opposed American attendance, but
President Coolidge was attracted because of the economies that ac-
companied disarmament. He also could not help but notice edi-
torials favorable to the idea and public calls for action. The president
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at length decided to participate in the Commission's work, together
with the other major naval powers.
THE SPECTER OF MILITARISM: THE PRESSURE GROUPS
This peace psychology of the 1920s really amounted to public opin-
ion favoring American efforts to achieve peace and prosperity in the
world, and had a tangible effect on presidents and government offi-
cials in deciding to seek disarmament.2 It also apparently influ-
enced leaders of the other great naval powers to varying degrees. But
to gain a greater understanding of how public opinion, and espe-
cially pressure groups, contributed to disarmament in each country,
one should first take note of recent public opinion theory. A brief
discussion of this theory can establish controls for comparison and
delineate parameters within which pressure groups operated.
Most scholars who have examined public opinion and foreign
policy during the last thirty-five years have adopted one of two ap-
proaches. The first of these, more prevalent in the literature, em-
phasizes a top-down model. According to scholars holding this
view, power elites, a small segment of the population, control for-
eign policy through their manipulation of a poorly informed mass
public.3 The other approach highlights a bottom-up model. These
scholars believe that the mass public has considerable impact on
foreign policy and that leaders generally respond to the wishes of
the public at large.4
But both of these approaches suffer from defects.5 The top-down
approach fails to note that elites often go to great lengths to per-
suade the public toward one policy or another because they believe
themselves politically beholden to the public. Forming public con-
sensus on an issue through elaborate propaganda campaigns is
therefore of great interest to elites. The bottom-up approach fails to
account for fissures both among elites and among various elements
of the mass public. In short, elites may be receiving mixed signals
from the mass public, making it difficult to claim that the public
has formed a consensus on a particular issue.
One or sometimes both of these approaches also suffer from
other problems. The bottom-up approach often does not differenti-
ate between segments of the public. Just who constitutes the pub-
lic? Obviously, one must identify those members of the public who
are involved in foreign policy issues and those who are not. Surely
one must identify the segments of public that matter in foreign af-
fairs as well as opinion that a leader, his advisers, and legislature
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deem important. Further, one must note the influence of involved
citizens, both that of individual actors and of nongovernmental
groups, as they may have a decisive effect on foreign policy decision-
making.6 Neither of the above approaches attempts this or moves
on to the next step: evaluating the effect of these actors and groups,
possibly because it is easier to describe opinion than to gauge it.
If neither of these approaches is satisfactory, then what is left?
Recently scholars in such disciplines as political science and soci-
ology have investigated a third approach toward foreign policy and
public opinion, one that permits a controlled comparison between
cultures of particular foreign policy issues. Calling their method the
domestic structure approach, these scholars particularly note the
activities of nongovernmental groups and actors.
The domestic structure approach holds that the nature of differ-
ent democratic political systems is the most important element in
foreign policy decision-making and the level of influence that dif-
ferent social groups may have on this process. Seeking to explain the
stability of social coalitions interacting with established political
players, scholars have identified two aspects of democratic political
systems: the degree of openness or closure and the relative weak-
ness or strength in dealing with social groups.7
An open political system has certain characteristics, including
an independent legislature that pays heed to public demands; a
number of political parties presenting different political concerns,
making it harder for established interest groups and government bu-
reaucrats to prevail; and an electoral process that allows public in-
put into the political process. A closed system, in contrast, typically
has a less independent legislature, a smaller number of political par-
ties, and an electoral process offering less opportunity for public
participation. One may measure the strength or weakness of a par-
ticular democratic system by noting the facility with which the ex-
ecutive is able to institute policy and reject alternative viewpoints.8
Social coalitions not surprisingly show greater stability in an
open system in which they have greater access to members of the
political elite. They can then create political networks with the
elite to promote causes and hopefully institute policies through in-
teraction with the executive and the bureaucracy. In a closed sys-
tem, however, social coalitions tend to be unstable: they enjoy less
interaction with the elite and have little opportunity to influence
the decision-making process. Because of this situation, groups suf-
fer from a volatile membership and an ad hoc strategy. They matter
less in helping shape the public debate.9
Domestic structure theory is useful because it stresses the lim-
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itations as well as the possibilities that political and social institu-
tions of liberal democracies present to social groups seeking to enter
the political ring. As one scholar notes: "Visible changes in policy,
political rhetoric, and the policy-making process can create a politi-
cal space for movements. Within that window of opportunity, move-
ments can mobilize dissent, make political gains, and alter the struc-
ture of opportunity for subsequent challenges."10 In short, domestic
structure has a great deal to do with the probable success or failure of
various social groups vying for influence.
Domestic structure theory therefore offers a way to compare the
disarmament process in the three great naval powers.11 To do so,
however, one must establish controls in order to focus attention on
domestic structure and social groups as variables that proved impor-
tant. Then, one might compare the domestic structure of the three
nations to understand the political conditions that pressure groups
faced.
Four sociopolitical aspects of the three major naval powers were
similar between 1922 and the early 1930s. First, the international
situation was relatively stable until the early 1930s. All three gov-
ernments were also democracies, with executives, legislatures, and
voter input. The economies of all three powers, though suffering
from time to time, essentially were robust. And finally, all these
governments sought naval disarmament, though not always at the
same time or with the same enthusiasm.
In the terms of domestic structure theory, the United States
may best be described as an open, weak society, permitting social
groups opportunities to interact with political players. This descrip-
tion was true of the 1920s, when the American legislature was inde-
pendent of the executive, especially in foreign affairs because treat-
ies required an approval margin of two-thirds in the Senate. Political
parties were also relatively weak in that they could not dictate poli-
cies. Tensions between bureaucratic departments meant that differ-
ences of opinion on various policy issues abounded. In addition, in
the American system the press could debate policy and influence
foreign policy decision-making. This decentralized political system
featuring a strong press and a government endowed with little pow-
er to terminate public debate offered social groups of the 1920s
"windows of opportunity" to build coalitions to discuss such poli-
cies as disarmament.12
The British system at the time may be described as open and
relatively strong. An independent Parliament represented the last
word on legislation and could often stymie the best laid plans of a
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prime minister. Political parties could control elections and policies
because prime ministers were party leaders above all and had al-
ways to heed party members' wishes. Prime ministers also had to
contend with the entrenched bureaucracy, such as the Admiralty,
which upended more than one prime minister's policy. An active
press tended to take sides according to party affiliation and was ac-
tive in pushing or panning particular policies. Social groups operat-
ing in the British system often found they could make their voices
heard, but almost as often found their policies assimilated and wa-
tered down by the government.
Japanese domestic structure during the 1920s and early 1930s
was closed and strong. The Diet was weak and provided little coun-
terweight to the executive branch. Political parties, although stron-
ger in the 1920s than they had ever been, still were limited in power
by western standards. A strong bureaucracy, especially the mili-
tary—which could appeal directly above the heads of civilian lead-
ers to the emperor—paid increasingly less attention to party lead-
ers. The press, never prone to reporting stories that might prove
embarrassing to the nation in the eyes of foreigners, also suffered
from external censorship by the late 1920s. Social groups in Japan,
therefore, faced a moderately repressive government dominated by a
small group of established interest groups, including the zaibatsu
(business elite), the Privy Council, and military groups.
Operating within the above political boundaries, social groups
in all these countries pushed their agenda in the public arena. But
they had to decide whom they wanted to target for their campaigns
and they had to develop strategies to achieve their aims. Indeed, the
question arises: Just what were the segments of the public that so-
cial groups attempted to swing toward their position? After all,
many citizens the world over, as mentioned, pay little attention to
foreign affairs unless these directly affect their lives.
Certainly many Americans in the 1920s, as now, were blissfully
unaware of international affairs, being more concerned with domes-
tic affairs, especially in their own communities. Most were content
to leave foreign affairs to the government unless they saw danger that
could affect their lives. The attentive public was that 5 to 10 percent
of the population that had knowledge of foreign affairs and followed
international events; of this group, perhaps half make up the influen-
tial public, citizens belonging to foreign policy organizations or hav-
ing access to government policymakers. Public opinion refers to the
views of the attentive and influential public and to those of a "mid-
dle mass" of the public, comprising perhaps 75 percent of the popula-
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tion. This middle mass, although less well informed, moves in and
out of politics, especially when administration elites disagree on is-
sues, such as the League fight or the decision to go to war in 1941.
During these periods many more people may join in foreign policy
debates.13
Social groups and elites, therefore, must identify their publics
and their political targets if they want to advance their policies.
They also must decide how to gauge public opinion. Before the
mid-1930s, when national opinion polls first appeared, the presi-
dent and government officials were influenced by four major opin-
ion sources.14 Republican administrations of the 1920s looked first
to the media to gauge public opinion, especially the New York dai-
lies such as the New York Times and the Republican New York Her-
ald Tribune.15 They supplemented these papers with the New Re-
public, the Literary Digest, and the Review of Reviews. By the late
1920s both national political parties were beginning to use radio,
but still concentrated on the more familiar print media. Presidents
and their advisers also received opinions from friends, who were
usually members of the influential public, well-informed on foreign
affairs, as were the news correspondents whose letters arrived on
the desks of the president and his top advisers. (Letters from the
public at large were handled by White House secretaries, who sel-
dom bothered the president and his advisers with their content.)
Congress was a third source of information. Congressional hearings,
debates, and resolutions received notice in the White House be-
cause they frequently offered insight into the views of the attentive
public. Interest groups were a final source, composed of members of
the attentive or influential public who sought to persuade Congress
and the executive branch to follow certain policies. Pressure groups
in the 1920s focused on such interests as education, farming, busi-
ness and manufacturing, military spending, and peace. When it
came to naval disarmament the interest groups most active were
those advocating peace through arms control and those advocating
preparedness, who opposed arms control.
As I have mentioned, Secretary Hughes managed to control pub-
lic opinion and limit the influence of peace groups through the Ad-
visory Committee at the Washington Conference during his term in
office. But his successors in the 1920s were not as skilled vis-a-vis
public opinion and often found it difficult to dispense with these
groups. And the groups were certainly active, as presidents, pre-
miers, diplomats, and admirals would complain.
American private groups for peace, far larger than their Euro-
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pean or Asian counterparts, busied themselves in support of inter-
national harmony. Among themselves they appear to have agreed to
some extent on the need for four measures. One was adherence to
the protocol of the World Court. A second was some form of cooper-
ation, mostly in support of committees for social and economic
measures, with the League of Nations. A third category of concern
was what for some years had been described both in America and in
Europe as "militarism," though it is not very clear what that notion
meant. Generally peace groups held it to mean either an arms build-
up that they feared might lead to war or the attitude that sought to
increase the presence of the military in different walks of life. The
fourth area of agreement was a general belief that the world re-
quired a limitation, and ideally a reduction, of armaments. Arms
reduction could serve as a curative to militarism, a way to reduce
the influence of warmongers. This belief was based on the assump-
tion, widely held in the 1920s, that if one reduced arms, interna-
tional tension would subside.
Conservative peace groups in the United States focused on in-
ternational law or collective security or both as a way to keep peace.
These groups, composed of "political internationalists," attracted
bankers, lawyers, politicians, and academics.16 Almost all the mem-
bers of these organizations came from the Northeast and many
lived in or near New York City, the headquarters for most of the
peace organizations. Included among these groups were many of the
influential public, leaders in their professions, and many who were
former public servants.
The largest organization in this category, the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, was presided over by the president of
Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, assisted by one of his
professors, fames T. Shotwell, the director of the Endowment's Di-
vision of Economics and History. The Endowment was important
because of its leaders' entree to government, business, and academic
circles in the United States and in Europe. Indeed, some eyebrows
raised in 1925 when a former law partner of Secretary Kellogg
moved from the Endowment into the State Department as assistant
secretary of state.17 The Endowment also financed other interna-
tionalist organizations such as the League of Nations Non-Partisan
Association and the Foreign Policy Association. Butler, Shotwell,
and other officials of the Endowment preferred indirect influence—
informal visits to political leaders and other elites and providing
experts and studies for the government—to the pressure techniques
favored by more radical peace groups.18
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The League of Nations Non-Partisan Association (which became
the League of Nations Association in 1928) and the Council on For-
eign Relations (CFR) were two other important internationalist
groups. Elites made up these organizations as well, including the
chairmen of important New York City banks, former Supreme Court
justices, and members of past presidential administrations. In fact,
the boards of these groups often had the same men serving as direc-
tors.19 The League of Nations Non-Partisan Association, as its name
implies, viewed the League of Nations with favor and desired to use it
or its agencies as a means to expand American economic and ideolog-
ical power. The CFR preferred a more subtle and indirect role as an
internationalist group. Its membership comprised former members
of the American Inquiry group active during the Versailles negotia-
tions and many conservative Republicans who looked to Elihu Root
as their leader—men, in short, used to wielding great power behind
the scenes. The CFR therefore strove, especially through its journal,
Foreign Affairs, to serve as a bipartisan repository of international
experts. Some prominent Anglophile members of the CFR desired
naval limitation but favored an old-style balance of power arrange-
ment rather than international arms reductions. They favored an
American and a British naval sphere of influence, as well as one for
Japan in the Western Pacific, based on economic cooperation.20
Internationalist organizations at this time especially sought, al-
beit unsuccessfully, U.S. participation in the World Court. Partic-
ularly active were the Endowment and the League Association, to-
gether with the World Peace Foundation (subsidized by the Boston
publisher, Edwin Ginn), the Foreign Policy Association, the Wood-
row Wilson Foundation, and the American Foundation (sponsor of
the Bok Peace Plan Award of 1922).
More liberal peace organizations, some dominated by religious
groups and by women, distinguished themselves from the conserva-
tives not so much by their objectives as by their crusading zeal. Most
of these "community internationalists" (so called because they em-
phasized an international community of social interests rather than
the expansion of American economic might and power), agreed with
conservatives about the World Court and supported some sort of
American relationship with the League of Nations but disagreed both
with the conservatives and among themselves about militarism and
disarmament.21 Foremost among the groups advocating disarmament
was the National Council for the Prevention of War, headed by Fred-
erick J. Libby, a pacifist Congregationalist minister turned Quaker.
A pacifist group led by Jane Addams (international president) and
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Emily Greene Balch (American branch president), the Women's In-
ternational League for Peace and Freedom, also supported disarma-
ment, as did the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of
War, founded by the former suffragist leader, Carrie Chapman Catt,
and the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, organized by
an energetic lawyer, Salmon O. Levinson of Chicago, and supported
by the philosopher, John Dewey. These groups, joined by the Church
Peace Union and the Commission on International Justice and
Goodwill of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, produced
leaflets and sponsored lectures attacking militarism and advocating
disarmament. They of course encouraged Congress to limit naval
appropriations.22
Pro-navy organizations, notably the Navy League, sought to
counter the disarmament proponents. Although most of the Ameri-
can newspaper press was anti-navy, the Hearst press, the New York
Herald Tribune, and the Chicago Tribune sought to make up for such
criticisms. These papers received backing from Irish-Americans (al-
ways anti-British), steel and shipbuilding interests, chambers of com-
merce, the American Legion, and national organizations of manufac-
turers.
The Navy League, composed of retired officers and of civilians
interested in the navy, fought for a strong navy. Besides sponsoring
an annual Navy Day, which featured speeches and tours aboard navy
ships, it produced reports comparing the strengths of the signatories
of the Five-Power Treaty of 1922, showing that the U.S. lagged in
construction. The Navy League especially argued that the U.S. Navy
was essential in protecting foreign trade and the expansion of the
American economy.23
Another group wholeheartedly supporting the navy was the Na-
tional Security League (NSL), founded in 1915 by a New York corpo-
rate lawyer, S. Stanwood Menken.24 The group had originally been
involved in the preparedness movement during the period of Ameri-
can neutrality, then supported the decision of President Wilson to
enter the war. In the early 1920s, the NSL lost prestige in some
quarters by its participation in the Red Scare: the group had drawn
up lists of possible communist sympathizers to be investigated by
the government. Nevertheless, its members included many promi-
nent politicians and educators. And many NSL members were like-
wise members of the Navy League. In April 1922, Menken sched-
uled mass rallys to apply pressure on congressmen who opposed
building the fleet up to treaty limits. This was only a part of an NSL
propaganda effort that included writing letters to editors and con-
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tacting influential congressmen. Menken and others also helped or-
ganize a national Defense Day in September 1924.
The American Legion also confronted those who opposed build-
ing the navy. It specifically targeted pacifist organizations because
many pacifists called for a worldwide governmental organization, an
idea in opposition to the nationalism that the Legion espoused. Many
pacifists, particularly those on the far left, favored a socialist eco-
nomic system, anathema to Legion members, and many, of course,
also worked for disarmament, while Legion members worked for pre-
paredness.25 The president of the National Civic Federation, another
pro-navy group, perhaps pointed to the Legion's greatest value to pre-
paredness supporters when he noted in 1924 that the Legion was the
major organization that all anti-radical groups could work with.26 But
the Legion did not focus as much attention overall on the disarma-
ment question as did other pro-navy groups. It tended to work more
on such issues as veterans' benefits, education programs, and anti-
immigration legislation.
Yet the Navy League, National Security League, American Le-
gion, and other navalist groups and pro-navy newspapers could boast
of only limited success by 1927, principally in the construction bill
of 1924. They were unable to push through a bill for twenty-two
cruisers in 1924 or prevent the House Naval Affairs Committee in
1926 from shelving a measure for ten cruisers. Sentiment against
navalism, in short, appeared stronger in the U.S. than pro-navalism.
Peace groups, in the meantime, had formed in other countries,
such as Britain, where their members hoped that the League might
support disarmament. In London, the League of Nations Union
(LNU) called for a freeze in armaments and for an international
percentage-of-budget reduction in naval expenditures or manpower.
The LNU felt that if universal reduction were impossible, regional
arrangements between neighboring nations would suffice. This posi-
tion varied from the LNU report of 1921, which saw the League of
Nations as an international policeman settling disputes. Many mem-
bers of the LNU realized that such a program would be difficult to
achieve and turned to limitation of naval arms, which seemed a more
realistic goal. The LNU report of 1926 sought to restrict cruisers to
6,000 tons and battleships to 10,000 tons, figures much lower than
the Washington limits. Smaller British peace groups, such as the
Congregational Union, passed resolutions asking the government to
take the lead in disarmament.27
Preparedness groups were also active in Britain, especially the
Navy League which, like its American counterpart, had close ties to
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naval officers. The Navy League and other groups publicized appro-
priation debates in Parliament and supported Britain's cruiser pro-
gram of the 1920s.
Japanese peace groups, more varied than the American or Brit-
ish, focused on world understanding or better Japanese-American
relations. They were less effective in publicizing their message of
peace and cooperation than British or American groups because Jap-
anese society emphasized respect for authority, limited free discus-
sion, and did not permit peace groups the latitude that groups in the
Western democracies enjoyed. Nevertheless, the Institute of Pacific
Relations, established in Honolulu in 1925 to encourage the study
of countries in the Pacific area, opened a branch in Tokyo soon after.
The branch received a government subsidy and enjoyed little inde-
pendence. A League of Nations Association in Japan sponsored
study groups and meetings in support of disarmament but had little
effect on members of the Diet or on government officials. Perhaps
the most active disarmament group in Japan was the Society of
Friends, which enrolled many pacifists.28
Navy groups were also prominent in Japan, but were smaller in
size and influence, probably because naval officers held more power
in government than in the U.S. or in Britain, negating the need for
special coalitions.
THE QUEST FOR NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS
Outside of the peace sentiment, one of the major reasons President
Coolidge considered disarmament in 1925 was that a cruiser race
among the naval powers had occurred since the Washington Confer-
ence; the trouble was that Britain and Japan had built cruisers while
the U.S. had not. But by 1926 all three powers became more interested
in disarmament. Indeed, naval proponents in the United States, Brit-
ain, and Japan had begun to find the task of obtaining appropriations
for cruisers difficult. In America, congressional resistance remained
almost as strong as it had been immediately after the Washington
Conference—despite authorization for cruisers in 1924. In Britain
and Japan economic and domestic unrest worked against increased
naval appropriations. Aware of the large portion of national budgets
going to naval appropriations, government leaders looked to a new
disarmament conference that might make more ships unnecessary.
"A veritable cyclone of opposition" arose in Congress when big-
navy supporters sought increased budgets in the United States, and
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advocates had difficulty appropriating money for cruisers author-
ized in the act of 1924.29 In the end, the House Appropriations Com-
mittee provided for only five of the eight cruisers authorized. Navy
supporters did defeat an amendment that would have delayed con-
struction of three of the remaining five cruisers for a year. Congress
voted the money for all five cruisers in 1926.
Opposition to a big navy appeared from another direction—the
White House. Although President Coolidge had not contested the
appropriation for the five cruisers, he made clear his opposition at a
press conference when he said he would avoid an arms race. He, not
Congress, had prevented the navy from building auxiliary ships, and
he would support a new treaty reducing naval strength below pre-
sent treaty limits. In his annual message to Congress, Coolidge re-
peated his hope for a new conference to reduce arms. In a budget
message the next day, he opposed an amendment to a recently intro-
duced bill requesting appropriations for the remaining three cruis-
ers authorized by the act of 1924.
For these sentiments Coolidge received a letter of protest from
Chairman Thomas Butler and nineteen of the twenty members of
the Naval Affairs Committee, and Butler introduced a bill in the
House that proposed ten more cruisers. He announced that he
would seek both authorization and appropriations during the cur-
rent session of Congress. Coolidge at first opposed the Butler bill,
but after discussion with the Navy Department he changed his
mind, though he could not agree to the appropriations asked. He
apparently agreed to support Butler's bill in order to use the threat
of new cruisers to persuade other nations to attend a disarmament
conference.30
The Butler bill appeared too late to be included in the appropria-
tions for fiscal year 1927, but big-navy proponents hoped that Con-
gress might include the funds for the three remaining cruisers of the
act of 1924, despite the president's disapproval. But when the naval
appropriations bill was reported, it did not provide for the cruisers
because, according to Congressman Burton L. French, it would ap-
pear premature, considering the president's opposition and the work
of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission in Geneva.31 In
the ensuing House debate many Republicans supported the naval-
ists, emphasizing British cruiser construction and expressing skep-
ticism about a new disarmament conference. The administration
had trouble attracting enough votes to defeat the cruiser amend-
ment, though the measure did fail by two votes on January 7, 1927.
In the Senate, Frederick Hale (R-Maine), normally a spokesman for
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the administration, offered his own amendment for the three cruis-
ers, which was passed by a two-to-one margin on January 24. Cool-
idge reiterated his opposition but, faced with subsequent House ap-
proval of $450,000 to begin construction of the cruisers, reluctantly
signed the bill into law on March 2.
In Britain, the House of Commons debate over the naval esti-
mates of 1927 turned on the question of the navy's role and its strate-
gic aims. Was the navy little more than a police force for the empire,
as British delegates had argued before Sub-Commission A of the Pre-
paratory Commission? Or did it have more substantial duties? Crit-
ics of the Royal Navy cited an article from the Economist charging
that the Admiralty had maintained a two-power standard in cruisers
that could induce the United States or Japan to build cruisers,- in the
event of a cruiser race, they warned, Britain would lose. Further,
cruisers could not defend the trade routes, even with a two-power
standard. Labour argued that the supposed savings that William
Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty, described were misleading,
for the Admiralty had simply transferred money from one account to
another to make savings appear. One Labourite said he lacked "great
confidence in the First Lord's enthusiasm for disarmament."32 An-
other called for publication of the Colwyn Committee Report (criti-
cal of high military estimates), though Prime Minister Baldwin had
refused to show it outside of the Cabinet. Pacifists proposed amend-
ments to the estimates that would force reductions or eventually
eliminate warships over 5,000 tons. Other members of Parliament
asked if the navy was building against Japan, because the United
States posed little threat to British interests. They noted that the
Japanese regarded enlargement of the naval base at Singapore, accom-
modating more British warships, as a threat.
Admiralty officials provided a spirited defense of battleships
against a 5,000-ton limit and defended the need for cruisers. One
remarked that "naval disarmament is not in itself an end, but that,
if it is to be of value, it must tend to promote a feeling of security
and the avoidance of a feeling of suspicion." Reduction of naval
arms was useful only in a political sense, as it could lessen ten-
sions.33 Admiralty officials also observed that since the Washington
Conference the French had rebuilt their fleet, gravely damaged in
the war. Any calculation of British defense needs must also consider
increasing numbers of French submarines.34
In the mid-1920s, Winston Churchill as chancellor of the Exche-
quer attempted to curb Admiralty expenditures, but failed abjectly.
His critics, and he had many in British politics, claimed that he was
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in the pocket of the Admiralty—over which he once had presided.
He doughtily pointed out that the Exchequer could manage no
economies until the country either abandoned the one-power naval
standard or reached an arms-limitation agreement. He hoped to
maintain the former while pursuing the latter, provided Britain's
needs as a worldwide empire were recognized. He acknowledged that
the Admiralty had found funds to pay for the cruisers it wanted.35
In Japan, parliamentary consideration of cruiser construction
took place amid turmoil. Following a period of mourning for the
late emperor, politicians braced themselves as the Diet reopened
early in 1927, in part because of instability of the Wakatsuki cabi-
net, in part because of fist fights on the Diet floor during the previ-
ous session. They turned to the budget, of which naval estimates
formed a part, while Tokyo dailies reported bribery, especially regard-
ing General Tanaka Giichi, leader of the opposition Seiyukai party.
Despite all the uncertainty, the government gave attention to the
navy's needs, especially the request for cruisers. The minister of the
Marine had submitted a seven-year building program asking the
equivalent of $147 million, only to see it rejected. The ministry
then proposed a new program asking the equivalent of $130 million
over five years. Premier Wakatsuki defended the part of the program
providing appropriations for three cruisers, as he deemed the ships
necessary for national defense. He vowed not to drop them from the
budget.36
The Diet passed the budget in March 1927, shortly before it
adjourned, because of another outbreak of violence on the chamber
floor. Physical attacks linked to disagreements about government
aid to failing banks and to charges of corruption had become so
commonplace that older party members took seats surrounded by
younger, more hardy men for protection. After more fisticuffs, the
speaker of the house, Karuya Gizo, resigned, and the Diet closed the
next day.37
Unable to convince either the Diet while in session or the Privy
Council after parliament closed that the failing Bank of Taiwan
needed a twenty million yen emergency loan from the Bank of Ja-
pan, Wakatsuki too resigned, in April 1927. His government had
also been subjected to severe criticism over Foreign Minister Shide-
hara's noninterventionist policy in China after the Nanking Inci-
dent. Stepping into the political turmoil, General Tanaka of the op-
position then formed a cabinet, taking over the foreign minister
portfolio as well.
Tanaka was a prominent military officer who differed from
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many in the army and navy in that he cooperated with the party
politicians and was well regarded by many of them.38 He had served
in Premier Hara's cabinet as a minister of war and had headed the
Seiyukai party since 1925. Tanaka was no political ideologue: he was
by nature a man of action and he particularly abhorred Shidehara's
policy of nonintervention in China (even though Shidehara had in
recent months departed occasionally from this policy in order to pro-
tect Japanese nationals). Tanaka was determined to take a stronger
hand in China if the need arose, and, as the civil war in China spread
northward, few doubted that Chinese nationalists and Japanese in-
terests would soon clash anew. Not long after he became premier, the
general announced that he favored appropriations for cruisers.
BEGINNINGS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION
In part because of antimilitarist feeling, in part because of foreign
cruisers, in part because of the need for economy, many Americans
looked to the League's Preparatory Commission to bring arms lim-
itation. In his annual message to Congress in early 1926, Coolidge
dealt mostly with a definition of the limitation of armaments and
with technical questions, noting the general European assent to arms
reduction following the signing of the Locarno Treaty. He empha-
sized that disarmament might remove part of the burden of taxes and
reminded his audience that the work of the Preparatory Commission
carried no obligation on the part of the U.S. to attend any disarma-
ment conference or support any arrangements by League-sponsored
bodies. He explained that representatives of interested governments
and members of the League Council made up the Commission and
that it would only suggest disarmament figures for delegates to con-
sider. He asked Congress for $50,000 to send a delegation to Geneva,
and Congress voted the money.39 The first session of the Preparatory
Commission had been set for February 15, 1926, but because of a
French request the date was pushed back until late May.
Secretary Kellogg named the American delegates to the confer-
ence, who would operate under the leadership of the minister to
Switzerland, Hugh S. Gibson, recently vice chairman of the delega-
tion to the International Conference for the Control of Arms. The
choice of Gibson was auspicious. Educated in California and Europe
by a doting, ambitious mother, the forty-two-year-old Gibson pos-
sessed, according to one observer, an "almost inhumanly polished
and suave exterior that concealed a singularly able and resourceful
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mind."40 His assistants included Allen W. Dulles and Dorsey Rich-
ardson of the State Department (counsel and general secretary, re-
spectively), several War Department representatives, and Rear Ad-
mirals Hilary P. Jones and Andrew T. Long, together with Captain
Adolphus Andrews and Lt. Comm. Harold C. Train. The officers
from the War Department did not figure prominently in the work of
the Commission, as the United States possessed a small army, but
the delegates from the Navy Department would labor for months to
arrive at some sort of naval agreement. They were led by Admiral
Jones, an attractive figure with ever-present cigar, straw hat, and
light gray suit—the white-haired Jones might have been taken for "a
Mid West banker on a holiday trip." Alas, his charming personality
did not diminish his stubbornness and Anglophobia.41
Kellogg informed the delegates that the U.S. would insist on
limiting immediately usable armaments, especially naval arms.
The administration would not agree to international inspection and
enforcement and would rigorously uphold the naval ratios estab-
lished by the Washington Conference. He declared the reduction of
land armaments impracticable, as circumstances differed in Europe
and in the Western Hemisphere (Kellogg he favored separate land
and naval conferences). As for air arms, limiting aircraft might be
the most troublesome issue at the conference, he noted, though it
was of slight concern to Americans.42
The long-delayed first session of the Commission at last opened
in Geneva in May 1926. The British delegates, led by a sixty-two year
old patrician orator, Sir Robert Cecil, Viscount of Chelwood, recom-
mended the establishment of two subcommissions—one military,
with an army, navy, and air expert from each country, the other eco-
nomic, with economic and social experts. The Americans refused to
participate in League committees in the military subcommission,
Sub-Commission A, such as the Permanent Advisory Commission
or the Temporary Armament Committee, and the subcommission
had to be reconstituted, leaving membership essentially the same,
save for the addition of Americans. The Americans, not being League
members, had made their complaint with an eye on domestic poli-
tics. The military subcommission would study technical aspects of
limitation and demonstrate different ways of limitation.
During the first days of the meeting of the Preporatory Com-
mission the British and the French presented their positions on a
questionnaire submitted to the delegations prior to the conference.
On behalf of the American delegation, Gibson refused to participate
in this exchange of information, saying that he desired opinions of
the other countries and instruction from his government. For the
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most part Americans did not participate in debate during the first
session and offered suggestions only when their interests arose or
when acting as mediators between views.
Divergent opinion abounded, as one observer noted, especially
among the British and French, whose positions represented differing
ideas of war.43 Possessing the world's largest navy, the British could
control access to their snores, they could afford to send troops into
territory where they controlled the adjacent seas, and they could
pick the time and place for engagement. The French preferred to
limit their ability to wage war and focused especially on reserve
strength, because they possessed a large standing army. The French
general staff adhered to the Clausewitzian theory that one had to
confront enemy forces, especially countries with great reserves
such as Germany. Worried about proximity to Germany, their na-
tion's low birth rate, and weaker industrial position compared both
to Britain and to Germany, the French were more concerned about
land than naval arms.44
Focusing on their navy, British delegates called for national arm-
ies proportional to overseas commitments and air forces compara-
ble to countries of similar military power. A subcommittee of the
Committee of Imperial Defence, presided over by Cecil, had formu-
lated the delegation's instructions, stressing that the British navy
depended on cruisers for overseas commitments and that their lim-
itation might prove difficult. In his opening remarks Cecil dis-
cussed British concern about cruisers and alluded to the American
demand for parity:
In the case of the Navy there is no doubt a certain element of—I will not
call it competition, but dependence on the size of other navies. That was
very carefully considered from the point of view of certain kinds of ships at
the Washington Conference, which ended in an agreement which was very
warmly welcomed in my country. The Washington Conference, however,
only dealt with certain kinds of ships. It is possible that further agreements
may be made in respect of submarines and cruisers, but I ought to point out
that the number of cruisers in the British Navy is also largely a question of
overseas commitments and not of the size of foreign navies, or only very
slightly a question of their size. While the number of cruisers may therefore
not come within the scope of the question, their size undoubtedly does, and
there is no reason why by general agreement the size of cruisers should not
be diminished.45
The French then responded, reflecting not only strategic dis-
agreement with the British but also a far different attitude toward
disarmament in general. In short, Paris distrusted disarmament. Al-
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though willing to discuss the issue, the French insisted on coupling
it with security and arbitration, as they had since at least the dis-
cussions of the Geneva Protocol in 1924. Although many League
observers believed that Aristide Briand, at the Foreign Office since
1924, supported disarmament (as he often spoke approvingly of it),
they did not always note that he carefully added caveats calling for
security and guarantees first.46 So too did other French delegates
involved in the disarmament discussions, no matter how enthusias-
tic about the League. This attitude was partly philosophic, and partly
an acknowledgment that a small number of men, fewer in number
than in the U.S., Britain, or Japan, controlled the disarmament issue
in France. These men controlled French disarmament policy through
two organizations, the Conseil Superieur de la Defense Nationale
(CSDN), an interministerial consulting body that issued instructions
to delegates at Geneva, and the Service Francais de la Societe des
Nations, another interministerial body under the auspices of the for-
eign office. The French military, even more hostile to disarmament
than the politicians, dominated both organizations during the 1920s,
in part through long-serving military observers in Geneva with close
connections to politicians, journalists, and the military high com-
mand.47
The French presented their proposals, led by Joseph Paul-Bon-
cour, a curly-haired dynamo famous for his oratory in the Chamber
of Deputies, and vice-president of the studies commission of the
CSDN. Paul-Boncour called for linkage of land, sea, and air arma-
ments, with naval limitation measured by total tonnage rather than
class of ship. The distinction meant that the French could continue
building submarines, their most effective vessel, while limiting
classes in which they lagged. They also championed enforcement of
limitations. Cecil rightly fumed that the French sought a guarantee
of security from League members, as they had with the Geneva Pro-
tocol; to a French member of the League secretariat he confided
that he would not be surprised if the American delegation left be-
cause of it. But the Americans gave no sign of leaving.48
Disagreement between the British and French led to temporary
adjournment of meetings on May 26. Delegates arranged for subcom-
missions to prepare reports. The British foreign secretary, Austen
Chamberlain, echoed the thoughts of many Europeans when he cau-
tioned about the effect disarmament questions might have on the
Treaty of Locarno.49 He preferred that treaty to a stronger League, not
only for reasons of defense, but perhaps also because it represented a
personal political triumph. The aristocratic, aloof foreign secretary
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viewed disarmament with suspicion, afraid that Britain's navy might
be irreparably harmed.
Talks continued, as did meetings of the subcommittees of Sub-
Commission A. By early July, discussion had narrowed to naval af-
fairs, but agreement between the French and British seemed no clos-
er. The French and Italians wanted comparison of vessels by total
tonnage and convinced a majority of the subcommittee to exclude
comparison by class, as they had at Washington. The British dele-
gate, Walter Roberts, reported that "discussions have been tortuous
and at times heated."50 In describing the minority report filed by
Britain, the United States, Chile, and Argentina against the notion
of total tonnage, the Journal de Geneve commented that a commit-
tee majority, made up of representatives of Czechoslovakia which
had no navy, and Poland, which had next to none, was attempting to
impose decisions on the British Empire and the United States. Ad-
miral Jones wrote home that "the attitude of the French and Italians
is so antagonistic to all that was done at the Washington Confer-
ence, that I am convinced there is little possibility of reconciling
the points of view." Things looked bleak: "I confess it looks to me
as if we are on a circle of talk of infinite radius. Such is the result of
'the Atmosphere of Geneva.'"51
After a recess, the technical committee meetings resumed on
August 2. One of the issues in the Sub-Commission and its subcom-
mittees was a French proposal for international supervision and en-
forcement. The Americans "threw up their hands in horror at the
mere reference by name in a proposed report to the detested idea."
Roberts confessed puzzlement that the French fought so hard for
supervision, since both the United States and Britain opposed it.52
By early September the delegates had made little progress. Jones
did not know when they would finish, and agreed with a Swedish
delegate who said that "the great trouble with us is that we are a
body of technical experts working under purely political instruc-
tions." Jones asked: "If political instructions can be largely elimi-
nated so that we may deal with the questions from purely technical
viewpoints, we may make more rapid progress." He meant French
insistence on tying together land, sea, and air solutions because of
the Franco-German political situation. In other ways Jones believed
that affairs at Geneva were becoming ridiculous. On the eve of the
second session of the Preparatory Commission, set for late Septem-
ber, he wrote: "Just now Geneva is full of self-appointed American
Ambassadors to the League of Nations (elderly ladies of both sexes)
who apparently delight in expressing to anyone who will listen, for-
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eigners particularly, shame of their country for not being in the
League. I am glad none had so expressed him or herself to me be-
cause I am afraid my language would not be fit for publication in
The Ladies' Home Journal."53
The second session of the Preparatory Commission opened Sep-
tember 22. Perhaps the most important discussion of this session
took place informally two days later between Gibson and Cecil,
who agreed that before a disarmament conference convened, ex-
perts from their countries should discuss an agenda, especially re-
garding cruisers. Cecil said that the Admiralty would reduce the
size of cruisers but must have a certain number to guard imperial
communications. The American government understood, Gibson
replied, but could not easily agree to build fewer cruisers than the
British. The Americans desired a "navy second to none" to guaran-
tee that a blockade hampering neutral shipping such as the British
had imposed on Germany during the war could not happen again.
Although they had far more need of cruisers because of their em-
pire, the British appeared to accept parity. In Cecil's words, "I said I
did not understand that our naval authorities objected in any way to
that. It was not so much the relative number of cruisers, it was the
absolute number that was essential to us."54
As a result of this conversation, Jones went to London to meet
with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir David Beatty, who agreed on
parity in all classes. Beatty conceded that the British could accept
parity with the U.S. Navy even in cruisers. They could not accept a
5-3 cruiser ratio with the Japanese, but that problem might await
the conference. To make sure he understood Beatty's position, Jones
said, "Now, let us understand each other perfectly so that there can
be no doubt as far as the United States is concerned: Great Britain
accepts equality in all categories. In any conference we would estab-
lish a level of armaments in all categories in which each nation
would have an equality." Beatty agreed "unequivocally."55 Nev-
ertheless, it is not clear how seriously Beatty meant what he said.
Many of his colleagues did not accept this position, and he himself
had not in the recent past. Perhaps he wished to sound out Jones on
other matters and deferred to him on the one issue he knew the
American held dear.
Delegates reassembled in Geneva in March 1927 for the third
session of the Preparatory Commission. Secretary Kellogg had writ-
ten to the impatient chairman of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Stephen G. Porter, reiterating that the Commission would
only survey problems and, he hoped, draw up an agenda for a confer-
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ence.56 The British and the French exchanged their proposed plans,
the British giving theirs to the French a few days before the meeting
because portions had already appeared in the French press. The Brit-
ish then formally presented their draft, which encompassed pro-
posals they had already championed. They urged limitation by class
instead of tonnage and opposed international supervision. Not want-
ing to hinder technological changes, they argued against budget re-
strictions, and they asked no limit on naval reserves in order to main-
tain flexibility in assigning personnel in time of crisis. The French
countered with a draft promoting limitation by total tonnage and
enforcement by international supervision. They supported limits on
reserves because they had neither a large navy nor air force. And in
proposing budget restrictions, they hoped to limit new weapons, par-
ticularly on land. But the French proposal ran so counter to American
wishes and placed so much stress on League involvement that an
exasperated Gibson described his French opposite (Paul-Boncour) as
an "impenitent idealist." Gibson announced that the United States
would take little part in debate until he knew his government's
views.57
By this time the American position was fairly clear. Gibson had
proposed that the United States, being outside the League, oppose
international inspection and submit no draft agenda. Americans
would regard a universal standard of disarmament—fixed total ton-
nages as offered by the French—as unwise and would favor a final
draft with two parts, the one for arms limitation, which would in-
clude the United States, the other for matters concerning only League
members. Secretary Kellogg cabled that he thought Gibson was invit-
ing other nations to arrange terms of supervision. The United States
disapproved of international control not because the nation remained
outside the League, the secretary wrote, but because Americans ob-
jected to supervision.58 Supervision impugned national honor and
dignity. Although he still thought League members might agree to
enforcement, Gibson suggested a single draft plan without enforce-
ment, fearing that the United States might become the scapegoat for
the failure of Commission efforts on enforcement.59
The French rejected limitation by class. Britain's First Lord of
the Admiralty, William Bridgeman, a delegate to the Commission,
feared the discussions at Geneva would produce little of value and
failure of the Commission might affect the disarmament confer-
ence scheduled by President Coolidge for Geneva in June. Described
by Chamberlain as "a really good fellow with a slightly surly man-
ner but as straight as they are made," Bridgeman remained optimis-
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tic, on the condition that conference participants not arrive com-
mitted to programs.60 At the Commission's meeting on April 11,
Gibson suspected that Cecil believed that "the three powers . . .
were more concerned with what might happen at the said Confer-
ence than with the present labors of this Commission." Americans
did not "denigrate" the work of the Commission in favor of the later
conference, Gibson said. Jones wondered if the British might have
set up the Americans. But Cecil supported the Commission as
much if not more than the forthcoming conference. He was sur-
prised that Gibson chided him for emphasizing the naval conference
above the Commission and took pains to point out the good work of
the Commission. In fact, Cecil concluded, Gibson's attitude seemed
"far more pro-League than that of our own Admiralty."61
The British and Americans had reason for pessimism about the
Commission, even if they applauded its work, for Paul-Boncour gave
a speech that implied that he wanted to break up the meetings. It was
a "direct slap at those countries that said they could not agree to
supervision and control." He suggested that the Commission answer
four questions: Did all participants accept an exchange of informa-
tion? Would an international organization collect and collate infor-
mation? Would delegates agree that this organization was more than
an information gatherer? If any country came before the League
Council could the Council decide its case?62
In the end, conferees achieved a modest compromise. They
agreed to limited sharing of information, without participation of
the League. The delegates made little headway, however, toward re-
solving differences over disarmament. Gibson thought that more
might have been accomplished if the French had not held out for
international control. Final meetings proved frenzied, and nerves
frayed. The mercurial Cecil complained to Chamberlain about his
naval advisers:
I feel bound to add that throughout this rather difficult task in which I have
been engaged, I have received no assistance, direct or indirect, from the Ad-
miralty, except such as has been extorted from them by yourself and my
other colleagues who have been good enough to come to my assistance. The
First Lord of the Admiralty [Bridgeman] throughout has adopted an attitude
of what may be called 'Malevolent neutrality' towards the whole of our pro-
ceedings here. . . . In private he continues to express the opinion that he
would be glad to see these negotiations come to an end, or words to that
effect. . . . This attitude will perhaps not surprise you, in view of the contin-
ual pretension of the Admiralty to run their own policy irrespective of that
which has been adopted by the Cabinet. . . . I felt it was proper for me to give
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you some account of how it has been that, with respect to naval officers at
any rate, our efforts here must be regarded as so far having failed.63
A NEW NAVAL CONFERENCE
Disappointed in the Preparatory Commission, distressed by the
British Admiralty's decision to build sixteen heavy cruisers, and dis-
mayed by Japanese-American tensions, Coolidge issued invitations
on February 10, 1927, for a naval conference. The president, having
considered the idea for some months, permitted Gibson to draft the
text of the messages, proposing that the powers use their Prepara-
tory Commission delegations in Geneva for the task. Gibson pre-
pared the ground for the invitations for two months, meeting with
personnel from the State and Navy Departments. He reported to his
mother after a meeting with Coolidge that the president genuinely
desired arms reduction, that he had "followed what we have been
doing and has a clear idea of our problems."64 The invitations went
to powers that had attended the Washington Conference.65 Coolidge
wondered if the Japanese would extend the 5-5-3 ratio to auxiliary
vessels and if European powers, having signed the Locarno pact,
might consider a conference. At a press conference the previous Oc-
tober, Coolidge had hinted that he would like to call a conference
on both land and naval disarmament, and European responses had
been unenthusiastic.
Kellogg, too, had considered a new conference. While ambas-
sador in London in the early 1920s he and MacDonald had discussed
the possibility but judged the timing inauspicious. When he and
Chamberlain met after the Conservative victory in 1924, Chamber-
lain favored a conference but Kellogg still hesitated. After becoming
secretary of state, he had called for regional meetings on land arma-
ments and for great-power naval meetings. Even so, according to
William R. Castle, Jr., assistant secretary of state, Kellogg remained
skeptical of the idea of a conference and had agreed only when the
cabinet, at a meeting on February 1, 1927, proposed unanimously
that the president issue invitations. From then on, Castle noted sar-
donically, the conference became Kellogg's idea.66
The initial reaction to the invitations was disappointing. France
declined the invitation because the agenda proposed to deal only with
naval affairs and ignored the French position on global tonnage. The
French chose to follow events at Commission meetings where, they
said, the true work of disarmament was continuing. The Japanese
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accepted, suggesting that the conference not meet before June. Pre-
mier Wakatsuki explained indelicately that the U.S. was Japan's best
customer and "one does not fight one's best customer." He hinted
that Japan would not accept the 5-5-3 ratio for auxiliaries, as the inter-
national situation had changed since the Washington Conference.
The Italians refused to attend, citing poor relations with the French—
although the American ambassador thought that the general staff and
Fascist leaders had overpowered Mussolini, who wished to attend.
London belatedly accepted, after communicating with the Domin-
ions; the latter were irritated that no diplomatic talks had gone on
before the invitations were issued.67
Coolidge had serious reservations about the value of a three-
power conference. Castle reported to Gibson that the president
wanted to "get Italy in" to the conference and was so preoccupied
with the matter that he seemed to have forgotten that he had given
the State Department leave to propose three-way discussions to
London and Tokyo. Happily, Castle wrote, answers from the British
and Japanese reassured the president. But Coolidge reacted strongly
to a rumor emanating from London that, as discussions would be
among the three powers only, negotiations would be restricted to
the Pacific. He labeled the rumor nonsense and reiterated that dele-
gates would focus on naval disarmament everywhere, subject to re-
view with changing conditions.68
Little more then occurred before the opening of the three-power
conference in June. Kellogg left Washington in late February for a two-
week vacation and made no provision for communicating with the
powers in his absence. He may have regretted this action, for on his
return he found himself overburdened with preparations for the im-
pending conference.69 Nevertheless, he believed that differences be-
tween Britain and the United States were slight, based on the conver-
sations between naval staffs and between representatives at the
Preparatory Commission.70 Kellogg wrote Ambassador Houghton in
London: "I do not think there will be any great differences between
Great Britain and ourselves. Of course, Great Britain would be willing
to cut the size of cruisers but she will not insist on that and I do not
think she will insist on anything that will make an agreement impos-
sible." He was relieved about arrangements for the conference be-
cause the League of Nations had offered its personnel and buildings.71
Between March and June 1927, the only subsequent correspon-
dence between the participating nations related to the appointment
of delegations. The Japanese appointed a prestigious delegation:
Saburi Sadao, Ishii Kikujiro (ambassador to France), and Admiral
Viscount Saito Makato (governor-general of Korea); for the British,
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Bridgeman, Cecil, Admiral Sir Frederick Field, and Lord Jellicoe.
Coolidge attempted to send a ranking delegation, asking former sec-
retary of state Charles Evans Hughes, who refused, ostensibly be-
cause he was involved with a Chicago drainage case but also be-
cause he saw little chance for success since French feelings had not
changed about limiting auxiliary vessels. The president then sug-
gested that Kellogg attend, with Secretary of the Treasury Andrew
Mellon and Senator Claude Swanson, ranking minority member of
the Naval Affairs Committee, but Kellogg declined, objecting that
"it would look like overloading the delegation and make it appear to
the other countries that we were overanxious to have an agree-
ment." In the end, the president appointed Gibson and Admiral
Jones, the American delegates to the Preparatory Commission, as
they were well acquainted with the subject, together with Hugh
Wilson, the new minister to Switzerland (Gibson had been trans-
ferred to Brussels).72 For his part, Gibson wished that a more promi-
nent figure such as Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania had been
selected and complained privately that he would not have time to
read the technical material before the conference.73
There remained the cruiser problem. In Britain, most naval ex-
perts opposed parity, especially in cruisers, despite Beatty's assur-
ances to Jones. As Sir Esme Howard wrote years later; "It is not pub-
lishing a secret to say that many of our leading Naval experts . . .
could not understand why the U.S. government should need so large a
navy as Great Britain."74 Americans continued to demand parity, and
Jones detected a whiff of future discord when he met Admiral Field,
who implied that the British might desire many cruisers. Jones pro-
nounced the notion unacceptable and hoped that Anglo-American
agreement might lead to limits on Japanese cruisers.75
Kellogg now suspected possible trouble. Responding to a request
from Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilbur for suggestions for the
General Board, he had proposed a reduction in capital ships and gun
calibers and division of cruisers into classes of 10,000 and 5,000
tons. Kellogg recommended a clause allowing Britain more cruisers
and destroyers with any increase in French and Italian submarines.
The General Board ignored these ideas.76
Coolidge expressed his views at a meeting in early June at-
tended by Gibson, Jones, and Admiral Long. The United States, he
said, must have parity in cruisers, but conceded that he might con-
sider a form of limitation that combined the French and British
proposals—restriction by total tonnage and numbers of ships—
"which would permit Britain to build vessels of less burden."77
As the weeks slipped away, the prospects of limiting the weap-
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ons of Mars in the realm of Neptune appeared bleak. Although the
Economist described the task before the powers as "child's play"
compared with the work of the Preparatory Commission, the Tokyo
Nichi Nichi predicted that the conference would fail because of
"special interests" mentioned in the British reply.78 Indeed, France
and Italy had refused to participate, and the draft convention, the
dubious result of the first three sessions of the Preparatory Com-
mission, left many questions unresolved. Success appeared to lie in
compromise, perhaps achievable yet exceedingly difficult.
3
OPENING GAMBITS
After a long train trip from Paris, Rear Admiral Frank Schofield
trudged up the stairs of his hotel in Geneva, La Residence, in the
early evening of June 18, 1927. Small of stature, gray-haired, sixty-
two years old, looking like "an emeritus professor of economics,"
the humorless Schofield would call the hotel his home for the next
six weeks.1 President Coolidge's invitation had suggested that the
conference would convene three weeks earlier, on June 1, but it had
been postponed to June 20 because the Japanese delegates pleaded
for time and officials of the League of Nations asked for a delay so
the League Council could discuss naval issues. Confident that it
would achieve some limitation, Schofield had no indication that
the conference would take longer than the summer, as initial meet-
ings between American delegates and technical representatives of
the other powers had not seemed troublesome to him.2
Having recovered from his fatigue after the third session of the
Preparatory Commission, Lord Cecil similarly settled into his spa-
cious quarters at the Hotel Beau Rivage, situated near Lake Geneva
with Mont Saleve in the distance. On a clear day he could even see
snow-clad Mont Blanc. A tall, ascetic man with bowed shoulders,
he shared Schofield's presumption that the conferees would quickly
fashion a treaty. To Austen Chamberlain, temporarily in Geneva for
a meeting of the League Council, he optimistically predicted suc-
cess in three weeks, "since even Admirals ought not to be able to
spin out a negotiation on the principles of which we are all agreed
for more than that time."3
NAVAL POSITIONS
Unhappily for the two men, the disagreement over cruisers hinted
at in the meetings of the Preparatory Commission and the informal
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naval talks of the spring soon appeared in the Geneva Conference.
The General Board of the U.S. Navy emphasized parity with Britain
because it had lagged in cruiser construction and was determined to
build a "navy second to none." Remembering the Dreadnought, the
all-heavy-gunned battleship that outclassed all other battleships
when launched in 1906, the board favored treaty cruisers. It viewed
with concern both the British preference for light cruisers and Ger-
man experiments in designing a "pocket battleship" which com-
bined speed and heavy guns within a displacement of 10,000 tons.
Yet the U.S. Navy had launched no treaty cruisers. It had laid down
the 10,000-ton Pensacola only in October 1926, the Salt Lake City
six months later. The navy would not receive the first of these ships
until at least 1929.
The board proposed extending the Washington ratio, 5-5-3, to
cruisers. It suggested a single cruiser class, not two classes as the
British had mentioned at the Preparatory Commission. It opposed
lowering displacement or allowing other nations to build more small
cruisers because it believed the small cruiser could not guard com-
merce. The board also suggested caliber of guns no larger than eight
inches, with no maximum for guns per ship, in part because it real-
ized that the eight-inch shell would pierce the thin armor of Japanese
and British battle cruisers. The board further recommended that del-
egates ask a total cruiser tonnage of 300,000 tons, and accept no more
than 400,000 tons. Finally, it proposed changing cruiser age limits to
twenty years. This would reduce the number of British cruisers, the
oldest being only sixteen years, and force Congress to replace Ameri-
can cruisers, some of which were thirty-four years old.4
In London, Admiralty officials sought to avoid mention of the
Royal Navy's lead in cruisers. British cruisers included those of the
Kent class (10,000 tons, eight eight-inch guns, four four-inch anti-
aircraft guns), and the London class, including both a "B" type,
which displaced 8,400 tons and featured six eight-inch rifles in twin
turrets and four four-inch antiaircraft guns, and an "A" type, which
displaced 10,000 tons.5 The Admiralty advised Cecil to turn any
talk of limitation toward discussion of the possibility of war in the
Far East. They anticipated completion of nine cruisers, the first
since the Washington Conference, by 1927-29, compared to two for
the United States and four for Japan.
The Admiralty favored a large number of light cruisers, both
because Britain already had great numbers compared to the U.S. and
Japan, and because the large merchant marine included several doz-
en ships that could mount six-inch guns in war. Admiral Beatty
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outlined this position at a cabinet meeting on May 20, advocating
extension of the Washington 5-5-3 ratio to other classes. He said
that, although the treaty cruiser had been forced on Britain at Wash-
ington, the Admiralty preferred not to limit such ships. If forced to
restrict them, he preferred limiting the heavy eight-inch type but
not the light six-inch. If driven to limit ships carrying the smaller
gun, he favored an absolute number of cruisers, namely seventy, in-
stead of a number based on the cruisers of other powers. Churchill
impatiently asked Beatty whether, if the U.S. and Japan insisted on
parity with Britain's seventy cruisers, the Admiralty would give in.
Beatty replied that it would not, since he based the figure of seventy
on the estimated strength of the other powers. Protection of trade
routes required seventy cruisers and he did not suppose any argu-
ment would arise at Geneva against the proposal. Bridgeman said he
believed the U.S. would not agree that trade routes justified more
cruisers. Churchill responded that not all routes needed patrolling,
which might mean fewer cruisers. Beatty admitted that Britain
might benefit by limiting small cruisers if the small naval powers,
France and Italy, agreed to reduce submarines and destroyers, for
fewer cruisers would then be needed to patrol the Mediterranean
routes.6
The Admiralty viewed the Far East with the least concern of any
strategic area. Officers believed that the widening civil war in China
rendered Britain's interests there vulnerable, and they warned of a
possible Sino-Japanese war. That problem would perhaps solve itself,
even though it might make a debating point at Geneva. It showed the
need for the base at Singapore.
The Japanese came to Geneva determined to improve their na-
tion's security and at the same time achieve economy. They feared
for security in the western Pacific because they considered neither
the League of Nations, the Washington Treaties, nor occasional dis-
cussions about limiting or outlawing war as compensation for a
large British base at Singapore and loss of the Anglo-Japanese alli-
ance. Addressing the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific
Relations, Vice Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, assistant chief of the
naval staff, doubted that Japan could halt British construction at
Singapore or American construction at Pearl Harbor. He expected
little financial benefit for Japan in disarmament, reflecting the sen-
timent of many in the navy.7 Admiral Kobayashi Seizo believed that
Japan needed to guard against China and the Soviet Union, both of
which could create "situations that no one can predict." He also had
doubts about the conference: he did not think that the British had
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changed their minds about cruiser limitation since the Washington
Conference, when they rejected the idea because of the high number
of French submarines. Kobayashi noted that the French had even
more submarines in 1927.s In his first message on disarmament since
assuming office, Premier Tanaka on June 13 repeated the pledges of
his naval spokesmen that Japan's naval needs were defensive; the
nation needed only to guard its trade routes.
In reality, the Japanese wished to safeguard their position by
achieving either equality or at least a better ratio with the other pow-
ers if ratios were applied to auxiliary ships. Editorials in a majority of
Japanese papers opposed the 10-6 ratio because of economic uncer-
tainty and political dislocation in China, and some, such as the To-
kyo Asahi and Hochi, reminded their readers that the political and
naval arrangements of the Washington Conference would be affected
by the outcome of the Geneva Conference.9 In Paris en route to Ge-
neva, the personable Saito, who was closely associated with the
chairman of the Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company, suggested Japa-
nese dislike of the Washington ratio.10 But at the same time, Tokyo
desired lower naval costs in the future, especially in auxiliary ships,
following the disastrous bank emergency that spring. Given this situ-
ation, the instructions for the delegates at Geneva approved by Wak-
atsuki's government were reaffirmed by the Tanaka government at a
ministerial conference May 3.11
OPENING DISCUSSIONS
In addition to Schof ield and the voting delegates, Rear Admiral Jones
and Ambassador Gibson, the American delegation at Geneva in-
cluded Rear Admiral Andrew T. Long, a member of the General Board
and a veteran of other conferences, notably the Paris Peace Confer-
ence; Captain J.M. Reeves (promoted to rear admiral during the con-
ference), commander of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet; Captain Ar-
thur J. Hepburn, the quiet, studious director of Naval Intelligence;
Captain Adolphus Andrews, who had been present at the Preparatory
Commission meetings; Captain W.W. Smyth, a gunnery specialist;
Lieutenant Commander Harold C. Train (promoted to commander
during the conference), who had been at the Preparatory Commis-
sion meetings; and Lieutenant Commander H.H. Frost. Also in-
cluded were Allen W. Dulles, the former State Department official
and disarmament specialist, then in private legal practice and Hugh
R. Wilson, the newly appointed, young (Schof ield thought too young)
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minister to Switzerland, who would serve as secretary-general of the
conference.
Some American officials worried that naval representatives,
lacking finesse and imagination, and little fearing the junior diplo-
mats of the delegation, might interfere in the diplomatic activity at
the conference. Yet Gibson wrote that Jones "is a lovable old boy but
it takes him forever to make up his mind and somewhat longer to
explain his ideas. As a result he did not produce one idea during our
recent meeting and I was to all intents and purposes our naval ex-
pert. We got away with it but it is too big a chance to take next
time."12 But William Castle wished that Kellogg would go to the
conference because the secretary might monitor the navy men and,
if needed, "sit on them with great vigor." Castle was probably overly
optimistic about this, as Kellogg did not do it in Washington. Castle
also worried about the effect the undistinguished delegation from
the U.S. might have on the outcome of the conference.13 Castle con-
cluded that "all in all, I feel that we may be riding for a great fall
unless we are extremely careful."14
The British delegation included—in addition to the leading dele-
gates, Cecil and Bridgeman, and Admirals Field and Jellicoe—Rear
Admiral A.D.P.R. Pound, assistant chief of the naval staff (who would
take Field's place when he became ill); Captain W.A. Egerton; Lieu-
tenant Colonel W.W. Godfrey; and Vice Admiral Aubrey Smith, liai-
son officer, together with representatives of the Dominions.
Accompanying the Japanese delegates, Saito and Ishii, were
Saburi Sadao, the director of the Bureau of Treaties and Conventions
in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Vice Admiral Kobayashi; Rear
Admiral Hara Kanjiro; Captain Hori Teikichi; Captain Toyoda Tei-
jiro, naval attache at London until March 1927 and close to Saito;
Captain Koga Mineichi, and various junior officers.
As Castle had feared, the Japanese delegation expressed concern
to Bridgeman in early June that Gibson was to preside over the con-
ference, for he was inferior in rank both to Japanese and to British
delegates.15 Ambassador Matsudaira pointed out to the Americans
that Gibson, although respected, did not rank with Saito, the most
prominent statesman in Japan, or with Ishii, the most senior foreign
office official. The Japanese, however, later sought to reassure the
Americans when the new navy minister, Admiral Okada, stated
that he wished to "shatter the illusion" that the Japanese objected
to American personnel.16
Delegates of all three nations considered informal discussion at
the outset, but time was short between the end of the third session
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of the Preparatory Commission and the opening of the conference.
Also, the delegates had only recently been selected, and many re-
membered the tactic of Charles Evans Hughes, who had made the
well-remembered American proposals at the first session of the
Washington Conference. In opposing preliminary talks, Beatty re-
marked: "There is no doubt that the United States scored tremen-
dously at Washington by withholding her proposals for a Naval Hol-
iday till the first public Session. The idea caught the imagination of
the world, and made it difficult for any Power to oppose it. There is
not so much credit to be expected this time, but what there may be
we should endeavour to obtain. Therefore if the Conference is to
hold Public Sessions, I consider we should not communicate our
proposals to the other Powers. . . . I would give nothing without a
quid pro quo."17 The other delegates agreed. The Americans as-
sumed preliminary talks were unnecessary because of Jones's con-
versations with the British. The Japanese refrained because they
wished to determine the positions of the other powers and only
then promote their own demands. The press reports from Geneva,
especially in the French newspapers, and the reports of Wythe Wil-
liams, correspondent for the New York Times, gave the participants
hints and started many rumors about the probable substance of
each power's proposals. Williams wrote that Britain should disman-
tle naval bases that might threaten American coastal and trade
routes since this would be an equivalent sacrifice to the one the
American navy made at Washington in scrapping capital ships and
not fortifying Guam. On June 1, Williams described the British pref-
erence for six-inch-gunned cruisers as a trick to prevent attacks on
armed merchantmen, which could not mount eight-inch guns.18
The first plenary session of the conference opened on the after-
noon of June 20, 1927, in the League of Nations' Glass Room, which
held about three hundred people. After photographs, the Americans
sat at the head of a large U-shaped table, with the Japanese on their
left and the British on their right. Minor officials and observers took
chairs around the sides of the room.
Gibson welcomed delegates in a voice barely audible and oversaw
the establishment of procedural matters. He outlined the American
proposals, concentrating on reduction of tonnages and continuation
of the Washington treaty limits,- Kellogg had forbidden the delegates
to introduce the nonfortification issue. Gibson proposed that the ra-
tios and principles of the Washington treaties apply to auxiliary ves-
sels. Auxiliary ships, he suggested, should be divided into classes—
cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and other vessels. He recommended
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total tonnages for cruisers of 250,000 to 300,000 tons for the U.S. and
Britain and 150,000 to 180,000 for Japan. For destroyers he suggested
200,000 to 250,000 total tons for the U.S. and Britain and 120,000 to
150,000 for Japan. He concluded that submarines might displace
60,000 to 90,000 tons for the U.S. and Britain and 36,000 to 54,000 for
Japan. The American proposal sought low tonnages in all classes be-
cause the Congress probably would refuse higher limits.19
Bridgeman offered the British proposals in a loud, clear voice,
declaring he would "not be revealing any secrets hitherto unknown."
Indeed, he continued, "I am more likely to be accused of repeating
well-worn platitudes." He suggested extending the lives of ships,
from twenty to twenty-six years for capital ships, twenty-four for
eight-inch-gun cruisers, twenty for destroyers, and fifteen for sub-
marines. He advocated reduction in displacement and gun size for
battleships and aircraft carriers. Turning to cruisers, he recom-
mended that the 5-5-3 ratio apply to eight-inch-gun cruisers and,
after the numbers of eight-inch-gun cruisers had been set, a limit of
future cruisers to 7,500 tons and six-inch guns. For destroyers, he
suggested guns of five inches and displacement of 1,400 to 1,750
tons. He noted British willingness to eliminate submarines, but, as
powers not at the conference might object, he stood ready only to
apply limits. He avoided the issue of total tonnage and noted that
any agreement at the conference would have to please France and
Italy, who were not participating officially. Whereas the Americans
proposed limiting cruisers at 5-5-3, according to total tonnage, then,
the British wanted the 5-5-3 ratio for heavy cruisers, based on ton-
nage, armaments, and age, but not on cruisers less than 7,500 tons
and carrying six-inch guns.
Finally, Viscount Saito submitted the Japanese proposals, ob-
serving that capital ships and aircraft carriers (for which the Japa-
nese wanted a higher ratio) were not in his outline. He suggested
that the powers not increase tonnages of authorized ships. He ex-
cluded ships under 700 tons, carrying guns under three inches (or no
more than four guns, between three and six inches), and aircraft
carriers under 10,000 tons. Destroyers, together with submarines,
would have a life of twelve years, and larger ships a life of sixteen
years. Excess tonnage should be destroyed and "appropriate regula-
tions" cover replacement construction, to avoid sudden tonnage dif-
ferences between the conferring powers. In line with the Japanese
strategy of "wait and see," his suggestions appeared vague.20
It is interesting that each power's proposals followed the recom-
mendations of its admirals. Flag officers in the 1920s received re-
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spect, since they had not gotten into trouble in the world war—
aside from the Battle of Jutlafid. Admirals at Geneva encountered
little resistance on technical issues from civilians. In the case of the
Americans, as noted, navy men were more senior than their State
Department counterparts. Diplomats rarely felt able to counter the
technical experts' advice because the president appeared to back the
navy men. Admiral Beatty dominated discussions in London, while
the prime minister appeared ambivalent about the conference. In
addition, the British may not have seen the conference as more than
a technical meeting: Ian Nish has claimed that the British did not
consider limits on auxiliaries as an extension of the "Washington
System."21 Navy men in Japan were more prominent in the govern-
ment and many held political or diplomatic posts, making the dis-
tinction between political and technical responsibilities hazy.
At any rate, after the opening plenary and executive sessions,
the admirals dominated proceedings for the next two weeks, both
informally and in technical sessions. They dealt first with battle-
ships, a subject unexpectedly brought up by the British. The Ameri-
cans, diplomats and admirals, were upset by London's proposal to
discuss modification of battleships before 1931, the date set by the
Five-Power Treaty. Gibson and Dulles visited Saito and the cautious
Ishii to find out the Japanese position, and Ishii, who spoke better
English, replied that the Japanese government might like the econ-
omies provided by further reduction in capital ships, but he would
have to await instructions from Tokyo. The American delegates did
not come away reassured, for they wanted to prevent the Japanese
from increasing their battleship ratio, in light of the Washington
limit on fortification of the Pacific islands.22
Despite American concerns, humor managed to leaven the dis-
cussion. Admiral Jones and Captain Hepburn met Admiral Ko-
bayashi and Saburi in Jones's office at the Hotel Les Bergues on June
25 to consider an approach to the battleship and cruiser problems.
During the conversation the Japanese inadvertently demonstrated
their concern about ratios, which they preferred to describe by other
names, possibly thinking the term "ratio" insulting. As Hepburn
noted later; "At one point Admiral Kobayashi used the word 'ratios,'
which caused both Mr. Saburi and Admiral Jones to laugh; the latter
saying that he was glad to see that the Japanese delegation had appar-
ently got over their objection to the use of that term. Admiral Ko-
bayashi said something about its only being a term, and Mr. Saburi
still laughing said they were going to propose a five-franc fine for
every mention of it." The Americans remained uncertain how the
OPENING GAMBITS 59
Japanese would stand on capital ships, and with reason, as the Japa-
nese announced on June 27 that they might accept the British pro-
posal to reconsider age limitation and tonnages of that category.23
But the cruiser issue overshadowed this problem and, indeed, all
others, so the technical committees turned to the subject of light and
heavy cruisers. Describing heavy cruisers, the British opined that
"this type will . . . eventually disappear," although it currently oper-
ated with the battle fleet, and that the Washington-dictated displace-
ment of 10,000 tons was unduly large. In conversation with Gibson
on June 23, Bridgeman and Cecil suggested informally that the
United States might not want to build to the level that the British
deemed necessary for their security and that of the Dominions. Gib-
son responded that they could settle the matter when Washington
decided on its program, but the right of parity remained fundamental.
Bridgeman said again that the British favored dividing cruisers into
two classes. He reported to London that in informal discussion the
Americans held that small cruisers were of little use but conceded
that if tonnage of light cruisers went as high as 7,500, they did not
foresee difficulties in dividing cruisers into classes. The Japanese fa-
vored limiting large cruisers, probably at the Washington ratio of
5-5-3, but preferred a total tonnage for small cruisers and would prob-
ably build more.24
Although the Americans would accept the division of cruisers
into classes, British demands for cruiser tonnage at 607,950, com-
pared to the proposed U.S. total of 511,945, or a 6-5 ratio, shocked
them, as Schofield confided in his diary. The United States wanted
to cut total tonnage drastically, not expand it, and refused to consid-
er any increased British tonnage. To keep track of the informal
talks, Gibson ordered a record book for the American Chancery at
Les Bergues; members of the delegation were to read and initial the
minutes. (Foreign offices in the 1920s still maintained the pretense
that they did not record informal talks.) Gibson's arrangement ap-
pears to reflect his concern over the proposed high British tonnage,
and perhaps also his desire to document intransigence in case the
conference failed.25
In Washington, Secretary Kellogg took offense at the British de-
mand for a large number of cruisers. He declared to Gibson that the
only nations with navies large enough to threaten the British were
the U.S. and Japan, and their representatives were at Geneva for the
purpose of limiting navies. Although Kellogg still hoped for agree-
ment, he began to distrust the intentions of the British.26
The Japanese expressed surprise at the high British figure, but
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held to their plan, which vaguely advocated a status-quo arrange-
ment with a holiday in auxiliary ships. They wished to preserve
their lead in cruisers over the Americans and, as Saito told Gibson,
would not accept a 5-5-3 ratio. Asked about rumors that Japan
would demand equality, Saito remained noncommittal, answering
only that his government would ask for tonnages on the basis of its
requirements. The opposition in Tokyo, the newly formed Minseito
party (made up of smaller opposition groups), joined with Premier
Tanaka's majority Seiyukai party in approving Saito's position.27
Seeking to head off speculation about his government's plans,
the vice minister of the Marine in Tokyo explained to a British naval
attache that the Japanese press remained poorly informed about the
negotiations. When told that it was too early for the ministry to
make a statement about the talks, Japanese journals fell back on
conjecture, he said, which might explain the articles attacking the
British and American positions at the conference. He assured the
attache that the government was considering proposals and would
make its position known.28
In a thoughtful article, the American journalist Frank H. Si-
monds speculated that the Japanese might propose a limit on cruis-
ers based on existing strength, a reasonable idea, since the Ameri-
cans had used that basis at the Washington Conference in the cases
of France and Italy. But he cautioned that Americans would not ac-
cept permanent inferiority with Tokyo. He offered little hope for
success in Geneva, as Americans expected both Japan and Britain to
give up any thought of cruiser supremacy, as the U.S. had done with
battleships at Washington. Those countries, he reminded his read-
ers, had different strategic needs than those of the U.S.29
As the month of June came to a close, delegates and observers
began to realize that a treaty might not be possible. While the Japa-
nese made little comment, Bridgeman warned Baldwin that negotia-
tion on cruisers would be difficult; he complained that the other
two delegations had proved slow in furnishing material for the Brit-
ish and that the Americans answered questions reluctantly and
seemed to be playing for time. Cecil sounded a more pessimistic
note in his report to London, in which he recognized American fi-
nancial ability but overestimated the desire of the American govern-
ment and public to increase their navy:
The conference here is not going extraordinarily well so far. I am afraid the
Admiralty made a mistake in insisting upon such profound secrecy about
our proposals before we came. No doubt it was tempting to play the part of
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the leading advocate for disarmament, but the fundamental fact of the situ-
ation is that we have gpt to do what the Americans wish, since they alone
are able and willing to build to any extent if we do not reach an agreement.
Unfortunately, as they had no guidance as to what we were going to pro-
pose, they arrive here in a rather suspicious frame of mind.30
Kellogg predicted to Gibson that even if the British put forward
its cruiser claims seriously, analysis of them would justify failure to
conclude a treaty in the eyes of the public: "It might even have the
effect of stimulating [the] zeal of Congress for competition build-
ing." From his vacation in South Dakota, President Coolidge sent
his encouragement to Kellogg.31
A CRUISER IMBROGLIO
Shortly thereafter, the Americans thought they detected a ray of
hope. Gibson reported that Bridgeman had consented to parity in
cruisers with the United States. In informal discussion, Schofield
suggested to the British a cruiser limit to last until 1936, based on a
formula for avoiding construction.32
But the British had not backed down. Churchill argued against a
treaty that granted parity with the United States, complaining that
the Americans had put forward the demand for reasons of prestige,
not need. He sagely suggested that as long as Britain led in cruiser
construction, and set a slow pace, the U.S. would probably follow, as
Coolidge seemed disinclined to increase the navy. With ill temper
he concluded that "it always seems to be assumed that it is our duty
to humour the United States and minister to their vanity. They do
nothing for us in return, but exact their pound of flesh."33 After
consultation with London, Bridgeman explained that Britain would
discuss a cruiser scrapping plan if America agreed to four principles:
a higher age for ships, the six-inch gun for light cruisers, a 7,500-ton
displacement for new light cruisers, and a limit on cruisers with
eight-inch guns. The United States responded by sending the cruiser
question back to the technical committee, and the Japanese told
Gibson the British tonnage figure saddened them.34
The cruiser imbroglio came to a head. An irritated State Depart-
ment cabled its delegates on July 2 to insist on a maximum total
cruiser tonnage of 400,000 tons. Over the Fourth of July weekend,
while most delegates were out of the city, Schofield drew up a pro-
posal for the next technical meeting: he was through trying to com-
promise with the British. Gibson added a final line to the docu-
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ment, per his instructions from Washington, which disclosed that
the Americans would not consider proposals for limitation higher
than 400,000 tons.35
When Jones revealed the terms on July 5, the technical commit-
tee members seemed stunned. Back at his office Jones apparently
had second thoughts and worried that the proposal might sound to
the British like an ultimatum; his fear was well-founded. Bridge-
man cabled London that "we have reached something like a climax
over cruisers." He could hardly believe that after the conference had
accomplished so much in respect to other classes of vessels the
Americans would break it up over the cruiser issue.36
The Cabinet in London split on the proper course of action. For-
eign Minister Austen Chamberlain had arrived back in London frpm
the League Council meeting and a vacation in the South of France in
late June, ill-prepared to face the crisis. He had had no messages for-
warded and knew little more about the conference than what he
could read in the Times. He was confused by the sketchy details
discussed in Cabinet, for the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID)
and the Cabinet Committee for Disarmament headed by Lord Salis-
bury, Cecil's brother, had handled most of the work of the Geneva
Conference. Nevertheless, Chamberlain apparently felt confident
enough to attack Churchill's contention that a breakdown of the
conference would not prove disastrous.37 Churchill had argued that
without an agreement, the Americans would probably build ten
cruisers, which would not hurt Britain. Indeed, he had concluded, the
collapse of negotiations might provoke a reaction in the US. that
would assist limitation. Chamberlain replied that the British would
be forced either to build eight-inch cruisers or to drop the one-power
standard. He was anxious for success at Geneva because if naval re-
duction did not occur, there seemed little prospect of a general disar-
mament conference in the spirit of Locarno, a meeting which was
dear to his heart. But Churchill and Beatty carried the Cabinet.
Chamberlain therefore instructed the delegation at Geneva to reite-
rate the British position on total tonnages, grant no parity in light
cruisers (a reversal of Bridgeman's assurances), and use the delega-
tion's press connections to publicize the government's objectives.38
For their part, the Japanese repeated to Gibson that they consid-
ered the British tonnage totals too high. They proposed restricting
cruisers to 450,000 tons for the U.S. and Britain and 300,000 for
themselves, adding that they would welcome lower figures. Gibson
considered withdrawing the U.S. proposal of 400,000 but his techni-
cal advisers, especially Schofield, talked him out of it.39
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The day after the technical meeting, American and British dele-
gates met in a stormy session. Cecil asked heatedly if the Ameri-
cans meant the 400,000-ton proposal as an ultimatum, and Gibson
assured him they did not. Perhaps he was too convincing, for the
British left the meeting believing that he was more conciliatory
than his naval advisers when, in fact, he had been responsible for
the harsh presentation of his country's proposal. Whatever the im-
pression Gibson created, the Americans were determined to hold
their position, and Kellogg told Ambassador Esme Howard that the
U.S. insisted on limits for all classes of vessels, including cruisers.
As concessions, Washington would accept an agreement with an
escape clause in the event nonsignatories increased naval armament
and would discuss anew the capital-ship question.40
Kellogg approved the American delegates' position, even if the
conference should fail because of it. A private meeting of American
and British delegates and advisers might be beneficial, but he sug-
gested adjournment for a week or so if breakdown appeared immi-
nent. He agreed that in case of failure Gibson should make a state-
ment that the Americans accepted the limit on cruisers and de-
stroyers that Hughes had proposed at Washington—that is, 450,000
tons. President Coolidge telegraphed his support: "Tell Gibson
what is needed is not excuse or soft words but clear strong state-
ment of American position. Let blame fall where may. Your plan
approved."41
Room remained for bargaining over cruisers, especially consid-
ering the Japanese proposal for total tonnage, but thus far neither
Washington nor London seemed inclined to compromise.
It was a strange impasse, in which theory dominated fact. As
mentioned, the British government really disliked the idea of build-
ing larger, so-called heavy cruisers, simply because the American
navy desired to build them. The Americans themselves had created
this issue but then chose not to build as rapidly as the British and
Japanese. The nation most threatened by the existence of large
cruisers was clearly Japan, and yet at Geneva the Japanese refused to
offer any constructive proposals, preferring to choose their best
course from among their opponents' proposals. The negotiation was
largely a series of poses, not in accord with reality because, after all,
none of the large cruisers had gone down the ways.
In such a situation one might expect the civilians, members of the
governments in Washington, London, and Tokyo, to take charge—to
decide what their national interests dictated. The success at Wash-
ington, they surely knew, had derived from the willingness of civil-
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ians to make choices in naval armament, not allowing the experts
alone to decide what was best. Something, one must conclude, had
happened to the heads of governments in the capitals of the major
naval powers, for this time around they were not willing to suppress
the building zeal of naval officers.
The root cause of the impasse at Geneva is difficult to know. It
may have been the receding memory of the world war, which made
issues of armament less pressing than they were in 1921-22. It may
have been the appearance of prosperity throughout the world fol-
lowing the violence of 1914-18—fears of an economic collapse had
somehow subsided, and national economies had gone from strength
to strength. It may have been a lack of imagination among the lead-
ers who, for some reason or reasons, were simply not up to the re-
quirements of the moment, the need to move decisively for limita-
tion at least, and if possible, reduction.
In any event, it was still not beyond the realm of possibility that
the conferees could find a solution to the cruiser impasse, and early
in July 1927 they turned to this possibility.
4
A DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE
All conferences come to an end, and so did the Geneva Naval Con-
ference; the concern of the historian is how it happened. The enor-
mously important problem of the limitation of arms, and, in 1927,
the limitation specifically of naval arms, seemed to have a real
chance of resolution in the 1920s; the first instance of this fortune
had occurred in 1921-22 at Washington. The second, presumably,
would take place at Geneva. The League of Nations was working
feverishly on a somewhat larger program—the limitation of all
arms, both on land and on sea. The League was pursuing this possi-
bility in part, of course, because the Treaty of Versailles had limited
German armaments and related that Germany's limitation was
only the first step in general limitation. The purposes of the Wash-
ington and Geneva conferences were, one might say, more modest.
But in retrospect, considering that they involved the Japanese gov-
ernment, they were of almost equal importance. Japan would attack
the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor only fourteen years after the
Geneva Conference of 1927. The failure at Geneva hence held great
importance for the future, for the way in which failure came about
is an indication of why the powers could not maintain peace in the
interwar years.
THE SHEARER QUESTION
Part of the difficulties during the naval discussions of 1927 lay in
the animosity, the irritability, that surrounded Anglo-American af-
fairs, and at the center of this problem was the American naval
publicist-cum-journalist William Shearer. Present during the talks
in Geneva, he circulated daily anti-British communiques on naval
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matters. The British Foreign Office on July 2 received an inquiry
about him from its delegation at Geneva. The delegates believed
that Shearer, while posing as a journalist, was really working for
American steel interests and hoped to wreck the conference. They
reported that the American delegation appeared equally anxious to
stop him but had insufficient evidence for the purpose. Suspecting
that Scotland Yard possessed a dossier on him, the delegates asked
that it be sent to Geneva.1
Although the delegates might have overstressed American anxi-
ety (after all, Shearer supported the American position), they accu-
rately reflected the annoyance of Britons in Geneva, London, and
Washington over the ability of the American press to discredit Brit-
ish proposals or, as Sir Esme Howard put it, to "queer the pitch
every time."2 Although leaks from the conference appeared most
frequently in the French press (presumably through French ob-
servers at the conference), the British were more exasperated with
American journalists who wrote scathing attacks on the British ne-
gotiating position or perennially favored other nations. In the latter
instance they could cite the francophile Edwin James of the New
York Times who had covered the meetings of the Preparatory Com-
mission. At length Scotland Yard complied with the request and
furnished the desired document on Shearer.
Shearer was indeed an interesting lobbyist. He was good-looking,
a careful dresser, and a bright and easy conversationalist. A foe of
the League of Nations, Britain, Judaism, Asiatic peoples, interna-
tionalism, pacifism, and communism (or, as he said, of pink, yellow,
and red), he had published a novel in 1926, Pacifico, about an Amer-
ican naval officer who discovered a Japanese plot to crush the
United States. A writer for Collier's Weekly surmised that "in the
old days he would have sold patent medicine or lightning rods. To-
day he sells patriotism, a product with a much higher social status
and more profitable to sell."3 Shearer maintained good relations
with Wythe Williams of the New York Times and Henry Wales of
the Chicago Tribune, who arranged for him to secure press creden-
tials from the New York Daily News. Reporters themselves be-
lieved that Shearer worked for arms manufacturers.
They were, of course, right. Shearer had lobbied for shipbuilders
in 1926, and afterward officials of the National Council of American
Shipbuilders engaged him. Any restrictions on construction of cruis-
ers might cost the shipbuilders as much as $54 million,4 they calcu-
lated, for the year 1926 had witnessed a sharp decline in orders.
Shearer was hired on March 17, 1927, in a meeting with Samuel W.
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Wakeman, a vice president of Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation,
and Frederick P. Palen and Clinton L. Bardo of New York Shipbuild-
ing, a subsidiary of American Brown-Boveri Electrical Corporation.
He communicated with the shipbuilders through Henry C. Hunter,
counsel for the National Council of American Shipbuilding, of which
Bethlehem, New York, and Newport News Shipbuilding were the
only members.5
In Geneva, the wily Shearer propounded the navy's case, vexed
the British, but made little real difference in the course of the nego-
tiations. For information he used a booklet prepared by the General
Board of the Navy, and let other journalists see it, providing them
with tables about gun caliber, elevation, tonnage, and other techni-
cal points. He occasionally dined with junior members of the Amer-
ican technical staff. But Rear Admiral Schofield remarked in his
diary that in dealing with the press he and the other advisers talked
only about reasons for American proposals and said nothing about
decisions reached or progress made. After dining with Shearer one
evening, Schofield wrote that, as usual, Shearer had done all the
talking. Shearer did not learn much of importance during his time
in Geneva. He even missed the biggest leak of the conference, for it
was French journalists, probably with the assistance of French in-
formateurs, who first revealed the large British figure for cruiser
tonnage.6
Shearer tried to make up for lapses in his ability as a lobbyist by
claiming that the British were already over the tonnage limit in cap-
ital ships established by the Washington treaty. Williams repeated
the charges in the New York Times. Annoyed, the British filed a
protest with the State Department.7 In a cable to Gibson, Kellogg
asked if reports about lobbyists for steel interests were true. Gibson
said he had no idea of anyone in Geneva associated with steel inter-
ests and thought the British had brought this up to explain the criti-
cal attitude of the American press. It is interesting that by this time
the British had shown Gibson their dossier on Shearer.8 Gibson per-
haps was embarrassed by his own ignorance.
At Geneva the essential problem was not press distortion, how-
ever, it was governments that could not agree on cruisers. Poor com-
munication between delegates in Geneva and their governments,
which, the delegates regularly complained, gave them no informa-
tion, exacerbated this problem. Yet the French had leaked many se-
crets during meetings of the third Preparatory Commission and dele-
gates had not complained as strongly. The admirals wanted cruisers.9
The humorist Will Rogers wryly observed that "two more disarma-
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ment conferences and there won't be enough ocean to hold all the
cruisers they want to build."10
THE PHANTOM OF PARITY
Delegates struggled to find areas of agreement, and the first progress
came in the Technical Committee's meeting of July 8, when its
members agreed on limitation of destroyers, fixing the maximum
displacement for destroyer flotilla leaders, which carried additional
equipment, at 1,850 tons, and that for ordinary destroyers at 1,500
tons. Flotilla leaders, they concurred, might make up 16 percent of
each nation's destroyer tonnage. They designated a five-inch gun as
maximum armament and sixteen years as an age limit. The British
wanted 221,600 tons of destroyers, with 29,600 as leaders, while the
Americans and Japanese withheld their figures until establishment
of cruiser tonnage.
The committee also set tentative limits for other ship catego-
ries, limiting displacement for submarines to 1,800 tons, with max-
imum gun caliber of five inches and an age limit at thirteen years.
The British had proposed dividing submarines into classes, one of
1,000-to-1,600 tons, the other under 600, but the Japanese and
Americans had disagreed, and the British yielded. Technical experts
also agreed not to limit any type of ship under 600 tons, provided it
carried no guns over six inches, no torpedo tubes, and did not have a
speed over eighteen knots.
But the experts on each side did less well with cruisers, as they
largely maintained their previous positions. The British still asked
fifteen heavy and fifty-five light, while the Japanese hinted that
they might agree to a smaller cruiser class of 8,000 tons, albeit with
eight-inch guns. The Americans asked for a total cruiser tonnage of
300,000 to 400,000."
The conference's executive committee held its second formal
session the same day and accepted the Technical Committee's re-
port. Attempting to find a solution to the problem of total tonnage
for cruisers, the Japanese suggested that the conferees group figures
for cruisers and destroyers together, with totals of 450,000 for Brit-
ain and the U.S. and 300,000 for Japan. Gibson spoke against ton-
nage limits, and the committee decided to consider the question
between that meeting and the next. The British insisted on a plen-
ary session on July 11 to present their case, as they believed their
position had been misrepresented in the press. Gibson and Ishii
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PARITY—WITH A DIFFERENCE.
[ERICA. "HOW'S THIS FOE FIFTY-FIFTY?"
IITANNIA. "VEKY NICE; BUT YOUR TBIDENT'S MAINLY A LUXURY, WHILE MINE'S AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY."
Punch, August 3, 1927.
strongly opposed such an early date, fearing that views of delega-
tions would harden when subjected to public scrutiny. In the end,
the British did postpone the meeting for a few days, ostensibly to
discuss the proposal of a temporary cruiser restriction and to honor
a recently assassinated delegate from the Irish Free State, Kevin
O'Higgins.12
Before the next executive committee session Britons and Amer-
icans sought a breakthrough on cruisers. Both delegations consulted
with their governments, and naval advisers met in small groups.
Gibson and Dulles considered a compromise in cruiser numbers,
but their naval advisers persuaded them against it. Gibson had
drafted a cable to Washington suggesting fifteen cruisers instead of
twenty-five, but Jones and Schofield prevailed on him not to send it.
Schofield told Hugh Wilson: "As between breaking up the confer-
ence and sacrificing national interests, I thought that we could
quite well afford to break up the conference."13
On the British side, Admiral Jellicoe counselled Bridgeman and
Cecil to hold for a total of seventy cruisers, although he thought
that a new tack—limiting cruisers for a shorter period of time rath-
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er than attempting an arrangement that would last until 1936—
deserved study. Jellicoe had returned from consultation in London
prepared to do battle for the cruisers. He had written in a private
letter that the American program had only one object, "equality
with Great Britain on the sea. We cannot help it if they build up to
our required standard, but we can avoid lowering our standard to
suit them, and we shall of course take this line."14 At a private
meeting of leading delegates (except Jones), Cecil suggested study-
ing building programs for 1927-31 and concentrating on cruisers for
those years only. He proposed restricting all programs to 400,000
tons through 1931. Bridgeman and Cecil assured the others that the
British could assent to this, but not to setting cruiser tonnage lower
than 465,000 until 1936. Gibson said he would study the proposal.15
Bridgeman meanwhile pressed for seventy cruisers and equivo-
cated on parity. At a press conference, he emphasized the require-
ments of empire, underscoring Britain's need for seventy cruisers
and questioning America's need for heavy cruisers. Although he
hoped for a settlement just before the plenary session of July 14, he
refuted Kellogg's charge that delegates at the Washington Confer-
ence had agreed to 450,000 tons as a maximum limit for destroyers
and cruisers. The journalists were openly skeptical of Bridgeman's
claims and interpreted them as a retreat from parity.16
Chamberlain also hedged on the issue of parity, appearing to offer
it in one breath and attack American need of it in the next. In Lon-
don, Ambassador Alanson Houghton asked Chamberlain for the
minimum number of cruisers Whitehall would accept and wondered
if the British objected to the American figure of twenty-five. Cham-
berlain evasively replied that Britain desired the "same parity for
which you ask." He would scrap some of the fifteen heavy cruisers
then being built, and he offered to go to Geneva and meet Kellogg if
the Americans thought it would help. But at the same time, Cham-
berlain assailed the American position, claiming that he could not
understand U.S. opposition to light cruisers armed with six-inch
guns since American experts at the conference had never maintained
that the cruising radius of the smaller ship was too short. British
naval experts, he continued, could not believe that the Americans
would take such a position, as the argument had no technical founda-
tion. The Admiralty had assured him that a 7,500-ton cruiser, armed
with six-inch guns, had a range of 3,000 to 4,000 miles at full speed
and 7,000 to 8,000 at cruising speed. Coming slowly to his point,
Chamberlain concluded that the Japanese posed a problem in the
negotiation, too, for if the U.S. embarked on a large cruiser program
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(achieving parity with Britain), the Japanese would build more ships
and the British would have to follow with even more. Britain in any
event, he said, needed seventy cruisers, and he suggested that a maxi-
mum number be established that each power would agree not to ex-
ceed before 1936.17 He apparently did not realize the incongruity of
arguing for an absolute number based on the relative strength of other
powers. In a speech to Parliament the same day, he added an obscure
caveat: "We do not attempt to suggest that in any class of vessel they
[the Americans] are not entitled to parity, without criticism or objec-
tion from us, that their needs require."18 The key word, of course, was
"needs," which the Americans in British eyes did not have.
In Washington, Ambassador Howard found Secretary Kellogg fu-
ming about headlines in the Washington Post stating that he had
rejected the British heavy-cruiser proposal. Kellogg protested that he
did not even know what the proposal was. The secretary's irritation
was partly the fault of Howard, who had spent part of the summer
in cool Massachusetts out of direct contact with the State Depart-
ment, while Kellogg dealt with a charge d'affaires in sweltering
Washington. But the ambassador had returned to Washington on
July 7 when it appeared that problems at Geneva might require his
presence in Washington. Kellogg was also himself at fault: he had
neglected to delegate responsibility for communications received
from Geneva, so few in the State Department could inform him of
developments.
The conference plodded along. At the plenary session on July
14, each delegation stated its latest position, which had been pre-
sented to the other delegations in private the day before. Arguing for
total cruiser and destroyer limits of 450,000 to 550,000 tons, Gibson
charged that British figures were based on the strengths of the other
powers and not on absolute need. He objected to light cruisers,
which he privately called "woolly lambs" or the "kitten fleet," but
conceded that the number of heavy cruisers could be negotiable af-
ter delegates set tonnage limits. Exasperated, he finally announced
that if the Japanese and British reached agreement on main issues,
Americans might make the decision unanimous. He made no com-
ment on the British proposal for considering building programs only
binding to 1931.
At this juncture Admiral Jellicoe extended the debate. He stressed
the need for lines of communication and hence seventy cruisers: "It
is a generally accepted view that in a fleet five cruisers are required
for every three capital ships. With a British fleet of 15 capital ships
the number of cruisers needed for fleet work, therefore, is 25, and
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45 out of 70 are therefore left for direct trade protection. Of this
number we must expect 12 to be refitting or fueling at any given
moment. With lines of communication 80,000 miles in length, this
gives one cruiser for every 2,500 miles of communication."19 Jel-
licoe admitted that by any conceivable means the navy could not
stop commerce raiders from entering non-Mediterranean ports. He
thus succeeded only in demonstrating the opposite of what he
intended—that seventy or any other number of cruisers would be
inadequate to protect trade. Churchill had received similarly contra-
dictory responses to earlier questions as to why the Admiralty de-
sired seventy cruisers. Perhaps the Admiralty refused to adjust its
figures because it surmised that seventy cruisers was the most it
could expect from Parliament.
Lord Lee of Fareham, former First Lord of the Admiralty and a
participant at the Washington Conference, now took a more realis-
tic view of parity. As First Lord of the Admiralty, he had advocated
building the fleet, as the Americans before the Washington Confer-
ence were augmenting their fleet. But in a letter to the Times he
now averred that the British would gain more from granting parity,
without proof of need, because they enjoyed a comfortable lead and,
as Churchill said, the Americans probably would not build to lim-
its.20 At the same time, some Cabinet members worried that the
call for 600,000 ships and 70 cruisers would lock the Cabinet into a
cruiser-building program not yet committed to and wondered if
these figures were new or related to those approved in the building
program of 1925. Cabinet referred these questions for reexamina-
tion to the CID.21
The British were particularly annoyed with Admiral Jones, who
had infuriated them by equating the lines of imperial communica-
tion and commerce with America's commercial routes, especially in
the Pacific. Discounting the British need to maintain trade routes
except in the North Sea and Mediterranean, he displayed no under-
standing of empire—that to a Briton defending Australia was as im-
portant as defending the Isle of Wight. He exaggerated American
commerce in the Pacific, conveniently forgetting that U.S. trade with
the Far East made up only 10 percent of the total and most of that was
with Japan.22 His lack of tact did not help—Hugh Wilson thought
Jones's debating style, such as it was, lacked variety, and Admiral
Kobayashi offered a backhanded compliment in an interview, saying:
"there are some people who say that Admiral Jones . . . is a pig-
headed old man, but my impression is that he is an earnest man not
like a Yankee."23
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THE ANGLO-JAPANESE COMPROMISE
Responding to Gibson's call for Anglo-Japanese conversation, the
British and the Japanese held informal discussions for two days, as
Bridgeman noted, in an improved atmosphere. The press hinted
about a new Anglo-Japanese alliance, and the Japanese anxiously
kept Americans informed about the negotiations. Captain Egerton
told Schofield that the British hoped to compromise and that the
Cabinet was considering some of the questions. Baldwin had con-
sidered calling the delegation home but permitted Bridgeman and
Cecil to continue the talks at their request.24
Gibson received the compromise at a private meeting on July 17.
Tokyo and London suggested up to 500,000 tons of surface auxiliary
vessels for Britain and the U.S., 325,000 for Japan, and a heavy cruiser
limit of twelve for the U.S. and Britain and eight for Japan. Light cruis-
ers could carry only six-inch guns, and Britain could retain its four
Hawkins-class cruisers, the United States its ten Omaha-class, and
Japan its four Fmutaka-class. All powers could maintain 25 percent
of overage ships.25
The Americans asked for instructions from Washington and, in
a cable to Kellogg, recommended rejection of the compromise. They
objected to retention of overage ships, since those of the British and
Japanese were newer than the American (Congress had not author-
ized any auxiliary ships between 1904 and 1916). They also found
fault with the proposed increased ratio for Japan and the use of
small guns on cruisers. Schofield had recast the cable because the
original contained arguments why allowances could be made to the
other delegations. His draft mentioned none of them and pointed
out why the Americans could not offer concessions.26 By allowing
the Schofield draft, Gibson did not offer Kellogg much choice, un-
fortunately; the Americans soon rejected the compromise.
Curiously, the British delegates had almost given in to the
American position. Cecil later wrote Baldwin that after the Anglo-
Japanese compromise the British seemed "on the road to an agree-
ment." Of course, he had largely been responsible for the compro-
mise. But the Americans, he said, saw little difficulty with the pro-
posals, save for the cruiser question. Compromise on this point had
seemed possible. Bridgeman recorded that discussions were at "a
critical stage" when the Cabinet recalled the delegates to London. He
could not believe that members of Cabinet had been following the
proceedings. He admitted he would have compromised on guns—
perhaps because Cecil accused him of not wanting agreement. He
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recognized that the Japanese would prefer the eight-inch gun, "main-
ly because they were unaware that they could have mechanical load-
ing for 6-inch guns as well as 8-inch (their men [were] too small to
load the 6-inch by hand)." One wonders what might have been the
reaction of the Cabinet if a tentative agreement had been reached at
this juncture. Breakthrough, even if minor, might have given pause to
critics.27
At any rate the Cabinet ordered its delegates home for consulta-
tion. Beatty, having doubts about an Anglo-Japanese compromise,
had ordered Admiral Field home, and Churchill convinced Baldwin
and other Cabinet members to recall the others, as Baldwin was
about to visit Canada with the Prince of Wales. Admiralty officers
and Cabinet members then argued against concessions. Beatty hesi-
tated to scrap cruisers and was considering technical proposals for
arming cruisers against eight-inch shells.28 These circumstances,
together with worries about Cecil's health and the fear that the Brit-
ish delegates might give too much away had encouraged the Cabinet
to call a recess.29
The Cabinet did consider compromise on the eight-inch gun.
Beatty reported that if the U.S. and Japan did not agree on the six-
inch gun, the Admiralty might consider using eight-inch guns on
smaller cruisers. He wanted to ensure that American and Japanese
cruisers would not outclass British light cruisers before 1931. He
tempered his proposal, saying it represented increased expenditure
over the existing program, which anticipated construction of light
cruisers. After a stormy session during which Cecil threatened to
resign, the Cabinet supported Beatty and Churchill and found for
the six-inch gun. In a speech before Parliament (part of a Cabinet
plan to publicize its proposals), Chamberlain summarized the Brit-
ish position, paradoxically denying that the government had forbade
parity for all cruisers with the U.S. while ruling it out for small
cruisers. He held hope for a temporary cruiser agreement, much as
the British and American delegations had discussed.30
When American representatives received news of the British
delegation's departure, an exasperated Gibson wrote his mother
that "if the show keeps on much longer the burden will pass to the
naval experts to figure out the details and I hope to have an easier
time."31 In Washington, Kellogg conferred with Secretary of the
Navy Wilbur and the chief of naval operations, Admiral Eberle. With
American delegates idle, the secretary reported developments to the
president in South Dakota and wondered privately just how closely
Coolidge was following the conference. Kellogg wrote Coolidge con-
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demning the suggested tonnage limit as high; he was more open to
compromise on cruisers than the General Board because he thought
the United States could use light cruisers based at continental ports
and at Hawaii. But he concluded that he did not understand all the
technicalities and had to take the opinion of the Navy officials.32
Coolidge responded with a commitment to heavy cruisers. The
president had to "confess that it is very disappointing to have the
British position revealed to us, as it apparently shows a state of
mind on their part which I did not suppose existed." He ruled out
compromise: "We have made a perfectly straightforward and candid
presentation of a plan for limitation. I do not think we should devi-
ate from it. If others are unwilling to accept it, we can very well be
content with having made a fair proposal and leave others with the
responsibility for its rejection."33
If the British-Japanese proposal did not attract the Americans,
neither did it appeal to many British or Japanese leaders. In London
it had little support outside of Cecil and Bridgeman.34 Japan's dele-
gates had agreed with the British on some points, conceding on light
cruisers because they wanted support for an increased ratio, even
though they did not appreciate the British demand for seventy cruis-
ers. Admiral Kobayashi received a cable on July 20 that directed him
to advocate a ratio of 5-5-3.5, rather than the 3.25 he had recom-
mended.35 Bridgeman was aware of Japan's intent—"very anxious to
stand with both us and the USA, while getting the most she could
for herself out of our [Anglo-American] differences. . . . The main
desire was to get some improvement on the 5-3 ratio against the
USA." Ishii later speculated that if conversations had continued, the
delegation might have found it difficult to avoid resentment over the
Anglo-American-Japanese ratio. Although Foreign Minister Shide-
hara did not wish to upset America, one of Japan's best customers,
opinion in Japan, he and the delegates knew, demanded a better
ratio.36
DISACCORD
On their return to Geneva after the recess, the British found that
the American attitude had stiffened on the gun and tonnage issues.
Bridgeman attributed the change to fancied British concessions and
wrote with typical vagueness: "It was not for me to justify such
claim, or to sign an agreement to say it has right, but I was not going
to oppose it."37
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The final British proposal offered little compromise, as it de-
manded twelve or more heavy cruisers for the U.S. and Britain, pro-
hibition of eight-inch guns on light cruisers, and an increase in total
tonnage for submarines from 60,000 for all three naval powers to
90,000 for the U.S. and Britain and 60,000 for the Japanese.38 The
proposal dismayed the Japanese delegates. The delegations sched-
uled a final plenary session for August 1, but Gibson asked to have
the date pushed back to August 4, so as to receive instructions from
Washington.
The powers cast desperately about for a face-saving temporary
solution, to no avail. Secretary of Commerce Hoover discussed the
possibility of joint American and British peace propaganda with
British Ambassador Howard during the last days of the conference,
but the British ultimately balked.39 Secretary Kellogg meanwhile
suggested a clause allowing a naval power to call a cruiser conven-
tion with six-months' notice; if negotiation then failed, any limita-
tion might be terminated in a year. Schofield opposed the secre-
tary's proposal and pressed for adjournment, noting that "the longer
we stay here, the greater the tendency is to look around for some
compromise that is unsatisfactory from my viewpoint, and from
that of most naval members of the delegation."40 But he need not
have worried, for conference delegates met at Hugh Wilson's house
(surrounded by reporters) late the night before the final plenary ses-
sion in a final futile attempt at agreement.41 The other delegations
rejected Kellogg's suggestion of another conference. The Japanese
then proposed a holiday, based on building plans to 1931 and Anglo-
American maintenance of parity until that date. The proposal repre-
sented a compromise between the Japanese government and the Na-
val General Staff, the latter having held for parity in cruisers with
the other powers. After the new First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Charles
Madden (Beatty had retired July 30), rejected the Japanese compro-
mise in a report to the Council of Imperial Defence on August 4, the
British rejected the holiday scheme, as did the Americans.42 After
this plenary session the conference adjourned, a failure.
Repercussions came in the weeks that followed. Rumor cir-
culated of an Anglo-Japanese secret pact (officially denied), a large
new American building program, and gun elevation on American
ships. Cecil resigned from the Cabinet on August 7, disgusted with
Churchill, Baldwin, and Chamberlain, who did not share his con-
viction that the British should have used the conference to "erect an
effective barrier against war."43 Coolidge announced that he would
not seek another term, though this decision was only remotely re-
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lated to Geneva.44 At the dedication of a "peace bridge" at Niagara
Falls on August 8, Vice President Dawes, probably jockeying for
presidential position, criticized the State Department's handling of
conference preparations in the presence of Baldwin, Kellogg, and the
Prince of Wales. In London, MacDonald leveled similar charges
about British preparation.45
What had gone wrong? For one thing, it is clear that much had
changed since 1921-22. At the Washington Conference, it seems, a
miracle had occurred against the heaviest of odds. At Washington
several factors had contributed to success: an esprit de corps among
recent war allies, American willingness to cut its lead in battle-
ships, and political calm in China. At Geneva other factors worked
against success: European dissatisfaction with Washington's intran-
sigence on war debts, British unwillingness to cut its lead in cruis-
ers because of imperial obligations, American insistence on large
cruisers and guns, and a Japanese conviction that civil war in China
required naval strength.
Could the outcomes of the two conferences have depended on
the varying quality of the American delegations? At Washington
Secretary Hughes had dominated his delegation with skill. He also
had been in close communication with President Harding. As head
of the Department of State and by force of personality he had kept
his naval representatives in check. Oswald Garrison Villard, the
caustic editor of The Nation, concluded that "few men [such as
Hughes] are capable of a stroke like that—witness the disaster of a
second-rate man and a half-hearted admiral at the abortive Coolidge
Conference at Geneva."46
But the American delegation at Geneva was not so noticeably
inferior as to explain its failure. Although delegates did not perform
brilliantly, Gibson and Jones did not function as poorly as Cecil,
Bridgeman, or even Villard claimed. If neither as strong a person-
ality as Hughes nor as able to guide technical advisers, Gibson nev-
ertheless did a fair job in negotiating, given the narrow range of op-
tions he received from Washington. Jones often proved disruptive,
only underscoring that he was a naval officer, not a diplomat. Still,
Allen Dulles negotiated behind the scenes and received high marks
from foreign representatives. Moreover, the delegation received
sound technical advice from Admiral Schofield.
The difference between the Washington and Geneva Confer-
ences lies in executive determination to achieve success. At Wash-
ington, economic, technical, and strategic differences among the
powers, to be sure, played their part, but the strength of the United
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States' large number of battleships had given it a strong bartering
position. Perhaps more important, President Harding's desire for
agreement overrode any negative considerations in the end. Harding
wanted an agreement to demonstrate his leadership ability to his
party and to the nation.47 A stunning success in disarmament
would help strengthen his relationship with Congress and thus his
ability to direct domestic legislation. In contrast to Washington, the
United States had nothing to offer at Geneva, as Kellogg noted.48
And Coolidge, though he admittedly wanted an agreement for do-
mestic reasons, did not want it enough to compromise. He com-
manded the loyalty of Republican party regulars and voters, having
proved his popularity in the 1924 campaign. The American econ-
omy continued to boom, at least in most sectors, and the president
benefited from this prosperity. He desired disarmament, but only if
he could obtain it easily.
Indeed, Coolidge was weary of all foreign policy. He had spent
trying months dealing with foreign affairs in the spring of 1927, as
he came under attack for the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua and for
U.S.-Mexican disagreement over Mexican oil leases. He had extri-
cated himself from Nicaragua through the skill of his agent, Henry
L. Stimson, but he still faced continuing strife with the Mexicans.
As the president spent his summer in the Black Hills working on
the budget, seeking the advice of western farm leaders, and mulling
over whether to run for reelection the last thing he must have de-
sired was a foreign complication. Even more irritating, Coolidge
probably thought that he had already obtained agreement on cruiser
parity, based on Admiral Jones's discussions with British officers
the previous spring. When differences appeared, he showed little
imagination in appraising the alternatives raised at the conference
he had called. By refusing any significant concession, he signaled
that agreement was not all that important.
Confusion within the British government also contributed to
failure at Geneva. In assessing the effect of the conference, Cham-
berlain confessed to Howard that he worried more about the Geneva
Conference than about anything else since he had taken office; Ce-
cil's resignation had exposed him to criticism.49 A League man, Ce-
cil believed that "we ought to have regarded the American Navy and
ours as two divisions of a great Peace Fleet, and if the Americans
liked to provide the larger part of it, so much the better."50 Cecil
naively dismissed the opinions of military men out of hand. Bridge-
man, for his part, vacillated over parity until his return to London
shortly before the end of the conference. The Cabinet agonized but
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finally, with Chamberlain's reluctant support, opposed Cecil. After-
ward it took a weak position, delaying heavy-cruiser construction
and hoping that inaction would encourage similar behavior by the
Americans.51
Like the Americans, however, the British found their biggest
problem was executive leadership. Like Coolidge, Prime Minister
Baldwin did not take much interest in the negotiations at Geneva.
But neither did he allow the delegation there the freedom to shape
proposals. The Committee of Imperial Defence and Salisbury's Dis-
armament Committee usually managed to keep tight rein on the
moves of Cecil and Bridgeman. Baldwin reasoned that a failure of
the conference would not harm his government. He was more con-
cerned in the summer of 1927 with reform of the House of Lords,
continuing unemployment, and maintenance of trade with the So-
viet Union following a rupture in diplomatic relations in May. He
did not, of course, count on Cecil's resignation, which embarrassed
the government but did not wound it.
The French, who had sent unofficial observers to the confer-
ence, gleefully noted the disaccord. Philippe Berthelot, Briand's
powerful assistant at the Quai d'Orsay during the 1920s, disdain-
fully noted that the conference had ended "a mess."52 But Briand
noted that the conference presented the French an opportunity to
push their disarmament proposals at the Preparatory Commission
meetings. He declared that France would respect the Washington
Conference in the future but would reemphasize French security
needs. He also hoped to put the French case before the Americans
again and overcome their objections.53
Indeed, whatever its other effects, the Geneva Conference did
manage to clear the air. Bridgeman noted that "in time the fact will
emerge that there was a great deal of common ground disclosed."
Kellogg concurred; in late October he wrote Coolidge (as part of his
suggestions on foreign affairs for the president's annual message to
Congress) outlining the conference's preliminary agreements on
submarines, auxiliary vessels under 600 tons, and destroyers.54 Ne-
gotiation had also displayed points of disagreement for future refer-
ence, especially about cruisers. Naval advisers were discredited for
their narrow views—helping ensure that in future meetings the
technicians would supply only testimony, not diplomacy.
Ironically, the lack of agreement offered hope for future disarma-
ment. Geneva demonstrated that the Conservative government and
the Coolidge administration were not deeply committed to disarma-
ment. Their failure to resolve the cruiser impasse at once encouraged
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big-navy supporters in both countries and worried pacifists. Geneva
therefore provided pressure groups a window of opportunity to pur-
sue their goals with elites and with the mass public. Within months,
pressure groups began to support new disarmament discussions or
new naval building.
5
RECRIMINATIONS AND
RAPPROCHEMENT
The Geneva Conference of 1927 was disappointing generally to
Americans, and especially so to many in Congress, who had been
urging disarmament resolutions on presidents for years. It was dis-
maying also to many peace groups in the United States, Britain, and
Japan, who, with varying success, began agitating for new disarma-
ment measures. Between 1927 and 1930 these groups, especially in
the United States, would go far in publicizing antiwar efforts, in-
cluding disarmament.
Discouraged by the failure of the Geneva Conference, Frederick
J. Libby, head of the National Council for the Prevention of War
(NCPW), decided that the duty of the American peace movement
was "to educate America 'clear to the grassroots' that she may use
her unique power wisely and effectively." Libby believed that Yan-
kee ingenuity could point the way to sensible antiwar solutions for
Europe and Asia that had not yet been considered. For Libby and
many other peace activists, education meant working for the Kel-
logg-Briand Pact and a resumption of disarmament discussions, and
against a large new naval bill proposed by the Coolidge administra-
tion. They also attempted to neutralize the effect an Anglo-French
naval compromise would have on American leaders and encouraged
British and Japanese associates to work for disarmament.1 They
took heart when the Quaker, Herbert Hoover, was elected presi-
dent in 1928, for disarmament had been a strong campaign theme
for the former secretary of commerce. Many of the radical groups
distrusted his business philosophy and connections, however, and
decided to approach the president gingerly as he opened new disar-
mament talks in the summer of 1929 with a new Labour govern-
ment in London.
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PEACE GROUPS, DISARMAMENT, AND OUTLAWRY OF WAR
Taking advantage of the openness of the U.S. political system that
provided them easy access to elites, peace groups looked first to a
treaty renouncing war. This idea had grown out of informal conversa-
tions between American peace leaders and the wily French foreign
minister, Aristide Briand, in the spring of 1927. James T. Shotwell of
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had visited Briand
and suggested formal renunciation of war by the United States and
France and possibly other nations.2 Briand had sought to appease
American public opinion since facing American anger over France's
failure to pass the Mellon-Berenger accord of 1926. Later, when
France refused attendance at the Geneva Naval Conference, Ameri-
can congressmen had accused France of being "armed to the teeth."3
Briand therefore sent a draft treaty incorporating Shotwell's sugges-
tions to Washington on June 20, 1927, the same day the Geneva Con-
ference opened. The date was no accident, as Briand desired to dem-
onstrate his country's unhappiness with the proceedings at Geneva
while presenting an alternative to naval disarmament that would
appeal to peace groups, especially in the United States.
Unimpressed with Briand's proposal, Secretary Kellogg ignored
it as long as possible, and peace groups, puzzled by his hesitation,
sought to change his mind. They were inspired by the League of
Nations' approval of a Polish resolution that outlawed aggressive
war and called for settlement of international disagreements.
American peace workers accordingly sent representatives to dis-
cuss strategy in Washington and New York, a significant action, for
peace organizations had not collaborated much during 1926 and
1927. Occupied with other issues, conservative groups with closer
links to elites, like the Carnegie Endowment, the League of Nations
Non-Partisan Association, and the National Committee on the
Cause and Cure of War (NCCCW), worked for entry into the World
Court.4 Indeed, the League's educational programs and pamphlets in
1927 focused on international economics, international law, and on
the World Court, rather than on the subject of disarmament.5 Mean-
while, such liberal groups as the NCPW, the Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and Fellowship of Recon-
ciliation (FOR) labored for arbitration of the United States' dispute
with Mexico over the nationalization of American oil holdings,
with considerable success.6 Several issues also divided these liberal
groups, however, including the August 1927 execution of two Ital-
ian anarchists, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, convicted of
Above left, Admiral Hilary P. Jones, a dubious disarmament supporter during and
after his tenure at the Preparatory Commission, briefly served as a technical adviser
at the London Naval Conference of 1930. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical
Center. Above right, Ishii Kikujiro, Japanese delegate and the empire's most promi-
nent diplomat at the time of the Geneva Conference. He skillfully helped Japan
sidestep the cruiser controversy between the U.S. and Britain in 1927. Courtesy of
the Library of Congress. Below left, Robert Cecil, Viscount of Chelwood, was Britain's
disarmament delegate during most of the 1920s, including stints at the Preparatory
Commission and at the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. Perhaps more than any
other British politician, he supported the League of Nations and warmly embraced
naval arms control. Right, Sir William C. Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty
and a personal friend of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin. He and Cecil, his co-
delegate to the Geneva Conference, often disagreed over the value of disarmament,
leading to confusion about the British position on parity. The Cabinet came to monitor
their activities at the conference closely. Both courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Above left, Hugh S. Gibson, the urbane and witty U.S. ambassador to Belgium,
served as the leading American disarmament specialist during the Coolidge and
Hoover administrations. Above right, Frank B. Kellogg, secretary of state from 1925
to 1929. Lacking much guidance from President Coolidge during the Geneva Naval
Conference of 1927, the cautious Kellogg usually deferred to his navy advisers. Both
courtesy of the Library of Congress. Below, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover
during the presidential campaign of 1928, posing at the summer White House in
Brule, Wisconsin. Of the two presidents, Hoover believed more strongly in disarma-
ment and sometimes overruled his naval advisers. Courtesy of the Herbert Hoover
Presidential Library.
Above, Admiral Frank H. Scho-
field (left), the influential tech-
nical adviser at the Geneva Na-
val Conference of 1927, who
favored eight-inch guns on
cruisers, and Admiral William
V Pratt, who held the same post
at the London Naval Confer-
ence of 1930 but favored six-
inch guns. They are shown
aboard a warship in 1930. Cour-
tesy of the U.S. Naval Histori-
cal Center.
Admiral David Beatty (right)
Britain's First Sea Lord for much
of the 1920s and a staunch op-
ponent of disarmament, chats
with King George V aboard a
battleship during the king's visit
to the Grand Fleet in July 1918.
Courtesy of the U.S. Naval His-
torical Center.
Herbert Hoover and British Prime Min-
ister Ramsay MacDonald on the steps
of the White House in October 1929,
shortly after their first meeting.
MacDonald and American envoys had
shaped the outlines of an Anglo-Ameri-
can cruiser agreement the previous
summer. Courtesy of the Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library.
Left to right, British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, Prime Minister Stanley
Baldwin, and Winston Churchill, then chancellor of the exchequer, outside No. 10
Downing Street in January 1925. During the mid-1920s, Baldwin mediated between
Chamberlain, who increasingly favored disarmament, and Churchill, who opposed
it. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Above, Cabinet members of the government of Kato Komei in May 1925, some of
whom dealt extensively with naval limitation. Left to right, back row, Hamaguchi
Osachi, later premier during the London Naval Conference; Ugaki Issei; and
Shidehara Kijuro, foreign minister during the Geneva and London conferences.
Front row, Ogawa Heikichi and Okada Ryohei. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Below, Wakatsuki Reijiro, Japan's lead delegate to the London Naval Conference of
1930 and a disarmament supporter, addressing the League of Women, a group of
educators and social workers, in Tokyo, April 1926, when he was prime minister.
Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
France's delegates to the London Naval Conference of 1930. Left, Foreign Minister
Aristide Briand, longtime proponent of security and disarmament and co-sponsor
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Right, Premier Andre Tardieu, a French representative at
Versailles in 1919 and head of the London delegation. He had to contend with a
shaky coalition government. Both courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Frederick J. Libby, executive secretary of the
National Council for the Prevention of
War, an American private group dedicated
to disarmament and greater international
cooperation. Libby unsuccessfully sought
defeat of the Naval Building Bill of 1929.
Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Above left, Dorothy Detzer, executive secretary of the American branch of the
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a pacifist group that strongly
favored naval reduction, in 1929. Detzer was one of the more effective disarmament
organizers. Above right, Laura Puffer Morgan, American disarmament lobbyist for
the National Council for the Prevention of War during the Geneva and London
naval conferences. Both courtesy of the Library of Congress. Below, Carrie Chapman
Catt (second from left), American leader of the National Committee on the Cause
and Cure of War, with NCCCW officers (left to right), Henrietta Roelefs, Ruth Mor-
gan, and Josephine Schain, at the opening session of the annual National Con-
ference on the Cause and Cure of War, Washington, D.C., 1931. Until 1928 the
NCCCW focused more on international cooperation than on disarmament. Cour-
tesy of the Library of Congress.
Above, Herbert Hoover signing the London Naval Treaty in the East Room of the
White House, July 22, 1930. Surrounding him are (left to right) Senator Joseph T.
Robinson of Alabama, a delegate at the London Conference; Secretary of State Henry
L. Stimson, lead American delegate at London; Vice President Charles Curtis; Sena-
tor William E. Borah of Idaho; Senator Claude Swanson of Virginia; Navy Secretary
Charles E Adams; Senator James C. Watson of Indiana; and Senator David A. Reed
of Pennsylvania, another delegate at London. Courtesy of the Herbert Hoover Presi-
dential Library. Below, the Salt Lake City (foreground), one of the first of the Ameri-
can treaty cruisers, carries President Hoover and his party as it passes the aircraft
carrier Lexington during the naval review of 1930. After all the controversy over
cruisers during the 1920s and 1930s, these ships would prove less important than
carriers in the next world war. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical Center.
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the murder of a paymaster in Braintree, Massachusetts; a campaign
by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ against compulsory
military training in colleges and secondary schools (which attracted
the wrath of the American Legion, Daughters of the American Rev-
olution, and the National Civic Federation); and a struggle to guar-
antee the civil rights of pacifist aliens.7
Despite differences, many peace leaders cooperated in 1927. Lib-
by of the NCPW, Shotwell of the Carnegie Endowment, and officials
of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCC) met at the Car-
negie Endowment offices to organize an executive committee to ad-
vance Briand's proposal in Washington. Soon most of the peace
groups were at work: Jane Addams and members of the WILPF called
on President Coolidge and urged him to press for the outlawry of war.
The president also received a petition against war with thirty thou-
sand names. The third convention of the NCCCW, headed by Carrie
Chapman Catt, met in Washington in January 1928, and Catt de-
clared war on the war system. Delegates heard Secretary of War
Dwight H. Davis, Rear Admiral Schofield, and Assistant Secretary of
State Castle defend national security and describe ways that the U.S.
sought to maintain peace in the world.8
For six months peace groups continued their crusade. The NCPW
served as a clearinghouse for thirty-two smaller peace agencies
through its journal, Peace Action, and its newsletter, and by pub-
lishing books, and sponsoring radio programs. It called for state con-
ferences and appealed to other groups, offering to present peace
"clinics," speeches, and programs. It sought to enlist farm and labor
organizations, church denominations, Sunday schools and mission-
ary societies, fraternal orders, the American Federation of Teachers,
the Socialist party, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.9
Peace workers gave special attention to the newspaper press.
The executive secretary of the WILPF, Dorothy Detzer, scheduled
visits to congressmen or administration officials to coincide with
votes or important speeches and engaged a clipping agency. Laura
Puffer Morgan of the NCPW supervised her organization's publicity,
making speeches and sending out press releases. Salmon O. Levin-
son, of the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, focused
on getting his committee mentioned in midwestern newspapers, in-
cluding the Chicago Daily News.
Many peace leaders rallied to congressional resolutions that
called for antiwar measures. Mrs. Catt and executives of the FCCC
and the World Alliance for International Friendship through the
Churches supported the short-lived Capper Resolution in the Sen-
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ate and the Burton Resolution in the House. Arthur Capper of Kan-
sas and Theodore Burton of Ohio (who was also president of the
American Peace Society) had sponsored resolutions urging treaties
with France and other interested nations, acceptance of the Locarno
definition of an aggressor nation, and refusal to help any aggressor
nation or any nationals aiding an aggressor.10 The eastern press took
the Capper Resolution to indicate that the western United States
was awakening to the peace campaign. Senator William E. Borah,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, perennially
concerned about neutrality and skeptical of American involvement
in international activities, sponsored a resolution calling on the
president to assemble a conference to draw up a code of maritime
law that would include neutral rights. He hoped to replace the Cap-
per Resolution and directed the Foreign Relations Committee to
hold the measure. The House refashioned the Burton Resolution
into a simple proposal for American neutrality.11
Meanwhile, Secretary Kellogg had reopened negotiations with
Briand. Although doubtful about the value of a bilateral treaty out-
lawing war, Kellogg came to believe that a multilateral treaty might
be useful.12 He probably saw the latter as a capstone to his diplo-
matic career, for he planned to retire in March, 1929.13
Just who inspired the secretary and the president to expand
Briand's suggestion into a multilateral treaty is unknown. Kellogg
had been toying with the idea, as had Senator Borah. Although most
officers in the State Department distrusted public opinion and op-
posed what they saw as idealism in Briand's idea, Kellogg often ig-
nored State Department advice and took notice of public opinion—
especially since his senatorial reelection defeat in 1922.14 The secre-
tary was quite aware of the high-powered campaign on behalf of
Briand's bilateral proposal. He perhaps received encouragement from
the president, who had met with the British journalist, Henry Wick-
ham Steed, at the White House a few months after Geneva. Steed em-
phasized the relation between neutral rights at sea, naval arma-
ments, and European security. He suggested that Coolidge reiterate
the American position on neutral rights, as it seemed to him the
main stumbling block to Anglo-American naval agreement. Cool-
idge hinted vaguely that Congress might pass a resolution forswear-
ing American aid to aggressors and pledging readiness to consult
with other nations.15 But the president, still angry about Geneva, had
no wish to take the initiative himself. He suggested that Steed contin-
ue the conversation with Senator Borah.16 Although Coolidge per-
haps favored linking American neutrality policy closer to the needs of
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League members, he wanted above all to justify America's need for
naval parity with Britain, on which he had insisted throughout the
Geneva Conference. The State Department conveyed the president's
feelings to the Foreign Office when Theodore Marriner of the West
European desk told British officials in Washington that freedom of
the seas had not been the issue at the unsuccessful conference in
Geneva; parity had.17
As the president considered the problem of security in Europe,
Kellogg pursued negotiation with Briand, keeping in touch with
Borah, Shotwell, and Levinson. Kellogg attempted to persuade a re-
luctant Briand, who preferred a bilateral treaty, of the merits of a
more general treaty. The Frenchman only relented when Germany
announced its agreement with Kellogg's draft in July 1928.18 Britain
then joined.
The resultant multilateral treaty contained three articles that
renounced war, prescribed pacific means in settling disputes, and
established procedure for ratification. But the signatory nations at-
tached reservations that considerably altered the original treaty, ex-
empting wars of self-defense and those arising from the League Cov-
enant or Locarno treaties—that is, war between signatories and
nonsignatories and war with violators of the pact. In consenting to
the treaty, the Senate attached amendments exempting use of force
to maintain the Monroe Doctrine and matters of vital interest or
national honor.
At first, the American peace groups were hesitant about the trea-
ty. Although most of them had favored the original Briand proposal,
many opposed Kellogg's version. The Carnegie Endowment and the
American Peace Society, both with close links to the State Depart-
ment, ultimately supported the treaty, as did Libby and most mem-
bers of the NCPW, but arbitration advocates accepted it reluctantly,
and World Court advocates, such as James Brown Scott of the Car-
negie Endowment and Clark Eichelberger of the League of Nations
Non-Partisan Association, disliked it because it ignored the World
Court. Shotwell, who had played such a large part in the original idea
of the pact, still preferred a bilateral treaty with the French, as he
explained in correspondence with Admiral William V. Pratt.19 Writ-
ing to a British friend, Dorothy Detzer of the WILPF admitted that she
preferred bilateral arbitration treaties and had difficulty reconciling
Kellogg's treaty with the U.S. action in sending marines to Nicaragua
and imposing leaders on the Nicaraguans: "Many people feel that
they are unwilling to support the Secretary of State's proposals for
outlawing big wars while he continues to wage little wars." Still,
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she feared that the Senate might withhold consent and that friends
of peace would undergo the same disappointment they had experi-
enced with the World Court. The approaching presidential cam-
paign of 1928 might also confuse matters: the Republican platform
had endorsed the Kellogg-Briand Pact together with Coolidge's Nic-
araguan policy and a new naval bill, and Detzer feared that the Demo-
crats might make the Kellogg proposal a party issue, as the Republi-
cans had when they opposed the League of Nations.20 Although ill
throughout much of 1928, Mrs. Catt urged on the NCCCW in its
efforts to encourage ratification of the treaty. She planned to use the
pact as pressure on Washington to join the World Court and engage in
disarmament. Like Shotwell and Detzer she saw the pact by itself as
weak without greater international involvement by the United
States: "A pact to renounce war is a poor dike with which to hold
back the flood.""
Perhaps the basic trouble was the naval bill. Detzer complained
that Libby, rather than concentrating on the Kellogg-Briand treaty,
was "so full of destroying the Navy program that he does not seem to
want to take up this double issue." Libby was not alone, for congress-
men had wondered about outlawing war while increasing the navy.
Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi asked: "Why do we in one hand
hold a peace pact for the preservation of peace throughout the world
and in the other a bundle of explosives to burst upon the world? "22
Secretary Kellogg noted the high volume of mail to Congress favoring
the treaty but opposing the naval bill and feared that linking the two
issues would mean defeat for the treaty. He believed that people did
not understand the need for ships, as the naval bill simply meant
replacing obsolete or outdated cruisers up to 300,000 tons, just what
the Americans had proposed at the Geneva Conference.23
In Britain, activity after the Geneva Conference was more re-
strained. Peace workers found that many of their proposals were
coopted by the government or by the political parties. Once this
occurred, the proposals were inevitably watered down and only par-
tially adopted. The League of Nations Union, for its part, usually
continued to cooperate with the government. It supported the Kel-
logg-Briand Pact, believing it would inspire a new campaign for disar-
mament, but did not see in the pact a substitute for the League, as did
many American supporters. Cecil, MacDonald, and Lloyd George,
along with many LNU members, primarily regarded the pact as a way
to improve Anglo-American relations.24
Peace groups were less active in Japan. Little access to elites and
a dependence on the government for financial support meant that
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peace groups controlled few resources for collective action. Few of
their views were ever aired in the Diet, in contrast to the views of
American and British groups in their national legislatures. Many of
the most prominent, pro-Western advocates in Japan, in addition,
were still angry about the American Immigration Act of 1924 and
noticed that Californians supported further limits on Japanese land-
holding. The Tanaka government meanwhile began repressing dissi-
dent groups. It did not encourage further disarmament and im-
prisoned thousands of Marxists and fellow travelers under a so-
called Peace Preservation Law. Under such circumstances, advocacy
of disarmament diminished in Japan.
THE ANGLO-FRENCH COMPROMISE
If observers hoped that the Kellogg-Briand Pact would soon lead to
international disarmament, they were mistaken, for the British and
French began bilateral discussion of naval limitation, resulting in an
agreement that infuriated Americans. The Europeans initiated in-
formal talks during meetings of the Preparatory Commission for a
General Disarmament Conference because they doubted the suc-
cess of the Commission.25 The British saw advantage in conversa-
tion, for they were still smarting from their experience at Geneva
and the Americans at the Preparatory Commission seemed little
inclined to discuss naval subjects anew. In a memorandum to For-
eign Secretary Chamberlain, Lord Salisbury listed reasons why the
British government might negotiate with France. He and Lord Cush-
enden, the delegate to the Preparatory Commission meetings in Ge-
neva, had agreed that Britain should avoid diplomatic isolation, and
they therefore proposed approaching either the French or the Amer-
icans about a naval accord. They perceived two obstacles to this
plan: Briand's influence with the French admiralty, and the possi-
bility of a Franco-American agreement.26
The Cabinet in London had already accepted a memorandum
describing the future of Anglo-American relations. The conference,
it stated, "strengthened enormously those elements in the United
States whose object it is to 'show the world' conclusively that,
while the nineteenth century may have belonged to Britain, the
twentieth century undoubtedly belongs to the United States." The
report predicted an "almost certain" increase in the U.S. Navy but
doubted if it would affect relations, unless "more fuel were added
on, in the shape of further naval disagreements." The Disarmament
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Committee headed by Lord Salisbury—including Bridgeman—had
also presented its post-Geneva Conference report and concluded
that the government should postpone immediate disarmament dis-
cussions at the Preparatory Commission, but if that were not possi-
ble, then it should mention anew its proposed battleship cuts and
emphasize recent cuts in British cruiser construction.27
Chamberlain, a true francophile, hardly needed encouragement
to pursue the French connection and proceeded forthwith. Follow-
ing conversations between the two naval staffs, he visited Briand,
who informed him of France's need for a navy larger than that of
Italy. The two men met again in Paris, as did their naval staffs. At
Preparatory Commission meetings in Geneva, Admiral Violette of
the French Navy suggested to Vice Admiral David Kelly of the Brit-
ish Navy an absence of limits on six-inch-gunned cruisers, since
armed merchantmen could be included in this class. Instead, Violet-
te proposed limits on heavy cruisers. The Admiralty approved the
idea, and the British presented a draft incorporating the French sug-
gestions.28 The British had accepted the French demands on July 4,
after Chamberlain stressed the awkwardness with Germany that
would result if the British and French failed to agree. Ironically, the
Germans were upset by the agreement itself, as they thought it sig-
naled a new entente containing secret agreements aimed at Ger-
many.29 Lord Crewe, the departing ambassador at Paris, reported
that French officers agreed in substance to British proposals, includ-
ing a system of classification for cruisers and submarines. The
French accepted the British draft, and the Cabinet Committee on
Policy in London recommended acceptance.30 The British acted
quickly out of fear of a Franco-American agreement and out of min-
isterial weariness caused by continued discussion of detailed tech-
nical matters.
A few British officials, nevertheless, opposed the compromise
before its final acceptance. Cushenden, with an eye toward the U.S.,
with whom he had to contend at Geneva, declared that Washington
would never accept the compromise. Sir Victor Wellesley of the For-
eign Office argued much the same, noting that such an agreement
with Paris would likely doom further naval parleys with the U.S.
Salisbury continued to worry about the effect the compromise
would have on the U.S. and Germany, yet he also dreaded Britain
standing alone diplomatically.31
The Anglo-French proposal suggested two classes of cruisers,
one subject to limitation, for ships with guns of seven inches or
more, and one not limited, for ships with guns under seven inches.
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All great powers would receive parity in heavy cruisers and in sub-
marines over 600 tons. After news of the proposal leaked out of
Paris, London sent the basis of the Anglo-French agreement to
Washington, Tokyo, and Rome.32
As Cushenden and Wellesley had predicted, the Americans were
hardly pleased. Secretary Kellogg received a telegram from the presi-
dent, then summering near Superior, Wisconsin. "Please," Coolidge
directed, "make no commitment concerning limitation of arma-
ments." He expanded in a letter of the next day: "I have your wire
relative to the British naval proposals. What I desire to have done in
relation to these at present is nothing at all. I shall be back in Wash-
ington within a few weeks and we can take the matter up at that
time. I would not have you even ask the British Government for any
explanation of the proposals which they have made. Let the entire
matter stand in abeyance." Perhaps Coolidge thought that the issue
might disturb the ceremonial signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in
Paris, which Kellogg would soon attend. At any rate the president
instructed Kellogg to discuss neither disarmament nor war debts
while in Europe, and asked the secretary to cancel a planned person-
al visit to London after the signing.33
Washington regarded the compromise as the British way of get-
ting the League of Nations to approve what Americans had opposed
at the Geneva Conference. "If the limitation is to have a beneficial
effect in securing peace and saving expenditures," warned Admiral
Jones, "it must be a real limitation and must not be restricted to a
small number of classes that are especially adapted to the use of one
country and excite competitive building in unrestricted classes by
others. In other words, we must not close the spigot and leave the
bunghole open."34 As the British had sent only the general terms of
the compromise, Washington asked for more information. Kellogg
had Jones look over the draft American response to the compro-
mise, and Jones made suggestions that the secretary used in the
final version. The Americans unofficially rejected the proposal on
September 22, 1928.35
For a while the cruiser issue rested. In London, Lord Cush-
enden, acting foreign secretary, wanted to send a soothing message
to Washington, but Churchill, who regarded President Coolidge as a
"New England backwoodsman," favored a sharp response. While de-
fending the Foreign Office's handling of the affair, Cushenden ex-
plained to the Cabinet that Washington would not likely change its
mind. The British government nevertheless retained the proposal
but ordered details of the agreement withheld until receipt of an
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official American note. Cabinet members wanted to demonstrate
the British view of disarmament and, just as important, put forward
the Unionist view and take the wind out of Labourite sails. To avoid
antagonizing the Americans further, the Foreign Office did nothing,
for it recognized that the impending American presidential election
would bring in a new administration. Also, because Congress would
soon meet and the Senate had scheduled debate on the naval bill,
any British move might appear as an attempt to influence that
discussion.36
Briand had written a letter meant for Kellogg's eyes to the
French charge in Washington on July 23, 1928, stating French goals
for the compromise. Briand affirmed in a subsequent letter to the
charge that he believed the compromise tilted largely toward Amer-
ican views on disarmament, but he recognized, he said, that many
American officials opposed the compromise. He also believed that
an American press campaign against the proposal hurt chances of
its acceptance by Washington.37
Coolidge's call for an expanded navy on Armistice Day 1928 did
not bode well for the Anglo-French proposal. The president appar-
ently agreed with Secretary Kellogg, who had concluded a few days
after receiving news of the compromise that the "best answer" was
to "pass the Naval Bill as soon as possible." Coolidge and Kellogg
also disliked reports that delegates at the League of Nations had
attacked the United States for its silence on the proposition, and
they suspected that League members might blame them in advance
for future difficulties in disarmament.38 The president ignored for-
eign affairs as much as he could. To Hugh Gibson's complaints that
he had not received new instructions about naval disarmament at
the Preparatory Commission, Assistant Secretary Castle replied:
"Although the President wants results, he is so thoroughly dis-
gusted with the result of the Geneva Conference, so bitterly anti-
British, that it is unlikely that instructions could be drawn up
which would really be helpful."39
Thus the Anglo-French proposal quietly died. Although Prime
Minister Baldwin gave a speech explaining the compromise, at-
tempting to show that it would be satisfactory to the United States,
few in Washington believed him. Castle met with the prime minis-
ter shortly afterward and, seeking to smooth relations, told him
that Herbert Hoover, the president elect, was not anti-British. In
conversation with Briand, Chamberlain explained that without
American concurrence the compromise was dead and that the Brit-
ish would hold to their current modest naval program.40
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THE AMERICAN NAVAL BILL
Like politicians, peace workers turned their attention to a new na-
val building bill after the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In
working toward defeat of the impending bill, peace workers were
challenged by navy supporters who used the Anglo-French compro-
mise in a drive for increased naval spending. Peace workers recog-
nized the damage done their campaign by the agreement: "The case
of the [American] navy," Laura Puffer Morgan confided to a British
peace worker, "has, of course, been made infinitely stronger by the
activities of your own Foreign Minister and the Anglo-French Naval
agreement. We are following with great interest the attacks of the
Manchester Guardian upon the Government for this piece of secret
diplomacy."41 Mildred Wertheimer of the Foreign Policy Associa-
tion called Secretary Kellogg's protest against the Anglo-French
Compromise a "model state paper," and she added that Kellogg had
"dealt a well-deserved blow to the antiquated methods of secret di-
plomacy."42 Oswald Garrison Villard, the assertive, pacifist editor
of The Nation, wrote Ramsay MacDonald: "Everyone in Washing-
ton says that the Fifteen Cruiser Bill will go through with a rush
'just to give the Britishers what's coming to them.' . . . There can be
no doubt whatever that Baldwin's blunder in the matter of Franco-
British Alliance has done infinite harm. . . . People here have the
feeling that Baldwin, Bridgeman, and Churchill were caught . . .
cheating at cards as it were, and the fact that they have now dropped
their cards on the floor in no wise satisfies people here." ^  Yet Morgan
and most of her colleagues commented little publicly on the compro-
mise because they hoped it was less important than the Kellogg-
Briand Pact. With governments committed to outlawing war, a lim-
itation of weapons seemed the next logical step. But first the NCPW
and its allies had to upend the navy's request for increases.
Emboldened by the failure of the disarmament conference at
Geneva, the Navy General Board had fashioned a large bill for Secre-
tary of the Navy Wilbur that had Coolidge's backing. In final form it
asked for five aircraft carriers, twenty-five heavy cruisers, nine de-
stroyers and flotilla leaders, and thirty-two submarines at a total
cost of $725 million—in short, the largest building program since
the Naval Act of 1916.44
Peace promoters moved quickly. A variety of witnesses, includ-
ing representatives of the World Alliance for International Friend-
ship through the Churches, appeared before the House Naval Affairs
Committee during hearings on the bill. The American Friends Ser-
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vice Committee inundated congressmen and the White House with
letters and telegrams. The FCCC asked each city federation to send
a hundred telegrams from leading citizens. The NCPW engaged two
able lobbyists who had worked for the National Women's Trade
Union League and the Anti-Saloon League and produced a hand-
book for peace workers.
After an eight-week battle, Congressman Fred Britten, chair-
man of the House Naval Affairs Committee, announced withdrawal
of the bill, and a few weeks later the navy produced a more modest
proposal—instead of seventy-one new ships it proposed fifteen
heavy cruisers and one carrier, at a cost of $224 million. When Con-
gressman Loren M. Black of New York asked if the peace groups had
had an effect on reducing the original appropriations request, Brit-
ten did not reply directly, but said that the Naval Affairs Committee
had listened to all kinds of groups and that the new bill was fash-
ioned after considerable opposition from a "number of so-called
peace societies, pacifists, and communistic societies."45 Neither did
Britten remind his audience that England, responding to the size of
the new American bill, had declared that it was canceling construc-
tion of one of its cruisers scheduled for 1928.
Pro-navy forces, to be sure, opposed the peace activists. After Pro-
fessor William I. Hull of Swarthmore College testified before the Na-
val Affairs Committee in opposition to the bill, Chairman Britten
asked a friendly witness, an official of the Daughters of the American
Revolution, to recommend a DAR resolution asking Swarthmore to
dismiss Hull. She agreed and added that "if there was any other coun-
try that would like to have Dr. Hull [we] would gladly give him to
them." The national president of the American Legion criticized Lib-
by and his fellow pacifists as "white-livered yellow people" and ques-
tioned their right to live in a democracy. The Chicago Tribune and the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch also attacked the peace activists.46
On the floor of the House during the debate on the naval bill,
Congressman Britten called Libby "communistici" and claimed that
he was responsible for Britten having received "hundreds of letters
from people" who, according to Britten, were "misguided." Britten
also quoted from a letter during the debate from Laura Puffer Morgan
who criticized his handling of the Naval Affairs Committee hearings.
Britten's reply, also read into the Congressional Record, simply noted
that he had had a hard time maintaining order because of the "many
women [peace activists] clamoring for attention." Finally, Britten
took aim at Dorothy Detzer and the WILPF, declaring to the House
that the WILPF was a "dangerous . . . socialistic, communistic orga-
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nization which has sent out much trash against preparedness." In
short, Britten concluded, the WILPF was a "real menace" to the
government.47
In the end, more members of the House could accept the pared-
down version of the bill, for the failure at Geneva weighed heavily
on their minds. Voicing the opinion of many, Congressman Charles
L. Abernathy of North Carolina said on the floor that until the fail-
ure of the conference, he would have voted against new ships. But
Alan Treadway of Massachusetts perhaps put it best: "The fact that
the conference failed puts an entirely different aspect on the whole
proposition [of naval building]. We must all recognize that we have
gotten into a position of internationalism and are, to a certain de-
gree, a creature of the nations of the world. If our views are not
accepted by the other nations, whether we wish it or not, we are
practically forced to keep up with whatever programs they may set
up."48 The House passed the bill and, as it had for every such bill
since 1922, inserted a clause inviting the president to initiate a new
disarmament conference.
When the Senate withheld consideration of the bill until a later
session, the Navy League launched a new campaign, led by its presi-
dent, William Howard Gardiner, who created most of the group's
publicity and monitored both peace groups and the international
situation. Indeed, he "practically wore a groove between Capitol
Hill and Navy League headquarters," providing committees, wit-
nesses, and the press with volumes of reports and statistics supplied
to him by Navy officers. The Navy League emphasized the similar
patterns of British and American trade, pointing out that, like Brit-
ain, the U.S. was a net importer of food. It attacked Britain but not
Japan because the latter possessed a smaller navy and because
Americans on the West Coast, the site of most anti-Japanese senti-
ment, already largely supported the navy.49
Navy officials also found receptive audiences among many busi-
ness groups, which had become more critical of disarmament by
1927. Small manufacturers and medium-sized businesses paid as
little attention to news from Geneva as they usually did to news of
foreign affairs. Export manufacturers also paid little heed to the fail-
ure of the conference because they considered the chances of war
with either Britain or Japan remote. Financial and banking organiza-
tions, better versed on foreign affairs, were most critical of the ad-
ministration's handling of the conference. Sectional differences also
mattered: midwest businessmen reported more displeasure with
the outcome at Geneva than did those in the east and the south.
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Still, most business groups opposed disarmament because they had
already received one of the benefits that they had sought when sup-
porting disarmament at Washington in 1922: tax relief, which had
come about independently of disarmament in 1926 through the ef-
forts of Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon. Many businessmen, in
addition, saw the navy by 1927 as important in protecting overseas
commerce lines.50 Indeed, Thomas W. Lamont, the House of Mor-
gan partner and White House confidante who participated in most
European financial conferences during the 1920s, had made no
mention of disarmament when he addressed the annual convention
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States just a month
before the Geneva Conference.51 Navy proponents, therefore, found
interested audiences among many of these groups when they talked
of preparedness and naval construction.
Many senators began to favor the new naval bill for much the
same reasons that a majority of House members had: they ruefully
recalled Geneva, resented the recent Anglo-French action, and,
though noting the high-powered disarmament campaign, realized
that they could not allow the navy to decline. The Senate at last
passed the House bill in February 1929, authorizing fifteen cruisers
(five in fiscal 1929, five in 1930, and five in 1931) together with the
carrier (fiscal 1931). Isolationist senators such as David Reed of Mis-
souri, Thomas Walsh of Montana, George Norris of Nebraska, and
Borah added an amendment reaffirming the traditional American
position of protecting ships of neutrals from search and seizure. Al-
though their actions attracted the attention of the British Foreign
Office and opposition leader Ramsay MacDonald, neither President
Coolidge nor his successor, Hoover, valued neutral rights above
achieving a disarmament agreement. They believed the one would
lead to the other.
Through their publicity blitz and their dogged emphasis on the
goals of Kellogg-Briand, peace groups had probably helped force the
navy to reconsider its original request, and they kept up a vigorous
campaign against the naval bill even when it appeared that the Senate
would pass it. The NCPW sponsored a conference in Washington that
included prominent peace workers such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Os-
wald Garrison Villard, and Morgan. Libby engaged Jeannette Rankin,
the pacifist and former congresswoman from Montana, and at the last
moment Nicholas Murray Butler campaigned. Detzer encouraged
the British section of the WILPF to take a stand against cruiser con-
struction.
Given their hard work and the attention they received, why
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couldn't peace groups bring on the bill's defeat? In a report to the
International WILPF Detzer blamed internal divisions within the
peace groups. She believed that they had built effective coalitions
against the bill until they began to disagree over tactics. The League
of Nations Non-Partisan Association, for example, had lost its pres-
ident and appeared to have little direction.52 After supporting the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, in addition, church groups did not have enough
time to organize against the cruiser bill. At the same time, interna-
tional politics and economics favored passage of the naval bill. The
Franco-British agreement did not affect the person in the street but
did provide propaganda for big-navy interests to use in lobbying con-
gressmen, the White House, and businessmen. Detzer also blamed
shipbuilding firms in need of contracts. Yet she underestimated the
effect of the failed Geneva Conference and of the Franco-British
pact on Coolidge, Kellogg, and congressional leaders. Disgusted
with what they regarded as European maneuvering, they were de-
termined to augment the navy.53
It is interesting to observe how the progress of the American
naval appropriations bill in Congress coincided with British ac-
tions.54 Seeking to save money, deflect international criticism of the
British position at Geneva, and possibly help restrain the size of the
proposed American naval bill, Bridgeman announced in the House
of Commons the postponement of the cruiser program of 1927—the
government would not lay down the two remaining keels. On Janu-
ary 21, 1928, he canceled the heavy cruiser in the 1928 program.
In Britain, peace groups enjoyed less independence from the gov-
ernment than their American associates, and their workers did lit-
tle to protest the American naval bill, as Kathleen Courtney, head of
the British branch of the WILPF, wrote Detzer. The British WILPF
never concerned itself with the number or tonnage of cruisers or the
caliber of guns, but simply demanded the greatest possible reduc-
tion without going into technical details. Courtney commented on
the great success of petition campaigns of the WILPF in the United
States and added ruefully: "We had a disarmament petition here a
couple of years ago. It was not very well organised, the number of
signatures was not large, and at the same time it has somewhat
'queered the pitch,' as we say in this country. The petition method
is now rather out of favour and for all these reasons we are on the
whole not inclined to attempt anything in this direction."55 The
LNU stepped up its disarmament campaign in late 1928 following
the collapse of the Anglo-French naval compromise, and established
a disarmament study group. The British government did not always
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view these efforts favorably: Chamberlain complained to Gilbert
Murray of the LNU even before the push for disarmament that the
LNU was preoccupied with antigovernment speech.56 Nevertheless,
no British group won a similar influence or engaged in as many
activities as their American counterparts.57
In Japan, peace advocates failed for other reasons. After the Tan-
aka government sent troops to Shantung four times between May
1927 and May 1928, the interest of Japanese groups shifted from
disarmament to Manchuria and China by 1929. Civil war in China
threatened Japanese economic interests, particularly in Manchuria,
and caused the Chinese and Japanese armies to clash. In particular,
the angry Chinese maintained a boycott of Japanese goods, and the
Chinese Nationalist government proposed a tariff protection for its
textile industry that endangered Japanese cloth exports to China,
their biggest foreign customer. This action augured ill for the Japa-
nese economy, just emerging from a bank panic. Aside from eco-
nomic concerns, Japanese agents assassinated Chang Tso-lin, the
Chinese military governor of Manchuria. Scandals related to these
events caused the fall of the Tanaka government. Meeting in Kyoto
in late 1929, the Institute of Pacific Relations looked to the Man-
churian problem and paid small heed to naval disarmament, as it
had enjoyed scant success in promoting it. Other peace groups in
Japan, similarly distracted by the turmoil in China, did the same.58
NEW LEADERS, NEW OPTIONS
Despite the recent discouragements, new interest gradually evolved
for disarmament. It began slowly, for the League of Nations Prepara-
tory Commission for a General Disarmament Conference, meeting
in 1927 and 1928, accomplished little. At the latter sessions the
Soviet delegation under Maxim Litvinoff submitted a proposal for
universal and immediate disarmament. Along with most other del-
egations, the Americans rejected the proposition because it sought
to limit well-armed powers in favor of the poorly armed Soviet
Union.5"
Meanwhile, the Conservative government in Britain and the
Coolidge administration inched ever so slowly toward new naval
conversations. Despite his anger over the outcome of the Geneva
Conference, Coolidge had not jettisoned the idea of future naval par-
leys with Whitehall. He had offered some encouragement in conver-
sation with Ambassador Howard only a few days before the hardline
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Armistice Day speech in 1928.60 After the naval bill passed a few
months later, he appeared ready to discuss disarmament with Gib-
son anew, but Kellogg vetoed the idea because the work would like-
ly be redone by the incoming Hoover administration in March. But
Coolidge had little new to offer anyway, as he still insisted on
parity.61
More noticeable change took place in London. Foreign Minister
Chamberlain confessed to Ambassador Howard in February 1929:
"What worries me in the conduct of foreign affairs, as in other
things, is when I myself do not know what I want—in short when I
have not got a policy. This has been my position ever since the
breakdown of the Geneva Conference and it has caused me more
anxiety than anything else in our foreign relations."62 Following
this remarkable admission, Chamberlain began mending fences
with Washington. He participated in arbitration discussions and in-
timated to Washington that Whitehall would be interested in bilat-
eral naval discussions preceding any that might occur during meet-
ings of the Preparatory Commission.63
The pace of naval negotiation increased considerably as new
leaders took to the fore in Washington and London during the spring
of 1929. Herbert Hoover, more sympathetic toward disarmament
and somewhat more so toward peace groups, took the oath of presi-
dent in the United States. The former secretary of commerce, best
known for his relief work during and after World War I and after the
disastrous floods of the Mississippi River in 1927, was a shy, self-
righteous man distrusted by Republican party regulars. But he was a
talented, hard-working, and intelligent administrator and, at fifty-
four, had traveled abroad more than any president in a decade, hav-
ing spent much of his engineering career in China and London. A
Quaker, Hoover believed even more than his predecessor in the
power of moral suasion in diplomacy and in the probability of con-
tinued peace in the world.64 He disliked military men and solutions
and looked kindly on limiting arms.
Hoover's secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, had served as sec-
retary of war for President William Howard Taft and was Hoover's
fourth choice for the State Department post. The two men had nev-
er met prior to Stimson's appointment and never established a
warm rapport, as Stimson preferred to run his own department and
Hoover rarely granted him the freedom Coolidge had given Kellogg.
Tall and stern with little sense of humor, Stimson was often callous
toward State Department underlings, and he depended on them far
less than had his predecessor. But he was intelligent and a quick
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study, and, although he admired military men and methods, he be-
lieved in disarmament and in a diplomacy that strongly stressed
international law, being himself a lawyer. Stimson also supported
American participation in the World Court, had corresponded with
Salmon Levinson, and worked with Senators Swanson and Walsh on
the matter of disarmament in early 1929, having no confidence in
Borah.65 Despite his general support of disarmament, however,
Stimson had served most recently as governor of the Philippines,
and he remained more interested in Far Eastern affairs than in arms
control. Nevertheless, he had discussed disarmament with Prime
Minister Tanaka and Minister of the Marine Okada in Tokyo on his
way from the Philippines to Washington to assume the position of
secretary of state. Okada had done most of the talking and explained
to Stimson that he favored a naval conference in 1930 rather than
1931 so Japan could design new ships permitted by the Washington
treaties more quickly, once they knew what changes in ship design
a new conference might require.66
Hoover quickly began considering new approaches to disarma-
ment, in spite of discouraging advice from Coolidge. Coolidge had
brought Hoover up to date on disarmament efforts and possibilities a
few weeks after Hoover's inauguration. Although he had considered
discussing disarmament anew with Gibson in December 1928—
probably because he denied opposing further arms-control talks after
the New York Times accused the administration of such after Ge-
neva—Coolidge revealed to Hoover that his attitude had changed
little. In fact, Coolidge held little hope for success:
The Peace Treaty requires the allies to disarm, which they have not done. The
French Army remains and the British Navy has been increased. . . . We have
disbanded our army, reduced our navy and are building scarcely enough re-
placements. The allies would be glad to be able to say that they cannot disarm
on account of our attitude. I am not very familiar with the French proposal
but so far as I recall it seemed to offer possibilities. I doubt much headway can
be made with any discussion of parity. Certainly our country would not ac-
cept inferiority. It may be possible to agree on a navy of reasonable size for
each country.67
Hoover entertained Gibson, an old friend and colleague, in the
White House, where the two men discussed disarmament after
morning sessions of medicine ball—an activity that left Gibson
bruised and sore.68 Together they fashioned new disarmament pro-
posals based on a meeting between State Department officials and
navy men in February 1929.69 Returning to Geneva for the sixth
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meeting of the Preparatory Commission in April 1929, Gibson star-
tled some delegates of the Preparatory Commission, though not the
British, by agreeing with a French proposal assigning each nation a
total tonnage divided between ships in specific displacements. In
other words, he moved closer to the French position advanced in
earlier Preparatory Commission meetings calling for disarmament
according to class of ship. More important, he suggested a "yard-
stick" to achieve "equal tonnages" of classes by displacement, gun
caliber, and perhaps speed and other factors.70 Gibson's colleague,
Admiral Jones, not surprisingly, distrusted the idea, calling it pri-
vately "a mess . . . merely a method of approach" without quantita-
tive proposals.71 This was a somewhat surprising revelation, for
Jones had attended the February meeting at which the idea of a yard-
stick had been discussed, and he had made no objection to the idea
at that time. But Lord Cushenden, the British delegate, having re-
ceived advance warning of the speech through secret meetings be-
tween Gibson, Hugh Wilson, and Sir Robert Craigie, endorsed Gib-
son's proposal because it promised to appraise ships in terms of
fighting effectiveness instead of tonnage and gun size, thereby pro-
viding new diplomatic openings.72 As other delegates fell in behind
Cushenden, President Hoover emphasized the importance of disar-
mament and of the new yardstick proposals at Memorial Day exer-
cises at Arlington Cemetery.
A change of leaders occurred in London at the same time. Ramsay
MacDonald, a sixty-three year old Scotsman who had briefly served
as the Labour prime minister in 1924, succeeded Baldwin as prime
minister in the spring of 1929. The son of a farm laborer, MacDonald
had made his way in the world through hard work, good looks, and
charm, and by marrying money. He eschewed revolutionary action,
preferring gradual change. Hardly the intellectual equal of Hoover, he
was nevertheless a resourceful politician. Like the president, he sup-
ported disarmament. He had already proclaimed that the causes of
war, including armaments, were no more irremediable than the
causes of smallpox. Although he worked harder for a new disarma-
ment conference than had Baldwin, MacDonald could not fully meld
his desire for disarmament with his nationalism. When the Ameri-
can naval bill passed in early 1929, MacDonald claimed in a letter to
the American socialist leader, Norman Thomas, that he would "let
America build ships so that she packed the Atlantic from New York
to Southampton and would not lift . . . a little finger to prevent it or
to restore parity." Yet in the same letter, he blamed the Americans for
the failure of the Geneva Conference and implied that the American
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case for parity was weak: "The cause of the failure was just as much
America's as ours, and at any rate we were facing geographical and
industrial reality, whilst the United States were not."73 In great mea-
sure, MacDonald was also facing political realities in his call for
more cruisers: his was a minority government that could not directly
antagonize the Admiralty, which had agreed to drop its demand for
light cruisers from seventy to sixty shortly after the Labour victory.74
The tensions of the past at last seemed open to remedy. With
new leaders in both countries a diplomatic solution to the cruiser
issue now seemed possible.75 Although before his defeat Baldwin
had concluded that private negotiations were necessary before an-
other conference, he had nevertheless accepted Chamberlain's ques-
tionable conclusion that neutral rights on the sea were the main
source of discontent, rather than cruisers needed for the Pacific
against Japan, America's most likely enemy according to naval esti-
mates.76 MacDonald instructed Ambassador Howard to begin dis-
cussions with Stimson, and the result in Washington was agree-
ment that civil leaders, not naval officers, should handle future
disarmament negotiations, for only they would show the needed
imagination.77
When the new American ambassador to Britain, former vice
president Dawes, arrived in London, he established a warm relation-
ship with the new prime minister. Both declared another naval con-
ference desirable. Dawes afterward described for Secretary Stimson
MacDonald's desire to avoid upsetting the Washington treaties, his
support of parity in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines between
the U.S. and Britain, and the need of a yardstick to establish cruiser
equivalents. He related MacDonald's postponement of the con-
struction of two cruisers of the 1928 program.78 He also requested
Gibson's presence in London.79 Gibson handled most of the day-to-
day negotiating for the United States and thought little of Dawes's
participation or judgment.80
Stimson directed Dawes and Gibson to commit the British to
parity and make certain that any new treaty did not contradict the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. The U.S. would scrap enough destroyers and
submarines to come down to British levels. If necessary, it might
also scrap all submarines. It would postpone capital-ship replace-
ments and establish age limits for all ships—twenty years for cruis-
ers, sixteen for destroyers, thirteen for submarines. Many of these
ideas had arisen during discussions at the Geneva Conference.
MacDonald generally agreed with the American proposals, but
disclosed that the Royal Navy needed forty-five light cruisers to de-
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fend trade routes, in addition to fifteen heavy cruisers. For the U.S.
Navy he proposed eighteen heavy cruisers, to avoid upsetting the
cruiser ratio with the Japanese. After agreement with Japan, France,
and Italy, he might propose a decrease in heavy cruisers.81
Stimson disliked MacDonald's suggestions because he suspected
that the Admiralty had won over the prime minister.82 MacDonald
was also disappointed with the American position. To him, a yard-
stick did not make much difference: "We seem to be like the fox
and the stork who invited each other to dinner which each served
up in turn in utensils from which only one could eat." He dis-
counted the importance of small cruisers, believing that one large
cruiser equaled two and a half to four and a half small ones. Indeed,
in a letter to Dawes MacDonald said that large cruisers were "worth
almost an infinity of smaller craft."83
During these exchanges MacDonald also engaged in conversa-
tion with the Japanese. The government of General Tanaka fell in
July 1929, as mentioned, because the assassination by Japanese
agents of the Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-lin, left Tanaka's pol-
icy of bilateralism with China in shambles. But Tanaka's cabinet
first approved a course toward naval disarmament should a confer-
ence be called: Japan would require a 10-7 ratio rather than the 10-6
that the Americans favored for Japan. The incoming government of
Hamaguchi Osachi accepted the decision, probably because the Jap-
anese Navy staff had reacted to the failure of the Geneva Naval Con-
ference by appointing a committee to study post-1927 building poli-
cy. The committee's report, approved by Chief of Staff Kato Kanji
and Minister of the Marine Okada Keisuke in March 1929, had iden-
tified the United States and Britain as Japan's main enemies and
suggested that Washington treaty limits be forsaken.84 Shidehara
once again resumed his position at the foreign ministry and moved
anew toward greater internationalism, largely because the Japanese
planned to lift their gold embargo and link their economy more
closely with the West. But to achieve greater internationalism To-
kyo needed Western credits to assure steady transition to the gold
standard; the easiest way to obtain the loans lay in diplomatic coop-
eration with the West.85 One sure way to proceed, Shidehara knew
from past experience, was to pursue disarmament. He accordingly
directed Ambassador Matsudaira Tsuneo in London to inquire about
a new naval conference. Matsudaira told MacDonald that Japan wel-
comed a conference but suggested two preliminary steps: a tentative
adjustment of the levels of Anglo-American parity and Japanese-
American examination of Japan's strategic needs. Matsudaira also
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PREPARING FOR THE NEXT BIO REDUCTION SALE
—The Daily Express (London).
Literary Digest, February 1, 1930.
warned Ambassador Dawes that Japan would press for a higher ratio
than the 5-5-3 accorded at Washington.86
But, as MacDonald announced in Commons some weeks later,
any Japanese desire for a higher ratio in cruisers would probably anger
the Americans. Ambassador Matsudaira informed MacDonald that
Japan would agree to eighteen heavy cruisers for the United States and
fifteen for Britain, so long as Japan received twelve. MacDonald con-
tinually advised the U.S. to consider Japan in any cruiser formula,
leading Stimson to suspect that the British were using the Japanese
requests to bring down U.S. demands.87
Stimson and Hoover began to hope a simple agreement on par-
ity might encourage reduction, and they backed away from their
earlier proposal of a yardstick. They feared that a yardstick, which
would necessarily involve technical discussion, would persuade
other countries to turn to bilateral parleys and encourage public
opinion to focus on kaleidoscopic issues. The General Board also
opposed a yardstick on the grounds that it was impossible to com-
pare one ship class to others, and that a yardstick could put the U.S.
in an inferior position.88
Hoover and the General Board meanwhile came to an agree-
ment. The board reiterated its opinion that the navy needed heavy
cruisers, that the cruiser category not be divided, and that limits
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extend only to total cruiser tonnage. It asked for twenty-one cruis-
ers instead of eighteen. Hoover eventually agreed to twenty-one, as
well as ten more Omahas and four cruisers of 7,000 tons.89
During his negotiation with the board, Hoover used a controver-
sy involving shipbuilders and the journalist, William Shearer, to
garner public support for a disarmament conference. As was noted
earlier, Shearer had been accused of influencing statesmen to op-
pose disarmament at the Geneva Conference. Later, he claimed that
shipbuilders had paid him to work for them at Geneva and had
promised to take care of him afterward. Although he received over
$6,000 in late 1928 as "hush money," he was not satisfied and sued
the shipbuilders for back pay. Hoover encouraged Congress to inves-
tigate Shearer and the builders for, as he wrote Stimson, the Shearer
case might be a "useful public example and one that we will need
before we are finished."90 The Senate Naval Affairs Committee
named a subcommittee to investigate Shearer in September 1929
after several senators, including Senator Borah, mentioned the dis-
cussion of the case in the Washington Post.91 The affair inspired
calls for an examination of lobbying and went far in turning edi-
torial and congressional opinion against the arms builders and big-
navy supporters.92 A State Department investigation indicated, how-
ever, that Shearer had had scant influence on American delegates
and technical advisers at the conference.93 Investigation of the ship-
builders' records indicated that Shearer had been paid as a lobbyist
in 1926-28, but had provided little return for his wages.94
Herbert Bayard Swopes, the editor of the New York World, also
interviewed National Security League officials at the direction of the
White House to determine what links might exist between Shearer
and Stanwood Menken, the NSL founder. Shearer was a member of
the Speakers' Bureau of the NSL and had made NSL radio broadcasts
arguing against a new naval agreement with Britain. Ultimately, nei-
ther Swopes nor the FBI discovered any strong ties between the two.95
NSL membership, which had jumped as Hoover called for disarma-
ment, nevertheless declined after the investigation.96
Satisfied that the British and American cruiser positions had
moved close enough for a negotiated agreement, Hoover now in-
vited MacDonald to visit the United States, an invitation for which
MacDonald had been pushing all summer. The president did so be-
cause the positions of both countries had recently narrowed in that
he would limit heavy cruisers and build light ones, whereas the Brit-
ish had reduced their total demand from seventy to fifty, accepted
parity in cruiser classes, and conceded lower tonnage in all ship cat-
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egories. MacDonald sailed from Southampton on September 28,
1929, without military advisers. He and Hoover met at the White
House and at the president's rustic summer camp on the Rapidan in
Virginia over the course of a week.
The meeting was a considerable success. Although the leaders
struck no specific agreements, MacDonald ingratiated himself both
with the president and with the American public. The press enthu-
siastically reported his every move. The prime minister and the
president began their discussions on disarmament. They failed to
reach further agreements on cruisers, but progressed in other ship
categories. Regarding battleships, MacDonald suggested increased
ages and reductions in tonnage, with some construction because of
the effect on unemployment. Hoover recommended abolishing bat-
tleships after 1936, since they seemed obsolete. He hinted that
Americans might accept a 25,000-ton maximum displacement if al-
lowed to build one 35,000-ton ship to compensate for the British
battleships, Nelson, Rodney, and Hood, but he refused any reduc-
tion of gun calibers. MacDonald conceded that Britain might reduce
destroyer tonnage to 150,000 if both nations lowered submarine
tonnage. For his part, Hoover allowed that the U.S. might permit
Japan more submarines. Both men agreed to reduce the total ton-
nage for aircraft carriers from 135,000 to 120,000.97 Many of these
topics had been discussed in one form or another by British and
American diplomats during the summer.
The president proposed enhancing neutral rights in war by ex-
empting food ships from seizure. But MacDonald feared that Hoover
wanted only to protect American shipping during a period of Euro-
pean hostilities. Such an action might create trouble if Britain
needed to enforce sanctions as defined by article sixteen of the
League covenant.98 He refused to discuss the issue. He also skirted
conversation on armament limits at bases in the Western Hemi-
sphere, pointing out that the arms involved were small.
Despite these minor arguments, agreement on cruisers seemed
much more likely, and on October 7, 1929, Whitehall issued invita-
tions to the signatories of the Washington Five-Power Naval Treaty
for a conference in London beginning in January 1930. Within weeks
the powers, including France and Italy, accepted.
American peace groups applauded this development. If after the
Geneva Conference they did not truly "educate" America about
peace and disarmament, as Libby had wished—after all, most Ameri-
cans well remembered the world war and the Washington treaties—
the groups did publicize the issues and help harness public fear of war
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into support for peace issues. They could not likely gain more influ-
ence with the White House during the Coolidge administration be-
cause the president paid more heed to conservative business leaders,
many of whom now opposed disarmament. Likewise with the State
Department: Kellogg was hesitant to acknowledge peace groups—he
despised radical pacifists—but he was willing to correspond with
those whom he considered more moderate, such as Shotwell or Le-
vinson, when he needed them. Caution marked his diplomacy, both
in his dealings with domestic peace groups and with advocates of
preparedness, including the navy, to which he had deferred during the
Geneva Conference."
Nevertheless, as has been mentioned, peace groups did enjoy a
measure of success. They helped pressure the State Department to
settle issues in Latin America peacefully and to proceed with the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, for which they supplied initial ideas, impetus,
and persuasion. With regard to passage of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
they profited from Briand's desire for a military alliance and from
Kellogg's wish to polish his reputation after his much-criticized per-
formance during Geneva. Peace leaders were only partially success-
ful in their campaign against the naval bill, however, helping reduce
spending requests. But this episode hardly constitutes major defeat,
as many politicians, even some favoring further disarmament, recog-
nized that the navy needed appropriations just to maintain current
strength. If peace workers had little to do with actual disarmament
proposals or the direction arms-limitation talks took in late 1929
(they tended to take a wait-and-see attitude toward Herbert Hoover),
they did have an indirect influence on the new national leaders by
lobbying congressmen and State Department and White House offi-
cials to pursue negotiations.
It remained to be seen if American peace workers could educate
delegates and governments at the London Conference to use their
power wisely. Significant obstacles to this goal existed. Peace senti-
ment in other countries did not approach that found in the United
States. Japan had not yet addressed recent Anglo-American cruiser
compromises. France's security threatened to loom large in the equa-
tion of any London agreement. Undaunted, peace groups rallied and
bade farewell to their observers bound for the London conference.
6
THE LONDON NAVAL
CONFERENCE
As conferences go, the London Conference of 1930 was not much
different from its predecessors concerning naval limitation, except
that, unlike those of 1921-22 and 1927, the meeting in London turned
into fine technical discussions that then threaded themselves out
into political subtleties. The London Conference was far more tech-
nical-political than its forebears. In that lies its fascination.
The negotiators at London, one must add, almost certainly did
not realize the extent to which their understanding of both the
technicalities and the politics was incomplete. In technical issues,
for example, the importance of airplanes was not yet fully under-
stood. Aircraft carriers were fairly developed, but the planes that
flew onto and off of their platforms were fragile craft, only a bare
two decades beyond the time when the Wright brothers had shown
the world that flight was possible. Aerial planners of the year 1930
looked to the future uncertainly, and negotiators could not imagine
how aircraft would interfere with the technicalities of naval warfare
as they had understood it for nearly half a century.
In political matters, negotiators likewise could not know that
the coming decade would shatter the neat lines of (essentially)
three-power control of the world they had known since the end of
World War I. The great nations unrepresented at London would
change all that—Germany and the Soviet Union would rise from
impotence during the ensuing years and defy the London calcu-
lations.
With such limited understanding, however, the men of 1930 had
to negotiate, in hope that the world they had known would continue
into the indefinite future. They sought to understand and negotiate
from the technicalities, in hope that the political understandings
they implied would continue.
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1930 CALLING.
THE SEW YEAR SUMMONS THE FIVE NATIONS TO THE NAVAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON.
Punch, January 1, 1930.
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TECHNICAL TESTIMONY
The cruiser issue that had helped sink the Geneva Conference re-
mained a subject of heated debate during the next few years. Navies
sought to skirt the limitations of the Washington Conference by
improving the capabilities of unlimited ships—especially the cruis-
er. It appeared by 1930 that if political leaders in the United States
and Britain had come closer to agreement about cruisers, their re-
spective admirals had not. Even at the London Naval Conference,
British and American experts remained far apart in their views of
this type of warship. They argued at length about whether to rely on
a versatile all-around ship for fleet action—a ship not much superi-
or to destroyers—or to develop a cruiser as formidable as possible
under the Washington treaty. Neither country, of course, had had
any battle experience with either sort of cruiser.
The U.S. Navy's General Board had favored a powerfully armed
cruiser since 1927 and held to its position even after the London
Naval Conference of 1930. On the one hand, the American navy did
not want to increase armor on heavy cruisers at the cost of arma-
ment or speed; on the other, it did not want to construct light cruis-
ers fit for general purposes. In a memorandum to the House Naval
Affairs Committee written in November 1928, Rear Admiral An-
drew Long of the board concluded: "If anyone should ask me why I
do not wish to build 10,000-ton cruisers, armed with six-inch guns,
my reply is that one of those cruisers might fall in with a 10,000-ton
cruiser carrying eight-inch guns, and that in such a case its chances
of victory would be zero."1 In late 1929, the board also overruled
recommendations from the Bureau of Construction and Repair and
from the Director of Fleet Training for more armor for the 10,000-
ton cruisers by sacrificing three eight-inch guns and 3.5 knots of
speed.2
Board members much disliked the direction the Dawes-Mac-
Donald talks had taken. Ova Navy magazine in September 1929 ex-
pressed their opinion in parody:
Five little cruisers,
Sailing close to shore;
They cut the quota down some
And then there were four.
Four little cruisers,
As cute as they could be;
Along came a conference
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And then there were three.
Three little cruisers,
Each with a gallant crew;
Up bobbed a peace pact,
And then there were two.
Two little cruisers,
With men behind each gun;
Then someone suggested
We could get along with one.
One little cruiser,
Only one—no more,
Won't it be the dickens
If someone starts a war!3
Such was sentiment in American naval circles when President
Hoover selected Admiral William V. Pratt, a reserved New Eng-
lander, commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, as technical adviser to
the London Conference. Unlike most ranking officers, Pratt sup-
ported disarmament for the political gains he believed it offered. He
had served as technical adviser at the Versailles and Washington
Conferences and at the latter had presented Secretary Hughes much
good advice, although this had caused a breach between him and
many fellow officers. He consequently did not relish the new as-
signment but reluctantly accepted it.4 He also supported the six-
inch gun. He knew that Hoover might favor eighteen rather than
twenty-one heavy cruisers and that the president believed the U.S.
might make up the difference in six-inch-gunned cruisers. This
view he approved because he believed the United States would nev-
er go to war with Britain. Pratt's arguments helped persuade Hoover
that the U.S. could compromise on the cruiser issue.5
At the London Conference, the General Board and Pratt and
most of his technical advisers differed sharply on the cruiser issue.
At the outset, U.S. delegates supported the board's proposal of
twenty-one heavy cruisers, but then they began to listen to Pratt
and his assistants, many of whom were bureau chiefs who had long
disagreed with the board's strong emphasis on ordnance.6
The technical arguments for the six-inch-gunned cruiser were
complicated. Indeed, Ambassador Dawes described them along with
other current technical arguments as being a "technical octopus."7
When Captain A.H. Van Keuren, chief of design in the Bureau of
Construction and Repair, spoke before the American delegates in
favor of the six-inch-gunned, or light, cruiser, he argued that the
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eight-inch-gunned, or heavy, ship was inadequately protected. He
suggested eighteen heavy cruisers and more light cruisers, using a
new six-inch gun that in many respects could match the eight-inch.
He complained that the General Board had refused to issue orders
for any new design of the six-inch-gunned cruiser, save for brief
summaries comparing the existing six-inch design to the eight-
inch.8
Captain Harry E. Yarnell, chief of the Bureau of Engineering,
supported Van Keuren, agreeing that the heavy cruiser was unbal-
anced, with a gun too large for effective protection. Using argu-
ments similar to those of the Admiralty, he averred that the U.S.
should advocate a 10,000-ton cruiser containing twelve six-inch
guns and suggested parity with Britain at 339,000 tons. He sup-
ported more tonnage in aircraft carriers than battleships, a position
seconded by Pratt.9
Pratt's chief of staff, Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, also fa-
vored light cruisers. He recommended construction of the smallest
possible number of eight-inch ships to gain Japanese acceptance of a
10-6 ratio. As former director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, he
focused on strategy and the threat of Japan and framed the cruiser
issue in terms of obligations in the Pacific, especially defense of the
Philippines, as outlined by War Plan Orange.10
But Captain W.W. Smyth of the Bureau of Ordnance differed. He
preferred the heavy cruiser with the eight-inch gun and agreed with a
recent study that backed use of the bigger gun, citing "fire-effect
tables" of the Naval War College and standard test scores. The study
seemed to underscore assertions by the General Board that the eight-
inch gun scored better than the six-inch at long ranges and that thin
armor on turrets did not pose enough of a threat to forgo use of the
gun. Smyth discussed salvo patterns, percentage of hits at various
ranges, armor, and tactical questions, but his highly technical re-
marks likely left little impression on the delegates, save perhaps
Stimson and Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania.11
Pratt wanted a six-inch-gunned cruiser for fleet work, because he
believed a ship with the smaller gun could prevent attack by de-
stroyers and escort cruisers. He desired such a vessel to possess ade-
quate protection against six-inch shells, especially around turrets and
guns, and greater speed, permitting better night action. He favored a
new design rather than more of the existing Omaha's—which were
not protected against six-inch shells—and a ship with four more
broadside guns. Pratt considered the General Board's plan inflexible
because in effect it ignored the problems encountered at Geneva and
THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 111
did not allow for compromise. He pronounced it "reactionary and not
in keeping with the spirit of the present conference."12
Rear Admiral Schofield, the veteran of the Geneva Conference
and afterward the influential war plans director, estimated that be-
tween 70 and 80 percent of the Navy's officers disagreed with Pratt.
The General Board had reacted to Pratt's appointment by calling
Admiral Jones out of retirement and persuading President Hoover to
appoint him as one of the conference advisers. Admiral Charles F.
Hughes, chief of naval operations, insulted that he was not selected
as a technical adviser and, like Schofield, suspicious of Britain, at-
tacked Pratt's position not only because Pratt opposed the heavy
cruiser but also because he dared challenge the board. Hughes had
personally signed all the board's recommendations regarding naval
limitation during 1929 and tended to rely more on the board than
would his successors.13 Among Pratt's technical assistants in Lon-
don, Rear Admiral J.R.P. Pringle, president of the Naval War Col-
lege, Lieutenant-Commander Harold C. Train, and, as mentioned,
Captain Smyth opposed their chief on cruiser firepower.14 All other
members of the General Board later testified against Pratt.
The naval experts' disagreements with Pratt went beyond tech-
nical differences, of course. Fundamentally, most of them consid-
ered disarmament unwise. If they thought at all of political gains,
they did not deem them worth any weakening of American mar-
itime security. It is not surprising that most naval officers opposed
disarmament, since some had served during the entire era of the
naval technical revolution, 1880-1930, from sail to steam to oil.
Watching politicians attempt to undo or limit technical progress
was beyond their endurance.15
Even after the American delegates at London decided to accept a
reduction from twenty-one to eighteen heavy cruisers, the board
continued its opposition. Jones filed a minority report two days af-
ter the delegation changed its mind and then returned home on the
Berengaria, suffering an attack of ulcers.16 Pringle wanted to join
him, regarding himself as window dressing for the politicians.17
Rear Admiral Bristol opposed light cruisers before congressional
committees. By this time the General Board had in hand a report
presenting favorable arguments for the eight-inch gun and playing
down advantages of the six-inch gun, such as more-rapid fire.18
One should note a special aspect of the case for the eight-inch
gun that proved confusing. The General Board compared this weap-
on with the existing six-inch gun, the 6/53, the bag-loaded gun of
the Omaha cruisers, whereas Pratt compared it with a newly devel-
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oped triple-mounted six-inch gun, the 6/47 that fired more rapidly.
By 1929-30, many officers in the navy, though not the General
Board, acknowledged, however, that the rate of fire of the new six-
inch was superior to previous models. Thus the two sides were ar-
guing about different things and often talked past each other.19
The British meanwhile appeared to have had a change of heart
about heavy cruisers. They had been forced to reevaluate their cruis-
er position because of their experience at Geneva, recent Staff Col-
lege studies, Treasury calls for a smaller and less costly ship, and,
not least, attacks from the press. Following the Geneva Conference
of 1927 and Lord Cecil's resignation, the New Statesman had sug-
gested that the prime minister invite the First Lord of the Admi-
ralty, Bridgeman, "to retire into private life and take his ridiculous
cruiser programme with him."20 Sir Charles Madden, the First Sea
Lord, agreed with the latest Staff College report that Britain should
insist on six-inch cruisers. To do otherwise would be to confess
"that our policy at the Coolidge conference was incorrect and has
been reversed."21 Practice results mounting eight six-inch guns
against four eight-inch seemed to demonstrate that the eight-inch
gun was potentially superior, despite defects. Yet officials recom-
mended the six-inch gun for reasons of economy and because efforts
to develop a suitable eight-inch gun had failed. The director of plans
noted in late 1928 that a new, lighter cruiser of less than 6,500 tons
armed with a six-inch gun might be more convenient and more able
to develop a rapid yet sufficient fire than the disappointing eight-
inch guns.22 Admiralty officials also predicted that, cost aside, the
navy would be unable to get the number of cruisers it wanted with-
out reducing the displacement of each ship. The director of gunnery
development agreed with officers who believed: "If our supporting
cruisers are liable to have to fight 10,000-ton cruisers, the proper
answer is to have 10,000-ton cruisers ourselves. Omitting this from
consideration, the advantage lies in having six-inch cruisers, as we
can have more of them for the same outlay."23 Another well-known
naval officer, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, the former comman-
dant of the Imperial Defence College, had argued in lead articles in
the Times that 10,000 tons should be the largest size ship of the
navy. He also believed that the government should build to this size
unilaterally rather than engage in disarmament agreements with
other powers.24
But at least one important Admiralty official, the controller,
Admiral Ernie Chatfield, objected to the six-inch gun. He agreed
that the light cruiser would do for fleet work, as it might fall back
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M. BRIAND. "IRES BIKK."
SIGNOR MUSSOLINI, "BRAVO!"
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on support, and the six-inch gun excelled against destroyers; yet, he
argued, it would be folly to use an unsupported light cruiser on
trade routes, even those considered safe. He proposed parity with
the Americans in heavy cruisers and development of a convoy-
defense cruiser of 7,200 tons and slower speed, bearing an eight-inch
gun.25
Japan appeared more flexible concerning cruisers. The Ministry
of the Marine did not oppose building a few light ships. The Fuiutaka-
class cruiser had proven disappointing, as officers judged the guns
too big for displacement. So the navy proposed a new class of heavy
cruiser.26 Japan's strategists would not accept less than a ratio of 70
percent with the other powers in heavy cruisers. Many naval offi-
cers remained bitter about Japan's acceptance of the Washington ra-
tios and vowed to improve the empire's position in a future treaty.27
Ambassador Dawes noted at the conference, in fact, that the Japa-
nese civilian delegates and their technical experts differed over the
value of light and heavy cruisers and over how many of each the
Imperial fleet could use.28
CRUISER RESOLUTION
Despite the misgivings of naval experts over the cruiser, political
leaders looked forward to the conference. The Anglo-American
cruiser discussions of the previous summer seemed promising, and
delegates departed for London optimistic about their ultimate suc-
cess. Most realized, however, that after agreement on cruisers, they
would have to grapple with French desires for security guarantees, a
potentially more serious problem.
The Americans had learned from their experience at the Geneva
Conference. The delegation to London contained a mixture of prom-
inent political leaders, many of whom were acquainted with the
arms question. In fact, half-way through the conference Secretary
Stimson would boast to his sister that the delegation was working
together like "a well-trained football team." This was certainly of
benefit to Stimson, for although he had been well tutored on the
naval technical details, he had been nervous and tired on his arrival,
knowing little about European politics. He confessed he had since
been "cutting or trying to cut many new wisdom teeth in respect to
European diplomacy."29 The delegation included Stimson; Dawes;
Secretary of the Navy Charles E Adams, the great-great grandson of
President John Adams; Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, a
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leading Democrat on the Naval Affairs and Foreign Relations com-
mittees; Senator David A. Reed of Pennsylvania, a longtime Repub-
lican member of the Committee for Military Affairs and a major in
the field artillery during the last war; Gibson, delegate to the Ge-
neva Conference; and Dwight W. Morrow, ambassador to Mexico, a
quick learner who soon understood the experts' technical data.
Other delegations were also distinguished. MacDonald headed
the British delegation, assisted by his imperturbable foreign secre-
tary, Arthur Henderson. Wakatsuki, the agile former premier, led the
Japanese delegation, consisting of Admiral Takarabe Takeshi, the
Anglophile Minister of the Marine, Matsudaira, ambassador in Lon-
don and formerly in Washington, who had attended the Washington
Conference, and Nagai Matsuzo, Hugh Gibson's counterpart in Bel-
gium. Premier Andre Tardieu, a forceful orator, headed the French
delegation, which included Briand, Georges Leygues, Minister of the
Marine and former premier, Joseph de Fleuriau, ambassador at Lon-
don, and Rene Massigli, the cabinet's disarmament specialist, who
had attended conferences in the past. The young, handsome, and ar-
ticulate foreign minister, Dino Grandi, led the Italian delegation.
Following the opening of the conference by King George in the
Royal Gallery of the House of Lords, the American and British dele-
gates privately opened discussions of the cruiser question. Stimson,
Reed, Morrow, and Adams met MacDonald and Henderson on Febru-
ary 3, 1930, to agree on the impossibility of a yardstick. MacDonald
then made clear that the Admiralty would not accept twenty-one
American heavy cruisers, but would agree to fifteen and any number
of smaller ships. Later he conceded eighteen heavy cruisers for the
Americans, provided they reduced their total cruiser tonnage from
339,000 tons to 315,000. Discussion of other categories revealed con-
sensus about submarines, destroyers, and battleships. MacDonald's
change of heart about battleships was notable—he now accepted a
holiday in battleship construction until 1936.30 The next day, the
American delegates, after last-minute testimony from Pratt and
Jones, voted to accept the British offer of eighteen heavy cruisers.
Actually, most of the delegates had considered the lower figure
since hearing from their experts the preceding week.31 According to
Stimson, everyone feared that if they based their figures on twenty-
one heavy cruisers, the Japanese would require an increase in their
numbers, which would encourage Australia and New Zealand to
increase theirs, leaving parity for the U.S. and Britain itself, but not
for the British Empire.32
The cruiser compromise between the Americans and the British
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came about only after objections to a new British proposal setting
limits on light cruisers and the American demand for a new battle-
ship had been settled. On February 11, the British delegates pro-
posed limiting light cruisers to between 6,000 and 7,000 tons and
constructing only fixed percentages of the ratios for them. Mac-
Donald explained to Stimson that he hoped to avoid a new cruiser
race in this category but might have to increase British tonnage be-
cause of attacks in Parliament and the press. The message found its
target, for although Stimson refused to hear of displacement limits
under 10,000 tons for light cruisers, he realized he could not press
MacDonald to reduce the number or total tonnage of all British
cruisers.33 The British desire to limit light cruisers seemed to con-
tradict their position at the Geneva Conference as well as Mac-
Donald's earlier assurance that if the Americans accepted the light
cruiser, they could build as many as they wished. But the British
had changed their position because they wished to limit the cruisers
of the Japanese and the French. To remove the last obstacle to a
cruiser settlement, the Americans gave up their demand to build a
battleship before 1936 that would compensate for the extra tonnage
the British had enjoyed after the Washington Conference. Stimson
and Hoover decided that an agreement was worth sacrificing the
battleship tonnage.34
Delegates then turned to French and Italian demands. The Amer-
icans negotiated with the French during social occasions—where
chamois gloves and tails or tuxedos, rather than uniforms as at Ge-
neva, were de rigueur. They also met in rooms adjoining the confer-
ence hall in St. James's Palace on small chairs around white tables
laden with ash trays and matchbooks. Morrow served as the Ameri-
can spokesman, and Briand described him as "degourdi comme une
pochette de souris"—shrewd as a pocketful of mice.35 But in spite of
Morrow's efforts, the French resisted compromise. As one historian
has noted, the French had arrived in London with proposals that em-
phasized overall security, rendering naval limitation almost "inci-
dental."36 The French nevertheless resisted parity for Italy, on the
grounds that their own interests extended far beyond the Mediterra-
nean, into the North Sea and the waters of the Far East. The Quai
d'Orsay was also loath to grant parity for reasons of prestige and, more
important, now feared the increasing militancy of Italy.37 The Italian,
Grandi, proved little more conciliatory: he claimed he would be shot
at the first station across the border if he returned to Italy agreeing to
the terms of the French.
French difficulty with the negotiations involved other factors
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than the question of Italian parity, of course. Anglo-French relations
had recently suffered and the French did not believe that success at
London was as politically important as did the British and Ameri-
cans. French diplomacy also suffered from an essential contradic-
tion. French unhappiness with the British stemmed from events of
1929. Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Snowden at the Hague
Conference discussing the Young Plan for reparations had dismissed
French claims and demanded more British reparations. Foreign Sec-
retary Arthur Henderson had also announced British withdrawal
from the Rhineland, prompting an especially angry response from
Paris. MacDonald's Labour government, finally, gave top priority to
Anglo-American relations, seemingly ignoring the French.38 The
French therefore did not feel particularly conciliatory toward the
British. At the same time, however, the Quai d'Orsay did not want
the Americans to go home angry, because it wished to bring the
Americans closer to the League and to European affairs.
The French did not place as much importance in the conference
because domestic support for disarmament in France lagged behind
that in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In part, this was because the
French had engaged in considerable naval building since 1928.39 But
a Quai d'Orsay memo for Tardieu written before the conference also
noted that MacDonald, and, to a lesser extent, Hoover had staked
much on the outcome of the conference, whereas French leaders
had not. The French were also put out by the Rapidan and subse-
quent naval discussions: "The fate of these auxiliary vessels de-
pends primarily on us, for the English figures assume that we will
resign ourselves . . . to the percentage they give us. But politically
we do not need success at any price."40 The French suspected secret
agreements between the Anglo-Saxon powers at Rapidan, despite
declarations to the contrary by the American ambassador to Paris,
Walter Edge. Premier Tardieu had responded before the conference
that France might require a security agreement complementing any
disarmament agreement.41 The French did cheerfully note Anglo-
American disagreement over freedom of the seas, as the two sides
did not discuss it at Rapidan and, when Hoover mentioned it in a
speech in November, the British had remained silent. Here possibly
was a point to exploit. Finally, Paris disapproved of Anglo-American
insistence on using the Kellogg-Briand Pact as the basis for discus-
sion. The French instead preferred using the League covenant (arti-
cle 8) as the basis of conversation, as it might promote an interna-
tional security system linking land, air, and sea disarmament. Any
such arrangement would hopefully include the Americans.42
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French foreign policy on the Continent also affected diplomacy
at London. Briand favored Franco-German reconciliation, such as he
had sought with Premier Gustav Stresemann. But he also supported
the principle of equality among states, especially among East Euro-
pean states, that in alliance with France might serve as a collective
military counterweight to Germany. But these goals clashed with
one another because while Germany demanded to rearm, France's
eastern allies never cooperated with each other, leaving France in a
difficult spot. The French tended therefore to equivocate, seeking
alliances in the west—perhaps with the United States or with Brit-
ain, if its current behavior improved—while delaying disarmament.43
As Morrow and Tardieu struggled to find a solution, aided by
Briand and Grandi, the French continued to put up barriers to agree-
ment. By February 12 they were demanding the right to build ten
heavy cruisers and wanted vessels under 600 tons included in fleet
tonnage, contrary to the wishes of other delegations. They refused,
in addition, to sign an agreement that would punish nations making
submarine attacks on commercial shipping.
French-Italian discord appeared almost impossible to resolve.
The French would have to augment their fleet to prevent Italian par-
ity, but by so doing they would improve on their ratio with Britain,
which would threaten the Anglo-American agreements. A weary
Stimson suggested to Hoover that the United States consider a two-
power treaty with Britain if the French remained adamant. To Acting
Secretary of State Joseph P. Cotton, Jr., he confided that the search for
general agreement suffered from Tardieu's frequent absences, due to
an unsteady coalition in Paris. On February 18, Tardieu's government
fell, and the French delegation returned temporarily to Paris.44
PEACE PARTISANS
Looking to the work of peace groups at the time of the London Con-
ference, it is clear that their way was made much easier by the revela-
tion, shortly before the conference, that the so-called journalist,
Shearer, had been working for shipbuilding firms at the Geneva Con-
ference in 1927. The Shearer Affair, as it was called, certainly had
complicated the task of navy supporters. Just before the conference,
the Navy League president, William H. Gardiner, who beamed when
friends called him "the admiral" (although he had never served in the
navy), had trumpeted recent navy arguments in pamphlets with such
titles as Trade and Navies, Parity in Naval Strength, and Cost of
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Armaments. Yet these made little impression. Shearer hired Car-
negie Hall for a lecture, "Inside of the Geneva Conference of 1927,"
but attracted only 350 people, half of them with free tickets. Acting
Secretary Cotton confirmed to British observers that American navy
supporters were much less "potent" than a year or two previously.45
Before the conference, such peace groups as the WILPF had de-
cided not to organize an international committee in London, count-
ing instead on the work of members in their own countries. They
settled on this course partly because of problems in combining na-
tional viewpoints and partly because disarmament had suffered a
drop in popularity after the Great Depression brought hard times to
shipbuilding and related industries. Nevertheless, cooperation be-
tween peace groups did occur. The British Womens' Peace Crusade,
representing eighteen organizations, joined the American Interna-
tional Committee on the Cause and Cure of War (ICCCW) in asking
delegates to allow a petition. The ICCCW had met in Washington a
few days before the conference and passed resolutions for reduction
of armament and for entry into the World Court. Prime Minister
MacDonald, along with representatives from the U.S. and Japan, re-
ceived the ICCCW petition early in February.46
American groups gradually increased their efforts. Laura Puffer
Morgan, reporter and lobbyist for the NCPW, wanted the United
States to conform to the Washington ratios and believed a decision on
cruisers might smooth the way to the abolition of battleships. She
reported from London that "the cruiser proposal is disappointing, but
at least it points to a turn toward the six-inch gun cruiser instead of
the eight-inch." She distributed pamphlets to American and British
correspondents and delegates, interviewed peace groups to ascertain
their views, and took tea with Mrs. Dwight Morrow. In the United
States, Frederick Libby campaigned to abolish battleships, and wrote
a pamphlet entitled "What Has Happened at London?" which he
mailed to farm, labor, and religious journals, twenty-four hundred
daily newspapers, YWCAs, libraries, social workers, college depart-
ments of history, congressmen, and governors.47 Dorothy Detzer
wrote the president every day "as though he were my mother," to
protest the American position on parity. The State Department offi-
cial, Prentiss Gilbert, inquired how long she planned to continue: "In
your office, you just turn on a spigot, and the State Department is
flooded. . . . We are having to commandeer every typist in the ste-
nographic pool to handle the letters."48
Nicholas Murray Butler, Carrie Chapman Catt, Detzer, Shot-
well, Libby, and the journalist, Walter Lippmann, met in February in
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New York to sign a petition, eventually bearing twelve hundred sig-
natures, that called for arms reduction. The petition (which was
sent to Stimson in London) opposed demands of delegates for an
American battleship similar to the British Rodney and a cruiser ton-
nage above that of the Naval Act of 1929. It also decried Senator
Robinson's speech to American journalists in London in which he
characterized the peace movement as a small band of pacifists out-
side the mainstream of American opinion.49 The signers agreed
with Morgan of the NCPW that "if the American delegation suc-
ceeds in negotiating a treaty on the basis of which it is working at
present it will mean that the United States will have a navy incom-
parably the most powerful . . . in the world."50 Although the signers
recognized that a treaty of this sort would set limits on naval con-
struction by all powers, they failed either to mention that the Brit-
ish navy would still be larger for some time than the American or to
recognize the unlikelihood of American building.
Peace activists began to call for a consultative pact similar to
what Briand had had in mind when proposing his peace pact. In a
letter to the New York Times, Shotwell wrote: "For almost a month
the searchlights of the various delegations [in London] have played
upon ships and their equipment; so bright a light, indeed, that al-
most every bolt in the welding, as well as every gun on the decks,
could be counted and measured." The one area left in the dark, he
wrote, was a consultative pact. The petition of the twelve hundred
signatures echoed Shotwell, calling on the delegates to reestablish
the Kellogg-Briand Pact as the conference's foundation.51
Cotton warned Stimson that the State Department could not
hope to have the support of the navy groups and was quickly losing
the support of the peace groups. Tired of the carping criticism of
private peace promoters, Cotton had already warned the groups that
"this business of shooting at the piano player is an indoor sport I
deplore."52 With Hoover's assent he advised the delegates to take the
lead in reducing or limiting armaments, as "it would restore confi-
dence in this country back to the plane of our initial high purposes if
such a position of the American delegation is made known." But
Stimson defended the American delegation. For the president to call
for reductions in arms at that stage, he wrote, would give the impres-
sion that he sympathized with the peace press.53
Hoover's sympathies did create problems for him. In a Septem-
ber 1929 letter meant for MacDonald's eyes, Hoover wrote about
peace and disarmament in words little different from either Detzer
or Catt: "It seems to me that there is the most profound outlook for
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peace today that we have had at anytime since the last half century,
more especially if we succeed in our conference of January next, yet
in effect we are plunging along building more ships at fabulous ex-
pense only with the hope and aspiration that at the end of a period
so short as six years we shall be able to sink a considerable portion
of them. . . . All this is illogical and is the simple negation of our
own aspirations and I believe also of public opinion on both sides of
the Atlantic."54 The president had presented similar sentiments to
the British while secretary of commerce during the Geneva Confer-
ence.55 In an Armistice Day speech, Hoover had promised reduction,
not just limitation, and peace supporters held him to his promise. At
the same time, his political support weakened, for his nomination of
Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court stirred
strong protest among members of his own party in the Senate. Even
more important, unemployment continued to increase, despite talks
with business leaders at the White House. The president's vulner-
ability encouraged conservative antitreaty workers to block the ne-
gotiations. Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee asked that the
delegates be recalled, since no other powers were interested in limita-
tion. Congressman Fred Britten scheduled hearings of the House Na-
val Affairs Committee, calling for ranking naval officers to appear.
Judge Advocate General Ernest Lee Jahnke skirted Britten's plans,
explaining that the congressman's agenda were under discussion at
London and not ready for public consumption.56
The president did not ignore public comment over the shape of
the negotiations in London, hi fact, in contrast to other foreign-
policy issues, Hoover took careful note of public opinion when it
came to disarmament. During the cruiser negotiations in London
the summer before the conference he had had surveys of editorial
opinion on the cruiser issue and on the proposed visit of Prime Min-
ister MacDonald conducted. Mindful of his own publicity activities
during the Washington and Geneva Conferences, he also attempted
to sway public opinion: news releases were to present American
proposals and any agreements in a positive light and delegates were
to pronounce themselves "satisfied and proud" with conference ac-
complishments.57 But the president also realized the problem of
image—that most Americans expected parity, or near parity, in
cruisers, since that issue had scuttled the Geneva Conference of
1927. In the end, he valued naval limitation over either reduction or
lack of accord.
In Britain, MacDonald encountered little agitation from peace
groups. The League of Nations Union remained philosophically tied
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to government approval and financially dependent on government
aid. Pacifist groups supported their bolder American cousins but
their own appeals to political leaders were infrequent and weak.
Badgered by Conservative opposition to the negotiations and still
holding a thin margin in Parliament, the prime minister took no
lead in discussion but allowed the Americans to deal with the Japa-
nese while he consulted the Cabinet about continuing difficulties
with the French.
Premier Hamaguchi also faced political challenges, though not
from peace groups. Even though his Minseito party held a substan-
tial majority in the lower house of the Diet, he had little room to
maneuver with the United States. As the new American ambas-
sador in Tokyo, William Castle, noted with surprise, the public,
press, and government officials all were fascinated by the naval con-
ference and opposed anything less than a 70 percent ratio in cruisers
and desired parity in submarines.58 The Japanese Navy League, com-
posed of several pro-navy organizations, upheld these "fundamental
claims." It had organized a campaign under the auspices of the city
of Tokyo and the Imperial Marine Association to "educate" the pub-
lic. The meetings took place in public halls and schools where naval
officers spoke about the conference and inculcated the 70 percent
demand for heavy cruisers.59 The naval officers may have been at-
tempting in part to counter the source of most international news
in Japan: London's Reuters news agency.60 At any rate, no group op-
posed the League except the weak Association for the Realization of
Armament Reduction, in part because the government unwittingly
aided navy supporters by instituting a restrictive press law that re-
quired newspapers reporting on current politics to tender deposits,
forfeitable if they incurred government objection. The law forbade
reports of the proceedings of governmental departments, reprints of
confidential documents, and specific, detailed editorial guesses
about government policy.61
Despite these restrictions, a small amount of uncensored news
was reported, as the police could only confiscate newspapers after
publication—not before—newspapers might present material for
government review and then change the contents before publica-
tion, and editors could use blank type—replacing objectionable
words or phrases with the letters x and o.62 Nevertheless, Japanese
editors imposed much self-restraint, as traditionally journalists had
not reported government problems or scandals until announced, for
fear of bringing disgrace to the government and the nation in the
eyes of foreigners. Newspapers in Japan had also become big busi-
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"WE NEED MORE SECURITY"
—Eose in the Boston Herald.
From Literary Digest, March 8, 1930.
ness in the early twentieth century and many publishers had close
ties to government officials. This situation substantially reduced
the news that peace groups could create, and information about the
negotiation in London outside of the Navy League meetings dried
up. Censorship was a blow to Japanese organizations interested in
internationalism, especially as they had never been as powerful as
those in Western countries.63
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GUARANTEES AND RATIOS
Anglo-American efforts to alloy French fears of security and pro-
tracted American-Japanese negotiations dominated the latter half of
the London Conference. When the French returned in early March,
delegates wearily reassembled. On the eve of the French delega-
tion's return, rumor had circulated in Washington that Secretary
Stimson favored and Senator Robinson opposed a consultative pact
with Paris. Echoing the president, Cotton at the State Department
warned that the U.S. was not inclined to gain French cooperation at
the cost of broadening the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as the Senate would
probably not accept such a treaty. Accordingly Stimson told the
French that the United States would not agree to a pact.
The French, in fact, had gone back and forth about whether they
required a consultative agreement. They feared for their security be-
cause they no longer placed much faith in the Locarno agreements,
entertaining strong doubt about British commitment to the Conti-
nent. Ambassador Fleuriau told Stimson that the French detected a
"bad case of nerves" in British leaders after the coal strike of 1926.64
French diplomats sensed that MacDonald and Henderson dif-
fered over the advisability of an Anglo-French consultative pact.
Henderson favored a pact similar to the Geneva Protocol of 1924,
which offered consultation in case of aggression against a signatory,
whereas MacDonald, ever conscious of his minority government
and of American disapproval, did not. The prime minister recog-
nized that most of the British people opposed closer relations with
France, especially any requiring sanctions or alliances, for the bur-
den of such action with Paris—or the League for that matter—
would fall on the British navy, which would have to maintain a
blockade on any aggressor.65 Many Britons, he feared, would not dis-
tinguish between a consultative pact and an alliance.
The French at last showed their hand—a consultative agreement
by itself would not suffice, Paris needed stronger assurances from the
British. Hoping to force concession, the French announced plans to
retain two seven and one-half-inch cruisers, thereby greatly increas-
ing their total tonnage. At the same time, they told Stimson that they
did not rely on a security Pact from the U.S., but did desire American
thoughts on the Kellogg-Briand Pact and European affairs. Although a
consultative pact would be helpful, they slyly added, France needed
even more a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain. If the U.S. en-
tered such a pact it might encourage the British to sign.66
British security pledges were not forthcoming, and Briand's de-
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parture for Paris on March 21 probably meant the end of any five-
power treaty, though his leaving caused a flurry of last-minute
Anglo-American hand-wringing. Stimson received a midnight tele-
phone call from an agitated MacDonald and was persuaded to call a
meeting between himself, MacDonald, and Henderson to review
the American position on a consultative pact and its possible impli-
cations. Thrashing about for a last-minute solution, in this meeting
Stimson agreed to a limited consultative agreement, whatever that
meant, provided the British offered guarantees to the French. He did
so without informing Washington. Believing that the conference
rested "on the brink of a precipice," he wanted to encourage British
discussion with the French.67
But Stimson soon tempered his offer of consultation, as he was
overruled by Hoover, who, like MacDonald, did not worry about
consultation as much as he feared domestic reaction. Hoover sus-
pected Americans might assume that the agreement meant an addi-
tional military burden. Given such a scenario, navy allies in the
Senate could easily defeat any treaty coming out of the conference.
The president announced that the United States would not accept a
consultative pact.
Reacting to the agitation of peace groups for a consultative pact,
the president sent them a message through fames McDonald of the
Foreign Policy Association: "Seven of the most eminent men of
America are now over there doing their best to secure reduction: let
them alone." The State Department attempted to prevent the asso-
ciation from holding a meeting in New York protesting the presi-
dent's announcement.68 Cotton reported to Stimson that the presi-
dent was bothered by agitation of peace groups and that pacifist
activity seemed on the increase.69
Indeed, Hoover still feared (with good reason) that the Foreign
Policy Association and its allies might try to "get out another broad-
side urging the country to root for" the consultative pact. Therefore,
before breakfast on March 25, 1930, the same day that Cotton issued
his report, the president telephoned Thomas Lamont, the Morgan
partner with whom he maintained regular communication, to ask
him to dissuade McDonald from this action. In an illuminating letter
that underscores the close informal links between business and gov-
ernment during the New Era, Lamont wrote Dwight Morrow in Lon-
don of his response to the president's entreaty:
I suggested to Mr. McDonald that he and the others hold their horses for the
time being, and I repeated to them President Hoover's statement to me that
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the question of a Consultative Pact was not the crux of the question and
was not the thing that was going to save the conference. . . . I conferred
again with the White House, told them that McDonald and his friends
would not move ahead any further without consultation and, in fact, ar-
ranged for two of them to go over on Friday to have a little further talk.
Certainly they ought not to make any move that is not agreeable to the
Administration.70
In London, a chagrined Stimson announced that the United
States had never agreed outright to a consultative pact. He criticized
people who spread "peace propaganda" supporting the French posi-
tion and limited the press room to bona fide journalists who made
daily reports home. This action shut out representatives of the
NCPW, the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, the Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace, and the Foreign Policy
Association, who had been using the State Department's press facil-
ities to serve the cause of peace.71
Without American support, Prime Minister MacDonald could
not convince his cabinet to consider the consultative pact, and ne-
gotiation with the French ended. The best diplomats could now
hope for was a three-power treaty between the United States, Brit-
ain, and Japan. France's demand for security had proved insur-
mountable when combined with the inability of Britain to define its
relation to the Continent.72
In contrast to the Anglo-American talks with France, American
conversations with Japan eventually brought a positive result. The
American desire for a ratio of 10-10-6 in cruisers was almost impos-
sible to obtain because Japan had already built up its navy. In effect,
the U.S. was asking Japan to halt building while it caught up. But
when Japan called for an improvement in the Washington Treaty
ratio from 10-10-6 to 10-10-7 it got its way.
Assuming the Japanese might be coerced by the Anglo-American
cruiser agreement, Stimson and MacDonald had informed Wakat-
suki of the agreement's details. Their belief that the Japanese might
agree to the status quo had some foundation, for Premier Hamaguchi,
Shidehara, and Wakatsuki himself had advocated a pro-Western poli-
cy. In addition, Stimson judged Wakatsuki a man who might make an
unpopular decision, but not until after the Japanese elections, sched-
uled for February 20.73 Yet Stimson failed to realize that the ratio
could not be a Japanese bargaining point for several reasons: econom-
ic hard times in Japan, a press and public convinced that a higher
auxiliary ratio was a patriotic necessity, and the navy's real need for
small vessels to patrol Chinese waters.
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It is interesting that American naval men partly corroborated
Japan's claim that it must have a 10-7 ratio. Pratt, Hepburn, Bristol,
Coontz, and Pringle later testified that this ratio would allow the
American fleet to protect the Hawaiian Islands without operating
in Japanese waters.74
Stimson designated Senator Reed as the chief negotiator with
the Japanese. A sticking point seemed resolved by a suggestion
made by Saito Hiroshi to Sir Robert Craigie that since the Ameri-
cans demanded eighteen heavy cruisers and the Japanese favored fif-
teen, the Americans should delay laying down the three in dispute
until 1935. This would give the Japanese a de facto 10-7 ratio in
cruisers until that year. In practical terms, the Japanese could not
build another cruiser until 1936, since they already had twelve,
whereas the U.S. could build nine heavy cruisers in that time.75
On February 27, Reed and Ambassador Matsudaira finally agreed
upon a formula that delayed American cruiser construction and
granted Japan a de facto 10-7 ratio in heavy cruisers until 1936. Dur-
ing the next weeks the two men struggled to fit numbers into their
compromise and finally altered it so the Americans could lay down
one of the three delayed cruisers in 1933, another in 1934, and the last
in 1935. Wakatsuki and Stimson also conferred; on behalf of the
Americans, Stinson agreed to an outright 10-7 ratio for light cruisers
and destroyers and parity in submarines. In 1936, the Japanese could
decide if they wanted to replace their Furutaka-class cruisers with
10,000-ton ships, provided the Americans had laid down their final
three cruisers.
This completed the American-Japanese negotiations and the
delegations recommended acceptance to their governments.76 A
weary Wakatsuki believed that the agreements were the best that
Tokyo could hope to achieve, as he cabled his superiors. He recorded
in his memoirs: "If the government had not sent its approval or if it
had sent its approval with substantial amendments or demands ap-
pended, I was absolutely resolved, quietly and without threats, to
resign from the delegation."77 Hoover readily agreed to these con-
cessions, probably because he still regarded Japan as a force for
peace: at Washington the Japanese had made concessions to China,
and Japanese leaders in 1930 were clearly pro-Western.78
In Tokyo, the newspapers, supported by the navy, opened a bar-
rage of criticism. In an opening salvo, the influential Tokyo Nichi
Nichi called the Reed-Matsudaira compromise the "American pro-
posal" because it did not offer a permanent 70 percent ratio in heavy
cruisers; the newspaper likened it to a "beautiful gold lacquer lunch
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box containing gruel."79 The Japanese Advertiser published a state-
ment from naval authorities that the proposal was not acceptable.
Although the Foreign Office insisted the next day that this state-
ment was unofficial, it was clear at the time that the government
had divided on the issue. Hamaguchi and Admiral Kato Kanji met at
the premier's residence to discuss the proposal, and Kato told the
premier the navy opposed the compromise. Kato asked for an agree-
ment like the Locarno treaties, defining national aims in the Pacif-
ic, especially toward China. Shidehara meanwhile weakly explained
to Ambassador Castle that the cabinet needed time to study the
proposal, as it lacked records of the negotiation.80 More likely, Ham-
aguchi, Shidehara, and their allies needed time to deal with Kato
and his supporters.81
The politicians were eventually victorious, aided by a minority
of naval officers. No happier about the vessel numbers than his
American and British naval counterparts, Admiral Takarabe, the
chief naval expert, kept quiet because he feared blame if the confer-
ence failed. He did not command the attention and loyalty either
among the public or navy officers, that Navy Minister Kato Tomo-
saburo, the chief navy expert at Washington, had enjoyed, and so
could not repress discontent among his colleagues in the navy.82 Nev-
ertheless, Vice Minister of the Marine Yamanashi Katsunoshin and
Admiral Okada Keisuke, now the powerful secretary of the Supreme
War Council, took Takarabe's silence as approval. Yamanashi said
Japan accepted the arrangement because it provided what amounted
to a 10-7 ratio for heavy cruisers, even if the Americans would not
admit it. He noted that Japan could minimize any limit on ship
numbers by technological improvement on individual ships and an
increase of the naval air force, and could try for a higher ratio in
1936.83 At length, the Japanese delegation announced acceptance on
April 2 and straightened out final points by April 10.
Japan's acceptance made possible an expansion of the Anglo-
American arrangement, and when France and Italy agreed to sign the
general articles of the proposed pact, a five-power treaty became pos-
sible. This treaty contained five parts, of which all nations signed
four. Part one extended the holiday in capital ships until 1936 and
prohibited cruisers over 10,000 tons. Part two restricted submarines
and special vessels. Part four limited submarine warfare. Part five
specified that the treaty would remain in effect until December 3,
1936, except for part four, which was permanent. Part three dealt
with naval agreements concerning only the United States, Britain,
and Japan. An escalator clause that had made up part of the original
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Anglo-American cruiser agreement formed a preface to this section.
(The escalator clause permitted building by a signatory if nonsignato-
ries engaged in significant naval construction.) Amid much pomp,
the delegates signed the London Treaty on April 22, 1930.
IN RETROSPECT
In the end, peace groups were disappointed in some of the results of
the treaty. They had publicized the conference and continually met
with journalists and administration members to push for lower ra-
tios and the consultative pact. Their pressure worried the president
and the State Department, leading to an attempt to limit peace-
group influence in New York and London. Despite their visibility,
peace promoters found themselves unable to sway decisions once
the conference began. Part of their trouble was that pacifists wanted
arms reduction, not just arms limitation, and internationalists sup-
porting the consultative pact could not understand why Hoover
would oppose such an action. The peace groups came closest to af-
fecting policy when they took advantage of the split in elite opinion
over the consultative pact to make their case to the public and to
the government. But when the elites closed ranks, adopted some of
the peace groups' own rhetoric, and urged the cancellation of the
New York rally, the peace groups complied, not wishing to engage in
civil disobedience or disloyalty. As a result, their influence dimin-
ished and their policy wishes were partially assimilated or dis-
missed. Their enthusiasm for the final treaty was therefore less
than wholehearted.
In fact, the London Treaty offered its signatories mixed blessings.
Resolution of the cruiser question represented a gain, together with
the improvement in Anglo-American relations. Stimson always con-
sidered the goal of the meeting to be better relations with London,
which had been strained since the Geneva Conference. In this lim-
ited way the treaty was successful. But the arrangement provided
little restriction, and it even permitted Americans to increase auxil-
iary vessels. It also brought to light, as if more evidence were needed,
France's fears for its security. An arms-control agreement, naval or
otherwise, that would include the Continental powers seemed im-
possible so long as the French believed themselves threatened by
Germany and Italy. To the Quai d'Orsay, the Maginot Line and
numbers of submarines were more reassuring than a disarmament
pact that lacked British or American pledges of protection. If ob-
130 PEACE AND DISARMAMENT
servers had thought that France had altered its position on this point
before the London Conference, they could harbor no such illusions
by the time conference delegates departed London. Further, one may
argue that any gains of the treaty were outweighed by the resentment
it caused in Japan, where the military refused to accept limits on
Japan's colonial aims. Premier Hamaguchi was assassinated in 1931
and his was the last civilian government until 1945.
Could the treaty's weaknesses be blamed on inadequate nego-
tiators or technical experts?
President Hoover showed less interest in the political benefits
of disarmament than had Coolidge or Harding. This inattention to
political implication is not surprising, for Hoover faced other prob-
lems of his presidency, such as the Depression, with the same
strongly moral approach that he brought to the disarmament issue.
Yet he recognized some political imperatives well enough. It is diffi-
cult, for example, to criticize him for refusing the guarantees that
might have soothed the French in 1930: he knew that no chief exec-
utive could have faced down Congress, ignored the worsening de-
pression, and persuaded a distracted public that involvement in Eu-
ropean affairs were in their interest. But agreement with Japan was
not so clearly desirable as to grant the 10-7 ratio, especially given
conditions in China that threatened the political guarantees of the
Four- and Nine-Power Treaties of 1922.
As for Hoover's lack of understanding of Japan's needs, perhaps
the trouble was American representation in Tokyo. Ambassadors in
Tokyo had usually been political appointees, who bothered Hoover
more with requests for greater allowances for better housing than
with complete accounts of the political scene. Also, Tokyo was re-
garded as a less desirous post than one of the European capitals.
Before Castle's arrival, the State Department received little accurate
reporting on press opinion regarding naval ratios. Still, if the presi-
dent had had a clearer vision of the Japanese public's view toward
Japan's rights in Manchuria and their determination to remain there
despite Western disapproval, he may have hesitated in granting na-
val concessions.
One may criticize Stimson for not keeping Washington in-
formed during the discouraging period of negotiation that occurred
in mid-March—the period when he told Briand "no" to a consulta-
tive pact and MacDonald "maybe," thereby confusing the issue, as
Hoover had already refused such an agreement. The secretary had
little room for maneuver, however,—the French would not sign a na-
val agreement without a guarantee and the British, unsure of policy
THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 131
vis-a-vis the Continent, could not be pushed.84 Then he overreacted.
After all, Americans and Britons had considered a three-power treaty
even before the conference, should France or Italy or both refuse con-
cession.85 At one point, Stimson himself had even suggested an
Anglo-American two-power treaty. He seemed willing to offer more
concessions than Hoover, who had yielded only in the cruiser catego-
ry. Perhaps Stimson's Anglophilia or ill health caused this lapse in
judgment. He may also have failed to keep the president abreast of
developments because he distrusted the president's judgment.
As for Admiral Pratt, his advice proved of mixed value. In one
respect, his misgivings about heavy cruisers, were later justified
when American heavy cruisers constructed under the London Treaty
came down the ways: the first four cracked their steering gears during
their shakedown cruises.86 But in other ways he proved less than pres-
cient, failing to realize that the navy did not have much support with-
in the Hoover administration. The president was no friend of the
navy, and indeed was more concerned with the national budget, espe-
cially after the Great Depression began.87 Within Congress the navy
had few friends, for congressmen were mainly concerned about the
cost of a fleet "second to none." To them the theory of parity with
Great Britain was more important than the actuality. Pratt had been
out of Washington for most of the late 1920s—at the Naval War Col-
lege and at sea with the U.S. Fleet—and appears to have been out of
touch with national politics.
Prime Minister MacDonald was, like Hoover, more committed
than his domestic opponents to disarmament as a moral issue, but his
position in Parliament was weak. As Cecil and others of the LNU
noted, he was torn between support for disarmament and the desire
to defend the empire. Even if he had been stronger, he likely would not
have veered far from the Admiralty's position. As with the American
president, it is hard to criticize MacDonald for failing to accommo-
date the French, for Parliament would not have permitted broad guar-
antees. But he and the Cabinet never stopped to consider just what
their country's position in relation to the Continent should be. By
1930, it was clear that France needed support.
As with Hoover, it is easier to criticize MacDonald for his posi-
tion toward the Japanese. During negotiations with the United
States, the British had kept their eye on Japan's heavy cruisers, yet
allowed the Americans to urge concessions on the Japanese. Faced
with a united Anglo-American front, Japan might have agreed more
readily to compromise or, more likely, left the conference without
agreement, thereby taking the blame for its failure.
132 PEACE AND DISARMAMENT
Hamaguchi negotiated for political and economic reasons, per-
haps believing that success at London would solidify his support at
home. He supported Shidehara's commitment to accommodation.
Once convinced that Japan had received adequate concessions, he
maneuvered his domestic foes to gain acceptance of the Reed-Matsu-
daira compromise. He and the delegates also gained more from the
conference than the other participants, if one compares their goals
before the conference with results obtained. They did, after all, force
the Americans to capitulate on the 10-7 ratio.
Negotiators at London recognized that the achievements of the
conference depended on those of the preceding conferences. The
Washington Conference had set up a model of collective security
based on arms limitation and political reconciliation. Signatories
regarded it as a success. The Geneva Conference carried on the tra-
dition of Washington, at least in American eyes, as the powers
sought to extend the 5-5-3 ratio to auxiliary ships, especially cruis-
ers. Discussions there flagged areas of disagreement about cruisers
that could be discussed at a later conference. Failure at Geneva con-
tributed to actions—the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Anglo-French na-
val compromise, and the American Naval Act of 1929—sufficiently
inspiring or disturbing to justify another attempt at halting the
cruiser race and extending the Washington ratios. The change of
leadership in London and Washington brought opportunity to begin
discussions anew. In the end, the treaty's weaknesses did not result
from errors in judgment of the participants as much as from suspi-
cion remaining from the war years, especially between France and
its neighbors, the shortcomings of the Treaty of Versailles, and the
strain of the Great Depression. Leaders in 1930 had little inkling
that the deepening depression would invite totalitarian govern-
ments to bring about another world war. Statesmen at the time be-
lieved that they had produced a new age in international security.
When the conference delegates at London left the Great Hall of
St. James's Palace for the last time, an era of cooperation had ended
and a new and darker era was about to begin.
7
DISARMAMENT IN THE
GREAT DEPRESSION
The years after the London Naval Conference, so far as they con-
cerned naval disarmament and general limitation of armaments,
were a disappointing time for arms control advocates, for not much
came of this once-heralded idea. Indeed, the apogee of arms limita-
tion turned out to be the meetings in London. Thereafter the indus-
trial nations of the world found themselves forced to deal with the
Great Depression, the economic debacle that began with the crash
of the New York stock market in 1929. Production worldwide
dropped in bewildering ways, accompanied by increasing unemploy-
ment. By the time economies began to turn up a little, indicating
that troubles might be over, the Hitler regime in Germany, which
came to power in 1933, had embarked on an increasingly assertive
foreign policy that soon disturbed the politics of Europe and turned
thoughts of peace into those of war.
In retrospect, and even at the time, the early 1930s constituted a
tremendously disillusioning era, for those years proved a final dash-
ing of belief that the peace of the world, seemingly so assured in the
late nineteenth century, might now be coupled with economic
prosperity—that the twentieth century could come into its own as
an enlightened time when the troubles of preceding centuries no
longer would intrude. The First World War had shaken trust in all
sorts of principles, and probably more than any other event in our
present century disarranged the hopes of peoples everywhere, end-
ing any real possibility that the philosophy of the nineteenth centu-
ry, "onward and upward," would prevail. The 1920s and momentary
prosperity had briefly banished thoughts of the world war, and con-
fidence had returned. But with the coming of the Great Depression
the old uncertainties arose again.
The years between the London Conference of 1930 and the Sec-
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ond London Conference of 1935-36 marked the final downturn of
hope, and form a cheerless subject for analysis. The period began
with ratification of the naval treaty in the United States and else-
where, followed by its proclamation,- it ended with a conference
that did little more than confirm the chaos into which the peace of
the world was disappearing.
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TREATY RATIFICATION
Because he had pinned so many hopes on naval disarmament—
indeed believing that it would ensure peace both in Europe and
Asia—President Hoover naturally desired approval of the London
Treaty as soon as possible. Any delay would broadcast to the world
that the United States was not really in favor of the treaty and
would also raise the specter of more serious opposition, for only a
decade earlier the Senate had refused to approve the Treaty of
Versailles, at least in a form acceptable to President Woodrow
Wilson.
To Hoover's consternation, some of his supporters in the Sen-
ate began to advise waiting until autumn to submit the treaty for
ratification. Senator David Reed, returning from London, so sug-
gested because recent speeches of some senators, such as those
made by Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee and Frederick Hale of
Maine, suggested that the immediate Senate reaction might be
negative. Sufficient uncertainty existed, so Reed sensed, that it
would be possible in the interim for the president to speak pri-
vately with his more timid supporters and persuade them gradu-
ally to back the treaty.
Still, there appeared to be supporters of immediate submission—
believers in action, Hoover might have called them. The majority
leader, James E. Watson of Indiana, favored voting immediately, be-
cause Claude Swanson of Virginia, a key navy supporter, and Wil-
liam E. Borah, head of the powerful Committee for Foreign Rela-
tions, seemed ready. The Old Man of the Republican party, Elihu
Root, apparently also favored the expansion of Washington limits at
London, in part because he believed that Congress would not likely
augment the navy much, and because he trusted the Japanese from
his days as a diplomat before World War I.1
Hoover himself seized the moment and sent in the treaty. Quite
apart from its merits, he may have thought that it would divert at-
tention from his recent veto of benefits for veterans of the Spanish-
American War, an increasing sentiment against Prohibition, and the
rising unemployment.2
The London Naval Treaty of course did not have unanimous pub-
lic support. Not surprisingly, conservative groups opposed it; the
Daughters of the American Revolution, for example, passed a hostile
resolution at their annual convention. The Chicago Tribune and the
Journal of Commerce (New York) attacked it. But most organizations
and publications gave moderate approval, and a few major news-
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papers, such as the Christian Science Monitor, waxed enthusiastic.
The labor and farm press remained mostly quiet on the issue, being
more concerned with economic problems.3
As noted, businessmen were generally less enthusiastic about
disarmament than they had been before the Washington Conference,
largely because tax reduction, the issue they cared most about, had
been achieved. But many nevertheless supported the president and
the London Treaty, because additional tax savings appeared possible
and international security concerns did not seem to warrant a larger
navy. One writer advocating passage of the treaty even depicted the
ratification debate in Washington in business terms, as "the interplay
of forces representing on the one hand the desire for adequate insur-
ance and on the other the desire to reduce the premium as much as
possible."4 Business Week had suggested before the conference that
naval limitation might mean that "purchasing power [would] be re-
leased for the benefit of domestic business and international trade."
The president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce wrote Hoover that
his organization had concluded the treaty did not "jeopardize ade-
quate defense" and thus the Chamber would support it. He perhaps
did so because the chairman of the Chamber's Committee on Nation-
al Defense, although offering lukewarm support for the Kellogg-
Briand Pact and naval limitation, had testified in favor of industrial
preparedness in congressional hearings and had urged the same in the
Chamber's magazine, Nation's Business.5 The Commercial and Fi-
nancial Chronicle, more sympathetic to disarmament than many
other business journals, remarked when the terms of the treaty had
been disclosed that there appeared "nothing brilliant about the Lon-
don outcome. Nevertheless . . . there seems to be no good reason why
the treaty, as far as the United States is concerned, should not be
promptly ratified."6
Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened
on May 12 and before the Naval Affairs Committee two days later.
Secretary Stimson served as the administration's leading witness and
displayed a grasp of the issues. He explained that the United States
had agreed at London merely to divide cruisers into two equal types,
both being necessary for a f leet. He did not want, he said, to put all the
navy's eggs in one basket. Seeking to counter charges that limitation
rather than reduction had been achieved, he went on:
The very fact that a nation is willing to agree that it shall not exceed a limit
fixed by agreement with other nations, and that the amount of the navy shall
be known, produces confidence by terminating rivalry. Then as that confi-
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dence grows, it produces more limitation and more reduction, and so on. It is
a beneficent circle, working from limitation to confidence and from confi-
dence back to limitation. In that way, I think, it is one of the most practical
measures for producing international good will upon which, more than any-
thing else, the preservation of peace depends.7
Stimson repeated this theme in a radio address of June 12, attack-
ing "warriors" who did not understand the political benefits of the
treaty but insisted on belittling its achievements: "They are likely to
be blindfolded to one-half of the horizon, a very important half." By
implication, of course, he was censuring Admiral Jones and the Gen-
eral Board. His remarks prompted an angry memorandum from Jones,
who saucily suggested that the secretary was overstepping the
bounds of his office.8
Senator Hiram Johnson of California subjected Stimson to stiff
questioning in hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee. Pri-
vately, Johnson groused about the administration's rush tactics; he
feared senators would not take time to inspect the details of a treaty
he believed flawed. Dismissing as "veriest twaddle" the assertion
that the treaty was a step toward peace, he insisted that it did not
grant parity with Britain, permitted the United States to build only as
many cruisers as Britain desired, and gratuitously raised Japan's ratio.
Although he realized that the Senate would probably pass the treaty
by a large margin, he did his best to defeat it, questioning administra-
tion officials and calling witnesses he knew opposed the treaty.9
Captain Harry Yarnell went far to counteract Senator Johnson's
obstructionism and convince the committee of the treaty's merits.
In a statement to the committee, he backed Admiral Pratt's posi-
tion that the navy could design a six-inch cruiser as good as a heavy
cruiser. Reacting to testimony that the Philippines would be vulner-
able because of the higher Japanese cruiser ratio, he stressed the
political importance of the treaty.10
Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, head of the General Board, dis-
puted Yarnell's statement, writing Johnson that Yarnell had disre-
garded the principles of national defense to such an extent as to
make his conclusions "valueless."11 Admiral Schofield estimated
that seven or eight out of ten ranking officers agreed. Admiral Wiley
summed up the attitude of many navy officers in testifying that he
had opposed the 5-3 ratio of the Washington treaty and considered
the new concessions equally ill-advised. He said that the navy
would have to "go out of business" if the United States had too
many conferences.12
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The committee nevertheless approved the treaty with no report,
only four members, Johnson, Robinson of Indiana, George Moses of
Vermont, and Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota, voting against it.13
With these Senate preliminaries, passage was assured. Senator
Reed led the administration's fight on the floor. By careful and cagey
questioning of naval personnel in earlier hearings, he had managed
to demonstrate that the range of the eight-inch gun, described by
many witnesses as over 20,000 yards, remained unproved because
splashes of shells were difficult to see. He drew particular attention
to the treaty's proviso that Japan, beginning in 1934, would build no
more cruisers while the U.S. caught up. When the Senate failed to
act before the session ended in early July, Hoover called a special
session.14 In a masterful speech on July 15, Reed coolly compared
the fleets of each major navy and declared that ratification of the
London treaty would end the cruiser race and balance the American
fleet. When the Senate passed a resolution sponsored by McKellar,
demanding cables, memoranda, and other particulars of the treaty
negotiations, Senator Robinson of Arkansas helped Reed with a
clause making compliance unnecessary if judged not in the public
interest. The matter blew over. The Senate consented to the treaty
on July 21, 58 to 9, attaching a reservation by George Norris of Ne-
braska that there were no secret agreements. Everyone thereupon
departed steamy Washington. *5
In Britain, the public paid scant attention to the treaty. The
press focused on the budget, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, and the
situation in India, where masses of protesters were calling for inde-
pendence. What little comment the treaty aroused was optimistic.
The Manchester Guardian urged approval, acknowledging that
much work remained before 1936. J.L. Garvin of the London Ob-
server wrote that talks between the British and French governments
might continue. The Daily Herald (Labour) admitted that on bal-
ance the treaty was good.16
Debate began in the House of Lords on May 8. Interestingly,
both delegates of the Geneva Conference of 1927, Viscounts Cecil
and Bridgeman, opposed the London Treaty, Cecil because it did not
go far enough, and Bridgeman because it went too far. Hoping for
delay, Bridgeman called for the negotiation papers and received the
backing of Admirals Beatty and Jellicoe and Lord Carson. But sup-
port for the motion died, and opposition ended.
In the House of Commons, Churchill led the attack on the trea-
ty for reasons similar to those he had advanced in Cabinet against
concessions at Geneva in 1927. He saw no connection between the
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Washington treaties and the London Treaty, as the instruments of
1921-22 established Anglo-American battleship parity, whereas that
of 1930 promoted British inferiority because the few cruisers al-
lowed Britain would be spread over a large part of the world. He
especially disliked the increased ratio for Japan. Stanley Baldwin en-
dorsed Churchill's stance and moved to appoint a committee to ex-
amine the treaty, in the hope of defeating it. In particular, he ques-
tioned the decision to accept fewer than seventy cruisers. But he
fared no better than Bridgeman had in the House of Lords. Prime
Minister MacDonald defended the results of the conference, de-
scribing them as but "a little nibble at the cherry" of disarmament,
and he observed that the treaty did not represent the last word on
arms control because it looked to more Anglo-French conversations
and to talks at the Preparatory Commission. He urged quick pas-
sage.17 Baldwin's motion was defeated, and on July 24 the House
approved the treaty.18
Acceptance proved more difficult in Japan. Conservatives en-
couraged antitreaty demonstrations, while some newspapers com-
plained that the delegates had not struck a good bargain. Admiral
Takarabe wisely visited Viscount Saito in Korea to allow emotions
to cool, but on his belated return to Japan a junior naval officer
presented him with a dagger and denounced him as a traitor. Admi-
ral Kato, chief of the Navy General Staff, described the treaty as
"offering us the crumbs and telling us to eat them."19 Still, most
newspapers, including many of the largest and most influential, ac-
cepted the treaty, and delegate Wakatsuki received a suitable wel-
come in the capital. The emperor even praised him in a rare politi-
cal statement.20
The Meiji Constitution did not specify how treaties were to be
confirmed, although by custom the Privy Council advised the em-
peror on his proper course. The question arose about who had author-
ity to limit the navy—the emperor, as advised by the navy, or the
cabinet. Premier Hamaguchi knew that if the cabinet simply pre-
sented the controversial measure to the emperor, the minister of war
would almost certainly resign, forcing the fall of the cabinet. The
naval staff argued that the cabinet had overstepped its bounds in ad-
vising the delegation at London; the government countered that, be-
cause the treaty dealt with politics and economics, its handling of
the delegation had been proper. The opposition Seiyukai party at-
tacked the treaty but stopped short of agreeing with the navy staff,
lest the latter use the same argument against a future Seiyukai gov-
ernment. Public opinion generally followed the government.21
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There followed an involved negotiation. Hamaguchi decided not
to claim that the cabinet possessed the right to approve the treaty,
but allowed the Diet and House of Peers to debate the issue. A veri-
table battle ensued between the government and its opponents in
the Diet and War Council. Hamaguchi insisted that the treaty did
not impair Japan's defense, that the empire had gained much inter-
national good will and could present its case again in another con-
ference, and that failure to sign probably meant another cruiser race.
He submitted the treaty to the Privy Council on July 24, and that
body appointed an investigative committee. After long weeks of ex-
amination and sharp debate it could not reach a conclusion, so
Hamaguchi argued his case before the emperor, attended by the
council. At length the council voted unanimously to ratify.
Opponents outside the council remained intransigent. The navy
was wracked by resignations. Admiral Kato resigned as chief of the
naval staff, helping force the resignations of Vice Admiral Suetsugu
Nobumasa, vice chief of staff, Vice Admiral Yamanashi of the Min-
istry of the Marine, and Navy Minister Admiral Takarabe. Senior
army officials were also angry that Hamaguchi had served as acting
navy minister for Takarabe while the latter was in London attending
the conference. They had not forgotten budget cuts in 1925 that had
rendered the army more technologically efficient but at the cost of
size. They also feared Hamaguchi might act as army minister as
well. For his troubles Hamaguchi was assassinated in early 1931.22
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
Following the exchange of ratifications of the London Treaty, naval
officers in the United States, Britain, and Japan concentrated on de-
signing ships that conformed to treaty standards and on influencing
their political superiors to expand their respective fleets.
Aware that the administration had failed in the past to authorize
construction, American officers hoped that the president might fi-
nally now consider enlarging the fleet.23 But they hoped in vain. Seri-
ous expansion began only when the chairman of the House Commit-
tee for Naval Affairs, Carl Vinson, introduced a bill to strengthen
what he described as the nation's dangerously weak position vis-a-vis
the Japanese. When the House defeated the bill, the indefatigable
Vinson argued that shipbuilding would furnish a source of employ-
ment and managed to convince Hoover's successor, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, to allocate $238 million from the National Industrial Re-
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covery Administration to the fleet. Isolationists and disarmament
defenders protested, but Roosevelt accepted Vinson's logic that new
construction was necessary, as many of the ships built during the
First World War were becoming obsolete. The Vinson-Trammel Act
of 1934 authorized building the navy to treaty limits by 1942 (an
increase of 102 ships) and appropriated money to begin the program.
The administration carefully announced that a treaty navy was the
goal and that the president planned only moderate construction dur-
ing the first year.24
Meanwhile, the General Board began planning for adapting its
cruisers to the London Treaty. In Washington, Admiral Pratt testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty gave
the navy a building schedule, a goal for which to aim, that would help
eliminate the construction bulges of 1916 (battleships) and 1917-18
(destroyers). Captain Johnson, director of Naval Intelligence, sec-
onded Pratt's contention and added that the treaty's construction
timetable furnished the navy with something to "hang its hat on."
Pratt and the bureaus of Engineering, Construction and Repair, and
Ordnance initially spent much time designing and modifying the
heavy cruisers authorized by the Naval Act of 1929. In building the
first cruisers, designers had underestimated their displacement; the
first eight heavy cruisers displaced far less than 10,000 tons. The first
two, the Pensacola and Salt Lake City, also possessed inadequate
armor, and officers described them as "eggshells with hammers." A
dissatisfied Pratt and the General Board ordered enhanced protec-
tion, particularly around vulnerable magazines, machinery, and gun
turrets.25 In March 1933, however, the board reversed itself and or-
dered more gunpower, from an improved gun, at the expense of pro-
tection. Tests had demonstrated flaws in the eight-inch gun, such as
inaccuracy at long range, insufficient rate of fire, and problems with
ammunition-loading. Naval intelligence had received descriptions
of the Japanese Mogami-class cruisers, which featured high speed
and fifteen six-inch guns. Ordnance experts also set to work amelio-
rating the deficiencies of the eight-inch gun. Too, there were prob-
lems with torpedoes. The last American heavy cruiser built under
the Washington Five-Power Treaty, the Wichita, laid down in 1934,
carried no torpedoes because the board saw them as secondary
weapons to main batteries and antiaircraft guns. Only in 1936 did
the director of fleet maintenance recommend that future cruisers
carry torpedoes, presumably because the latest Japanese cruisers
possessed them.26 Because they lacked the torpedoes of their Japa-
nese opponents, American treaty cruisers would suffer from the
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board's decision during the Solomons campaign of the Second
World War.
Pratt supervised the designs of four other ship types—a conven-
tional six-inch cruiser, a gunboat, a flight-deck cruiser, and a battle
cruiser—but the navy built only conventional six-inch cruisers and
the gunboats.
Designers spent much time wrestling with the problem of put-
ting airplanes on cruisers. The correspondence between the chief of
naval operations, the bureaus, and the secretary of the navy between
1930 and 1934 reveals a multiplicity of plans, proposals, and recom-
mendations. Pratt, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, chief of the
Bureau of Aeronautics, and Rear Admiral Harris Lanning, the presi-
dent of the Naval War College from 1930 to 1933, favored a landing
deck so as to use planes in the scouting that cruisers often did for
convoys and carriers. The General Board recommended designs for a
such a cruiser. But many officers harbored doubts about the project.
Schofield feared the fire hazard of aviation fuel in aircraft and in
fueling stations. Deck piping for the fuel also might interfere with
gunfire. He believed that such a cruiser, rather than being able to
serve as a screen, would require its own screen of cruisers or de-
stroyers to protect its aircraft.27 Many members of the board agreed
with War College studies maintaining that such a ship constituted
neither cruiser nor carrier. The ship's advocates, Pratt, Moffett, and
Lanning, however, retired in 1933. After developing the Brooklyn-
class cruisers authorized by the Vinson-Trammel Act, the Bureau of
Construction and Repair attended to designs for a flight deck cruis-
er, but the General Board ended by stressing fleet action over air-
craft. It decided to forego a prototype because the navy was short of
conventional cruisers. A report from the director of war plans in
1936 suggested that aircraft should rank behind armament.28
Similar thoughts encouraged the board to emphasize battleships
and cruisers over aircraft carriers after the London Conference. The
board still favored battleships. Most officers continued to think in
terms of gunnery battles at sea and did not fully sense the impor-
tance of air battles, especially involving ship-launched planes.29 It is
true that during exercises in 1929, planes from the carriers Lexington
and Saratoga had evaded fleet forces and theoretically bombed the
locks of the Panama Canal. And based on this experience and on the
prodding of Admiral Moffett, planners by the late 1920s had desig-
nated various tasks to carriers, including leading landings in the Phil-
ippines, attacking the Mandates, and patrolling.30 But little evidence
existed pointing to carriers as the capital ship of the future: fleet
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maneuvers had demonstrated the vulnerability of carriers, especially
of flammable planes exposed on decks; carriers and planes encoun-
tered difficulties in bad weather and at night; and exercises hinted
that carriers might be used early in battle, leaving the battle line only
as last recourse. The navy conducted few exercises testing carriers, in
part because General Board members were not convinced of their
importance and because those few officers who did appreciate carri-
ers debated about the proper size—Moffett wanted small carriers in-
stead of large ones like the Saratoga and Lexington. He and others in
the Bureau of Aeronautics noted that the new smaller carrier, Ranger,
could launch almost as many planes as the larger carriers. The goal of
carriers, as he saw it, was to put as many planes as possible into the
sky.31
In addition, battleship technology changed in 1933-34, when en-
gineers designed a battleship that could travel twenty-eight knots,
rather than twenty or twenty-one, with adequate armor and arms
within the treaty limits of 35,000 tons. The faster battleships re-
quired faster screen and scout vessels, eating up more developmental
money per ship. Progress in battleship design, doubts about carriers,
treaty limits, and funding problems combined to prevent more tho-
rough investigation into carriers.32 The navy's top brass still favored
battleships, and the assumptions of the strategy of Alfred Thayer Ma-
han, at the time the Washington treaties expired in 1936.33
In London, the Admiralty succeeded in convincing political
leaders that Britain needed to increase the fleet. Naval officers suc-
ceeded less because of their persuasive talents than because of a
worsening international political climate that seemed to threaten
the empire at several points. In the Far East, there was the Japanese
occupation of Manchuria in 1931-33, when the Japanese Kwantung
Army used the pretexts of Chinese boycotts and an alleged plot to
blow up the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway to seize
the province. British intelligence detected Japanese naval building
in 1932-33 and reported that cruisers of the Mogami class displaced
at least 8,500 tons.34 The Admiralty felt compelled either to resort
to the escalator clause of the London Treaty and build an unlimited
number of cruisers or to increase the displacement of the cruisers
permitted by the treaty. Despite a preference for smaller cruisers, it
increased the displacement of new six-inch-gunned cruisers from
7,000 to 7,500 tons, with guns in triple mountings.35 Admiral Chat-
field, the First Sea Lord, approved these recommendations for the
Leandei class, reversing his position of 1928 when he had argued for
eight-inch-gunned cruisers. The Admiralty also drew up plans for
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an even heavier six-inch cruiser, and the prime minister told a group
of officers in October 1933 that he approved of a proposed "M"
cruiser of 8,900 tons, carrying twelve six-inch guns.36
The British paid even less attention to aircraft carriers than did
the Americans. They carried out few carrier exercises and were con-
cerned more about protecting trade routes because of the threat
posed by the new German pocket battleship, the Deutschland. In
November 1928, the Admiralty had recommended converting old
battleships into carriers to permit two carriers, rather than one, to
accompany each fleet. But it delayed construction of a new carrier.
Like their American counterparts, most officers favored armament
over aircraft.37
In Japan during these years the navy virtually dominated the
civil government. After the London Conference, the Navy General
Staff exerted control over the more moderate Ministry of the Ma-
rine. Staff leaders used maneuver and even threats to purge admirals
who had supported the London Treaty, for after 1930 many officers
lost what little confidence they had had in Shidehara's program of
cooperation with the Western powers. They recommended scrap-
ping the Washington agreements. They doubted the strength of the
Western economies because of the expanding depression, and re-
sented what they considered acts of economic warfare by the West,
especially the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, which closed American
trade to many Japanese goods.38 The London Treaty came in for a
barrage of criticism from officers and the press during the "May 15
Incident" trial—the court-martial of Premier Inukai's assassins in
August 1933. The American attache reported:
The widest possible publicity is being given to the trial—obviously in-
tended as a warning to the civilian authorities that unless the economic
and social evils of the capitalistic democracy are corrected further use of
'direct action' may be necessary. The criticism of the government and the
naval authorities as incompetent, weak-kneed and corrupt for accepting an
inferior ratio under the London Naval Treaty, and the publicity which is
being given this phase of politics, is clearly directed toward preventing the
Japanese nation from ever accepting any treaty which does not give Japan
practical parity with the United States and Great Britain.39
Japan, many junior naval officers concluded, would decide for itself
the proper policy to pursue in the Far East, and it would not include
disarmament.
Admiral Okada, no friend of arms control, replaced the more con-
ciliatory Admiral Saito as premier in July 1934, following publica-
tion of a communique by junior officers asking abrogation of the
DISARMAMENT IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION 145
Washington treaties and a new cabinet that could halt political un-
rest.40 Although some prominent politicians, including former pre-
mier Wakatsuki, lead delegate to the London Conference of 1930, had
defended the London Treaty in a speech in October 1933, they soon
desisted. Wakatsuki did so because he realized he was probably
marked for assassination and that public opinion seemed to favor
the navy's antidisarmament stand.41 In 1934, liaison committees of
civilians and military personnel, dominated by the navy, began to
form policy for the foreign office. Under these circumstances the
navy had little trouble gaining political approval of increased con-
struction.42
When designed, the Mogami-class cruisers that so worried Brit-
ish planners displaced 9,500 tons, but when launched they displaced
11,200 tons. After refitting in 1937-38, they reached 12,400 tons.
They carried increased armor, six-inch guns with reinforced barbettes
refittable with eight-inch guns (later done), and possessed stronger
hulls.43 In short, the Japanese proved unable to handle their treaty
cruiser requirements within the prescribed 10,000 tons. Rather than
sacrifice what they considered essentials, they simply refused to con-
fine themselves to treaty limits. This decision may have had some-
thing to do with the mysterious capsizing of the torpedo ship Ibmot-
suru in March 1934. Investigation afterward pointed to poor design,
based on treaty restrictions.44 Although the Americans and British
suspected what was going on, they do not appear to have realized the
extent to which the Japanese had gone over the limits. The diplomats
at London had not discussed verification, preferring to rely on na-
tional good will.
As for carriers, the Japanese by 1928 had completed their first
two, by converting battleships. They finished two more by 1933,
which placed them on a par with the United States Navy.45 They
experimented with ship-launched aircraft and with planes armed
with torpedoes considerably more than did the American or British
navies, yet battleship advocates continued to overshadow those offi-
cers who desired carriers. Like the Americans, Japanese officers
could not decide whether a bigger or smaller carrier was preferable
or how many to attach to the fleet. Their deliberations continued as
the war in China expanded, beginning in 1937.
PRESSURE GROUP ACTIVITY IN THE 1930S
After the London Conference, economic dislocation hampered the
efforts of civilian navy supporters who sought construction to trea-
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ty limits while it aided, at least for a short time, those of peace
groups calling for naval limitation. In the depths of the Great De-
pression it was difficult to support expenditures for navies. In the
United States the depression was acute: the gross national product
slid by a third, the banking system teetered, farm prices dove, and
gold reserves dropped, as Americans feared that the United States
might follow Britain off the gold standard. Circumstances in Brit-
ain, although alarming, were not as dire: for a while the economy
even enjoyed a mild upswing.46 Increased naval construction in both
the United States and Britain, however, seemed out of the question.
For a time it appeared that the disarmament process that Secretary
Hughes had begun in 1921-22 would be completed by the economic
cataclysm that began in 1929.
At the outset of the depression years, the London Treaty had
seemed acceptable to large-navy enthusiasts in the United States, if
only because they believed that it constituted the ultimate limita-
tion; it was assumed that there could not possibly be more limita-
tions to come. In its first comment on the London Conference of
1930, the Navy League had recommended ratification of the treaty,
but with amendments and reservations. The president of the league,
William Howard Gardiner, naturally disapproved of the treaty, warn-
ing that "naval power is not like a fire department, to be called upon
only when the conflagration of war appears." But his efforts were
halfhearted. The league suffered weakened relations with the Navy
Department after Pratt's appointment as chief of naval operations.47
Under such circumstances, the Navy League did what it could.
It berated President Hoover for not building up to treaty limits.
Navy League supporter Henry Cabot Lodge, an editorial writer for
the New York Ttibune, wrote in support of a navy built to treaty
limits. Following the administration's announcement that it would
build only five of the eleven destroyers for which Congress had ap-
propriated money, Gardiner wrote speeches for admirals highly crit-
ical of the London Treaty. One such speech, in draft, found its way
to the White House, where President Hoover ordered offending pas-
sages cut.
But then the league went too far—Gardiner produced a vitriolic
pamphlet, "The President and the Navy," so critical of Hoover that
the president, stung by the attack, took measures against it. The
FBI conducted an investigation that revealed the small size of the
league—it had no branch offices outside Washington—and pro-
vided information about a few of its members. Hoover appointed a
committee to investigate the league and forbade navy officers to
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belong to it. To serve on his committee the president shrewdly se-
lected administration officials including Navy League men cur-
rently in the administration. Ironically, the committee and the
Navy League executive board lunched in neighboring rooms at the
Metropolitan Club in Washington the same day the committee ten-
tatively agreed on its findings. Not surprisingly, the committee re-
port criticized the league in strong terms. League membership
plummeted, and Gardiner was forced to resign. The journalist Wil-
liam Allen White wrote that "the entire country applauds as Presi-
dent Hoover smashes back in Rooseveltian manner at the insolence
of the Navy League."48
Peace groups continued to endorse the London Treaty. Sidney
Gulick of the Federal Council of Churches had urged that the U.S.
ratify the treaty because not doing so would foster a belief that na-
val conferences were worthless. He suggested that the U.S. reduce
arms by example and continue to cooperate with the Preparatory
Commission for the forthcoming World Disarmament Conference
at Geneva. He also proposed that the nation join the World Court,
ratify the Pan-American arbitration treaty, and assure other nations
that the United States would not aid any aggressor. To make certain
that prominent members of the Senate favored naval disarmament,
the NCPW sent Jeannette Rankin to interview members of the For-
eign Relations Committee. The Council also persuaded Felix Mor-
ley of the Brookings Institution to rebut Henry Cabot Lodge's edi-
torial in its International Disarmament Notes.49 Dorothy Detzer of
the WILPF meanwhile made the most of her "picnic and dinner par-
ty relationship" with influential people, including the secretary of
Senator Borah's staff.50
Peace organizations continued to group themselves roughly in
two blocs. James McDonald of the Foreign Policy Association formed
a new conservative group, known as 99 Park Avenue, which sought
disarmament but also collective security, even at the risk of Ameri-
can involvement in European or Asian affairs. The Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, ICCCW, and League of Nations Asso-
ciation, the latter headed by Clark'Eichelberger, adhered to this
bloc. The other grouping, led by Clarence Pickett of the American
Friends Service Committee attracted pacifists, members of the So-
cialist party, the NCPW, and faculty members from the Union
Theological Seminary in New York.51
In preparation for the World Disarmament Conference of 1932,
both blocs publicized the cause of disarmament. The 99 Park Avenue
group sponsored disarmament institutes in six Midwestern cities,
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and the Carnegie Endowment appropriately arranged disarmament
meetings for Armistice Day 1931. The radical bloc displayed much
more enthusiasm. Detzer blamed armament races on "masculine in-
security nurtured by a selfish patriotism" and urged the appointment
of Dr. Mary E. Woolley, president of Mount Holyoke, to the delega-
tion scheduled to go to Geneva. Detzer helped organize a transconti-
nental peace caravan of 150 automobiles that started from California
in 1931, traversed the nation collecting signatures on a petition ask-
ing for women delegates to Geneva and for complete disarmament,
and ended at the White House, ironically escorted by the Navy Band.
To publicize her cause she also met with congressmen and the press.
All the while eleven international groups, including the ICCCW and
the WILPF, formed the Disarmament Committee of the Women's
International Organizations and established headquarters at Geneva.
Pierre Boal of the State Department told Navy Department officials
that, judging from previous conferences, the navy should expect a
remarkable pressure at Geneva.52
With the opening of the new conference in 1932, peace groups
engaged in a flurry of activity. The International Committee ar-
ranged to produce news reports, consultative groups to interview
delegates, members to lecture in the United States and in the
Netherlands, France, Germany, and, of course, Switzerland. The
WILPF collected signatures for a "No More War" petition and or-
ganized mass meetings. Captain T. Kinkaid, a naval aide at the Ge-
neva Conference, noted that peace groups at the Geneva Conference
printed a daily Conference Journal which provided communica-
tions from peace groups around the world, secured a special Plenary
session of the conference at which they addressed delegates, and
showered delegates and the president of the conference (Arthur
Henderson) with telegrams.53
In Britain, private peace organizations also promoted the cause.
British groups circulated a petition that by May 1931 obtained al-
most a hah1 million signatures. The Trade Union Congress passed a
resolution that the Geneva Conference could not succeed unless
disarmament treaties covered one fourth of the arms expenditures
of governments. A demonstration at the Royal Albert Hall drew an
audience of 20,000 that listened to MacDonald, Baldwin, and Lloyd
George.54
Japanese advocates of peace through disarmament similarly
held meetings, sent delegations to the ministries of foreign affairs
and education, and circulated literature. Yet, as a Japanese WILPF
member reported to Detzer, the disarmament message did not attract
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a wide audience.55 Censorship restricted communication in Japan.
Economically speaking, the times were not right for talk of disarma-
ment: the silk, rice, and bond markets were slumping and foreign
trade had fallen 40 percent. The depression dramatically affected
Japanese farmers and tended increasingly to radicalize the army,
many members of which came from the segments of society hardest
hit by the country's economic difficulties—small landowning fami-
lies and the peasantry.56 The largest Japanese peace organization, the
League of Nations Association of Japan, remained preoccupied with
China. It published International Gleanings from Japan, a monthly
journal that focused almost exclusively on Japanese-Chinese rela-
tions, describing anti-Japanese propaganda in Nationalist Chinese
schoolbooks, listing anti-Japanese groups in Shanghai, and explain-
ing new restrictions on Japanese businessmen in China. It also put
out a pamphlet by Viscount Ishii in which he defended in strong
terms Japan's rights in Manchuria. Naval disarmament seemed near-
ly forgotten in Japan.57
DISARMAMENT AFTER THE LONDON TREATY OF 1930
For a while after the London Conference of 1930, the attention of
the naval powers shifted to the efforts of the French and Italian gov-
ernments to agree on limitation of their navies. Hope had followed
hope. The statesmen first had expected that a Franco-Italian accord
might come before the Preparatory Commission meeting in late
1930. It was not to be: the French and Italian delegates achieved
little. Gibson visited Premier Mussolini but did not obtain any sort
of compromise. When Foreign Secretary Henderson and First Lord
of the Admiralty Alexander met with II Duce in February 1931,
they seemed on the verge of success, but nothing came of the con-
versation that month. Italian claims for parity with France were in-
compatible with the ratios of the other powers at London.
Delegates at last gathered in Geneva for the World Disarmament
Conference, the conference toward which the Preparatory Commis-
sion had labored for nearly six years. Hoover appointed Stimson as
chairman of the American delegation to the Geneva Conference,
with Gibson as acting head.58 The Americans planned no naval ini-
tiatives; they essentially wanted to continue the Washington and
London treaties and forestall capital-ship reduction. As Gibson had
observed not long after the London Conference, the United States
had less interest in the new conference because treaties already lim-
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ited its navy, its army was so small that reduction was ludicrous, and
the proposed measures of air limitation were so vague that they
meant little.59 He also incidentally provided a remarkably prescient
estimate of the length and achievement of the coming conference at
this time. He wrote that the conference would "probably meet in
February or March 1932 and, discouraging as it may sound, it will
probably go on and on."60 He had come to believe that armaments
would never be abolished completely but that treaties could perhaps
maintain military balances.61 Secretary Stimson later wrote that
Americans regarded the Geneva Conference as really "a European
peace conference with European political questions to be settled. . . .
The necessary work of settling them must be done by the leaders of
Europe." He realized that Germany's position in European affairs
could not be ignored as it had at Geneva in 1927 or at London in 1930,
but he did not know how to reconcile German military ambition
with French fear of its neighbor. Stimson therefore hoped the Euro-
peans might find a solution. The secretary also hesitated over further
naval disarmament because of the Manchurian crisis; in particular he
worried whether the navy possessed enough carriers for possible ac-
tion in the Far East.62
Britons were no more optimistic. Mindful of Geneva in 1927,
Austen Chamberlain believed that although the U.S. would "push
strongly for disarmament by others, their own attitude in this and
other international questions of the moment will not, I fear, lend
much weight to their arguments."63 MacDonald had also wondered
about the amount of disarmament the Empire could afford. He had
written privately to Cecil:
There is a fundamental weakness in all our international transactions, and
that is a lowering of the position which this country has held for so long in
the eyes of the world. I feel it to be a problem to which we ought primarily
to address ourselves. Its influence upon the minds of other people was
shown by a remark that was made to me by one of the French Delegates to
the Naval Conference, when he said that the only reason why we wanted to
reduce our Navy was that we could not afford to build up to old standards.
We shall have to be very careful not to allow our peace determination to be
interpreted by unfriendly people to mean that we have got flabby and
useless—that it is spirit going out of us, rather than wisdom going into us.64
France and Italy had negotiated settlement in March 1931, but
the measure failed of ratification because the problem of parity be-
tween the two remained unsolved; the Italians demanding it and
the French refusing it. The French came to Geneva resolved to bol-
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ster their security by linking any disarmament of land, air, and
sea.65 They also sought guarantees from other countries, even Italy
if need be, against German rearmament. French diplomats' heads
had been turned by Mussolini's proposal of a four-power arms lim-
itation meeting should the disarmament talks at Geneva flounder.66
Britain also debated its future stand on disarmament. Although
London would concentrate on land and air reduction at Geneva, the
Admiralty nevertheless demanded seventy cruisers and wanted to
limit capital ships drastically. It desired abolition of the heavy cruis-
er and restricted numbers of aircraft carriers and six-inch cruisers.
In short, the British planned no new initiative, preferring to make
their wishes known when the Americans approached them.67 Mal-
colm MacDonald, secretary to his father, remarked to Cecil that at
the new Geneva Conference the government simply wanted to es-
tablish the London Treaty as the international standard until 1936
and otherwise hoped that the conference would pass a resolution
asking the French and Italians to adhere to the limitation clauses of
the London Treaty.68
Meanwhile Whitehall's opinion of Japan began to change in ear-
ly 1932 because of events in China. The British had reacted less
strongly to the Manchurian Incident of 1931 than had the United
States, and continued to refuse to join Secretary of State Stimson's
call for a combined naval mission to China after the Shanghai Inci-
dent began on January 28, 1932. But in the months following Shang-
hai, London began to move closer to the American position, criticiz-
ing Tokyo more strongly and frequently and sponsoring a League
resolution that called for the maintenance of the military status
quo in the Far East. The British, of course, had greater economic
interests in the Yangtse valley than they had in Manchuria.69 Under
such circumstances naval disarmament began to look less attractive
to many British leaders.
The Japanese proposed to ask parity in auxiliary ships and
would brook no discussion of political matters. Because of the na-
tion's new position in Manchuria and an increasing Japanese pres-
ence in North China, disarmament seemed of no avail; discussing
it, one Japanese critic observed, was like sailing a small boat on "a
turbulent sea against contrary winds."70
As for disarmament on land or in the air, the many delegates at
Geneva had to contend with the grand series of disarmament proj-
ects identified over several years by the Preparatory Commission.
On land the conferees could examine the advisability of trained re-
serves, which constituted the strength of the French and Italian
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armies, or they could consider limitation of land armaments ac-
cording to either numbers of troops or expenditures. Because of the
clash between China and Japan in Manchuria, most nations leaned
toward supervision of any treaty—the Preparatory Commission had
established a Permanent Disarmament Commission to oversee pos-
sible agreements at Geneva. The question remained how much
power this commission would hold.
Conference delegates encountered serious obstacles from the
start. Proposals were almost innumerable and, of course, too ambi-
tious, especially considering the deteriorating international situa-
tion. On the very day when the conference opened, it was necessary
to delay the ceremonies for a short time because of an emergency
meeting of the League of Nations Council, summoned to consider
the Manchurian crisis. Thereafter, delegates did what they could in
the face of increasing trouble in the Far East. During the first phase
of the conference, from February to June 1932, the missions studied
all categories to determine what weapons were defensive and what
offensive (that is, threatening to civil populations). The conference's
naval commission found this task impossible. The British members
presented proposals for the abolition of naval aircraft. In despera-
tion, or perhaps inadvertence, President Hoover suggested limiting
the numbers of battleships and submarines by one third and carri-
ers, destroyers, and cruisers by one fourth. He also sought to trim
land armies by one third and limit troop numbers to a ratio equal to
that of the German army as established by the Treaty of Versailles.
Finally he wanted to abolish chemical warfare, bombers, and large
mobile guns.71
The president perhaps offered these proposals to draw attention
from the impasse over war debts and reparations at the Lausanne
Conference sessions, which opened in June 1932. He was backed in
this instance by the influential financier and perennial presidential
adviser, Bernard Baruch, who, though he had long supported a
strong navy, had come to believe that a disarmament of all nations
would be more useful than a moratorium on war debts.72 In short,
Hoover may have wished to achieve a bold foreign-policy initiative
that would deflect criticism of his economic measures. He was, af-
ter all, a candidate for reelection in November.
A British observer carefully noted the difficulty of American
proposals at Geneva, so far as they concerned limitation of naval
arms: the United States wanted Britain to accept a reduction nearly
double its own, to a level of parity lower than Britain was willing to
go. London would have had to scrap ships whereas American treaty
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tonnage was largely unbuilt—"phantom vessels sailing on the seas
of fancy."73 Another drawback to the American plan: British naval
reductions would have encouraged the Dominions to build.
Norman Davis, a member of the American delegation, shrewdly
observed that only accompanying diplomatic arrangements would
put Hoover's disarmament plan across, such as a land-arms agree-
ment between France and Germany or a naval accord between France
and Italy.74 Japan also rejected Hoover's naval suggestions, as the
Foreign Office, Navy, and War Ministry adamantly opposed them.
The Japanese press condemned them, citing Japan's special interests
in Manchuria and the need for security. The weak cabinet dared not
accept the proposals.
Despite MacDonald's forecast to Baldwin that "a month's steady
work of a delicate and difficult kind is required to bring Geneva
near to an end," the conference, unable to agree, recessed on July 23,
planning to meet again in September.75 Americans were not as opti-
mistic. State Department officials complained that so much of the
work at Geneva did not concern disarmament per se that the de-
partment could not build a staff under the disarmament budget.
Hugh Wilson wrote in December that unless the French received a
guarantee of security from the British and Americans, which was
not likely, the conference would fail. By March 1933, Pierrepont
Moffat was having trouble getting the army and the navy to retain
concessions offered at the start of the conference. In addition, the
new secretary of state, Cordell Hull, was less concerned with disar-
mament than with debts and the Far East.76 At the same time, im-
portant businessmen such as Owen Young, who had much to do
with European financial restructuring during the 1920s, began to
doubt that disarmament was wise given the world economic situa-
tion. Young, for one, believed that the Disarmament Conference in
Geneva should recess until western leaders had reached agreement
at an economic summit in London. He believed that the one de-
pended on the successful conclusion of the other.77
The rise of militaristic governments in Germany and Japan
eventually rendered the work of the Geneva Conference impossible.
In Berlin, the Bruening cabinet fell; Franz von Papen and General
Kurt von Schleicher followed, and then Adolf Hitler. Germany with-
drew its delegates from Geneva in September 1932, only to return
there in December. In October 1933, the Germans withdrew again.
Japanese politics similarly entered a stormy period. After Prime Min-
ister Inukai, whose party had won an election in February 1932, was
assassinated in August, Admiral Saito formed a cabinet that tried to
154 PEACE AND DISARMAMENT
keep peace between factions in the navy. In March 1933, after the
League of Nations adopted the so-called Lytton Report, chaired by
Lord Lytton of Britain, which was critical of Japan's actions in Man-
churia, Japan withdrew its delegation from the League of Nations,
never to return.78 After drifting for months, the World Disarmament
Conference mercifully adjourned sine die in June 1934, never to
reassemble.
Few held out any hope for what would be the last naval disarma-
ment conference of the interwar years, which met in London be-
tween December 1935 and March 1936. Talks during the summer
and autumn of 1934 concerned the Americans, for the Admiralty,
worried about Japan and Germany's effect on France, recommended
seventy cruisers and building to limits in its memorandum for the
Second London Conference, without compensation to the U.S.79 But
the U.S. had already been angered by Whitehall's request that it
postpone laying down four six-inch cruisers in September 1933.
Moffat wrote that the request "has created so much resentment
here that more detailed publicity would, I fear, needlessly embitter
Anglo-American relations at the moment."80 Whitehall also wanted
to explore a naval compromise with the Japanese. But during subse-
quent talks between Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, and Admiral
Yamamoto, the Japanese insisted on a 10-7 ratio in capital ships,
10-8 in heavy cruisers, and parity in submarines, destroyers, and
light cruisers. Chatfield gloomily reckoned that "we shall have no
treaty. . . . The Japanese proposals are likely to be unacceptable to
the USA. I think the sparks will be flying in a fortnight's time."81
Meanwhile, the Japanese government announced in December 1934
that it would abrogate the Five-Power Treaty in two years. Britain's
weakness in regard to naval limitation reflected the tenuous leader-
ship of MacDonald. Still prime minister but a broken figure, he had
left the Labour party to head a coalition government but enjoyed
little support in Parliament, and suffered from deteriorating health.
Neville Chamberlain, chancellor of the Exchequer, soon to be prime
minister, forthrightly asked that Britain limit its worldwide obliga-
tions and concentrate on European problems.
On the eve of the Second London Conference, the American
attitude toward naval limitation was glum. The General Board pro-
posed compensating the United States in other classes of ships for
increases in British cruisers and opposed reduction in the numbers
or size of capital ships. Much as Admiral Pratt had believed of the
London Treaty, so Pratt's successor, Admiral William H. Standley,
judged that a new treaty offered the best chance that Congress
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would provide appropriations for the navy to build to treaty limits.
President Roosevelt quixotically pressed the board to accept a plan
that would permit some limitation but allow building to treaty lim-
its. He instructed the delegation to the Second London Conference,
headed by Admiral Standley and Norman Davis, to ask for tonnage
limits, unless the Japanese delegation withdrew, in which case the
Americans might accept the British position for qualitative limits,
albeit with an escape clause.82
The Second London Conference opened on December 9, 1935,
and reached a stalemate within a week. The Japanese delegation
refused to back down on its ratio demands, set out earlier by Admi-
ral Yamamoto, and quickly retired from the conference, as the other
powers had expected. The British and Americans signed a treaty on
March 25, 1936, that maintained the sixteen-inch limit on guns of
capital ships, set a 35,000-ton limit on battleship displacement, and
established a five-year building holiday for heavy cruisers. But the
Americans could finish some of their heavy cruisers, as the U.S.
Navy had fallen below current treaty limits. The treaty limited dis-
placement of light cruisers to 8,000 tons, that for carriers to 22,000
tons, and guns for each to 6.1 inches.83
The era of naval disarmament thus ended. Many nations signed
the new treaty, but it hardly achieved naval limitation. In the later
1930s, the Japanese furiously built their navy toward parity with the
Americans and British and by 1941 would have a clear superiority in
carriers—the capital ships, as it turned out, of World War II. As in-
ternational tension mounted, cheating on treaty limits became
common, and powers could rely only on inadequate intelligence re-
ports. Japanese cruisers, as mentioned, had passed beyond the re-
strictions of the Washington and London treaties, even while those
treaties remained nominally in effect. The Americans and the Brit-
ish eventually sensed what was happening, but public opinion in
these countries, nurtured by the peace movement, supported by fi-
nancial constraints, bolstered by the hope that what had not hap-
pened would not happen, made it impossible to seize the moment
and build beyond the Japanese.84
And so the time of decision passed, and with it the chance for
world peace.
8
CONCLUSION
In one of his last speeches during the presidential campaign of 1932,
Herbert Hoover listed the accomplishments of his administration
and emphasized disarmament—he had sought it, he said, because of
his experiences in the world war. Having been so involved with the
war, he beheld a personal responsibility to prevent another such cat-
aclysm. Surely here was one of the primary reasons, perhaps even
the sole reason, for the fascination of statesmen and publics with
the limitation of naval armaments during the 1920s.
There was in addition the economic reason for taking interest
in disarmament. At the outset of the 1920s, observers showed con-
cern over national budgets, burdened by large debt because of the
war. At the end of the decade and during the 1930s, many thought-
ful individuals feared what the Wall Street crash and then the Great
Depression itself could mean for budgets, and they saw the intense
difficulty of naval construction during a time of economic trouble.
Political leaders in the United States, Britain, and Japan showed
interest in disarmament partly because they could gain politically
from it. A success in foreign affairs that had broad public approval,
helped balance the budget, and deflected interest from troubling do-
mestic problems could bolster their positions within their parties
and with the electorate. Presidents and premiers after the Washing-
ton Conference carefully noted how Harding, Lloyd George, and
Hara had profited from their participation in that conference, and
they hoped to equal those successes when timing proved auspi-
cious. They initially hoped that politics internationally had entered
a period of lessening tension. Hoover wished for better Anglo-
American relations. In Britain, parties hoped to better relations
with the Continent, especially after the assurances that Britain had
given at Locarno. In Tokyo, political leaders at first sought naval
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adjustments through disarmament. When the situation in China
turned down, and governing became difficult because of pressure
from the military, the government's position began to shift. Stabil-
ity in the Far East became more important than arms control.
As a causal variable in affecting disarmament, nongovernmental
pressure groups influenced public opinion but were less important
than such other variables as public memory of the world war and the
desire for economy, especially in the United States with its tradition-
al congressional frugality in maintaining the navy. Yet social groups
in the three naval powers contributed to the disarmament process
and, as mentioned, their efforts are easily comparable until the Lon-
don Naval Conference of 1930. After the depression deepened, condi-
tions changed and analysis becomes more difficult. But during the
late 1920s, social groups in the United States, Britain, and Japan
largely benefited from common sociopolitical controls: a relatively
calm international situation, democratic governments, stable econ-
omies, and governments that sought naval disarmament.
The domestic structure of each country most affected the
achievement of their social groups. In the United States, the open,
weak structure permitted social groups the greatest impact. They
could easily interact with legislators, government bureaucrats, and
the media because an independent Congress featuring weak parties
publicly discussed policy, providing a forum for individual actors to
make their views heard. Social groups enjoyed windows of oppor-
tunity during the late 1920s and early in 1930 that afforded them
chances to influence policy: the failure of the Geneva Conference of
1927, Hoover's election in 1928, and elite disagreement about a con-
sultative pact during the London Conference of 1930. Social groups
won only partial victories because their coalitions often shifted and
because elites often assimilated their messages and diluted their
original demands. British social groups operating within an open,
strong structure found fewer opportunities to affect policy. True,
these groups also had access to politicians and the media and also
beheld political opportunities following the Geneva Conference and
MacDonald's election. But powerful political parties dominating
the executive hampered the efforts of social groups to alter policy.
Japan's closed, strong domestic structure granted social groups—at
least the peace groups—the least room for maneuver. Individual cit-
izens had little input into political affairs. A weak legislature al-
lowed little public debate on policy while a small number of estab-
lished interest groups maintained their hold on policy. Increasing
suppression of radical political groups after 1925 did not encourage
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nongovernmental actors to attempt political work that ran counter
to elite views.
Working within the above domestic parameters, preparedness
groups sought to convince their fellow citizens to build navies and
to reject arms control. Navy leagues in the United States, Britain,
and Japan were particularly active in this work. Composed of busi-
ness leaders, politicians, and navy officers, the leagues worked to
counteract the propaganda of groups supporting disarmament. The
Navy League in Japan was the most important, for it assumed quasi-
governmental authority by 1930 in disseminating its message to a
variety of business groups, schools, and community centers. It ben-
efited from a censorship imposed on its opponents that did not ex-
tend to its own activities. In the United States, publicists such as
William Shearer encouraged building but encountered little success
and much derision. Patriotic groups had the greatest success in the
United States with the large naval bill of 1929, for which they made
numerous appearances before business and civic groups. But it was
the memory of the recent Geneva Conference and the obsolescence
of the navy more than their efforts that brought passage of the bill.
By publicizing disarmament, peace groups hoped to bring public
opinion to favor conferences. In the United States, conservative and
radical peace workers circulated petitions, wrote editorials, engaged
in countless meetings with each other and with congressmen, and
donated funds to international peace organizations. British groups
persuaded clergymen, such as the archbishop of Canterbury, to par-
ticipate in prayer meetings for the cause. They also occasionally
held huge peace rallies in London and in other cities. In Japan, peace
workers focused on better Japanese-American relations, believing
that disarmament would follow.
But the effectiveness of peace groups varied. Those in the United
States proved the most energetic, independent, and useful in spread-
ing their message, not only because of the more auspicious domestic
structure but because they controlled their mobilization resources
and did not rely on government support as did British and Japanese
peace societies, hi Britain, the League of Nations Union, the largest
peace group, preferred naval budget and manpower restrictions over-
seen by an international body (for instance, the League of Nations) to
disarmament conferences limiting types of ships. Japanese groups,
much smaller than their Western counterparts, had only recently
organized and had to contend with a censorship unknown in the
West.
What difference did peace groups make in the campaign for disar-
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mament? They held out a vision of a more peaceful world and en-
couraged leaders to reach for it. They focused attention on naval dis-
armament, but they could not translate this awareness of the issue
into international agreement. Part of their problem was inherent: the
idealistic outlook of many groups, especially that of church and
women's organizations in the United States, ignored international
security needs. Peace workers argued in general terms for disarma-
ment and rarely pushed their governments to modify specific techni-
cal positions, in part because few if any of them really understood the
detailed issues. Too, their demands for public sessions and open di-
plomacy at the conferences demonstrated an ignorance toward the
need for privacy in diplomatic conversation. Peace workers, along
with some political leaders, also placed extraordinary faith in the
political power of world sentiment to enforce disarmament agree-
ments. When James Shotwell or Dorothy Detzer or Salmon Levinson
spoke of enabling public opinion to "function with a vengeance" for
disarmament, they failed to account for the effects of nationalism,
and they assumed that world opinion would move as a single entity
in a rational manner.1 Part of their problem was environmental: by
1936, memories of the world war, a major motivating force for peace,
had faded with the maturity of a new generation. In addition, peace
groups lost the prestige the League had formerly afforded them when
it appeared powerless to prevent aggression in Manchuria and Ethio-
pia. The international tension, finally, prevented even those making
more limited appeals for disarmament from attaining their goal by
the mid-1980s.
The Washington treaties actually were a remarkable combina-
tion of arms limitation and political settlement. They succeeded
because delegates had not attempted too much. Charles Evans
Hughes and the other delegates settled for agreement on capital
ships. They resolved questions regarding China and the mandated
Pacific islands by tacitly accepting geographic areas of dominance
for each of the naval powers. Coolidge, Baldwin, and Wakatsuki
could hardly have avoided being seduced by the popular success of
the first disarmament conference when they considered participa-
tion in subsequent efforts. They hoped that the Geneva Conference
of 1927 would come to represent a high point of naval disarmament
by extending the limits of the Washington treaties to auxiliary
ships.
The Geneva Conference of 1927 served as an introduction to the
London Conference. Diplomats laid out their disagreement on cruis-
ers, the thorny problem that had defied solution during and after the
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Washington Conference. The Americans and British could not agree
on the size of gun, and consequently on the size of cruiser necessary
to carry it, to implement their naval strategies. A related issue was
parity. After the British blockade experience of World War I, Ameri-
can leaders and naval officers insisted that the United States re-
quired a navy second to none in order to guard its commercial
routes. Britain equivocated on the point, its delegates accurately
pointing out that their country had worldwide imperial commit-
ments, whereas the United States did not. They conceded parity at
some meetings and denied it at others. By the end of the conference
they would not grant it. Exasperated, the Americans suggested that
the British and Japanese fashion a compromise, then rejected it
when offered. Neither government could enter another conference
confused about the position of the other. Participants at the confer-
ence did reach tentative agreements on ships in categories other
than cruisers, however, which served as benchmarks for similar
agreements at London.
Geneva ironically helped raise interest in future meetings. The
Kellogg-Briand Pact became possible in large part because of alarm
over the failure of the naval conference; it encouraged political lead-
ers and peace activists to new efforts. Geneva encouraged the British
to pursue bilateral naval conversations with the French, resulting in
a compromise that so angered the United States that statesmen
quickly sought an improved relationship. Finally, the American gov-
ernment reacted to the failure of the conference by passing the larg-
est naval construction bill in a decade. The choice seemed to be disar-
mament or naval construction.
Delegates at London in 1930 completed the task begun at Ge-
neva. Led by new leaders more enthusiastic about disarmament, the
United States and Britain fashioned the outline of a cruiser compro-
mise before the conference out of the remnants of arguments pressed
at Geneva. The Americans suggested a yardstick, and it prompted
renewed talks, even though the yardstick was never used. President
Hoover overrode his navy board, which MacDonald could not and
would not do, and accepted fewer cruisers with eight-inch guns and
more with six-inch. He did not overly concern himself with which
guns were preferable. He accepted a de facto 10-7 ratio for Japan in
auxiliary ships because he regarded the Hamaguchi government as a
force for peace in the Far East. Delegates also reached accord on ship
categories that had presented little problem three years earlier—
destroyers, submarines, and smaller vessels. All parties signed the
agreement, and to observers it appeared to extend the Washington
system.
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But by 1935, when President Roosevelt sent his delegates to the
Second London Conference on what he believed was a treasure
hunt, the agreements of Geneva and London had already begun to
unravel.2 Roosevelt viewed disarmament quite differently than had
Secretary Hughes in 1921-22 when he remarked that the Washing-
ton treaties had ended competition in naval arms.
Failure to disarm in the 1930s came partly because of changing
technology. During most of the life of the Five-Power Treaty, battle-
ship technology did not change much. But diplomats at the London
Conference virtually ignored the ship type that would prove most
important during the 1940s—aircraft carriers. Along with carriers,
strategists by the mid-1930s had to contend with rapid changes in
the types of planes, which planners had not foreseen in 1930. The
rising importance of carriers cast doubt on agreements that empha-
sized surface ships, which no longer necessarily represented the
most important weapons of a nation's arsenal. Meanwhile, the addi-
tion of torpedo tubes to the Japanese cruisers helped end the debate
about cruiser guns. In World War II fire support became important
in landing operations, but ship logs from battles of the Solomon
Islands campaign—where cruiser fire was important—such as Savo
Island, Guadalcanal, and Kula Gulf, do not distinguish enough be-
tween the six-inch and the eight-inch gun to measure which one
performed better. After the Solomons campaign, air torpedo attack
and radar became important, fire power less so.3
Statesmen needed to contend with verification. The issue had
been a problem since the Versailles Conference, when Americans
had spurned French proposals for League verification and enforce-
ment of disarmament measures.4 Intelligence could observe adher-
ence to restrictions governing size and numbers of battleships, but
enforcement of the London Treaty was more difficult. True, one
could explain limitation in terms of numbers, but one could not
readily monitor compliance because of the several categories of
ships, each with varying displacement.
Not surprisingly, lack of enforcement led to cheating. At Ge-
neva in 1933, American and British delegates harbored enough sus-
picion about Japanese activities to discuss compliance. Although
they tentatively agreed to a plan proposed by Prime Minister Mac-
Donald, nothing came of it because they could not agree on punish-
ment if a violator were apprehended.5 The problem loomed ever
larger during the mid and late 1930s as nations began to rearm.
Leaders could not expect help from the League of Nations, as its
prestige plummeted after 1932-34, when the Geneva Conference
broke up and the League refused to take action against aggressors.
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Domestic support for disarmament, strong in the 1920s, dwin-
dled in the 1930s. After the Washington Conference, the peoples of
the naval powers still remembered the war and desired reductions in
navies to reassure themselves about avoiding another war. But after
1930, people in the United States did not think much about disarma-
ment because of worsening economic conditions. President Hoover
supported arms control, but his delegates to Geneva in 1932 and
most of the American public did not. President Roosevelt only went
through the motions of discussing disarmament. Disarmament fell
from favor in Britain because the public and politicians beheld ship-
yards as important for employment in a period of economic and polit-
ical uncertainty. As MacDonald suffered from poor health and a weak
political base, executive leadership on this and other issues flagged.
In Tokyo, the battle over the London Treaty did not end with the Privy
Council's belated acceptance of the treaty. Unrest in China encour-
aged Japanese expansion of foreign markets. The second round of dis-
armament conferences in Geneva and London in the mid-1930s could
not allay Japan's uneasiness about the situation in China.
A final difference between the Washington treaties and the Lon-
don treaty involved the increasing level of international anxiety. Be-
fore London, nothing had proved dangerous enough to upset the
Washington system. The Dawes Plan and the Locarno pact in Europe
had seemed to guarantee European stability. The civil war in China,
though troubling, had not prevented Hamaguchi and Shidehara from
pursuing arms control. After the London Treaty, circumstances
changed, as the weaknesses of the Treaty of Versailles began to ap-
pear. The rise of fascist regimes led to one crisis after another—in
Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, and Spain—and made disar-
mament seem increasingly unwise.
Today the problem of arms control is far more complicated.
American specialists couch their proposals in language that does
not appear to give much away because public sentiment has swung
from fear of the former Soviet Union to hope for peace. Negotiating
has changed in our time, for officials sign agreements at summit
meetings, preceded by low-profile conversations lasting several
years. These discussions contrast with the Preparatory Commission
meetings and high-profile disarmament conferences of the 1920s
and 1930s. Attention, too, has focused on nuclear weapons (land,
air, and sea) because they are the first-use weapons of our day. Peace
groups in the United States, Europe, and Japan have urged their re-
duction or elimination because of the high danger of accidental use.
Unlike their counterparts in the interwar years, present-day states-
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men usually emphasize the international political gains of any
agreement over the economic gains: nuclear arms have sometimes
seemed a less expensive deterrent than conventional forces.
Contemporary arms-control conversations nonetheless resem-
ble in many ways the discussions of the interwar years. As in that
time, there is now public demand for arms control. The United Na-
tions, as did the League, maintains a Disarmament Council. Like
negotiators between the wars, today's diplomats engage in bean
counting—listing numbers of weapons that may be quite dissimilar.
There are good reasons for doing so, such as the ability to explain the
cuts politically, but such actions should be reexamined periodically
to determine if they still make strategic sense. The dissolution of the
Soviet Union, for instance, has demanded such reevaluation. Partici-
pants in arms control today also have encountered problems of en-
forcement—verification, how much each side is willing to let the
other see, what schedule for on-site verification is satisfactory, and
so on.
Arms control, one may conclude, is an issue that will be with us
for years to come. Because it is popular in the United States, Europe,
Russia, and Japan, political leaders will find themselves under pres-
sure to negotiate a plan to reduce arms. Leaders should take advan-
tage of the situation and participate in discussions. But they must
remember what their predecessors in the early twentieth century
sometimes ignored—that arms control is no substitute for military
planning or arms procurement. Peoples must see arms control as
part of preparedness; limitation should conform above all to politi-
cal realities, but also to strategy, war plans, and development of
weapons. These are important elements of national security. At
best, arms limitation can provide predictability in defense planning,
slow the spread of weapons, and present political gains to leaders.
But it cannot, by itself, prevent war.
NOTES
Abbreviations Used
ADM U.K. Admiralty, files, Public Record Office, London.
Balch MSS Emily Greene Balch, papers, Swarthmore College Peace
Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.
Bristol MSS Mark L. Bristol, papers, Naval Historical Foundation Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
CAB UK. Cabinet Papers, Public Record Office, London.
Castle MSS William R. Castle, papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Li-
brary, West Branch, Iowa.
Cecil MSS Robert Cecil, Viscount of Chelwood, papers, British Li-
brary, London.
CDPR US. Department of State, Confidential Diplomatic Post Re-
ports, Japan, 1930-1935, Frederick, Md., 1982 (microfilm).
CFR U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
CID Committee of Imperial Defence, minutes, Public Record
Office, London.
CMD UK. Parliament, Command Papers, Public Record Office,
London.
CNO Chief of Naval Operations.
Cong. Rec. Congressional Record, Washington, D.C, 1922-1930.
CSDN Conseil Superieur de la Defense Nationale.
DBPP Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939.
DPCDC League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Com-
mission for the Disarmament Conference.
FCCC Federated Council of Churches of Christ.
FO U.K. Foreign Office, records, Public Record Office, London.
FOR Fellowship of Reconciliation.
FRUS Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1921-1936.
GB US. Department of the Navy, Records of the Navy General
Board, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
NOTES 165
Gibson letters Hugh S. Gibson, diaries, letters, and notes, 1922-1930, Her-
bert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Gibson papers Hugh S. Gibson, papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolu-
tion, and Peace, Stanford, Calif.
Herbert C. Hoover, miscellaneous papers, Hoover Institu-
tion on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, Calif.
Hoover Mis-
cellaneous
MSS
Hoover Presi-
dential MSS
Hornbeck
MSS
Hull MSS
ICCCW
JB
JPS
Jones MSS
Kellogg MSS
LNA
LNAJ
LNA MSS
LNU
MacDonald
MSS
Mayer MSS
Morley MSS
NCCCW
NCPW
NCPW MSS
NSL
NYT
ONI
Pad. Deb.
Pratt MSS
Roosevelt
MSS
Herbert C. Hoover, papers, presidential series, Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Stanley K. Hornbeck, papers, Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, Calif.
Hannah Clothier Hull, papers, Swarthmore College Peace
Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.
International Committee on the Cause and Cure of War.
General Records of the Joint Army and Navy Board, 1903-
1947, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Japanese Peace Society.
Hilary P. Jones, papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collec-
tion, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Frank B. Kellogg Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St.
Paul, Minn.
League of Nations Association.
League of Nations Association of Japan.
League of Nations Association, papers, Swarthmore Col-
lege Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.
League of Nations Union.
J. Ramsay MacDonald, papers, Public Record Office, London.
Ferdinand Mayer, papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Li-
brary, West Branch, Iowa.
Felix Morley, papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library,
West Branch, Iowa.
National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War papers,
Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.
National Council for the Prevention of War.
National Council for the Prevention of War, papers, Swarth-
more College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.
National Security League.
New York Times.
U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence
Files, RG 39, Naval Attache Reports, Tokyo, 1887-1939,
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
U.K. Parliamentary Debates.
William V. Pratt, papers, Naval Historical Center, Washing-
ton Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., papers, Library of Congress, Wash-
ington, D.C.
166 NOTES TO PAGES xii-xiii
SD U.S. Department of State.
SecNavy U.S. Department of the Navy, Secret and Confidential Cor-
respondence of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy,
1927-1930, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Stimson MSS Henry L. Stimson, diary and papers, Yale University Li-
brary, New Haven, Conn.
Train log, Harold C. Train, Log of the Third Session of the Preparatory
1927 Commission for the Reduction and Limitation of Arma-
ments, General Board Disarmament Conference Records,
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Train log, Log of the London Naval Conference, 1930, General Board
1930 Disarmament Conference Records, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
WILPF Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.
WILPF MSS Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, pa-
pers Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore,
Pa.
Wilson MSS Hugh R. Wilson, papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Li-
brary, West Branch, Iowa.
Introduction
1. For a similar bureaucratic-politics approach for an earlier period,
see Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Oiigins of Naval Arms Lim-
itation, 1914-1922 (Chicago, 1976).
2. For Realist arguments see: Gabriel Almond, The American People
and Foreign Policy (New York, I960); James Rosenau, Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (New York, 1961); Philip E.
Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and
Discontent, ed. D.E. Apter (New York, 1964), 206-61; Barry Hughes, The
Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco, 1979); and
Bernard Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston, 1973). For
dissenting views, see Eugene R. Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Pub-
lic Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C., 1990); Thomas
Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in
Liberal Democracies," World Politics 43 (July 1991): 479-512; Benjamin I.
Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," Ameri-
can Political Science Review 77 (1983): 175-90; and Robert Dallek, The
American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs
(New York, 1983), 93-99.
3. For more on controlled comparable-cases methodology, see Arend
Lijphart, "The Comparable-Case Strategy in Comparative Research," Com-
parative Political Studies 8 (July 1975): 158-77; and Alexander L. George,
"Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Fo-
cused Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory,
and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York, 1979), 43-68.
4. Catt to David Starr Jordan, September 21, 1928, David Starr Jordan
NOTES TO PAGES xiii-5 167
Papers, in John D. Crummy Peace Collection, Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, Calif.; Knox transcript, no date (circa
1932), Dudley W. Knox Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Li-
brary of Congress, Washington, D.C.
5. B.J.C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United
States, 1924-1929 (New York, 1984); Christopher Hall, Britain, America, and
Arms Control, 1921-1937 (New York, 1987); John Robert Ferris, The Evolu-
tion of British Strategic Policy, 1919-1926 (New York, 1989); Dick Rich-
ardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (New
York, 1989).
1. The Politics of Disarmament
1. Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of
the International System, 1919-1937," in Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-
1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Sec-
ond World War, ed. Ian H. Nish (New York, 1982), 4.
2. Lloyd George, for example, linked German disarmament to general
disarmament in the Fountainbleau Memorandum during negotiations. See
Lorna Jaffe, "Abolishing War? Military Disarmament at the Paris Peace
Conference, 1919," in Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on
War, 1899-1939, ed., B.J.C. McKercher (New York, 1992), 43, 52.
3. Maurice Vaisse, Securite D'Abord: Lapolitiquefrangaiseenmatiere
de desarmement, 9 decembre 1930-17 avril 1934 (Paris, 1981), 2.
4. This discussion is based on Dick Richardson, The Evolution of
British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (New York, 1989), 4-9; Christo-
pher Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Control 1921-1937 (New York,
1987), 16-19; Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval
Arms Limitation, 1914-1922 (Chicago, 1976), 70-79; and William Reynolds
Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin, Tex.,
1971), 410-19.
5. Hosoya, "Britain and the United States," 6; Ian H. Nish, Japanese
Foreign Policy, 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka (London, 1977),
118-25.
6. Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation
of Armageddon (New Haven, Conn., 1987), 35. Sherry provides a fine dis-
cussion of the interplay between air power and naval disarmament, 34-38.
7. Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 148.
8. Ibid., 162, 165, 172-77; Ferris, Evolution of British Strategic Policy,
96-100; Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Eco-
nomic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984),
81-84.
9. Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 182-89.
10. Hosoya, "Britain and the United States," 7-8. Also see Ian H. Nish,
Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923 (Lon-
don, 1972).
11. Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 216.
168 NOTES TO PAGES 6-9
12. Ernest Andrade, Jr., "United States Naval Policy in the Disarma-
ment Era, 1921-1937" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1966), 37. For
naval expenditures, see Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference
(New York, 1922), 139; and U.S. Navy General Board (hereafter, GB), 438,
Serial (hereafter ser.) 1088, September 27, 1921, both cited in Raymond G.
O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval
Conference of 1930 (Lawrence, Kans., 1962), 145, n. 13. Appropriations for
the fiscal year 1922 (July 1, 1921 through June 30, 1922) amounted to 32
percent of Japan's total budget as compared to 12 percent for the U.S. and 9
percent for Britain.
13. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 580-81, 588.
14. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, 12-13. O'Connor believes that
these episodes demonstrate how Hughes ignored military factors in the di-
plomacy of the conference, to the detriment of the navy. Thomas Buckley, in
contrast, writes that Hughes properly emphasized political factors in accept-
ing only some of the recommendations of his naval advisers. Hughes, he
concludes, correctly maintained the power of the State Department to con-
duct diplomacy without interference from the navy. Buckley acknowledges,
however, that problems did arise from Hughes's failure to achieve limitation
of auxiliary vessels and airplanes. See Thomas H. Buckley, The United States
and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Rnoxville, Tenn., 1970), 71,
185. Also see Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Consul-
tation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 70 (1955): 167-69.
15. Buckley, Washington Conference, 118, 126.
16. Ibid., 89, 155; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 595.
17. Buckley, Washington Conference, 185; O'Connor, Perilous Equilib-
rium, 7.
18. Dudley W. Knox, The Eclipse of American Sea Power (New York,
1922); Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea
Power (Princeton, 1943), 269-70.
19. Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States
Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia, Mo., 1963), 58.
20. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 582-83.
21. Andrade, "Naval Policy," 75; Sprout and Sprout, Sea Power, 270.
22. Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 206.
23. Ibid., 213.
24. C. Leonard Hoag, Preface to Preparedness: The Washington Disar-
mament Conference and Public Opinion (Washington, D.C., 1941), 74-79;
Joan Hoff-Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933 (Lex-
ington, Ky., 1971), 37-40.
25. Hoag, Preface to Preparedness, chapter 6; Sprout and Sprout, Sea
Power, 116; Gazette de Hollande, November 11, 1922, in Department of
State General Records, Record Group 59, (hereafter, SD), 500 A15/1, Na-
tional Archives, Washington, D.C.; Hector C. Bywater, Navies and Nations
(Boston and New York, 1927), 159.
26. Much of this paragraph is based on Frank Costigliola, Awkward
Dominion, 83-84, and Hoag, Preface to Preparedness, chapter 7.
NOTES TO PAGES 9-12 169
27. Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, vol. 2, The Cabi-
net and the Presidency, 1920-1933 (New York, 1952), 179.
28. Sprout and Sprout, Sea Power, 213, 161; Ferris, Evolution of British
Strategic Policy, 100-102.
29. Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 172-73.
30. Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1941: The Defining of a
Faith (New York, 1980), 62-63; Donald S. Birn, The League of Nations
Union, 1918-1945 (New York, 1981), 49, 54.
31. Sadako Ogata, "The Role of Liberal Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions in Japan," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations,
1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, 1973), 460,
463. The two peace groups became one in 1925 when the Japanese Peace
Society merged into the League of Nations Association of Japan. The LNAJ
then took over the JPS's role as coordinator of peace groups in Japan, ex-
cluding Christian groups, which tended to concentrate on spiritual values
rather than on international affairs.
32. Nish, Alliance, 385; Hosoya, "Britain and the United States," 8.
33. Hosoya, "Britain and the United States," 9-10; Asada Sadao, "The
Japanese Navy and the United States," in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg
and Okamoto, 225-60.
34. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 482; Lester A.
Brune, The Origins of American National Security: Sea Power, Air Power,
and Foreign Policy, 1900-1941 (Manhattan, Kans., 1981), 69-70, 74; Step-
hen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, vol. 1, The Period of Anglo-
American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London, 1968), 352; Bywater, Navies
and Nations, 166; Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strate-
gy," World Politics 11 (1959): 226; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way
of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloom-
ington, Ind., 1973), 245-47, 254. An updated version of the 1919 Plan
Orange may be found in General Records of the Joint Army and Navy
Board, 1903-1947 (hereafter J.B.), 325, "General Correspondence of the War
Plans Division, 1921-1942," serial 228, March 12, 1924, National Ar-
chives, Washington, D.C., microfilm. Annual reports of the Office of Na-
val Intelligence from 1922 to 1926 emphasize Japan as the potential enemy
rather than Britain. The reports provide much information about the Japa-
nese merchant fleet and the fuel oil situation in Japan. U.S. Department of
the Navy, Secret and Confidential Correspondence between the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, 1919-1927,
Record Group 80, plate 212, National Archives, Washington, D.C., micro-
film.
35. For detail on the plan of 1922, see Edward S. Miller, WarPlan Orange:
The U.S. Strategy to Defeat fapan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, Md., 1991), 121.
36. For an example of General Board sentiment, see Admiral Hilary
Jones testimony, March 3, 1924, U.S. Senate Committee on Territories and
Insular Possessions, J.B. 305 (Philippines), ser. 227, National Archives,
Washington, D.C., microfilm. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pa-
cific, 506.
170 NOTES TO PAGES 12-17
37. See Waldo H. Heinrichs, "The Role of the U.S. Navy," in Peail Har-
bor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 200-5; Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl
Harbor, 89.
38. George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (New York, 1940), 315.
39. Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, 540; Daily Telegraph,
January 26, 1927, in SD 841.342/2.
40. GB 420-2, ser. 890.
41. Commander W.S. Pye to Chief of Naval Operations, January 28,
1921, Op 12, "Secret and Confidential Correspondence."
42. October 10, 1919, GB 420-2, ser. 928, cited in Roskill, Naval Policy
between the Wars, 213.
43. Rolland A. Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Policy (Lon-
don, 1935), 45; Norman Friedman, U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Design
History (Annapolis, Md., 1984), 105-6. As Americans became more inter-
ested in the Hawicins-class cruisers, Britons turned toward smaller cruisers
with five- or six-inch guns.
44. Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, January 26, 1921,
Op 11-HU "Secret and Confidential Correspondence"; William F. Trimble,
"The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of
Naval Armament, 1927" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1974), 39.
45. W.S. Pye to Chief of Naval Operations, January 28, 1921, Op 12,
"Secret and Confidential Correspondence."
46. W.C. Cole, Assistant for Material, to Chief of Naval Operations, Jan-
uary 27,1921, Op 23-EE, "Secret and Confidential Correspondence"; Gener-
al Board to Secretary of the Navy, April 29, 1921, GB 420-8, ser. 1033-Q
Trimble, "Geneva Conference," 40. Naval yarn cited in Memorandum for
Captain Cole, January 25, 1921, Op 25-HA 1/25, "Secret and Confidential
Correspondence."
47. Ferris, Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 20, 80-82; Historical
report, "Cruiser Building Policy," May 6, 1937, Plans Division, Admiralty
Papers (hereafter, ADM) 1/9427, Public Record Office, London. For more on
this point, see Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, 89.
48. ADM 1/9272/G.D. 3280/26; Roskill, Naval Policy between the
Wars, 1, 353.
49. Admiral Earl John Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Cre-
ation, Development, and Work (New York, 1919), 306.
50. ADM 1/9272/G.D. 3260/26; ADM 1/8694.
51. Robert A. Hoover, Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation
Agreements, vol. 17, book 3, Monograph Series in World Affairs, (Denver,
1980), 62-66, 72.
52. Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 123.
53. The General Board normally sent its building proposal to the secre-
tary of the Navy two years before each fiscal year (July 1 to June 30). For
more details, see Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 1, 209.
54. New York Times (hereafter, NYT), April 9, 1922, and April 12, 1922.
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt turned back the more stringent demands of
the Kelley committee, especially on personnel, receiving help from Hughes.
NOTES TO PAGES 18-21 171
Braisted, The United States Navy, 676. For the fate of the bill for fiscal
1923, see NYT, April 12, 1922, April 20, 1922, and June 11, 1922.
55. NYT, March 22, 1924, April 27, 1924.
56. Joseph H. Kitchens, Jr., "The Shearer Scandal and Its Origins: Big
Navy Politics and Diplomacy in the 1920s" (Ph.D. diss., University of Geor-
gia, 1968), 3, 4, 10; NYT, April 27, 1924.
57. Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States (Detroit,
1962), 92-93, 97, 99.
58. Braisted, United States Navy, 675. Unbeknownst to most con-
gressmen, significant disagreement existed among strategists whether War
Plan Orange would succeed even with the desired number of ships. For
more on this point, see Morton, "War Plan Orange," 230-31, and Braisted,
"On the American Red and Red-Orange Plans, 1919-1939," in Naval War-
fare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945: Essays in Honor of Arthur }.
Marder, ed. Gerald Jordan (New York, 1977), 272.
59. For more detail, see Roger K. Heller, "Curtis Dwight Wilbur, 19
March 1924-4 March 1929," in American Secretaries of the Navy, vol. 2,
1913-1972, ed. Paolo E. Coletta (Annapolis, Md., 1980), 606-10.
60. NYT, May 4, 1924, May 24, 1924; Kitchens, "Shearer Scandal," 17.
61. Congressional Record (hereafter, Cong. Rec), 68th Cong., 1st sess.,
1924, 65, pt. 5: 4254-65.
62. Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the
1920s (New York, 1932), 183.
63. NYT, May 21, 1924; Rappaport, Navy League, 101; Calvin Cool-
idge, "Promoting Peace through Limitations of Armaments," Ladies Home
Journal 48 (May 1929): 3-4.
64. NYT, May 29, 1924, December 12, 1924; Cong. Rec, 68th Cong.,
1st sess., 1924, 65, pt. 5: 4730; Cong. Rec, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1924, 65,
pt. 10: 6782-83.
65. Parliamentary Debates (hereafter, Parl. Deb.), (Commons), 5th
ser., 176 (1924): 2298. For a more complete discussion of this point, see
Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 161.
66. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London,
1969), 323-24; Times (London), October 26, 1923; James H. Mannock,
"Anglo-American Relations, 1921-1928" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University,
1962), 235. John Robert Ferris presents a persuasive argument that Britain
was not disarming during the early 1920s, despite the Washington accords,
but was building its largest peacetime naval force. Ferris, Evolution of Brit-
ish Strategic Policy, chapter 1.
67. Christina Newton, "Anglo-American Relations and Bureacratic Ri-
valry, 1927-1930," (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1975), 19-20.
68. Quoted in Sir Robert Vansittart, The Mist Procession: The Auto-
biography of Lord Vansittart (London, 1958), 353. Vansittart served as Bald-
win's principal personal secretary in the mid-1920s, and one of his main
tasks was to interest Baldwin in foreign affairs. For further discussion of
Baldwin's character, see Stuart Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party:
The Crisis of 1929-1931 (New Haven, Conn., 1988), 7-17.
172 NOTES TO PAGES 21-27
69. Kenneth Young, Stanley Baldwin (London, 1976), 70.
70. Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, 328, 334, 338.
71. Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan
(Cambridge, 1968), 194-95; James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy:
National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton, 1966), 30.
72. Marius Jansen, "Introduction to the Manchurian Incident," in Ja-
pan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident,
1928-1932, ed. James William Morley (New York, 1984), 123.
73. Hosoya, "Britain and the United States," 12; Nish, Japanese For-
eign Policy, 126-28, 131-45.
74. See James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of
Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (London, 1981); and W. David Mcln-
tyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942 (London,
1979).
75. Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, 130-34.
76. B.J.C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United
States, 1924-1929 (New York, 1984), 58.
2. The Preparatory Commission
Portions of this chapter and chapters 5 and 6 appeared in altered form in
"Peace Groups and the Campaign for Naval Disarmament, 1927-1936,"
Peace and Change 15, no. 1 (January 1990): 26-45.
1. For more detail on peace leaders' links to progressivism, see Dal-
lek, American Style of Foreign Policy, 93-99. Also see Thomas Ferguson,
"The Right Consensus: Holsti and Rosenau's New Foreign Policy Belief
Surveys," International Studies Quarterly 30 (1986): 422.
2. Hoag, Preface to Preparedness-, John Chalmers Vinson, The Parch-
ment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference,
1921-1922 (Athens, Ga., 1955); Charles DeBenedetti, Origins of the Modern
American Peace Movement, 1915-1929 (Millwood, N.Y., 1978); Charles
Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifists in America, 1914-1941 (Knox-
ville, Tenn., 1971).
3. See, for example, Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Ber-
nard Cohen, Public's Impact on Foreign Policy, and Hughes, Domestic
Context of American Foreign Policy.
4. See, for example, Page and Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on
Policy," and Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, 1990).
5. Much of this discussion of theory is drawn from Risse-Kappen,
"Public Opinion," 480-84.
6. For a fine summary of these arguments, see Melvin Small, "Public
Opinion," in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed.
Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1991).
7. Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American
Cities," American Political Science Review 67 (1973): 11-28; Herbert P.
Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-
Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," British Journal of Political Sci-
NOTES TO PACES 27-31 173
ence 16 (January 1986): 57-85; Sidney Tarrow, Struggling to Reform: Social
Movements and Change: Policy Change during Cycles of Protest (Ithaca,
N.Y., 1983), 3 ; Risse-Kappen, "Political Opinion," 484.
8. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures," 63; Risse-Kappen,
"Public Opinion," 486.
9. Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion," 484-86; David S. Meyer, A Winter
of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (New York,
1990), 5.
10. Meyer, Winter of Discontent, xv.
11. Most domestic-structure theory describes the post-1945 era, but it
offers the scholar comparative possiblity for the pre-1945 period as well.
12. For a description of "windows of opportunity," an idea much dis-
cussed recently in peace research, see Meyer, Winter of Discontent, 5.
13. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, chapter 4 ; Ralph Le-
vering, The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978 (New York,
1978), 20-21. Rosenau and Levering describe an attentive public as constitu-
ting about 20 percent of the population, with about 5 percent making up
the influential public. Recently, however, these numbers have been chal-
lenged by R.W. Neuman, who argues convincingly that elite or influential
opinion constitutes about five percent of the population, a "middle mass,"
75 percent, and the apolitical, 20 percent. R.W. Neuman, The Paradox of
Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate (Cam-
bridge, 1986); Ole Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "The Domestic and For-
eign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders," Journal of Conflict Resolution
32, no. 2 (June 1988): 251; Russett, Controlling the Sword, 88. Eugene R.
Wittkopf argues that despite its ignorance, the mass public still forms opin-
ions and participates in the foreign policy process. Wittkopf, Faces of Inter-
nationalism, 15.
14. This paragraph is based on Small, "Public Opinion," 171-73; idem,
Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves (New Brunswick, N.J., 1988); and Levering,
Public and American Foreign Policy, chapter 2.
15. See Robert C. Hilderbrand, Power and the People: Executive Man-
agement of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897-1921 (Chapel Hill,
N.C., 1981); and George I. Juergens, News from the White House: The Presi-
dential-Press Relationship in the Progressive Era (Chicago, 1981) for the
ways that Progressive presidents, especially Theodore Roosevelt and Wood-
row Wilson, increasingly monitored and attempted to mold public opinion
through the media.
16. Sondra Herman describes these internationalists as "political" in
her important study, Eleven against War: Studies in American Interna-
tionalist Thought, 1898-1921 (Stanford, 1969), chapter 1.
17. Charles DeBenedetti, "The American Peace Movement and the
State Department in the Age of Locarno," in Doves and Diplomats: Foreign
Offices and Peace Movements in Europe and America in the Twentieth
Century, ed. Solomon Wank (Westport, Conn., 1978), 208-9.
18. Harold Josephson, "The Search for Lasting Peace: Internationalism
and American Foreign Policy, 1920-1950," in Peace Movements and Politi-
174 NOTES TO PAGES 32-40
cal Cultures, ed. Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen (Knoxville,
Term., 1988), 206-7; Gary B. Ostrower, Collective Insecurity: The United
States and the League of Nations during the Early Thirties (Cranbury, N.J.,
1979), 31.
19. Ostrower, Collective Insecurity, 28-30.
20. Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The His-
tory of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 1984), 14-17.
21. See Herman, Eleven Against War, chapter 1, for an in-depth discus-
sion of community internationalists.
22. Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact (New Haven, Conn., 1952), 15, 26-28.
23. Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of An-
napolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York,
1972), 368-71. Also see Rappaport, Navy League.
24. This paragraph is based on John Carver Edwards, Patriots in Pin-
stripe: Men of the National Security League (Lanham, Md., 1982), 6-8,
133-34, 142.
25. This paragraph is based on William Pencak, For God and Country:
The American Legion, 1919-1941 (Boston, 1989), 162-63.
26. Ibid., 163
27. Birn, The League of Nations Union, 65-66. Times (London), May
12, 1927.
28. Ogata, "Liberal Non-Governmental Groups," 465-66.
29. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (New York, 1952), vol. 2,
454.
30. NYT, December 8, 9, 13, and 16, 1926.
31. Cong. Rec, 69th Cong. 2d sess., 1927, 69, pt. 1: 1091.
32. The Economist 54 (March 19, 1927): 568-69, Pad. Deb. (Com-
mons), 5th ser., 204 (1927): 81-84.
33. Pad. Deb., 5th ser., 205 (1927): 474-75; ibid., 5th ser., 204 (1927):
66, 95, 103-6.
34. Vaisse, Securite D'abord, 66.
35. Pad. Deb., 5th ser., 205 (1927): 511-12.
36. Japan Times, (Toyko), February 16, 1927. For comparisons of each
power's number of cruisers, see: Cong. Rec, 69th Cong., 2d sess., 1927, 68,
pt. 2: 2066-80.
37. Japan Times, March 26, March 27, 1927.
38. This paragraph is based on Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, Chapter
8, especially 152-54, 173.
39. Coolidge Message to Congress, January 4, 1926, Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States 1926 (hereafter, FRUS 1926}
(Washington, D.C., 1941), 1: xxviii.
40. A.C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe (London, 1938),
58; NYT, May 9, 1926.
41. NYT, July 14, 1927. Gibson was most famous for attempting to
save the life of Edith Cavell during the war. Harold C. Train, "Reminis-
cences," Columbia University Oral History Project (Annapolis, 1965-66),
NOTES TO PAGES 40-46 175
oral interviews with John T. Mason, Jr., Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C. Microfilm.
42. Kellogg to Houghton, February 11, 1926; FRUS, 1926, 1: 51.
43. Hilary P. Jones to Admiral E.W. Eberle, Chief of Naval Operations,
August 14, 1926, Hilary P. Jones Papers (hereafter, Jones MSS), Naval His-
torical Foundation Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
44. Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, 134-37.
45. League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission for
the Disarmament Conference (hereafter, DPCDC), series 2, 14; Chaput,
138.
46. Vaisse, Securite D'abord, 32; Jacques Bariety, Les relations franco-
allemandes apres la premiere guerre mondiale (Paris, 1976), 76.
47. This paragraph is largely based on Vaisse, Securite D'abord, 29-31,
35-42.
48. Robert Cecil to Austen Chamberlain, May 22, 1926 in Documents
on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (hereafter, DBFP), edited by WL. Med-
licott et al., (London, 1968), ser. la, 2: 26; Cecil to Chamberlain, May 20,
1926, ibid., 15. Jones thought a deal could be struck with Whitehall. Jones
to Admiral Pratt, February 1, 1926, Jones MSS.
49. Chamberlain to Marquess of Crewe, May 31, 1926, DBFP, ser. la,
2: 53. Edouard Benes of Czechoslovakia confided to Allen Dulles that he
thought there would be no progress in disarmament discussions until Ger-
many had entered the League of Nations (negotiation was ongoing) and the
Locarno pacts had been tested and found effective; cited in Gibson to Kel-
logg, June 11, 1926, FRUS, 1926, 1: 108-9.
50. Roberts to Chamberlain, July 2, 1926, DBFP, ser. la, 2: 130.
51. Jones to Secretary of the Navy (Curtis Wilbur), July 13, 1926, Jones
MSS.
52. Roberts to Chamberlain, August 13, 1926, DBFP ser. la, 2, 255;
Ibid., Roberts to Chamberlain, August 21, 1926, 297.
53. Jones to Wilbur, September 10, 1926, Jones MSS.
54. Cecil memorandum, September 24, 1926, DBFP, ser. la, 2: 396.
55. Jones memorandum, November 10, 1926, Jones MSS.
56. Kellogg to Porter, January 11, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 163.
57. Harold C. Train, Log of the Third Session of the Preparatory Com-
mission for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, (hereafter, Train
log, 1927) General Board Disarmament Conference Records, National Ar-
chives, Washington, D.C, series 5: 3, 6.
58. Gibson to Kellogg, March 24, 1927; Kellogg to Gibson, March 27,
1927, both in FRUS, 1927, 1: 183, 188.
59. Gibson to Kellogg, April 4, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 190-91; Train log,
1927, 39.
60. Chamberlain to Howard, August 10, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 218.
61. Gibson to Kellogg, April 11, 1927; Houghton to Kellogg, April 9,
1927, both in FRUS, 1927, 1: 196-97, 199; Train log, 1927, 35; Cecil to
Chamberlain, April 12, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 220.
62. Train log, 1927, 65.
176 NOTES TO PAGES 47-51
63. Cecil to Chamberlain, April 12, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 220.
64. Gibson to Mary Gibson, February 11,1927, Hugh S. Gibson letters,
(hereafter, Gibson letters) Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa.
65. Gibson to Mary Gibson, January 13, 1927, Gibson letters; Japan
Times, February 13, 1927.
66. L. Ethan Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations,
1925-1929 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1961), 164.
67. SD 500 A15 al/20 ; Japan Times, February 22, 1927; Ellis, Frank B.
Kellogg, 165.
68. Castle to Gibson, March 9, 1927, Hugh S. Gibson Papers, (hereaf-
ter, Gibson MSS), Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stan-
ford, Calif.
69. Marc Epstein, "The Historians and the Geneva Naval Conference,"
in Arms Limitation and Disarmament, ed. McKercher, 134.
70. Kellogg to Lord Astor, November 2, 1926, Frank B. Kellogg Papers,
(hereafter, Kellogg MSS), Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota.
In a remarkably prescient letter, Lord Astor cautioned his friend, the secre-
tary, about the danger of entering too hastily into a naval disarmament con-
ference, observing that conditions had changed since the Washington Con-
ference. Lloyd George, Astor noted, fell from power because of poor prep-
arations for the Genoa Conference. Lord Astor to Kellogg, September 16,
1926, Kellogg MSS.
71. Kellogg to Houghton, May 2, 1927, Kellogg MSS.
72. Kellogg to Coolidge, May 27,1927, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Gibson to Mary Gibson, May 14, 20, 25,
1927, Gibson letters. Castle wrote Gibson that he had hoped that Gibson
would suggest to Secretary Kellogg Rear Admiral William V. Pratt as a naval
delegate instead of Jones. Castle thought that Pratt was a "real negotiator"
and took "a broader view" of policy than Jones. Castle to Gibson, May 11,
1927, Gibson MSS.
73. Gibson to Castle, April 15, 1927, Gibson MSS.
74. Esme Howard, Theatre of Life, vol. 2, 531.
75. Adolph Berle Clemenson, "The Geneva Tripartite Conference of
1927 in Japanese-American Relations" (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona,
1975), 151.
76. Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg, 166-67;
77. Gibson to Mary Gibson, June 1, 1927, Gibson letters.
78. The Economist 104 (April 23, 1927); Toyko Nichi Nichi, cited in:
Japan Times, March 2, 1927.
3. Opening Gambits
Portions of this chapter and chapters 4 and 5 appeared in an altered form in
"The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray," in Arms
Limitation and Disarmament, ed. McKercher, 83-104.
1. William C. Bridgeman, diary, June to August 1927, 143, Shropshire
NOTES TO PAGES 51-59 177
County Record Office, Shrewsbury, England; Miller, War Plan Orange,
135-36.
2. Frank H. Schofield, diary, June 18, 1927, Naval Historical Center,
Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
3. Cecil to Austen Chamberlain, June 17, 1927, Robert Cecil Vis-
count of Chelwood, Papers, British Library, London.
4. "General Board Report for Delegates to Geneva," June 1, 1927, in
notebook, "General Board Reports and Studies re: Geneva Three Power
Conference, March 1927-July 1927," 138-39, General Board Disarmament
Conference Records, Series 5, Box 12 National Archives, Washington,
D.C.
5. Cruiser Report, November 16, 1926, ADM 1/9272/G.D. 3260/26;
Report Comparing Forces of Three Naval Powers, February 1, 1927, Com-
mand Papers (hereafter, CMD) 2809, Public Record Office, London, micro-
print; July 23, 1926, October 8, 1926, ADM 1/9267.
6. May 20, 1927, Cabinet Papers (hereafter, CAB) 2 (Committee of
Imperial Defence minutes) /5/227 ; June 1927, CAB 4 (Committee of Impe-
rial Defence Miscellaneous Memorandum) /16/808, Public Record Office,
London.
7. Japan Times, May 17, 1927.
8. Attache interview with Kobayashi, April 26, 1927, C-9-b, 18608,
Record Group 38, Naval Attache Reports, 1887-1939, Office of Naval Intel-
ligence files (hereafter, ONI), National Archives, Washington D.C.
9. News summary of Japanese Advertiser, Norman Armour to Wash-
ington, June 23, 1927, C-9-b, 18608A, ONI.
10. Japan Times, June 13, 18, 1927.
11. Ibid., May 5, 1927; Malcolm D. Kennedy, The Estrangement of
Great Britain and Japan, 1917-1935 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), 108.
12. Gibson to Castle, April 19, 1927, William R. Castle Papers, Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa (hereafter, Castle MSS).
13. Castle to Houghton, May 2, 1927, Castle MSS.
14. Castle to Gibson, May 3, 1927, Castle MSS.
15. Bridgeman to Chamberlain, June 3, 1927, Austen Chamberlain Pa-
pers, Foreign Office Records (hereafter, FO) 800/261/38, Public Record Of-
fice, London.
16. Japan Times, June 7, 1927.
17. Beatty memorandum, April 13, 1927, ADM 1/8715/188.
18. NYT, May 28, 1927,1 Esme Howard to Chamberlain, June 3, 1927,
DBFP, ser. la, 3: 602.
19. Schofield diary, June 20, 1927.
20. League of Nations, Records of the Conference for the Limitation of
Naval Armament; Held at Geneva from June 20 to August 4,1927 (Geneva,
1927).
21. Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 141.
22. Gibson to Kellogg, June 22, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 48; Wheeler, Pre-
lude to Pearl Harbor, 145.
23. Jones to Wilbur, June 25, 1927, Jones MSS.
178 NOTES TO PACES 59-63
24. Notes on British Empire Proposals, June 20, 1927, Mr. London to
Chamberlain, June 22, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 606, 611; Gibson to Kellogg,
June 23, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 51.
25. Schofield diary, June 24, 1927.
26. Kellogg to Gibson, June 24, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 55-56.
27. fapan Times, June 22, 24, 25, 29, 1927.
28. Sir John Tilley to Chamberlain, June 27, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3:
618.
29. Simonds, in Review of Reviews, cited in fapan Times, June 23,
1927.
30. Bridgemanto Chamberlain, June 28,1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 621-23;
Cecil to Tyrrell, June 24, 1927, Cecil Papers, British Library, London.
31. Kellogg to Gibson, June 24, 1927; Coolidge to Kellogg, June 30,
1927, both in FRUS, 1927, 1: 56, 64. Coolidge was not in close touch with
the day-to-day negotiations—his summer home in the Black Hills was
sixty-four miles from Rapid City, where his executive office had been estab-
lished. Literary Digest 93, no. 12, (June 11, 1927): 10.
32. Gibson to Kellogg, June 30, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 65-66.
33. June 29, 1927, CAB 23 (Cabinet Conclusions) /55/37(27)10, Public
Record Office, London. Although the secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Maurice
Hankey, an opponent of disarmament, told Baldwin on July 1 that Bridge-
man had made a statement about parity of which the Cabinet had no
knowledge, the Cabinet had realized on June 29 that its opposition to parity
contradicted Chamberlain's and Bridgeman's previous statements. Baldwin
sent a message to Geneva directing the delegates to announce that the Brit-
ish would build to their needs and would set no lower limits on other pow-
ers. Stephen Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets, Vol. 2, 1919-1931 (London,
1977), 439; Newton, "Anglo-American Relations," 29. Churchill continued
his attack, backed by Beatty, against parity at a meeting of Cabinet on July
4. July 4, 1927, CAB 23/55/38(27)5.
34. Gibson to Kellogg, July 2, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 67-68.
35. Schofield diary, June 29, July 2-5; London to Chamberlain, July 5,
1927, FO 412/115/51.
36. Schofield diary, July 5, 1927; Bridgeman to Chamberlain, July 5,
1927, CAB 4/16/814,- Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Control, 45-46;
McKercher, Second Baldwin Government, 71-73.
37. Chamberlain to Cecil, July 5, 1927, Cecil MSS; McKercher, Second
Baldwin Government, 66. Chamberlain had spent most of the spring deal-
ing more with the Egyptian crisis and sour Anglo-Soviet relations than with
disarmament.
38. July 7, 1927, CAB 2/5/228; Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Con-
trol, 46.
39. Gibson to Kellogg, July 5, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 72, Schofield diary,
July 6, 1927.
40. Gibson to Kellogg, July 6, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 77-78; Minutes of
British delegates' meeting, July 7, 1927, ADM 116/2609; Howard to Cham-
berlain, July 6, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 641-42.
NOTES TO PAGES 63-72 179
41. Kellogg to Gibson, July 8, 1927, Coolidge to Kellogg, July 9, 1927,
FRUS, 1927, 1: 82-83, 89.
4. A Diplomatic Impasse
1. London to Chamberlain, July 2, 1927, found in: ADM 116/2609.
2. Howard to Chamberlain, July 13, 1927, FO 800/261/109.
3. Quoted in Morris Robert Werner, Privileged Characters (New York,
1935), 344.
4. Kitchens, "The Shearer Scandal and Its Origins," 134.
5. Ibid., 129, 141.
6. Schofield diary, June 30, 1927; Kitchens, "The Shearer Scandal and
Its Origins," 142.
7. Kellogg to Gibson, July 11, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 93.
8. Howard to Chamberlain, July 13, 1927, FO 800/261/110; Kellogg
to Gibson, July 12, 1927, Gibson to Kellogg, July 14, 1927, both in FRUS,
1927, 1: 96, 106.
9. Schofield diary, July 20, 1927; Kitchens, "The Shearer Scandal and
Its Origins," 151; Jones memorandum, July 13, 1927, Jones MSS.
10. NYT, July 7, 1927.
11. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Relations, 1927 (Lon-
don, 1929), 55-56.
12. Ibid., 56-57; Schofield diary, July 8, 1927; Bridgeman diary, 153.
13. Schofield diary, July 9, 1927; NYT, July 10, 1927.
14. NYT, July 10, 1927; Sir Reginald H.S. Bacon, The Life of John Rush-
more Earl fellicoe (London, 1936), 495.
15. NYT, July 9,1927; Gibson to Kellogg, July 9,1927, FR US, 1927,1: 89.
16. Gibson to Kellogg, July 9, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 89; Bridgeman to
Baldwin, July 12, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 675.
17. Chamberlain memorandum on conversation with Hough ton, July
11, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 656; memorandum presented to Cabinet, July 13,
1927, CAB 23/55/40(27)4a.
18. Pad. Deb., 5th ser., 208 (1927): 1786.
19. Jellicoe speech reprinted in the Times (London), July 15, 1927, cited
in Toynbee, Survey of International Relations, 1927, 57.
20. Ibid., 59, 76-77; P.J. Noel-Baker, Disarmament and the Coolidge
Conference (London, 1927), 32, 34; Pad. Deb., 5th ser., 210 (1927): 2101-6;
Beatty, Balfour, and Churchill arguments against parity with the United
States, July 14, 1927, CAB 2/5/229.
21. Cabinet meeting, July 13, 1927, CAB 23/55/40(27)4a.
22. Jones later reiterated his argument in a speech to the veterans of
World War I. Jones speech, October 5,1927, Jones MSS. Dudley Knox, editor of
the Naval Institute Proceedings, informed Jones during the conference of his
error: Jones could not compare the coastal trade of the United States and the
foreign trade of Britain. Knox to Jones, July 6,1927, Dudley Knox Papers, Na-
val Historical Foundation Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
23. HughR. Wilson, Diplomat between the Wars (New York, 1941),218;
180 NOTES TO PAGES 73-76
clipping, Tokyo Nichi Nichi, September 22, 1927, in ADM 1/8715/188. Ad-
miral Beatty and Ambassador Howard also cited Jones as an obstacle to agree-
ment. Beatty comments, July 14, 1927, CAB 2/5/229(4); Howard to Cham-
berlain, July 13, 1927, FO 800/261/108.
24. Minutes of British Delegates' meeting, July 19, 1927, ADM 116/
2609; Schofield diary, July 15, 1927; Baldwin to Bridgeman, July 15, 1927,
DBFP, ser. la, 3: 682.
25. Richardson, British Disarmament Policy, 128-29; McKercher, Sec-
ond Baldwin Government, 73-74.
26. Gibson to Kellogg, July 18, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 109; Schofield
diary, July 18, 1927. British discussion of American actions found in: Brit-
ish delegates' meeting, July 19, 1927, ADM 116/2609.
27. Robert Cecil, A Great Experiment: An Autobiography (New York,
1941), 358-63; Bridgeman diary, 155, 145; Bridgeman to Cecil, November
21, 1927, Chamberlain to Cecil, August 14, 1927, Cecil MSS.
28. NYT, July 19, 1927; CAB 2/5/229; Baldwin to Bridgeman, July 19,
1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 698.
29. NYT, July 20, 1927. The Cabinet worried about its delegates'
resolve—recent dispatches had hinted at concessions in parity, tonnage,
and even gun caliber. Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets, 2: 439-40.
30. Times (London), July 23, 1927; Cabinet meeting, July 22, 1927,
CAB 23/55/42(27)1; Cabinet meeting, July 26, 1927, CAB 23/55/42(27)1,
CAB 23/55/44(27)1; Pad. Deb., 5th ser., 209 (1927): 1246-49; McKercher,
Second Baldwin Government, 74.
31. Hugh Gibson to Mary Gibson, July 23, 1927, Gibson letters.
32. Kellogg to Coolidge, July 22, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 124.
33. Coolidge to Kellogg, July 25, 1927, FRUS, 1927, 1: 133.
34. Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Control, 47-48.
35. Tilley to Chamberlain, July 21, 1927, FO 412/115/75; Schofield
diary, July 20, 1927.
36. Bridgeman diary, 145; Ishii Kikujiro, Diplomatic Commentaries
(Baltimore, 1936), 196; Gibson to Kellogg, July 22, 1927, FRUS, 1927,1:123.
37. Bridgeman diary, 157.
38. Cabinet meeting, July 29, 1927, CAB 23/55/46(27)1.
39. McKercher, Second Baldwin Government, 84; Epstein, "Historians
and the Geneva Naval Conference," 137.
40. NYT, July 30, 1927; Schofield diary, August 2-3, 1927.
41. Wilson to Kellogg, August 5, 1927, Hugh R. Wilson, papers (hereaf-
ter, Wilson MSS), Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
42. Madden memorandum, CAB 4/16/808, Appendix 1, Hall, Britain,
America, and Arms Control, 49-50; McKercher, Second Baldwin Govern-
ment, 75-76.
43. Cecil to Col. Edward M. House, September 15, 1927, Cecil MSS. In
response to Cecil's resignation and charges that Churchill had sabotaged the
conference, Churchill drily noted that "the Cecils are always ill or resigning."
Kenneth Rose, The Later Cecils (London, 1975), 172; Cecil charges, Cecil to
Chamberlain, August 10, 1927, FO 800/261/192.
NOTES TO PAGES 77-82 181
44. Interestingly, as Mark Epstein has pointed out to me, Theodore
Roosevelt, Jr., claimed that Coolidge had remarked to Roosevelt and to
Frank Stearns (a key adviser to the president) in 1924 that the election of
that year would be his last. Roosevelt wrote the president that after the
announcement from South Dakota, he had been "assuring various public
leaders that from my judgment of your character, you meant exactly what
you said." Roosevelt to Coolidge, August 3, 1927, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.,
papers, (hereafter, Roosevelt MSS), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
But Stearns, for one, was shocked by the announcement, as he wrote the
president, and Roosevelt may not have been the best judge of character vis-
a-vis political action: he also predicted that Franklin Roosevelt would not
run for a third term in 1940, based in part on his estimation of FDR's char-
acter. Stearns to Coolidge, August 1927, in Claude M. Fuess, Calvin Cool-
idge: The Man from Vermont (Boston, 1940), 399; T. Roosevelt to Hugh
Gibson, May 31, 1939, Roosevelt MSS.
45. Dawes statement, NYT, August 8, 1927; MacDonald statement,
Pail. Deb., 5th ser., 210 (1927): 2089-95. A cartoon in the Chicago Daily
Journal probably best sums up Dawes's presidential motive in depicting a
ring of naval vessels with a big top hat flying into their midst inscribed:
"No competitive naval building—Dawes." Chicago Daily Journal, August
15, 1927, in Charles G. Dawes Papers, Northwestern University, Evanston,
Illinois.
46. Villard, Prophets True and False (New York, 1928), 47.
47. For more on this point, see Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 217.
48. Kellogg to Simonds, August 17, 1927, Kellogg MSS.
49. Chamberlain to Howard, August 10, 1927, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 729.
50. Cecil, A Great Experiment, 186.
51. Churchill to Bridgeman, August 18, 1927, FO 800/261/281.
52. Berthelot to Aime-Joseph de Fleuriau (ambassador to London), No-
vember 17, 1927, Fleuriau MSS, quoted in Vaisse, Securite D'abord, 42.
53. Briand to Paul Claudel (ambassador to Washington), December 31,
1927, Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Limitation des armements navals:
Trente-cinq pieces relative aux travaux preparatoires du desarmement et a
la limitation des armements navals, 21 mars 1927-6 octobre 1928 (Paris,
1928), 33-35.
54. Bridgeman diary, 159; Kellogg to Coolidge, October 24?, 27?, 1927,
Kellogg MSS.
5. Recriminations and Rapprochement
1. Frederick J. Libby, "Why an American Peace Movement?" National
Council for the Prevention of War News Bulletin, July 1, 1928, in Knox
MSS; Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, 111.
2. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, 64, 68-69, 77, 86. Also see Harold
Josephson, James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America,
(Cranbury, N.J., 1974), 156-60.
3. Vaisse, Securite D'abord, 33.
182 NOTES TO PACES 82-84
4. For a fine discussion of the World Court battle, see Michael Dunne,
The United States and the World Court, 1920-1935 (London, 1988), chapter
3, 122-56.
5. Pamphlets, Box 1, League of Nations Association Papers (hereafter,
LNA), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa. In fact, the
League would pay little attention to disarmament until 1929-30. Minutes
of the committee for the Tenth anniversary of the League of Nations meet-
ing, October 7,1929, LNA MSS. The League of Nations Non-Partisan Asso-
ciation changed its name to the League of Nations Association in Decem-
ber 1928.
6. DeBenedetti, "American Peace Movement," 210.
7. Dorothy Detzer correspondence, Folder: England, 1925-1929, Wom-
en's International League for Peace and Freedom Papers (hereafter, WILPF),
Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.; DeBenedetti, Mod-
em American Peace Movement, 190-91.
8. Emily G. Balch to Hannah Clothier Hull, November 3, 1927,
Hannah Clothier Hull, papers (hereafter, Hull MSS), Swarthmore College
Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.; Ferrell, Peace in Their Time, 155-56;
program, Third Annual Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, National
Committee on the Cause and Cure of War Papers (hereafter, NCCCW
MSS), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa. Although
disarmament was discussed at the 1928 NCCCW conference, the bulk of
the organization's efforts, particularly as reflected in Catt's favored project,
the public reading education courses, was directed toward such subjects as
arbitration, internationalism, and information about Asia and Latin Amer-
ica. See, for instance, NCCCW Bulletin, November 3, 1927, March 15,
1928, NCCCW MSS.
9. Chatf ield, For Peace and Justice, 99; Ferrell, Peace in Their Time,
99.
10. Capper Resolution text, December 9, 1927, Cong. Rec, December
9, 1927, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1927, 69, pt. 1: 351; Burton Resolution, ibid.,
January 25, 1928, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, 69, pt. 2: 2045.
11. Ferrell writes that the Capper Resolution demonstrated western
interest in the peace campaign and caught the attention of the administra-
tion, whereas DeBenedetti believes that it did not attract wide interest in
the West, judging from the amount of coverage it received from newspapers
there. The administration did begin to notice the campaign with the Capper
Resolution, even if peace workers were never able to gain as many converts
to their cause in the West as in the East and Old Northwest. Ferrell, Peace
in Their Time, 117; DeBenedetti, Modern American Peace Movement,
200-1.
12. Kellogg to Elihu Root, December 23, 1927, Kellogg MSS.
13. Kellogg to Clara Kellogg, May 5, 1928, Kellogg MSS.
14. The Foreign Service School, established in 1925 to train foreign
service officers, stressed in lectures and courses that disarmament had no
place in modern diplomacy. Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Dip-
lomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of United States Foreign
NOTES TO PAGES 84-88 183
Service Officers, 1908-1931 (Middletown, Conn., 1975), 83, 97-99; De-
Benedetti, "American Peace Movement," 205-6.
15. Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of Euro-
pean Stability and French Security, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979),
161.
16. Ibid.
17. Howard to Chamberlain, April 20, 1928, DBFP., ser. la, 5: 605-6;
Newton, "Anglo-American Relations," 125.
18. Kellogg to George W. Wickersham, May 19, 1928; Kellogg to Borah,
July 19, 1928; Levinson to Kellogg, October 29, 1928; all in Kellogg MSS.
19. DeBenedetti, "American Peace Movement," 213. For a recapitula-
tion of Shotwell's position, see Pratt to Shotwell, January 26, 1928, William
V. Pratt Papers, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washing-
ton, D.C.
20. Detzer to Dorothy Woodman, June 22, 1928, WILPF MSS; De-
Benedetti, Modern American Peace Movement, 188.
21. Quoted in Women's Journal, February 1930, p. 19, as cited in Jac-
queline Van Voris, Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life (New York, 1987),
211.
22. Detzer to Kathleen Courtney, March 5, 1928, WILPF MSS; Har-
rison speech in Kathleen Whitaker (Sayre) file, Emily G. Balch Papers
(hereafter, Balch MSS), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore,
Pa.
23. Kellogg to George W. Wickersham, December 24, 1928, Kellogg
MSS.
24. Birn, League of Nations Union, 82-84; series of letters between
Cecil, MacDonald, and Lloyd George, March, 1928, J. Ramsay MacDonald
Papers, (hereafter, MacDonald MSS), Public Record Office, London.
25. Cabinet Conclusions, June 22, 1928, CAB 23/58/34(28)2; Untitled
manuscript on disarmament, Container 67, Mark L. Bristol Papers, Naval
Historical Foundation Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
26. Lord Salisbury to Chamberlain, May 3, 1928, FO 800/262/374-75.
For evidence that the French may have deliberately been trying to play the
British off the Americans to gain more concessions from Whitehall, see
Richardson, British Disarmament Policy, 169.
27. Cabinet memorandum, November 17, 1927, CAB 24/189/C.P.
292(27). Disarmament Report, November 24, 1927, CAB 24/189/58(27)3.
28. "Report on current naval discussions," March 28, 1928, ADM
1/8724/56; Report: "General History of Disarmament" (undated), CAB
4/19/998b; Cabinet Conclusions, June 6, 1928, CAB 23/58/31(28)1; Cabi-
net Conclusions, June 22, 1928, CAB 23/58/34(28)2; Richardson, British
Disarmament Policy, 177.
29. Cabinet Conclusions, July 4, 1928, CAB 23/58/36(28)2; Jon Jacob-
son, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929 (Princeton,
1972), 190; David Carlton, "The Anglo-French Compromise on Arms Lim-
itation, 1928," The Journal of British Studies 8 (1969): 151. Carlton argues
correctly that the British gave in to the French on most crucial points.
184 NOTES TO PAGES 88-92
Among other concessions, Whitehall withdrew objection to the abolition of
submarines to gain French acceptance of Anglo-French parity in two classes
of cruisers. Also see Richardson, British Disarmament Policy, 179.
30. Crewe to Chamberlain, July 19, 1928, FO 800/263/15; Untitled
manuscript on disarmament, Bristol MSS.
31. Newton, "Anglo-American Relations," 140-41.
32. British charge (Chilton) to Kellogg, July31,1928,FRUS, 1928,1:264.
33. Telegram, Coolidge to Kellogg, August 2, 1928, FRUS 1928, 1: 267;
letter, Coolidge to Kellogg, August 3, 1928, ibid., 270; Kellogg to Coolidge,
August 4, 1928, Kellogg MSS.
34. Jones memorandum on Anglo-French agreement, August 4, 1928,
Jones MSS.
35. Kellogg to Coolidge, September 22, 1928, Kellogg MSS.
36. Cushenden to Chamberlain, November 22, 1928, FO 800/263/60;
McKercher, Second Baldwin Government, 175; Richardson, British Disar-
mament Policy, 179; Cabinet Conclusions, September 24, 1928, CAB
23/58/44|28); Cabinet Conclusions, October 1, 1928, CAB 23/58/45|28)2;
"General History of Disarmament," CAB 4/19/998b.
37. Briand to M. de Sartignes, July 23, 1928, September 1, 1928, France,
Ministere des etrangeres, Limitation des armements navals, 50-52, 59.
38. Kellogg to Coolidge, August 9, 1928, SD 500.A15 3 1/2; Memoran-
dum, Division of West European Affairs, November 21, 1928, SD RG 43,
Entry E161, 200.5/1.
39. Gibson to Castle, November 17,1928; Castle to Gibson, December
19, 1928, Gibson MSS.
40. Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, 374; Cabinet Conclusions, De-
cember 19, 1928, CAB 23/59/57(28)6. Ramsay MacDonald later acknowl-
edged the American contribution to the death of the compromise in a
speech to Parliament during the debate over ratification of the London
Treaty. Speech transcript, June 20, 1930, MacDonald MSS.
41. Morgan to George A. Innes, September 13, 1928, Morgan to Wilson
Harris, December 9,1927, National Council for the Prevention of War Papers
(hereafter, NCPWMSS), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore,
Pa.
42. Foreign Policy Bulletin 7, no. 48 (October 4, 1928), quoted in Frank
Abbott, "The Foreign Policy Association," (Ph.D. diss., Texas Tech Univer-
sity, 1972), 72.
43. Quoted in David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977),
473.
44. Heller, "Curtis Dwight Wilbur," 612; Giovanni Engely, The Poli-
tics of Naval Disarmament (London, 1932), 45.
45. Britten speech, March 15, 1928, Cong. Rec, 70th Cong., 1st sess.
1928, 69, pt. 5; 4846.
46. Report on campaign against naval construction bill, February 15,
1928, Whitaker file, Balch MSS; NCPW Bulletin, July 1, 1928, in Knox
MSS; Detzer to Hull, February 18, 1928, pamphlet of the American Legion,
"Save Our Navy," February 24, 1928, both in Hull MSS.
NOTES TO PAGES 93-97 185
47. Britten speech, March 15, 1928, Cong. Rec, 70th Cong., 1st sess.
1928, 69, pt. 5; 4846-48.
48. Abernathy remarks, March 15, 1928, Cong. Rec, 70th Cong., 1st
sessv 1928, 69, pt. 5 ; 4856; Treadway quote, February 21, 1928, ibid., 1928,
69, pt. 3 ; 3387.
49. Armin Rappaport, Navy League, 113-14,123; Navy League pamph-
lets, in Knox MSS. For perhaps the best summary of both the navy and
peace forces arguments, see the series of letters and rebuttals by Laura
Puffer Morgan and Adm. Frank H. Schofield, introduced into the Congres-
sional Record during the Senate debate by Senator David I. Walsh (Mass.),
Cong. Rec, January 30, 1929, 70th Cong., 2d sess., 1929, 70, pt. 3 ; 2435-37.
50. Hoff-Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 51-53.
51. Lamont, "What Will Europe Renewed Mean to the United States?"
Nation's Business 125 (May 20, 1927): 17. At the time, Lamont was much
more interested in extending a loan to the Japanese government for Man-
churian development—and securing State Department approval for it—
than he was with disarmament. For more on this episode, see FRUS 1927,
2: 482-92; Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era, 1919-1932
(Baltimore, 1950), 36-38; and Warren Cohen, Chinese Connection: Roger S.
Greene, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky and American-East Asian
Relations (New York, 1978), 148-53.
52. Detzer to International Branch of WILPF (undated, early 1929),
WILPF MSS; DeBenedetti, Modern American Peace Movement, 214.
53. Detzer report to Board of International WILPF (undated, early
1929), WILPF MSS; DeBenedetti, Modern American Peace Movement, 211.
54. Chaput, Disarmament in British Naval Policy, 166.
55. Courtney to Detzer, November 15, 1929, WILPF MSS.
56. Chamberlain to Murray, January 28, 1928, FO 800/261, cited in Ce-
celiaLynch, "A Matter of Controversy: The Peace Movement and British Arms
Policy," in Arms Limitation and Disarmament, ed. McKercher, 70 n. 43.
57. League of Nations Union Annual Report, 1928 (London, 1928), 18;
Birn, League of Nations Union, 85. For a different view on the effectiveness
of British peace groups, see Lynch, "A Matter of Controversy," 61-82.
58. Ogata, "Liberal Nongovernmental Groups," 465; Akira Iriye, After
Imperialism, The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cam-
bridge, 1965), 262.
59. Gibson wrote his mother that the meeting in 1928 was "not an
encouraging session. Most of the time was spent in broadcasting Soviet
propaganda and the remainder in airing Franco-German rows." Gibson to
Mary Gibson, March 27, 1928, Gibson letters. For the official State Depart-
ment attitude, see Kellogg to Hugh Wilson, February 28, 1928, FRUS, 1928,
1: 242-43.
60. Howard to Cushenden, November 7, 1928, DBFP, ser. la, 5: 851-54;
Newton, "Anglo-American Relations," 152.
61. Castle to Gibson, January 17, 1929, Gibson MSS.
62. Quoted in Newton, "Anglo-American Relations," 158.
63. For more on the changing views of the Conservative government,
186 NOTES TO PAGES 97-100
see Newton, "Anglo-American Relations, 152-64, 184-87, and McKercher,
Second Baldwin Government, chapter 8.
64. Joan Hoff-Wilson correctly argues that most Hoover biographers,
for instance, David Burner, in his study Herbert Hoover: A Public Life
(New York, 1979), place too much emphasis on Hoover's Quaker back-
ground. She notes that his disrupted childhood, progressivism, and career in
engineering were more important in creating his mind set than was Quak-
erism. Joan Hoff-Wilson, "Herbert Hoover: The Popular Image of an Unpop-
ular President," in Understanding Herbert Hoover: Ten Perspectives, ed.
Lee Nash (Stanford, 1987), 7 n. 9.
65. Stimson to Levinson, November 12, 1929, Henry L. Stimson, Diary
and Papers, (hereafter, Stimson MSS), Yale University Library, New Haven,
Conn. Microfilm.
66. Castle to Gibson, June 11, 1929, Gibson MSS.
67. Coolidge to Hoover, March 30, 1929, Herbert Hoover Papers (here-
after, Hoover MSS), Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa; Kellogg to Hugh Wilson, December 15, 1928, FRUS, 1928, 1: 262.
68. Gibson had served as liaison between Hoover and the Belgian govern-
ment for the postwar Commission of Relief in Belgium and later coauthored a
book with Hoover, The Problems of Lasting Peace (New York, 1942).
69. For more on this meeting, see Newton, "Anglo-American Rela-
tions," 168-69.
70. Ronald E. Swerczeck, "The Diplomatic Career of Hugh Gibson,
1908-1938" (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1972), 225; Stephen Roskill,
Naval Policy between the Wars, vol. 2, The Period of Reluctant Rearma-
ment, 1930-1939 (London, 1976), 38.
71. Jones to Gleaves, April 28, 1929, Jones MSS.; O'Connor, Perilous
Equilibrium, 27.
72. Newton, "Anglo-American Relations," 181-82; Baltimore Sun,
April 23, 1929, in Felix M. Morley Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Li-
brary, West Branch, Iowa. Former Secretary Kellogg conferred with Mac-
Donald, whose Labour party was favored in the upcoming elections, after
Gibson's speech and reported him enthusiastic. Kellogg to Stimson, April
24, 1929, Hoover MSS.
73. MacDonald to Thomas, February 25, 1929, MacDonald MSS.
74. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, 504-6.
75. Boston Daily Globe, January 25, 1929, in Balch MSS; O'Connor,
Perilous Equilibrium, 27, 30-31.
76. McKercher ably traces the second Baldwin government's emphasis
on this theme, pointing out that Whitehall paid close attention to Senator
Borah's tirades about neutral rights. But the American government and
public did not. Further, Borah belatedly supported the American claim for
cruiser parity, and he called for Britain to scrap cruisers to achieve it, as
Americans had with battleships at Washington. McKercher, Second Bald-
win Government, 178-82. Borah statement, Japan Times, August 3, 1929.
77. Stimson to Atherton (charge in London), May 14, 1929, FRUS,
1929, 1: 112.
NOTES TO PAGES 100-103 187
78. Dawes, Gibson, and MacDonald, mindful of the experiences at the
Geneva Conference, soon established that if a five-power conference fal-
tered, the United States, Britain, and Japan would break off into a three-
power conference. MacDonald memorandum, June 25, 1929, CAB 23/61/
24(29).
79. Gibson to Stimson, June 20, 1929, FRUS, 1929, 1: 128.
80. Gibson to Mary Gibson, June 29, July 7, November 16, 1929, Gib-
son letters.
81. Gibson, Dawes to Stimson, July 29, 1929, FRUS, 1929, 1: 164-66.
82. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars 2, 41-42.
83. MacDonald to Dawes, n.d. (1929), Cecil MSS; Dawes to Stimson,
July 10, 1929, Hoover MSS; Raymond G. O'Connor, "The 'Yardstick' and
Naval Disarmament in the 1920s," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45
(1958-59): 457.
84. Kobayashi Tatsuo, "The London Naval Treaty, 1930," in Japan
Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident,
1928-1932, ed. James William Morley (New York, 1984), 21, Eric Lacroix,
"The Development of the A Class Cruisers in the Japanese Imperial Navy,
Part Four," Warship International 18, no. 1 (1981): 75.
85. Akira Iriye, "Japan's Policies toward the United States," in Japan's
Foreign Policy, 1868-1941: A Research Guide, ed. James W. Morley (New
York, 1974), 436, 440.
86. Kobayashi, "London Naval Treaty," 21-22.
87. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, 33, 38, 40; MacDonald,
"Memorandum on Current Status of Naval Discussions," July 25, 1929,
CAB 2/5/444; Dawes to Stimson, August, 12, 1929, FRUS, 1929, 1: 189.
88. General Board to Secretary of the Navy, July 13,1929, GB 438-1, ser.
1437; Report, "General History of Disarmament" (undated), CAB4/19/998b.
The Admiralty had foreshadowed the U.S. Navy's objections to a yardstick. Sir
Charles Madden, Beatty's replacement as First Sea Lord, testified to the Bald-
win Cabinet that it was not possible to devise a precise formula applying
equally to all navies. Madden testimony to Cabinet, June 6, 1928, CAB
23/58/31(28)1.
89. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, 41-43; General Board recommen-
dations for disarmament conference, September 11, 1929, GB 438.1, ser.
1444a; Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William V. Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor's
Life (Annapolis, 1974), 295. Hoover was confused about the General Board's
disagreement on the yardstick and requested clarification using the Omahas
as examples. Hoover to Captain (Ret.) Allen Buchanan, September 24, 1929,
GB 438-1, ser. 1449.
90. Hoover to Stimson, August 30, 1929, Hoover MSS.
91. Cong. Rec, September 13, 1929, 71st Cong., 1st sess., 1929, 71, pt.
3; 3582; also see Washington Star, September 9, 1929, in Hoover MSS.
92. Kitchens, "Shearer Scandal and Its Origins," 159, 163, 166, 225.
93. Theodore Marriner (Division of West European Affairs, State De-
partment) to William T. Beck (White House staff), September 19, 1929, in
Hoover MSS.
188 NOTES TO PAGES 103-111
94. Memoranda on Shearer, Office of the Assistant to the Attorney
General, September 14 and 20, 1929, Hoover MSS.
95. See Federal Bureau of Investigation report on Shearer links to NSL,
September 10, 1929, and memoranda on Shearer, Office of the Assistant to
the Attorney General, September 14 and 20, 1929, Hoover MSS.
96. Edwards, Patriots in Pinstripe, 136.
97. Report, "General History of Disarmament" (undated), CAB 4/19/
998b; Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 1} 45.
98. Leffler, The Elusive Quest, 111.
99. DeBenedetti, "American Peace Movement," 206-7.
6. The London Naval Conference
1. "Five Year Building Plan," General Board, September 27, 1927, GB
420-2, ser. 1358; Long memorandum, November 27, 1928, GB 420-8.
2. Report, "General Characteristics of Cruisers no. 37-41," by Direc-
tor of Fleet Training, with attached conclusions of the General Board, De-
cember 11, 1929, GB 420-8, ser. 1455.
3. Our Navy, September 1929, in Bristol MSS.
4. Craig L. Symonds, "William Veazie Pratt," in The Chiefs of Naval
Operations, ed. Robert W. Love, Jr. (Annapolis, Md., 1980), 73-74.
5. The admiral's position on the six-inch gun is interesting. He had not
always supported such a gun and may have changed his mind during his ten-
ure as commander of the fleet. He had always favored better protection and
discounted the need for range, arguing that in the unlikely event of war with
Britain many British bases would be captured, putting America on a par. Ger-
ald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, 198, 238-39, 249, 296; Fried-
man, U.S. Cruisers, 165; Pratt to H.A. Wiley, Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Fleet, October 17,1928, William V. Pratt Papers (hereafter, Pratt MSS), Naval
Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., photocopy.
6. For more detail on the disagreements between the General Board
and the bureau chiefs, see Philip T. Rosen, "The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937,"
in In Peace and War: Interpretations of U.S. Naval History, 1775-1978, ed.
Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, Conn., 1978), 221-36.
7. Charles G. Dawes, Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain (New
York, 1939), 151.
8. Brief, Van Keuren remarks to delegates, January 28, 1930, GB
438-1; Van Keuren memorandum, February 1, 1930, in Pratt MSS.
9. Brief, Yarnell remarks to delegates, January 29, 1928, in Pratt MSS.
10. Harold E. Train, Log of the London Naval Conference of 1930,
(hereafter, Train log, 1930) January 29, 1930, General Board Disarmament
Conferences Records, series 9, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
11. Memorandum, Captain Smyth to Senator David Reed, February 3,
1930, in Pratt MSS; Train log, January 29, 1930.
12. Pratt memorandum, February 13, 1930, Pratt MSS. For more detail
on Pratt's views vis-a-vis the General Board, also see Symonds, "William
Veazie Pratt," 76-83.
NOTES TO PAGES 111-12 189
13. William R. Braisted, "Charles Frederick Hughes," in The Chiefs of
Naval Operations, ed. Love, 53-54, 62.
14. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, 296-98, 302-3, 308. Train
noted that Pratt disapproved of a General Board and "campaigned actively"
against it during the conference and in the months afterward. Train, "Remi-
niscences," 124.
15. For a fine general description of the training, experiences, and out-
look of many of these senior officers, see Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy.
16. Dawes, Journal, 142; L. Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy,
1921-1933 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1968), 169-70; Hall, Britain, America,
and Arms Control, 92-94; Henry L. Stimson diary, February 24, 1930,
Stimson MSS. Hoover wrote optimistically, if not accurately, in his mem-
oirs: "Admirals Pratt, Hepburn, and Jones genuinely supported what we
were trying to do." Herbert C. Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover,
vol. 2, The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933 (New York, 1951-52),
341. About the Admiralty officers, he wrote: "They were naturally sus-
picious that the 'two welfare workers'—MacDonald and myself—were tan-
gled up in a conspiracy to injure 'that greatest safeguard of world peace and
world stability,' the British navy." Hoover to Roger Shaw, February 9, 1946,
Herbert Hoover Miscellaneous Papers (hereafter, Hoover Misc. MSS), Hoov-
er Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, Calif.
17. Train, Reminiscences, 193.
18. Report, "Comparison of two cruisers identical in size, protection,
and speed, but with one armed with nine eight-inch guns and the other
armed with twelve six-inch guns," by Lieutenant-Commander E.M. Wil-
liams for Rear Admiral Bristol, March 7, 1930, GB 420-8. In particular, Wil-
liams claimed that the six-inch gun lost its high rate of fire if mounted in
gun houses, approaching that of the eight-inch gun.
19. For more on this, see Friedman, U.S. Cruisers, 184.
20. New Statesman, September 3, 1927, cited in Adelphia Dane Bow-
en, Jr., "The Disarmament Movement, 1918-1935" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia
University, 1956), 142.
21. Madden cited in Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 1: 546;
Madden notes on Staff College report, May 17, 1928, ADM 1/8765/313.
22. Addendum, "Staff College Practice Results, 1922-1927"; Mem-
orandum, "Small Cruiser Conclusions," by Sea Lords, September 27, 1929;
Memorandum by Director of Plans, Roger Bellairs, November 14, 1928, all
in ADM 1/8765/313. The Admiralty, as Madden conceded in early 1928,
was under great pressure from the government to compromise on its stand
at Geneva regarding limits on the eight-inch gun. Madden memorandum,
May 17, 1928, ADM 1/8765/313.
23. Report, "Gun Armament and Protection of Small 8" Cruiser and
Comparison with 6" Cruiser," December 4, 1928; Memorandum, B. Fair-
bairn, Director of Gunnery Development, December 4, 1928; Memoran-
dum, Bellairs, July 28, 1929, all in ADM 1/8765/313.
24. Barry D. Hunt, Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond,
1871-1946 (Waterloo, Ont, 1982), 189, 194, 198.
190 NOTES TO PACES 114-17
25. Chatfield memorandum, undated (early 1929), ADM 1/8765/313.
Chatfield, however, could not carry other ranking officers with him.
26. Hansgeorg Jentschura, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy
(London, 1977), 77-79.
27. Sadao Asada, "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Im-
perial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927," Naval War College
Review 46, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 92. Asada notes that in contrast to the
more flexible top officers in the Ministry of the Marine, many officers of
the Naval General Staff had advocated the 10-7 ration long before the Ge-
neva Conference of 1927.
28. Dawes, Journal, 150; O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, 77, 80.
29. Stimson to Candace Stimson, February 22, 1930, Stimson MSS.
30. Stimson diary, February 3, 1930; CMD 3485.
31. Secretary Adams and Senator Robinson were the last to accept the
lower figure. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, 158 n. 44.
32. Stimson diary, February 2, 6, 1930; Dawes, Journal, 139; Stimson
to Cotton, February 5, 1930, FRUS, 1930, 1: 18.
33. Arthur Henderson to Howard, February 11, 1930, DBFP, ser. 2, 1:
209; Stimson diary, February 11, 1930.
34. Notes from Delegates' Meeting, February 14, 1930, DBFP, ser. 2, 1:
218; Stimson to Cotton, February 28, 1930, FRUS, 1930, 1: 32; David Carl-
ton, MacDonald versus Henderson: The Foreign Policy of the Second La-
bour Government (London, 1970), 124.
35. Harold G. Nicolson, Dwight Morrow (New York, 1935), 366.
36. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, 88.
37. For background on the Franco-Italian naval rivalry in the 1920s, see
Joel Blatt, "The Parity that Meant Superiority: French Naval Policy toward
Italy at the Washington Conference, 1921-22," French Historical Studies
(16) 1981: 223-48, and William Shorrock, "France, Italy, and the Eastern
Mediterranean in the 1920s," International History Review 8 (1986): 70-82.
Ironically, Briandistes in France had also talked periodically since 1922 of
building relations with Italy to guarantee the independence of the East Eu-
ropean states, as they distrusted British commitment to the Continent. See
Piotr S. Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1928-1936
(Princeton, 1988), 254-55; Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and Central
Europe: The Dilemmas of French Impotence, 1918-1940 (New York, 1992),
19.
38. Anthony Adamthwaite, The Lost Peace: International Relations in
Europe, 1918-1939 (London, 1980), 105; Leffler, Elusive Quest, 220-21.
39. Vaisse, Securite D'abord, 30.
40. Memo for Premier Tardieu, January 13, 1930, French foreign minis-
try archives, Tardieu Papers, vol. 41, cited in Adamthwaite, The Lost Peace,
109.
41. Walter E. Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal: Fifty Years of American
Business and Politics (Princeton, 1948), 156-57.
42. Memo for Tardieu, January 13, 1930, cited in Adamthwaite, The
Lost Peace, 110.
NOTES TO PACES 118-22 191
43. This paragrapah is based on Vaisse, Securite D'abord, 24-25.
44. Stimson to Hoover, February 17, 1930, Stimson to State Depart-
ment, February 16, 1930, both in Stimson diary.
45. Navy League pamphlets, General Board Disarmament Conference
Records, series 9, box 24; Memorandum on inaccuracies in Navy League
pamphlets, West European Bureau, January 27, 1930, SD 500 A15 a3/630;
Howard to Henderson, January 8, 1930, FO371 14257 A588/1/45; W. Camp-
bell to Henderson, March 19, 1930, FO 371 14260 A2095/1 /45, "British For-
eign Office, United States: Correspondence, 1930-1937," (Wilmington, Del.,
1981). Microfilm.
46. Kathleen Courtney to Dorothy Detzer, December 16, 1929, WILPF
MSS; NYT, January 15 and 21, 1930; Notes, delegates meeting, February 6,
1930, Stimson diary. The WILPF in the United States had organized an un-
successful campaign supporting Jane Addams, its international president,
as a delegate to London. Memorandum, SD 500.A15 a3 P43/73.
47. Morgan to Libby, February 6, 1930; Pamphlet, "What Has Hap-
pened at London?" NCPW MSS.
48. Dorothy Detzer, Appointment on the Hill (New York, 1948), 90;
Prentiss Gilbert quoted in Detzer to Hull, February 12, 1930, Hull MSS.
49. Pamphlet, "London Naval Conference," GB Disarmament Confer-
ence Records, Series 9, Box 24.
50. Morgan to Libby, March 5, 1930, Libby to Morgan, March 6, 1930,
NCPW MSS.
51. NYT, February 28, March 3, 1930; editorial, The Christian Centu-
ry, February 26, 1930, in Balch MSS.
52. NYT, February 13, 1930.
53. Cotton to Stimson, March 3, 1930, and Stimson to Cotton, March
17, 1930, both in FRUS, 1930, 1: 40, 64. Stimson to Cotton, February 14,
1930, SD 500 A15 a3/695 1/2.
54. Hoover to Stimson, September 17, 1929, Hoover Miscellaneous
MSS.
55. Hoover had conferred with British ambassador Howard with Kel-
logg's blessing and had proposed a joint Anglo-American publication of es-
says to "educate" the publics of both countries about what an Anglo-
American war might entail if disarmament efforts did not succeed. Howard
to Chamberlain, July 28, 1929, DBFP, ser. la, 3: 708-9; McKercher, Second
Baldwin Government, 82-83.
56. Press clippings and analysis, British Library of Information, New
York, February, 21, 1930, FO 371 A1706/1/45; Japan Times, March 2 and 5,
1930; Jahnke to Hoover, March 7, 1930, Hoover Misc. MSS.
57. Hoff-Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 58-59; O'Con-
nor, Perilous Equilibrium, 109; Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 230.
58. Of course, Castle had been privy to little disarmament information
before his arrival in Tokyo because Stimson disliked him. Castle to Gibson,
January 29, 1930, Gibson MSS. For Castle's efforts in Washington to partici-
pate in disarmament, see Newton, "Anglo-American Relations," 188.
59. Castle to Cotton, March 7, 1930, SD 894.911/55.
192 NOTES TO PACES 122-27
60. For more on Reuters' control of international news in Japan, see
Roger W. Purdy/ "Nationalism and News: 'Information Imperialism' and
Japan, 1910-1936," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1 (fall 1992):
295-325.
61. Sterling Tatsuji Takeuchi, "Japan and the London Treaty," The In-
stitute of Oriental Students 4 (1930), Univ. of Chicago, in Stanley K. Horn-
beck Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford,
Calif.
62. Gregory T. Kasza, The State and the Mass Media in Japan, 1918-
1945 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), 35-36.
63. Harry Emerson Wildes, Japan in Crisis (New York, 1934), 192, 195;
Ishida Takeshi, "Movements to Protect Constitutional Government—A
Structural-Functional Analysis," in Democracy in Prewar Japan: Ground-
work or Facade! ed. George O. Totten (Boston, 1965), 84. Kasza notes that
interest groups in general were weaker in Japan than in the democracies of
the West. Kasza, State and Mass Media in Japan, 106-7.
64. Cotton to Stimson, March 3, 1930, FRUS, 1930, 1: 40; Stimson
diary, February 9 and 18, 1930. For more on British domestic developments
in the late 1920s, see Philip Williamson, National Crisis and National
Government: British Politics, the Economy, and Empire, 1926-1932 (New
York, 1992), chapter 1.
65. Stimson to Cotton, March 10, 1930, FRUS, 1930, 1: 55; Notes of
delegates' meeting, March 12, 1930, DBFP, ser. 2, 1: 242; Walter Lippmann,
"The London Naval Conference: An American View," Foreign Affairs 8
(1930): 513. Britons still opposed sanctions in 1935 according to a "peace
ballot" sponsored by the League of Nations Union. Gordon A. Craig and
Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our
Time (New York, 1983), 63.
66. Stimson diary, March 21, 1930, and Stimson to Cotton, March 23,
1930, both in FRUS, 1930, 1: 55.
67. Stimson diary, March 22, 1930, O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium,
96-100.
68. Libby to Morgan, March 21, 1930, NCPW MSS.
69. Cotton to Stimson, March 25, 1930, FRUS, 1930, 1: 81.
70. Lamont to Morrow, March 26, 1930, Thomas W. Lamont Papers,
Baker Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
71. NYT, April 1, 1930; Leffler, Elusive Quest, 224-25.
72. Stimson to Cotton, April 8, 1930, SD RG 43, E161, 200.5/5.
73. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, 48-50.
74. Ibid., 46.
75. Ibid., 52, 55.
76. Stimson to Cotton, February 27, 1930, SD 500.A15 a3/716; Cotton
to Castle, March 13, 1930, SD, "Confidential Diplomatic Post Reports, Ja-
pan, 1930-1935" (hereafter, CDPR) (Frederick, Md., 1982), microfilm; Hen-
derson to Tilley, March 15, 1930, DBFP, ser. 2, 1: 249.
77. Quoted in Kobayashi, "London Naval Conference," 27.
78. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, 83.
NOTES TO PACES 128-37 193
79. Castle to Cotton, March 19, 1930, CDPR.
80. Castle to Cotton, March 21, 1930, CDPR; Tilley to Henderson,
March 19, 1930, FO 371 A2045/1/45. Before the Japanese responded, the
French tried to persuade them to reject the proposal because of the subma-
rine limits, and Stimson attempted to force acceptance by threatening Ja-
pan with foreclosure on a twenty-five year old loan. Stimson to Castle,
March 29, 1930, SD 500.A15 a3/802.
81. Japan Times, March 21, 1930; Kobayashi, "London Naval Treaty,"
35, 38.
82. Kobayashi, "London Naval Treaty," 31; Asada, "Revolt against the
Washington Treaty," 91.
83. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, 58-59, 64.
84. Ellis, Frank Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 173-75. Ellis
finds that George Rublee, an assistant to Morrow, came to favor a consulta-
tive pact and brought Stimson and Morrow around to this view.
85. Years later, Hoover wrote that he had considered French participa-
tion in a treaty secondary: "I instructed our delegation that we did not care
whether the French limited their navy or not, and our major purpose of
parity with Britain and the extension of the 5-3 ratio with Japan would be
accomplished even if France and Italy stayed out of the agreement." Hoover
to Roger Shaw, February 9, 1946, Hoover Miscellaneous MSS.
86. In addition, large cruisers performed poorly in the first important
naval battle of the Second World War. In 1939, the German "pocket battle-
ship," which was really a heavy cruiser, the Graf Spee (10,000 tons, eleven-
inch guns), chanced upon three British cruisers, one with eight-inch, two
with six-inch guns, off Montevideo. The Germans made a lucky hit on the
firing mechanism of the slower heavy cruiser, but the light cruisers, darting
about and peppering the larger ship with murderous fire, forced the Graf
Spee into Montevideo harbor.
87. Train log, 1930, March 24, 1930; Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie
Pratt, 309-10.
7. Disarmament in the Great Depression
1. Philip Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, 1938), 465-66; Richard Leopold,
Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston, 1954), 161.
2. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, 109-10.
3. FCCCA Information Service newsletter, May 10, 1930, in Sayre
file, Balch MSS.
4. A.G. Everett, "Navies, Taxes, and International Peace Insurance,"
Journal of the American Bankers' Association 23 (August 1930): 95.
5. "What the Naval Conference Means to Business," Business Week
20 (January 22, 1930): 5-6; president of the United States Chamber of Com-
merce to Hoover, July 1, 1930, Hoover MSS; Ernest T. Trigg, "Common
Sense in National Defense," Nation's Business 18 (March 1930): 154-55.
6. Commercial and Financial Chronicle 131 (April 26, 1930).
7. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (hereafter, CFR), Hearings
194 NOTES TO PAGES 137-41
on the Tieaty on the Limitation of Naval Armaments, 71st Cong.,',
1930 (Washington, 1930), 5.
8. Text, Stimson radio address, June 12, 1930, in Sayre fill
MSS; Jones memorandum, June 16, 1930, Jones MSS.
9. Johnson to his sons, May 17 and 24, 1930, The Diary Lt
Hiram Johnson, 1917-1945, vol. 5, ed. Robert E. Burke (New York, ]
10. CFR, Hearings on Tieaty, 359, 363.
11. Bristol to Hiram Johnson, June 13, 1930, Bristol to Arthi
land, September 25, 1930, Bristol MSS.
12. CFR, Hearings on Treaty, 241, 324; Admiral Jones express^
lar sentiments. Jones memorandum on London Treaty, undated, Jon
13. Sir Ronald Lindsay to Henderson, July 8, 1930, FO 371
1/45.
14. CFR, Hearings on Tieaty, 285, H.W. Cook to William Beck,
1930, SD 500.A15a3/1010 1/2.
15. Robert Dean Pope, "Senatorial Baron: The Long Political C
Kenneth D. McKellar" (Ph.D diss., Yale University, 1976), 193; Jot
Hiram Johnson, Jr., May 30, 1930, Diary Letters of Hiram Johi
1928-1933, Richard Lowitt, George W. Norris: The Persistence of a
sive, 1913-1933 (Urbana, 1971), 532; William R. Castle, Jr., diary,
and 23, 1930, Castle MSS.
16. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, 120; ¥CCCA Information
Newsletter, May 10, 1930, in Sayre file, Balch MSS.
17. Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey, October 28,1933, Cecil MSS;
nor, Perilous Equilibrium, 120.
18. Pad. Deb., (Commons), 5th ser., 239 (1929-30); 1791-94,
1909.
19. Tilley to Henderson, May 19, 1930, FO 371 A4229/1/45;
nor, Perilous Equilibrium, 82.
20. For press reaction, see Kobayashi, "London Naval Treaty,
Castle to Stimson, May 26, 1930, SD 500.A15 a3/969.
21. Tilley to Henderson, May 16, 1930, FO 371 A4229/1/45; T;
"Japan and the London Treaty," Hornbeck MSS; Kobayashi, "Londc
Conference," 59-117.
22. Tilley to Henderson, May 16, 1930, FO 371 A4257/1/45; I
Neville to Stimson, May 30, 1030, SD RG 43, E161 250/Japan/63; r
Henderson, June 17, 1930, FO 371 A5132/1/45; Jansen, "Introdu
the Manchurian Incident," 130; Kobayashi, "London Naval Con
79-80, 93-94.
23. CFR, Hearings on Tieaty, 302; Lindsay to Henderson, )
1930, FO 371 A4337/1/45.
24. Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the
London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cai
1974), 78, 81-82.
25. Friedman, U.S. Cruisers, 130, 139.
26. Ibid., 197, 133; Director of Fleet Maintenance to CNO, Se
22, 1936, US. Department of the Navy, Secret and Confidential Co
NOTES TO PAGES 142-44 195
dence of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, 1927-1939, (hereafter, Sec-
Navy) OP-12A-CTB, (SC)Al-3 D7014.
27. Alan D. Zimm, "The U.S.N.'s Flight Deck Cruiser," Warship Inter-
national 16 (no. 3, 1979): 242, 232; General Board to Secretary of the Navy,
December 18, 1930, GB 420-8, ser. 1515; Bristol to Secretary of the Navy,
April 20, 1931, GB 420-8, ser. 1519.
28. Zimm, "The U.S.N.'s Flight Deck Cruiser," 243-44; Director of
Fleet Maintenance to CNO, September 22, 1936, SecNavy OP-12A-CTB,
(SC)Al-3 D7014.
29. Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 360 n. 18; Weigley, American Way of
War, 249-53.
30. Miller, War Plan Orange, 348. In contrast to Thomas C. Hone, M.
Mandeles, Braisted, and Roskill, Miller argues that U.S. planners did appreci-
ate carriers. He notes, however, that planners mistakenly saw carriers as aux-
iliaries to the battle line, rather than as leaders of strike forces. Ibid., 348-49.
31. Thomas C. Hone and M. Mandeles, "Managerial Style in the Inter-
war Navy: A Reappraisal," Naval War College Review 33 (September-
October 1980): 91, 95-96.
32. Ibid.; Thomas H. Buckley and Edwin B. Strong, Jr., American For-
eign and National Security Policies, 1914-1945 (Knoxville, 1987), 104-5.
33. Buckley and Strong, American Foreign and National Security,
chapter 5, 92-112; William R. Braisted, "On the American Red and Red-
Orange Plans, 1919-1939," 178; Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 1:
542-43. Mahan, of course, had argued in his widely read book The Influence
of Sea Power upon History (1890) that modern navies must emphasize capi-
tal ships (i.e., the battleship) in their fleets to safeguard commercial routes.
He had amplified these views in other books and articles since that time.
34. Report on Japanese strength, January 21 and 22, 1933, ADM 116/
3116; Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, 2; 289, 146-47; Jentschura,
Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 84-89.
35. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, who had publicly advocated fewer
battleships and more cruisers and smaller ships, had had his views noticed
by the government. But his criticism of the Labour plan for the London
Naval Conference led to his retirement from the navy in 1931. Hunt, Sailor-
Scholar, 189, 194.
36. Admiralty Board Minutes extract, October 9,1933, ADM 1 /9360. By
early 1937, foreign building caused the British to build the Southampton-
class cruisers with six-inch guns and displacements of 9,000 to 10,000 tons,
far heavier than the British prototype favored a decade earlier at the Geneva
Conference. Report, "Cruiser Building Policy," Plans Division, May 6, 1937,
ADM 1/9427.
37. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 1: 536, 519-22.
38. Iriye, "Japan's Policies toward the United States," 445; Christopher
Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League, and the Far
Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (London, 1972), 52-53.
39. "Bi-Weekly Intelligence Summary, Japan," August 17,1933, C-10-e,
21201, Naval Attache Reports, 1887-1939, ONI.
196 NOTES TO PAGES 145-49
40. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," 226-28; Grew
to Hull, September 15 and October 20, 1933, CDPR.
41. Grew to Hull, October 20, 1933, CDPR.
42. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, 40.
43. Ibid.
44. Eric Lacroix, "The Development of the 'A Class' Cruisers in the
Japanese Imperial Navy," Warship International 21, no. 3, (1984): 247, 255;
Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, 2: 148.
45. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, 1: 530; Thorne, Limits of
Foreign Policy, 72.
46. Thorne, Limits of Foreign Policy, 80, 89.
47. Navy League press release, April 28, 1930, in William E. Borah Pa-
pers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Rappaport, Navy League of
the United States, 135.
48. Time, November 9, 1931, in Hoover MSS; J. Edgar Hoover to Law-
rence Richey (presidential secretary), October 31, 1931, Hoover MSS; J.
Pierrepont Moffat diary, November 5, 1932, in Gibson MSS; White quote
cited in Bowen, "The Disarmament Movement," 277.
49. Pamphlet, "The London Naval Conference: A Summary and an In-
terpretation," June 9, 1930, in Sayre file, Balch MSS; Morgan to Libby, May
20, 1930, NCPW MSS; Morley article, reprinted in New York Herald-
Tribune, September 28, 1931, in Morley MSS.
50. Detzer to Hilda Clark, March 3, 1930, WILPF MSS.
51. Detzer to Kathleen Courtney, April 7, 1931, WILPF MSS; Chat-
field, For Peace and Justice, 101.
52. Detzer quoted in Rosemary Rainbolt, "Women, War, and Resis-
tance to War: A Transnational Perspective," paper read at American Histor-
ical Association meeting (December 1976), 7; Disarmament Committee of
the Women's International Organizations Newsletter, (Autumn 1931), in
Balch MSS; Minutes of Women's Peace Union meeting, October 1, 1931,
Women's Peace Union Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarth-
more, Pa.; Bristol to CNO, March 24, 1931, Bristol MSS.
53. Amy Woods to WILPF members, April 30, 1932, in Balch MSS.
Kinkaid memorandum, September 26, 1932, in Jones MSS. Captain Dudley
Knox, director of the Naval Historical Center, attacked the "arm chair paci-
fists" and argued that they failed to recognize that law was supported by
force. Knox transcript, no date (circa 1932), Knox MSS.
54. Bowen, "The Disarmament Movement," 254-57.
55. Tano Jodai to Detzer, February 17, 1932, WILPF MSS.
56. Ransford S. Miller, State Department Division of Far Eastern Af-
fairs, "The Japanese Situation," lecture to Naval War College, January 16,
1931, Hornbeck MSS; Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Mak-
ing of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964),
29.
57. See, for example, League of Nations Association of Japan, Supple-
ment to the International Gleanings from Japan (January 1931); Viscount
NOTES TO PACES 149-53 197
Ishii, "Manchukuo and the Manchurian Question," League of Nations As-
sociation pamphlet, October 20, 1932; Hornbeck MSS.
58. Gibson had feared that the isolationist Borah would be named and
confided to Hugh Wilson that he was "burning candles to all the saints"
that Borah would refuse to go if offered the job. Swerczeck, "The Diplo-
matic Career of Hugh Gibson," 269.
59. Gibson to William R. Castle, December 7, 1930, Gibson MSS.
60. Ibid.
61. Schulzinger, Making of the Diplomatic Mind, 138-39.
62. Stimson to Neville, May 31, 1932, SD 500.A15 a4/1048; Robert H.
Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson
Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New Haven, 1957), 98-99; Castle to Gibson, Feb-
ruary 8, 1932, Gibson MSS.
63. Chamberlain to Cecil, January 20, 1932, Cecil MSS.
64. MacDonald to Cecil, August 13, 1930, Cecil MSS.
65. Wandycz, Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 239-47; Vaisse, Se-
curite d'abord, part 2.
66. Jordan, Popular Front and Central Europe, 20-21.
67. Memorandum, Director of Plans, "Number of Cruisers: Question
of Cabinet Authority to working to the number 70," April 9, 1932, ADM
116/2827; "Notes for Naval Members of British Delegation," n.d., (circa
1932), ADM 116/2826.
68. Malcolm MacDonald to Cecil, n.d., (circa 1932), Cecil MSS.
69. This paragraph based on Hosoya, "Britain and the United States," 16.
70. Neville to Stimson, March 9, 1931, CDPR; Fujito Shin-Ichiro in
Gaiko fiho (Diplomatic Review), quoted in W. Cameron Forbes to Stimson,
January 30, 1932, Ibid.
71. Hoover to Stimson, May 24, 1932, FRUS, 1932, 1: 180-82. Stimson
strenuously disagreed with the president's approach. He wrote that al-
though the proposal would publicize the conference, further concessions on
the part of the U.S. Navy would not be popular in the United States except
for a "few circles of organized pacifists." He concluded that "quiet diplo-
macy [is] better than publicity and bold strokes." Stimson memorandum,
May 25, 1932, ibid., 182-85.
72. Jordan A. Schwartz, The Speculator: Bernard M. Baruch in Wash-
ington, 1917-1965 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981), 260. Baruch swung back to a
preparedness stance by 1935.
73. S.R. Vansittart to Sir John Simon, n.d., ADM 116/2827.
74. Gibson diary, Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference, June 27,
1932, Gibson MSS.
75. MacDonald to Baldwin, July 15, 1932, MacDonald MSS.
76. Pierrepont Moffat to Ferdinand Mayer, October 12, 1932, Ferdinand
Mayer Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Hugh Wilson to Norman Davis, December 14, 1932, Davis to Wilson,
March 2, 1933, Wilson MSS; Kinkaid memorandum, September 26, 1932, in
Jones MSS.
198 NOTES TO PAGES 153-61
77. Josephine Young Case and Everett Needham Case, Owen D. Young
and American Enterprise (Boston, 1982), 557, 630-32.
78. For assessments of Japanese politics in the 1930s, see Carol Gluck
and Stephen R. Graubard, eds., Showa: The Japan of Hiiohito (New York,
1992).
79. Chief of Staff to Henderson, March 14, 1934, FO 371 A2176/1/45.
80. Moffat to Mayer, September 27, 1933, Mayer MSS.
81. Quoted in Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 2: 298.
82. Stanley Hornbeck memorandum of meeting in Executive Office,
White House, November 19, 1935, Hornbeck MSS. Hornbeck, chief of the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, had considered disarmament dead by 1934
because of Japanese transgressions in China, which violated the Nine-
Power Treaty. Memorandum, April 24, 1934, Hornbeck MSS.
83. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 2: 314.
84. The Americans would eventually engage in some cheating them-
selves—the carrier Wasp, laid down in January 1936 exceeded treaty limits
on completion, as did the New Orleans-class cruisers. Roskill, Naval Policy
between the Wars, 2: 177; Friedman, U.S. Cruisers, 155-57.
8. Conclusion
1. Levinson to Mrs. Jessie K. Jordan, October 21, 1930, David S. Jor-
dan Papers, Herbert Hoover Institution, Stanford, California.
2. Stanley K. Hornbeck, memorandum of meetings at the White
House, November 19 and 23, 1935, Hornbeck MSS.
3. Friedman, U.S. Cruisers, 323-24. For an example of how officers
failed to notice the performance of eight-inch or six-inch guns, see U.S.
Department of the Navy, ship logs, 1943, U.S.S. Salt Lake City, one of the
first treaty cruisers.
4. Jaffe, "Abolishing War?," 49.
5. Ferdinand Mayer, report from Geneva Conference, no. 25, Novem-
ber 15, 1932, Mayer MSS.; Richard Dean Burns, "International Arms In-
spection Policies between World Wars, 1919-1934," Historian 31, no. 4
(1969): 583-603.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Personal and Organizational Manuscripts
Balch, Emily Greene. Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarth-
more, Pa.
Borah, William E. Papers. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Bridgeman, William L., Viscount. Diary, Shropshire County Record Office,
Shrewsbury, England.
Bristol, Mark L. Papers. Naval Historical Foundation Collection. Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
Castle, William R. Diary. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
. Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Cecil, Robert, Viscount of Chelwood. Papers. British Library, London.
Chamberlain, Sir Austen. Papers. In FO 800. Public Record Office, London.
Coolidge, Calvin. Papers. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Microfilm.
Dawes, Charles G. Papers. Northwestern University Library, Evanston, 111.
Detzer, Dorothy. Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarth-
more, Pa.
Gibson, Hugh S. Diaries, Letters, and Notes, 1922-1930. Herbert Hoover
Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
. Papers. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford,
Calif.
Hoover, Herbert C. Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa.
. Miscellaneous Papers. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and
Peace, Stanford, Calif.
Hornbeck, Stanley K. Papers. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and
Peace, Stanford, Calif.
Hull, Hannah Clothier. Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection,
Swarthmore, Pa.
Jones, Hilary P. Papers. Naval Historical Foundation Collection. Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
200 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jordan, David Starr. Papers. In John D. Crummy Peace Collection. Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, Calif.
Kellogg, Frank B. Papers. Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minn.
Microfilm.
Knox, Dudley W. Papers. Naval Historical Foundation Collection. Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
Lamont, Thomas W. Papers. Baker Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Mass.
League of Nations Association. Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collec-
tion, Swarthmore, Pa.
MacDonald, J. Ramsay. Papers. Public Record Office, London.
Mayer, Ferdinand. Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa.
Morley, Felix M. Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa.
National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. Papers. Swarthmore
College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.
National Council for the Prevention of War. Papers. Swarthmore College
Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.
Pratt, William V. Papers. Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard,
Washington, D.C. Photocopy.
Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr. Papers. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Schofield, Frank H. Diary, the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. Naval
Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
Stimson, Henry L. Diary and Papers. Yale University Library, New Haven,
Conn. Microfilm.
Train, Harold C. Log of the London Naval Conference of 1930. General
Board Disarmament Conference Records. Series 9. National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
. Log of the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission for the
Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. General Board Disarmament
Conference Records. Series 5. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
-. "Reminiscences." Columbia University Oral History Project. An-
napolis, 1965-66. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Microfilm.
Van Keuren, Alexander. Papers. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and
Peace, Stanford, Calif.
Wilbur, Curtis D. Papers. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Wilson, Hugh R. Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa.
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Papers. Swarthmore
College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pa.
Women's Peace Union. Papers. Swarthmore College Peace Collection,
Swarthmore, Pa. Microfilm.
Yarnell, Harry E. Papers. Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard,
Washington, D.C.
. Papers (after 1937). Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 201
Government Manuscripts
U.K. Admiralty. Files, ADM 1, ADM 116, ADM 167. Public Record Office,
London.
U.K. Cabinet. Papers, CAB 2, CAB 4, CAB 23, CAB 24, CAB 29. Public
Record Office, London.
U.K. Foreign Office. Files, FO 371, FO 800, FO 412, Public Record Office,
London.
. FO 371. British Foreign Office, United States: Correspondence,
1930-1937. Wilmington, Del., 1981. Microfilm.
U.K. Parliament. Command Papers. Public Record Office, London. Micro-
print.
U.S. Department of State. Confidential Diplomatic Post Reports, Japan,
1930-1935. RG 43, Frederick, Md., 1982. Microfilm.
. General Records. RG 59. Decimal Files. National Archives, Wash-
ington, D.C.
U.S. Department of the Navy. General Records of the Joint Army and Navy
Board, 1903-1947. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
. General Board Disarmament Conference Records, Series 5, 9. Na-
tional Archives, Washington, D.C.
. Office of Naval Intelligence Files, RG 39, Naval Attache Reports,
Tokyo, 1887-1939. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
. General Records of the Navy General Board, 1926-1936. National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
. Secret and Confidential Correspondence between the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, 1919-1927.
National Archives, Washington, D.C. Microfilm.
. Secret and Confidential Correspondence of the Office of the Secre-
tary of the Navy, 1927-1939. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
-. Ship Logs, 1943, U.S.S. Salt Lake City, U.S.S. Pensacola. Naval His-
torical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
Government and Organizational Documents
Congressional Record. 1922-1930. Washington, D.C.
Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Edited by W.L. Medlicott
et al. Series la, 2. London, 1966-1984.
France. Ministere des affaires etrangeres. Limitation des armements na-
vals: Trente-cinq pieces relative aux travaux pieparatoires du desar-
mement et a la limitation des armements navals, 21 mars 1927-6 octo-
bre 1928. Paris, 1928.
League of Nations. Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Dis-
armament Conference. Series 2.
. Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament,
Held at Geneva from June 20th to August 4th, 1927. Geneva, 1927.
League of Nations Union. Annual Report. London, 1927-1930.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921-1936.
Washington, D.C, 1936-54.
202 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
U.K. Pailiamentaiy Debates, Commons. 5th series (1909-).
U.K. Pailiamentaiy Debates, House of Lords. 5th series (1909-).
U.S. Congress. Senate. Recoids of the Geneva Confeience foi the Limita-
tion of Naval Aimament. 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928. S. Doc. 55.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Healings on the
Tieaty on the Limitation of Naval Aimaments. 71st Cong., 2d sess.,
1930.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Naval Affairs. Alleged Activities at
the Geneva Confeience. 71st Cong., 1st sess., 1930.
. Healings befoie the Senate Committee on Naval Affaiis on the
London Naval Treaty of 1930. 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1930.
Books
Adamthwaite, Anthony. The Long Peace: International Relations in Europe,
1918-1939. London, 1980.
Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction.
New York, 1957.
Allen, Frederick Lewis. Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s.
New York, 1932.
Almond, Gabriel. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York, 1960.
Bacon, Sir Reginald H.S. The life of fohn Rushmore Earl Jellicoe. London,
1936.
Ball, Stuart. Baldwin and the Conservative Party: The Crisis of 1929-1931.
New Haven, Conn., 1988.
Bamba, Nobuya. Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's
China Policy, 1924-1929. Vancouver, B.C., 1972.
, and John F. Howes. Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist
Tradition. Kyoto, 1978.
Bariety, Jacques. Les lelations franco-allemandes apres la premiere guerre
mondiale. Paris, 1976.
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945. New York, 1987.
Birn, Donald S. The League of Nations Union, 1918-1945. New York, 1981.
Borg, Dorothy, and Shumpei Okamoto, eds. Pearl Harbor as History: Jap-
anese-American Relations, 1931-1941. New York, 1973.
Braisted, William R. The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922.
Austin, Tex., 1971.
Bridgeman, William. The Modernisation of Conservative Politics: The Dia-
ries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904-1935. Edited by Philip
Williamson. London, 1988.
Brune, Lester A. The Origins of American National Security: Sea Power,
Air Power, and Foreign Policy, 1900-1941. Manhattan, Kans., 1981.
Bryn-Jones, David. Frank B. Kellogg: A Biography. New York, 1937.
Buckley, Thomas H. The United States and the Washington Conference,
1921-1922. Knoxville, Tenn., 1970.
, and Edwin B. Strong, Jr. American Foreign and National Security
Policies, 1914-1945. Knoxville, Tenn., 1987.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 203
Burner, David. Herbert Hoover: A Public Life. New York, 1979.
Burns, Richard Dean. Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700. For
the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Santa Bar-
bara, Calif., 1983.
Butler, Nicholas Murray. Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflec-
tions. 2 vols. New York, 1940.
Bywater, Hector C. Navies and Nations. Boston and New York, 1927.
. Seapower in the Pacific: A Study of the American-fapanese Prob-
lem. Boston and New York, 1921.
Carlton, David. MacDonald versus Henderson: The Foreign Policy of the
Second Labour Government. London, 1970.
Case, Josephine Young, and Everett Needham Case. Owen D. Young and
American Enterprise. Boston, 1982.
Ceadel, Martin. Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1941: The Defining of a Faith.
New York, 1980.
Cecil, Robert, Viscount of Chelwood. A Great Experiment: An Autobiogra-
phy. New York, 1941.
Chalmers, W.S. The Life and Letters of David, Earl of Beatty. London, 1951.
Chamberlain, Sir Austen. Down the Years. London, 1935.
Chaput, Rolland A. Disarmament in British Foreign Policy. London, 1935.
Chatfield, Charles. For Peace and fustice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941.
Knoxville, Term., 1971.
Churchill, Sir Winston S. The Gathering Storm. Boston, 1948.
Cohen, Bernard. The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy. Boston, 1973.
Cohen, Warren. Chinese Connection: Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lamont,
George E. Sokolsky and American-East Asian Relations. New York,
1978.
Coletta, Paolo E., ed. American Secretaries of the Navy, vol. 2, 1913-1972.
Annapolis, Md., 1980.
Coolidge, Calvin. The Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge. New York, 1929.
Costigliola, Frank. Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic,
and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933. Ithaca, N.Y., 1984.
Craig, Gordon A., and Felix Gilbert, eds. The Diplomats, 1919-1939. Prince-
ton, 1953.
Craig, Gordon A., and Alexander L. George. Force and Statecraft: Diplo-
matic Problems of Our Time. New York, 1983.
Crowley, James B. Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and For-
eign Policy, 1930-1938. Princeton, 1966.
Current, Richard N. Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft. New Bruns-
wick, N.J., 1954.
Curti, Merle E. Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936. New
York, 1936.
Dallek, Robert. The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and
Foreign Affairs. New York, 1983.
Danelski, David, and Joseph Tulchin, eds. The Autobiographical Notes of
Charles Evans Hughes. Cambridge, 1973.
Davis, George T. A Navy Second to None. New York, 1940.
204 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dawes, Charles G. Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain. New York, 1939.
DeBenedetti, Charles. Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement,
1915-1929. Millwood, N.Y., 1978.
DeConde, Alexander, ed. Isolation and Security. Durham, N.C., 1957.
Detzer, Dorothy. Appointment on the Hill. New York, 1948.
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Washington, D.C.: 1959-1981.
Dingman, Roger. Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limita-
tion, 1914-1922. Chicago, 1976.
Duus, Peter. Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan. Cam-
bridge, 1968.
Edge, Walter E. A Jerseyman's Journal: Fifty Years of American Business
and Politics. Princeton, 1948.
Edwards, John Carver. Patriots in Pinstripe: Men of the National Security
League. Lanham, Md., 1982.
Ellis, L. Ethan. Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 1925-1929.
New Brunswick, N.J., 1961.
. Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933. New Brunswick, N.J., 1968.
Engely, Giovanni. The Politics of Naval Disarmament. London, 1932.
Feis, Herbert. The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era, 1919-1932. Bal-
timore, 1950.
Ferrell, Robert H. American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-
Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933. New Haven, Conn., 1957.
. Frank B. Kellogg and Henry L. Stimson. Vol. 11 of American Secre-
taries of State and Their Diplomacy. New York, 1962.
. Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. New
Haven, Conn., 1952.
-, and Howard H. Quint, eds. The Talkative President: The Off-the-
Record Press Conferences of Calvin Coolidge. Amherst, Mass., 1964.
Ferris, John Robert. The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-1926.
New York, 1989.
Friedman, Norman. U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Design History. Anna-
polis, 1984.
Fuess, Claude M. Calvin Coolidge: The Man from Vermont. Boston, 1940.
Gamson, William. The Strategy of Social Protest. 2d ed. Belmont, Calif.,
1992.
Glad, Betty. Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence: A Study
in American Diplomacy. Urbana, 111., 1966.
Gluck, Carol, and Stephen R. Graubard, eds. Showa: The Japan of Hirohito.
New York, 1992.
Grew, Joseph C. Ten Years in Japan, 1932-1942. New York, 1944.
. Turbulent Era. 2 vols. Boston, 1952.
Hall, Christopher. Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921-37. New
York, 1987.
Heinrichs, Waldo H., Jr. American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the
Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition. Boston, 1966.
Herman, Sondra. Eleven against War: Studies in Amrican Internationalist
Thought, 1898-1921. Stanford, 1969.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 205
Higham, Robin. Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain, 1918-1940, A Case
Study. London, 1962.
Hilderbrand, Robert C. Power and the People: Executive Management of
Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897-1921. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981.
Hoag, C. Leonard. Preface to Preparedness: The Washington Disarmament
Conference and Public Opinion. Washington, D.C., 1941.
Hoff-Wilson, Joan. American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933. Lex-
ington, Ky., 1971.
. Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive. Boston, 1975.
Hooker, Nancy H., ed. The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic
journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943. Cambridge, 1956.
Hoover, Herbert C. The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover. Vol. 2, The Cabinet
and the Presidency, 1920-1933. New York, 1952.
, and Hugh S. Gibson. The Problems of Lasting Peace. New York,
1942.
Howard, Esme. Theatre of Life. 2 vols. Boston, 1935-36.
Howland, Charles P. Survey of American Foreign Relations: 1928. New Ha-
ven, Conn., 1928.
Hughes, Barry. The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy. San
Francisco, 1979.
Hunt, Barry D. Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946.
Waterloo, Ont., 1982.
Iriye, Akira. After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far
East, 1921-1931. New York, 1973.
Ishii, Kikujiro. Diplomatic Commentaries. Baltimore, 1936.
Jacobson, Jon. Locarno Dipomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929.
Princeton, 1972.
fane's Fighting Ships. 1924-36. London, 1939.
Jones, Thomas. Whitehall Diary. 1 vols. Edited by Keith Middlemas. Lon-
don, 1969.
Jellicoe, Admiral Earl John. The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, De-
velopment, and Work. New York, 1919.
Jentschura, Hansgeorg, et al. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Lon-
don, 1977.
Jessup, Philip. Elihu Root. New York, 1938.
Johnson, Hiram. The Diary Letters of Hiram Johnson, 1917-1945. 7 vols.
Edited by Robert E. Burke. New York, 1983.
Jordan, Nicole. The Popular Front and Central Europe: The Dilemmas' of
French Impotence, 1918-1940. New York, 1992.
Josephson, Harold. James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in
America. Cranbury, N.J., 1974.
Juergens, George I. News from the White House: The Presidential Press
Relationship in the Progressive Era. Chicago, 1981.
Karsten, Peter. The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and
the Emergence of Modern American Navalism. New York, 1972.
Kasza, Gregory, T. The State and the Mass Media in Japan, 1918-1945. Berke-
ley, 1988.
206 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kennedy, Malcolm D. The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan: 1917-35.
Los Angeles, 1969.
Kenworthy, J.M. Peace or War! New York, 1927.
Knox, Dudley W. The Eclipse of American Sea Power. New York, 1922.
Latimer, Hugh. Naval Disarmament. London, 1930.
Leff ler, Melvyn P. The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Sta-
bility and French Security, 1919-1933. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979.
Leopold, Richard. Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition. Boston, 1954.
Levering, Ralph. The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978. New
York, 1978.
Love, Robert W., Jr., ed. The Chiefs of Naval Operations. Annapolis, Md.,
1980.
Lowitt, Richard. George W. Norris: The Persistance of a Progressive, 1913-
1933. Urbana, 111., 1971.
Marquand, David. Ramsay MacDonald. London, 1977.
McCoy, Donald R. Calvin Coolidge: The Quiet President. New York, 1967.
Mclntyre, W. David. The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-
1942. London, 1979.
McKercher, B.J.C. The Second Baldwin Government and the United States,
1924-1929. New York, 1984.
—, ed. Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-
1939. New York, 1992.
Marks, Sally. The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe,
1918-1933. New York, 1976.
Meyer, David S. A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American
Politics. New York, 1990.
Middlemas, Keith, and John Barnes. Baldwin: A Biography. London, 1969.
Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan,
1897-1945. Annapolis, Md., 1991.
Morison, Elting E. Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of
Henry L. Stimson. Boston, 1960.
Morley, James W, ed. Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan. Princeton,
1971.
, ed. Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Man-
churian Incident, 1928-1932. New York, 1984.
Neidpath, James. The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's
Eastern Empire, 1919-1941. London, 1981.
Neuman, R.W. The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in
the American Electorate. Cambridge, Mass., 1986.
Nicolson, Harold G. Dwight Morrow. New York, 1935.
Nish, Ian H. Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations,
1908-1923. London, 1972.
. Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka.
London, 1977.
, ed. Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers of the Anglo-
Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War. New
York, 1982.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 207
Noel-Baker, P.J. Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference. London, 1927.
O'Connor, Raymond G. Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the
London Naval Conference of 1930. Lawrence, Kans., 1962.
Ogata, Sadako N. Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign
Policy, 1931-1932. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964.
Ostrower, Gary B. Collective Insecurity: The United States and the League
of Nations during the Early Thirties. Cranbury, N.J., 1979.
Pelz, Stephen E. Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London
Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II. Cambridge, 1974.
Pencak, William. For God and Country: The American Legion, 1919-1941.
Boston, 1989.
Petrie, Sir Charles. The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen
Chamberlain. 1 vols. London, 1940.
Pusey, Merlo J. Charles Evans Hughes. New York, 1952.
Rappaport, Armin. The Navy League of the United States. Detroit, 1962.
Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. New
York, 1968.
Richardson, Dick. The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the
1920s. New York, 1989.
Rose, Kenneth. The Later Cecils. London, 1975.
Rosenau, James N. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational For-
mulation. New York, 1961.
Roskill, Stephen W. Churchill and the Admirals. London, 1977.
. Hankey, Man of Secrets. Vol. 2, 1919-1931. London, 1977.
. Naval Policy between the Wars. Vol. 1, The Period of Anglo-Amer-
ican Antagonism, 1919-1929. London, 1968. Vol.2, The Period of Reluc-
tant Rearmament, 1930-1939. London, 1976.
Russett, Bruce. Controlling the Sword. Cambridge, Mass., 1990.
Schulzinger, Robert D. The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training,
Outlook, and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908-
1931. Middletown, Conn., 1975.
. The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on
Foreign Relations. New York, 1984.
Schwartz, Jordan A. The Speculator: Bernard M. Baruch in Washington,
1917-1965. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981.
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Arma-
geddon. New Haven, Conn., 1987.
Small, Melvin. Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves. New Brunswick, N.J., 1988.
Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. Toward a New Order of Sea Power.
Princeton, 1943.
Stimson, Henry L., and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and
War. New York, 1947.
Takeuchi, Tatsuji. War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire. Chicago,
1935.
Tarrow, Sidney. Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Change: Poli-
cy Change during Cycles of Protest. Ithaca, N.Y., 1983.
Tate, Merze. The United States and Armaments. Cambridge, 1948.
208 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Taylor, Sandra C. Advocate of Understanding: Sidney Gulick and the
Search for Peace with Japan. Kent, Ohio, 1984.
Temperley, A.C. The Whispering Gallery of Europe. London, 1938.
Thorne, Christopher. The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League,
and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933. London, 1972.
Tilley, Sir John. From London to Tokyo. London, 1942.
Toynbee, Arnold J. Survey of International Relations: 1927; 1928; 1929;
1930. Under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
London, 1929-1932.
Vaisse, Maurice. Securite D'Abord: La politique francaise en matiere de
desarmement, 9 decembre 1930-17 avril 1934. Paris, 1981.
Vansittart, Sir Robert. The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord
Vansittart. London, 1958.
Van Voris, Jacqueline. Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life. New York, 1987.
Villard, Oswald. Prophets True and False. New York, 1928.
Vinson, John Chalmers. The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate
and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922. Athens, Ga., 1955.
Wandycz, Piotr S. The Twilight of French Eastern Allinces, 1928-1936.
Princeton, 1988.
Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States
Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington, Ind., 1973.
Werner, Morris Robert. Privileged Characters. New York, 1935.
Wheeler, Gerald E. Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor's
Life. Annapolis, Md., 1974.
. Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East,
1921-1931. Columbia, Mo., 1963.
Wheeler-Bennett, John W. Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925-
1931. London, 1932.
White, William Allen. A Puritan in Babylon. New York, 1938.
Wildes, Harry Emerson. Japan in Crisis. New York, 1934.
Williams, Benjamin H. The United States and Disarmament. New York,
1931.
Williamson, Philip. National Crisis and National Government: British Pol-
itics, the Economy, and the Empire, 1926-1932. New York, 1992.
Wilson, Hugh R. Diplomat between the Wars. New York, 1941.
Wittkopf, Eugene R. Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and Ameri-
can Foreign Policy. Durham, N.C., 1990.
Wittner, Lawrence S. Rebels against the Cause: The American Peace Move-
ment, 1933-1983. Philadelphia, 1984.
Young, Kenneth. Stanley Baldwin. London, 1976.
Articles
Andrade, Ernest, Jr. "The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Nego-
tiations, 1922-1936." Military Affairs 48 (1984): 113-20.
. "The United States Navy and the Washington Conference." Histo-
rian 31 (May 1969): 346-50.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 209
Asada, Sadao. "The Japanese Navy and the United States." In Pearl Harbor as
History, Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, edited by Dorothy
Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, 225-60. New York, 1973.
. "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Imperial Japanese
Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927." Naval War College Review 46,
no. 3 (Summer 1993): 82-97.
Baker, Arthur Davidson III. "Japanese Naval Construction, 1915-1945: An
Introductory Essay." Warship International 24, no. 1 (1987): 45-68.
Berg, Meredith William. "Admiral William H. Standley and the Second Lon-
don Naval Treaty, 1934-36." Historian 33, no. 2 (1971): 215-36.
Blatt, Joel. "The Parity that Meant Superiority: French Naval Policy toward
Italy at the Washington Conference, 1921-22." French Historical Stud-
ies 16 (1981): 223-48.
Braeman, John. "Power and Diplomacy: The 1920s Reappraised." Review of
Politics 44 (July 1982), 342-69.
Braisted, William R. "Charles Frederick Hughes, 14 November 1927-17
September 1930." In The Chiefs of Naval Operations, edited by Robert
William Love, Jr., 49-66. Annapolis, Md., 1980.
. "On the American Red and Red-Orange Plans, 1919-1939." In Naval
Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945: Essays in Honor of Ar-
thur J. Marder, edited by Gerald Jordan, 175-99. New York, 1977.
Burns, Richard Dean. "International Arms Inspection Policies between
World Wars, 1919-1934." Historian 31, no. 4 (1969): 583-603.
Bywater, Hector C. "The Treaty Cruiser—Is It Worthwhile?" Scientific
American 135 (November 1926): 326-28.
Carlton, David. "The Anglo-French Compromise on Arms Limitation,
1928." Journal of British Studies 8 (1969): 141-62.
. "Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of
1927." Political Science Quarterly 82 (1968): 573-99.
Converse, Philip E. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In Ideol-
ogy and Discontent, edited by D.E. Apter, 206-61. New York, 1964.
Coolidge, Calvin, "Promoting Peace through Limitations of Armaments."
Ladies Home Journal 48 (May 1929): 3-4, 93.
. "Promoting Peace through Preparation of Defense." Ladies Home
Journal 48 (April 1929): 3-4, 65.
"Promoting Peace through Renunciation of War." Ladies Home
Journal 48 (June 1929): 60, 160-61.
DeBenedetti, Charles. "Alternative Strategies in the American Peace Move-
ment in the 1920's." American Studies 13 (Spring 1972): 69-81.
. "The American Peace Movement and the State Department in the
Age of Locarno." In Doves and Diplomats: Foreign Offices and Peace
Movements in Europe and America in the Twentieth Century, edited
by Solomon Wank, 202-16. Westport, Conn., 1978.
Dulles, Allen W. "The Threat of Anglo-American Naval Rivalry." Foreign
Affairs 7 (1928-29): 173-83.
Eisinger, Peter K. "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,"
American Political Science Review 67 (1973): 11-28.
210 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Epstein, Marc. "The Historians and the Geneva Naval Conference." In
Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939, ed-
ited by BJ.C. McKercher, 129-48. New York, 1992.
Everett, A.G. "Navies, Taxes, and International Peace Insurance." Journal
of the American Bankers' Association 23 (August 1930): 94-95, 142.
Fagan, George V. "Edward Price Bell: the Journalist as Diplomat." Newber-
ry Library Bulletin 4 (November 1955): 24-27.
Fanning, Richard W. "The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in
Disarray." In Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War,
1899-1939, edited by B.J.C. McKercher, 105-28. New York, 1992.
. "Peace Groups and the Campaign for Naval Disarmament, 1927-
1936." Peace and Change 15, no. 1 (January 1990): 26-45.
Ferguson, Thomas. "The Right Consensus: Holsti and Rosenau's New For-
eign Policy Surveys." International Studies Quarterly 30 (1986): 411-23.
George, Alexander L. "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method
of Structured, Focused Comparison." In Diplomacy: New Approaches
in History, Theory, and Policy, edited by Paul Gordon Lauren, 43-68.
New York, 1979.
Heinrichs, Waldo H., Jr. "The Role of the U.S. Navy." In Pearl Harbor as
History, Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, edited by Dorothy
Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, 197-223. New York, 1973.
Heller, Roger K. "Curtis Dwight Wilbur, 19 March 1924-4 March 1929." In
American Secretaries of the Navy, vol. 2,1913-1972, edited by Paolo E.
Coletta, 605-630. Annapolis, 1980.
Holsti, Ole, and James N. Rosenau. "The Domestic and Foreign Policy Be-
liefs of American Leaders." Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 2
(June 1988): 248-94.
Hone, Thomas C. "The Effectiveness of the 'Washington Treaty' Navy."
Naval War College Review 32 (November-December 1979): 35-59.
, and M. Mandeles. "Managerial Style in the Interwar Navy: A Reap-
praisal." Naval War College Review 33 (September-October 1980):
88-101.
Hosoya, Chichiro. "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of the Inter-
national System, 1919-1937." In Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952:
Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second
World War, edited by Ian Nish. New York, 1982.
Houghton, Alanson B. "Disarmament and Depression." Nation 133 (De-
cember 23, 1931): 695.
Iriye, Akira. "Japan's Policies Toward the United States." In Japan's Foreign
Policy, 1868-1941: A Research Guide, edited by James W. Morley,
407-59. New York, 1974.
Ishida, Takeshi. "Movements to Protect Constitutional Government—
A Structural-Functional Analysis." In Democracy in Prewar Japan:
Groundwork or Facade! edited by George O. Totten, 82-95. Boston, 1965.
Jaffe, Lorna S. "Abolishing War? Military Disarmament at the Paris Peace
Conference, 1919." In Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints
on War, 1899-1939, edited by B.J.C. McKercher, 43-60. New York, 1992.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
Josephson, Harold. "The Search for Lasting Peace: Internationalism and
American Foreign Policy, 1920-1950." In Peace Movements and Politi-
cal Cultures, edited by Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen.
Knoxville, Tenn., 1988.
Kitschelt, Herbert P. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Pro-
test: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." Biitish Journal
of Political Science 16 (January 1986): 57-85.
Kobayashi, Tatsuo. "The London Naval Treaty, 1930." In Japan Erupts: The
London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932,
edited by James William Morley. New York, 1984.
Lacroix, Eric. "The Development of the 'A Class' Cruisers in the Japanese
Imperial Navy." Parts 3, 4, and 7, Warship International 16, no. 3
(1979): 329-61; 18, no. 1 (1981): 40-76; 21, no. 3 (1984): 246-305.
Lamont, Thomas W. "What Will Europe Renewed Mean to the United
States?" Nations' Business 125 (May 20, 1927): 17.
Lippmann, Walter. "The London Naval Conference: An American View."
Foreign Affairs 8 (1930): 499-518.
. "Public Opinion and the Renunciation of War." Academy of Politi-
cal Science Proceedings 13 (January 1929): 243-47.
Lynch, Cecelia. "A Matter of Controversy: The Peace Movement and Brit-
ish Arms Policy." In Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints
on War, 1899-1939, edited by B.J.C. McKercher, 61-82. New York, 1992.
May, Ernest R. "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the
United States." Political Science Quarterly 70 (1955): 161-80.
Miller, Ransford S. State Department Division of Far Eastern Affairs, "The
Japanese Situation." Lecture to Naval War College, January 16, 1931.
Found in Stanley K. Hornbeck MSS.
Morton, Louis. "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy." World Politics
11 (1959): 221-50.
O'Connor, Raymond G. "The 'Yardstick' and Naval Disarmament in the
1920s." Missississippi Valley Historical Review 45 (1958-59): 441-63.
Ogata, Sadako. "The Role of Liberal Nongovernmental Organizations in Ja-
pan." In Pearl Harbor as History, Japanese-American Relations, 1931-
1941, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, 459-86. New York,
1973.
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on
Policy." American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 175-90.
Perkins, Dexter. "The Department of State and American Public Opinion."
In The Diplomats, 1919-1939, edited by Gordon A. Craig and Felix
Gilbert, 282-308. Princeton, N.J., 1953.
Purdy, Roger W. "Nationalism and News: 'Information Imperialism' and
Japan, 1910-1936." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1 (Fall
1992): 295-325.
Rainbolt, Rosemary. "Women, War, and Resistance to War: A Transnational
Perspective." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Historical Association, December 1976.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign
212 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Policy in Liberal Democracies." Wozld Politics 43 (July 1991): 479-512.
Rosen/Philip T. "The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937." In Peace and Wai: Inter-
pretations of U.S. Naval History, 1775-1978, edited by Kenneth J.
Hagan, 221-36. Westport, Conn., 1978.
Shorrock, William. "France, Italy, and the Eastern Mediterranean in the
1920s." International History Review 8 (1986): 70-82.
Small, Melvin. "Public Opinion." In Explaining the History of American
Foreign Relations, edited by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson.
New York, 1991.
Symonds, Craig L. "William Veazie Pratt." In The Chiefs of Naval Opera-
tions, edited by Robert W. Love, Jr., 69-86. Annapolis, Md., 1980.
Takeuchi, Sterling Tatsuji. "Japan and the London Treaty." The Institute of
Oriental Students, 4 (1930). University of Chicago.
Trigg, Ernest T. "Common Sense in National Defense." Nation's Business
18 (March 1930): 154-55.
"What the Naval Conference Means to Business." Business Week 20 (Janu-
ary 22, 1930): 5-6.
Wheeler, Gerald E. "Isolated Japan: Anglo-American Diplomatic Co-opera-
tion, 1924-36." Pacific Historical Review 30 (1961): 165-78.
Zimm, Alan D. "The U.S.N.'s Flight Deck Cruiser." Warship International
16, no. 3 (1979): 216-46.
Dissertations and Theses
Abbott, Frank. "The Foreign Policy Association." Ph.D. diss., Texas Tech
University, 1972.
Andrade, Ernest, Jr. "United States Naval Policy in the Disarmament Era,
1921-1937." Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1966.
Bowen, Adelphia Dane, Jr. "The Disarmament Movement, 1918-1935."
Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1956.
Clemenson, Adolph Berle. "The Geneva Tripartite Conference of 1927 in
Japanese-American Relations." Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 1975.
Fagan, George V. "Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1927-1937." Ph.D.
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1954.
Kitchens, Joseph H. Jr. "The Shearer Scandal and Its Origins: Big Navy Poli-
tics and Diplomacy in the 1920s." Ph.D. diss., University of Georgia,
1968.
Mannock, James H. "Anglo-American Relations, 1921-1928." Ph.D. diss.,
Princeton University, 1962.
Newton, Christina "Anglo-American Relations and Bureaucratic Rivalry,
1927-1930." Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1975.
Pope, Robert Dean. "Senatorial Baron: The Long Political Career of Ken-
neth D. McKellar." Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1976.
Swerczeck, Ronald E. "The Diplomatic Career of Hugh Gibson, 1908-1938."
Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1972.
Trimble, William F. "The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 213
for the Limitation of Naval Armament; 1927." Ph.D. diss., University
of Colorado, 1974.
West, Michael Allen. "Laying the Foundation: The House Naval Affairs
Committee and the Construction of the Treaty Navy, 1926-1934."
Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1980.
Newspapers and Periodicals
Headway: A Monthly Review of the League of Nations. League of Nations
Union. London. 1925-1931.
Japan Times. Tokyo. 1922-1933
Literary Digest. New York. 1922-1934.
Nation. New York. 1926-1932.
New York Times. New York. 1921-1933.
Times. London. 1922-1934.
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis, Md. 1918-1935.
INDEX
Abernathy, Charles L., 93
Adams, Charles E, 114, 115
Addams, Jane, 9, 32, 83, 191 n 46
aggressor nations, definition of, 84
airplanes and aircraft carriers, 106, 142,
144, 145, 152, 161
Alexander, Albert V (First Lord of the Ad-
miralty), 149
American Association for International
Conciliation, 9
American Committee for the Outlawry of
War, 33, 83, 126
American Federation of Teachers, 83
American Foundation, 32
American Friends Service Committee,
91-92, 147
American Inquiry group, 32
American Legion, 33, 34, 83, 92
American Peace Society, 84, 85
Andrews, Capt. Adolphus, 40, 54
Anglo-French arms limitation agreement
(proposed), 87-90, 132
Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902), 4, 5, 7,
53
anticommunism, 33
Anti-Saloon League, 92
Argentina, on Preparatory Commission,
43
arms control, 30, 133, 162-63
arms race, 19
arms reduction, 31, 32, 120, 121, 129;
Coolidge's support for, 36, 47; petition
for, 119-20
Association for the Realization of Arma-
ment Reduction, 122
Astor, Waldorf (2d Viscount Astor of
Hever), 176n7O
Australia, 72
Australian Navy, 21, 115
Badger, Rear Adm. Thomas, 13
balance of power, 32
Balch, Emily Greene, 33
Baldwin, Stanley: and naval appropria-
tions, 20, 21, 37; and Geneva Naval
Conference, 60, 73, 74, 79, 178 n 33;
Cecil's disagreement with, 76; at dedi-
cation of peace bridge at Niagara Falls,
77; and proposed arms limitation agree-
ment with France, 90, 91; resignation
of, 99; and private disarmament nego-
tiations, 100; opposition to London
treaty, 139; and World Disarmament
Conference, 148, 153; impact of Wash-
ington Naval Conference on, 159
Balfour, Arthur, 9
Bank of Japan, 38
Bank of Taiwan, 38
Bardo, Clinton L., 67
Baruch, Bernard, 152
battleships: proposed abolition of, 119;
technological innovations in, 142-43
Beatty, Adm. Sir David: and parity be-
tween U.S. and British navies, 44, 49,
52-53, 62; and Geneva Naval Confer-
ence, 56, 58, 62, 74; retirement of, 76;
and ratification of London treaty, 138
Benes, Edouard, 175 n 49
Benson, Adm. William S., 13
Berthelot, Philippe, 79
INDEX 215
Black, Loren M., 92
Blanton, Thomas L., 19
Boal, Pierre, 148
Bok Peace Plan Award (1922), 32
Borah, William E.: and international dis-
armament conference, 4; and Washing-
ton Naval Conference treaties, 8; and
peace treaty with France, 84, 85; as an
isolationist, 94; and U.S. naval bill of
1928, 94; relationship with Stimson,
98; and Senate investigation of William
Shearer, 103; and ratification of London
treaty, 135; and peace movement, 147;
and U.S. neutrality, 186 n 76; as del-
egate to World Disarmament Confer-
ence, 197 n 58
Braisted, William, 12
Briand, Aristide, 130; and disarmament
policy, 42; reaction to failure of Geneva
Naval Conference, 79; peace treaty ne-
gotiations with U.S., 82, 83, 84-86,
120; influence of, 87; and proposed
arms limitation agreement with Great
Britain, 88, 90; and London Naval Con-
ference, 115, 116, 124; and Franco-
German reconciliation, 118
Bridgeman, William C: and naval appro-
priations, 21, 37, 95; on Preparatory
Commission, 45, 46; and Geneva Naval
Conference, 49, 53, 55, 57, 59-62, 69,
70, 73, 75, 77-79; on parliamentary
Disarmament Committee, 88; and pro-
posed arms limitation agreement with
France, 91; retirement of, 112; opposi-
tion to London treaty, 138, 139
Bristol, Rear Adm. MarkL., I l l , 127,
137
British Foreign Office, xii, 66, 90
British Royal Navy: strength of, 10;
cruisers in, 15-16, 17, 35, 41, 44, 47,
49, 52-53, 59, 71, 95, 100-101, 112,
170 n 43; Parliamentary appropriations
for, 16, 20-21, 35, 37-38; growth of,
142-44
Britten, Fred, 92-93, 121
Brownrigg, S. (director of gunnery devel-
opment), 15-16
bureaucratic-politics model, xii
Burton, Theodore, 84
Burton Resolution, 84
business concerns, U.S., 93-94, 136
Business Week, 136
Butler, Nicholas Murray, 31, 94, 119
Butler, Thomas S., 18, 20, 36
Byrnes, James E, 19
capital ships (battleships and carriers),
limitations on, 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 23, 49,
56,63
Capper, Arthur, 84
Capper Resolution, 83-84
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 9, 31, 32, 82, 85, 126, 147, 148
Caroline Islands, 11
Carson, Edward Henry (Baron Carson to
Duncairn), 138
Castle, William R., Jr., 47, 48, 55, 83, 90,
122, 128, 130
Catt, Carrie Chapman, xii-xiii, 33, 83,
86, 119, 120
Cecil, Sir James (4th Marquis of
Salisbury), 62, 79, 87, 88
Cecil, Sir Robert (1st Viscount Cecil of
Chelwood): and disarmament policy, 3,
10, 131; on Preparatory Commission,
40, 41, 42, 44, 46; and Geneva Naval
Conference, 49, 51, 52, 55, 59, 60-61,
63, 69, 70, 73-75, 77, 79; health of, 74;
resignation of, 76, 78, 79, 112; support
for Kellogg-Briand Pact, 86; opposition
to London treaty, 138; and World Disar-
mament Conference, 150, 151
Chamberlain, Sir Austen: and naval ap-
propriations, 21; and Preparatory Com-
mission, 24, 42, 46; opinion of
Bridgeman, 45; and Geneva Naval Con-
ference, 47, 51, 62, 70-71, 74, 78, 79,
97; Cecil's disagreement with, 76; and
proposed arms limitation agreement
with France, 87, 88, 90, 96; and London
Naval Conference, 97; and neutrality,
100; and World Disarmament Confer-
ence, 150
Chamberlain, Neville, 154
Chamber of Commerce, U.S., 83, 94, 136
Chang Tso-lin, 96, 101
Chatfield, Adm. Ernie, 112-14, 143, 154
chemical warfare, 152
Chicago Daily News, 83
Chicago Tribune, 33, 92, 135
Chile, on Preparatory Commission, 43
China: threat of civil war in, xii, 1,39,
216 INDEX
53, 77, 96, 162; treaty respecting terri-
torial integrity of, 7; Japanese noninter-
ventionist policy in, 22, 38-39; Japanese
development in Manchuria, 96, 130,
185 n 51; and Japanese invasion of
Manchuria, 96, 143, 149, 151, 152;
British interests in, 151
Christian Science Monitor, 136
Churchill, Winston: and naval appropria-
tions, 20-21, 37-38; and parity between
British and U.S. navies, 53, 61, 72; and
failure of Geneva Naval Conference, 62,
74, 180 n 43; and protection of trade
routes, 72; Cecil's disagreement with,
76; and proposed Anglo-French arms
limitation agreement, 89, 91; opposi-
tion to London treaty, 138-39
Church Peace Union, 33
collective security, 1, 3, 31, 132, 147
Colwyn Committee Report, 37
commerce. See business concerns, U.S.;
trade routes, defense of
Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
The, 136
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID),
62, 72, 76, 79
compulsory military training, in U.S.
schools, 83
Conference Journal, 148
Congregational Union, 34
Conseil Superieur de la Defense
Nationale (CSDN), 42
Coolidge, Calvin: disarmament policy of,
1, 17-18, 23, 35, 39, 79, 98, 130; eco-
nomic policy of, 1, 78; administrative
style of, 19; and navy appropriations,
19-20, 36-37, 81, 86, 90, 91; and Prepa-
ratory Commission, 23, 24, 25; and
arms reduction, 36, 47; and Geneva
Naval Conference, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51,
61, 63, 74-75, 78, 79, 85; and parity be-
tween British and U.S. navies, 49, 85,
97; decision not to seek reelection, 76;
and peace treaty with France, 83, 84;
and U.S. neutrality, 84, 94; policy in
Nicaragua, 86; Churchill's opinion of,
89; and proposed Anglo-French arms
limitation agreement, 89, 95; and Lon-
don Naval Conference, 96; relationship
to peace groups, 105; impact of Wash-
ington Naval Conference on, 159
Coontz, Adm. Robert E., 5, 6, 19, 127
Cotton, Joseph P, Jr., 118, 119, 120, 124,
125
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 32
Courtney, Kathleen, 95
Craigie, Sir Robert, 99, 127
Crewe-Milnes, Robert Offley Ashburton
(1st Marquis of Crewe), 88
cruisers, limitations on, 11-16
Curzon, George Nathaniel (1st Marquis
Curzon of Kedleston), 21
Cushenden, Lord (Ronald McNeill], 87,
88, 89, 99
Czechoslovakia, on Preparatory
Commission, 43
Daily Herald (Labour), 138
Daughters of the American Revolution
(DAR), 83, 92, 135
Davis, Dwight H., 83
Davis, Norman, 153, 155
Dawes, Charles Gates, 77, 100, 101, 102,
109, 114
Dawes Commission, 17, 23
Dawes Plan (19241, 1, 162
Defense Day (United States), 34
democratic political systems, open versus
closed, 27
Denby, Edwin, 13, 17, 19
Detzer, Dorothy: and peace movement,
83, 147; and peace treaty with France,
85-86; opposition to naval bill of 1928,
92, 94, 95; opposition to U.S.parity
policy, 119, 120; and cause of arma-
ment races, 148; and effectiveness of
peace groups, 159
Dewey, John, 33
disarmament: definition of, 1; calls for
universal disarmament, 9, 96
Disarmament Committee of the
Women's International Organizations,
148
domestic structure theory, 27-29
Dulles, Allen W, 40, 54, 58, 69, 77
Eberle, Adm. Edward W, 74
Eclipse of American Sea Power, The
(Knox), 8
Economist, 50
Edge, Walter, 117
INDEX 217
Egerton, Capt. WA., 55, 73
Eichelberger, Clark, 85, 147
Eiichi Shibusawa, 10
Fall, Albert E, 19
Federal Council of Churches of Christ
(FCCC) in America, 9, 83, 92, 147;
Commission on International Justice
and Goodwill, 33
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), 82
Field, Adm. Sir Frederick, 49, 55, 74
Five-Power Treaty, 6-7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17,
33, 58, 104, 141, 154, 161
Fleuriau, Joseph de, 115, 124
Forbes, Lord (director of naval ordnance),
15
Foreign Affairs (journal), 32
Foreign Policy Association, 9, 31, 32, 91,
125, 126, 147
foreign service, American, xii
Foreign Service School, U.S., 182-83 n 14
Four-Power Treaty, 7, 8, 22, 130
Fourteen Points (1918), 2
France: threatened by Germany and Italy,
41, 43, 129, 150; support for disarma-
ment in, 41-42, 117; proposed arms
limitation agreement with Great Brit-
ain, 87-90. See also French navy
freedom of the seas, 2, 85, 117
French, Burton L., 18, 36
French Navy: submarines in, 6, 37, 42,
53, 54, 129; rebuilding of, 37, 117; re-
duction of, 53; cruisers in, 124; limita-
tion of, 149; parity with Italian Navy,
150
Frost, Lt. Comm. H.H., 54
Gardiner, William Howard, 18, 93, 118,
146-47
Garvin, J.L., 138
Gary, Elbert H., 9
Geneva Naval Conference (1927): failure
of, xi, 65, 75-80, 93, 95, 99-100, 157,
160; disagreement over cruisers at, 11,
51-52, 59, 61-64, 67, 68-72, 121; pur-
pose of, 11; impact of Preparatory Com-
mission on, 45-46, 47-50; French par-
ticipation at, 47, 50, 82; Japanese par-
ticipation at, 47-48, 51, 53-54, 55,
57, 73-75; British participation at, 48,
52-53, 55, 57, 68-69, 73-75; Italian
participation at, 48, 50; U.S. participa-
tion at, 49, 52, 54-55, 56-57; position
of the parties prior to, 51-54; proceed-
ings of, 54-64; admirals' domination of,
57-58, 67; impact of William Shearer
on, 65-67, 103; limitations on destroy-
ers and submarines agreed upon at, 68;
Anglo-Japanese compromise at, 73-75;
French reaction to failure of, 79; U.S.
reaction to failure of, 81; as precursor of
London Naval Conference, 159-60
Geneva Protocol (1924), 42, 124
George V (king of England), 115
Germany: post-World War I disarmament
of, 1, 2, 23, 65; and Kellogg- Briand
Pact, 85; and proposed Anglo-French
arms limitation agreement, 88; rearma-
ment of, 106, 118, 151; Hitler's rise to
power in, 133, 153; military ambition
of, 150
Gibson, Hugh S.: on Preparatory Com-
mission, 39-40, 44, 45, 46, 90, 98-99;
and Geneva Naval Conference, 47-49,
54-56, 58-63, 67-71, 73, 74, 76, 77;
and London Naval Conference, 97, 115;
negotiations with British, 100; and Ital-
ian disarmament, 149; and World Dis-
armament Conference, 149-50
Gilbert, Prentiss, 119
Ginn, Edwin, 32
Godfrey, Lt. Col. WW, 55
Grand Fleet, The (Jellicoe), 15
Grandi, Dino, 115, 116, 118
Great Britain: support for disarmament
in, 4, 10, 151, 156, 162; sphere of naval
influence of, 7, 32; domestic structure
of, 28-29, 157; support for Kellogg-
Briand Pact, 85, 86; proposed arms
limitation agreement with France,
87-90; and ratification of London treaty,
138-39. See also British Royal Navy
Great Depression, and disarmament,
119, 130, 133, 135, 145-46
Grey, Sir Edward (Viscount of Fallodon), 3
Guam, 11, 16, 56
Gulick, Sidney, 147
Hague Conference, 117
Hale, Frederick, 36-37, 135
Hamaguchi Osachi: assassination of, 11,
130, 140; and naval appropriations, 22,
218 INDEX
101; and London Naval Conference,
122, 126, 128, 132, 160; and ratifica-
tion of London treaty, 139-40; disarma-
ment policy of, 162
Hankey, Sir Maurice, 178 n 33
Hara Kanjiro, 55
Hara Kei, 3, 4-5, 10, 21, 39, 156
Harding, Warren: disarmament policy of,
4, 130, 156; and defense of China, 7;
and Washington Naval Conference, 8,
9, 77, 78, 156; death of, 17-18; scandal
during administration of, 19
Harrison, Pat, 86
Hawaiian Islands, protection of, 127
Hearst, William Randolph, 33
Henderson, Arthur, 115, 117, 124, 125,
148, 149
Hepburn, Rear Adm. Arthur }., 54, 58,
110, 127
Hitler, Adolf, 133, 153
Hoover, Herbert: and Washington Naval
Conference treaties, 9; and Anglo-
American peace propaganda, 76; disar-
mament policy of, 81, 97, 98, 99, 102,
103, 120-21, 130, 135, 153, 156, 162;
policy toward Great Britain, 90; and
U.S. neutrality, 94, 104; and London
Naval Conference, 97, 109, 111, 116,
117, 118, 120-21, 125, 127, 129, 131,
160; and naval appropriations, 102-3;
meeting with Ramsay MacDonald,
103-4, 121; relationship to peace
groups, 105, 125; impact of public opin-
ion on, 121; and ratification of London
Treaty, 135, 136, 138; criticism of, 146;
and Navy League, 146-47; and World
Disarmament Conference, 149, 152,
153
Hori Teikichi, 55
Houghton, Alanson, 48, 70
House, Col. Edward, 3
Howard, Sir Esme, 78; and parity between
British and U.S. navies, 49; and U.S.
limits on tonnage, 63; and media at-
tempts to derail Geneva conference, 66,
71; and Anglo-American peace propa-
ganda, 76; and London Naval Confer-
ence, 96, 97, 191 n 55; negotiations
with Stimson, 100
Hughes, Charles Evans: at Washington
Naval Conference, 5, 6, 7-8, 9, 56, 63,
77, 159; and defense of China, 7; re-
placement for, 23; and public opinion,
30; and Geneva Naval Conference, 49;
Pratt as advisor to, 109; nomination to
Supreme Court, 121; disarmament
policy of, 146, 161
Hughes, Adm. Charles E, 111
Hull, Cordell, 153
Hull, William I., 92
Hunter, Henry C, 67
immigration, of Japanese to U.S., 1, 17,
87
Immigration Act (1924), U.S., 1, 17, 87
Imperial Defence College, British, 21,
112
Imperial Marine Association, Japanese,
122
inspections, international, 40, 43, 45,
161
Institute of Pacific Relations, 35, 53, 96
interest groups. See special interest
groups
International Committee on the Cause
and Cure of War (ICCCW), 119, 147,
148
International Conference for the Control
of Arms, 39
International Conference of Women, 9
International Disarmament Notes
(Brookings Institution), 147
International Gleanings from Japan, 149
internationalists: political, 31-32; com-
munity, 32-33; and U.S. naval bill of
1928, 93
international law, 31, 82
Inukai Tsuyoshi, 144, 153
Ishii Kikujiro, 48, 55, 58, 68, 75, 149
Italian Navy: reduction of, 53; limitation
of, 149; parity with French Navy, 150
Italy. See Italian Navy
Jahnke, Ernest Lee, 121
James, Edwin, 66
Japan: arms expansion program in, 4;
support for disarmament in, 4, 10, 22,
87, 148-49, 156, 162; sphere of naval
influence of, 7, 32; and German naval
technology, 11; cooperation with the
West, 22, 101, 144; domestic structure
of, 29, 157-58; development in Man-
INDEX 219
churia, 96, 130, 185 n 51; troops sent
into China (Manchuria) by, 96, 143,
149, 151, 152; internationalism in,
123; and ratification of London treaty,
139-40. See also Japanese Navy
Japanese Advertiser, 128
Japanese Foreign Office, 128
Japanese Navy: expenditures of, 6; cruis-
ers in, 12, 16, 17, 35, 38, 49, 101, 102,
114, 127; Diet appropriations for, 16,
21-22, 35, 38-39; technological innova-
tion of, 144-45
Japanese Peace Society (JPS), 10
Jellicoe, Adm. John Rushworth (1st Earl
Jellicoe), 15, 49, 55, 69-72, 138
Johnson, Captain A.W, 141
Johnson, Hiram, 137, 138
Joint Army and Navy Board, U.S., 6
Jones, Rear Adm. Hilary P: on Prepara-
tory Commission, 40, 43, 44, 46, 99;
and Geneva Naval Conference, 49,
54-56, 58, 62, 69, 70, 72, 77, 78; and
protection of trade routes, 72; and pro-
posed Anglo-French arms limitation
agreement, 89; and London Naval Con-
ference, 111, 115; Stimson's remarks
addressed to, 137
Journal de Geneve, 43
Karuya Gizo, 38
KatoKanji, 101, 128, 139, 140
KatoKomei, 21-22
Kato Tomosaburo, 128
Kelley, Patrick H., 17
Kellogg, Frank B., 31; on Preparatory
Commission, 23-24, 39-40, 44, 45;
and Geneva Naval Conference, 47-49,
55, 56, 59, 61, 63, 67, 70, 71, 73, 74,
76, 78, 79; at dedication of peace
bridge at Niagara Falls, 77; peace treaty
negotiations with France, 82, 84-86; re-
tirement of, 84; and proposed
Anglo-French arms limitation agree-
ment, 89, 90, 91, 95; and London Na-
val Conference, 97; relationship to
peace groups, 105
Kellogg-Briand Pact, 81, 82, 84-86, 89,
91, 95, 100, 105, 117, 120, 124, 132,
160
Kelly, Vice Adm. David, 88
Kinkaid, Capt. T., 148
Knox, Capt. Dudley W, xiii, 8, 179 n 22,
196 n 53
Kobayashi Seizo, 53-54, 55, 58, 72, 75
Koga Mineichi, 55
Lamont, Thomas W, 94, 125-26
Lanning, Rear Adm. Harris, 142
Lausanne Conference (1932), 152
League of Nations, 1, 2-3, 10; disarma-
ment conference called by, 22-23; U.S.
participation in, 25, 32, 43-44; coopera-
tion with peace groups, 31; as host to
Geneva Naval Conference, 48, 51; and
disarmament policy, 65; Polish peace
resolution approved by, 82; and pro-
posed Anglo-French arms limitation
agreement, 89, 90; and verification is-
sue, 161; Germany in, 175 n 49
League of Nations Association of Japan
(LNAJ), 10, 35, 149
League of Nations Non-Partisan Associa-
tion (later: League of Nations Associa-
tion), 31, 32, 82, 95, 147, 182 n 5
League of Nations Preparatory Commis-
sion for a General Disarmament Con-
ference: foundation of, 22-24; U.S. par-
ticipation in, 22-24, 25-26, 36, 39,
40-41, 43, 45; proceedings of, 39-47,
96; British participation in, 41, 45;
French participation in, 41-43, 45; Ital-
ian participation in, 43; compromise
reached by, 46-47
League of Nations Union (LNU), 10, 34,
86, 95-96, 121-22, 158
Lee, Arthur Hamilton (1st Viscount Lee
of Fareham), 4, 72
Levinson, Salmon O., 33, 83, 85, 98,
105, 159
Leygues, Georges, 115
Libby, Frederick }., 104; and National
Council for the Prevention of War, 32,
81; and peace treaty with France, 83,
85, 86; opposition to naval bill of 1928,
92, 94; and abolition of battleships,
119; and arms reduction petition, 119
Lippmann, Walter, 119
Litvinoff, Maxim, 96
Lloyd George, David: disarmament policy
of, 4, 9, 156; and Washington Naval
Conference, 9-10, 156; replacement of,
20; support for Kellogg-Briand Pact, 86;
220 INDEX
support for 1932 Geneva Conference,
148; and German disarmament, 167 n 2
Locarno Accords (1925). See Treaty of
Locarno (1925)
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 146, 147
London Naval Conference (1930): disar-
mament following, xi-xii; purpose of,
11; and treaty cruisers, 11; Japanese
participation at, 98, 114, 115, 126-28;
preliminary inquiries about, 101-2; in-
vitations to, 104; proceedings of, 106;
technical testimony at, 106, 108-14;
cruiser issues at, 108-16, 129; U.S. par-
ticipation at, 109-12, 114, 125; British
participation at, 112-14, 115, 116;
French participation at, 114-18, 124-26,
128, 129-30; Italian participation at,
115, 116-18, 128; impact of peace
groups on, 118-23, 125, 129; treaty
agreement made at, 124-29; and treaty
ratification, 135-40; technological inno-
vations following, 140-45; impact of
Geneva Naval Conference on, 159-60
London Naval Conference, Second (1935-
36), 134, 154-55, 161
London Observer, 138
Long, Rear Adm. Andrew T, 40, 49, 54,
108
Lytton, Lord, 154
Lytton Report (League of Nations), 154
MacDonald, J. Ramsay, 130; relationship
with peace organizations, 10; and naval
appropriations, 20, 21; and Geneva Na-
val Conference, 47, 77, 99-100; support
for Kellogg-Briand Pact, 86; and U.S. na-
val bill of 1928, 91, 94; as prime minis-
ter, 99; disarmament policy of, 99-100,
101, 131; and negotiations with Japa-
nese, 101-2; visit to Washington, D.C.,
103-4, 121; and London Naval Confer-
ence, 115-17, 124-26, 160; and peace
groups, 119; Hoover's letter to, 120-21;
and ratification of London treaty, 139;
support for 1932 Geneva Conference,
148; and World Disarmament Confer-
ence, 150, 153; loss of power of, 154,
162; and social groups, 157; and inter-
national verification, 161; and proposed
arms limitation agreement with France,
184 n 40
MacDonald, Malcolm, 151
Madden, Sir Charles, 76, 112
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 143
Manchester Guardian, 91, 138
Manchurian Incident. See China, and
Japanese invasion of Manchuria
Mariana Islands, 11
Marriner, Theodore, 85
Massigli, Rene, 115
Matsudaira Tsuneo, 55, 101-2, 115, 127,
132
McDonald, James, 125-26, 147
McKellar, Kenneth, 121, 135, 138
McNamee, Capt. Luke, 5
media: and public opinion, 30; impact on
Geneva Naval Conference, 65-67; peace
organizations' access to, 83; impact on
London Naval Conference, 122-23
Mellon, Andrew, 49, 94
Mellon-Berenger accord (1926), 82
Menken, S. Stanwood, 33-34, 103
Mexico, U.S. oil leases in, 78, 82
militarism, 31
military preparedness: U.S. support for,
30, 33, 34; British support for, 34-35;
arms control as part of, 163
Mitchell, Billy, 4
Moffat, Pierrepont, 153, 154
Moffett, Rear Adm. William A., 5, 142,
143
Monroe Doctrine, 3, 85
Morgan, Laura Puffer, 83, 91, 92, 94,
119, 120, 185 n 49
Morley, Felix, 147
Morrow, DwightW, 115, 116, 118, 125
Morrow, Mrs. Dwight W, 119
Moses, George, 138
Murray, Gilbert, 96
Mussolini, Benito, 48, 149, 151
Nagai Matsuzo, 115
National Civic Federation, 34, 83
National Committee on the Cause and
Cure of War (NCCCW), 33, 82, 83, 86
National Council for the Limitation of
Armaments, 9
National Council for the Prevention of
War (NCPW), 32, 81, 82, 83, 85, 91,
92,94, 119, 126, 147
National Council of American Shipbuild-
ers, 66-67
INDEX 221
National Industrial Recovery Administra-
tion, 140-41
National Security League (NSL), 33-34,
103
National Women's Trade Union League,
92
Nation's Business, 136
Naval Act (1916), U.S., 18, 91
Naval Act (1929), U.S., 120, 132, 141,
158
Navy Day (United States), 18, 33
Navy League, British, 34-35, 158
Navy League, Japanese, 122, 158
Navy League, U.S., 18, 33, 93, 118,
146-47, 158
neutrality, U.S. policy for, 84, 94
New Statesman, 112
New York Daily News, 66
New York Herald Tribune, 33
New ifork fournal of Commerce, 135
New York Times, 120
New York Tribune, 146
New York World, 103
New Zealand Navy, 115
Niagara Falls, peace bridge at, 77
Nicaragua, U.S. occupation of, 78, 85
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 94
Nine-Power Treaty, 7, 130
99 Park Avenue (peace group), 147
Nish, Ian, 58
Nomura Kichisaburo, 53
Norris, George, 94, 138
nuclear weapons, 162-63
O'Higgins, Kevin, 69
Okada Keisuke, 55, 98, 101, 128, 144
Open Door policy, 7
Our Navy magazine, 108-9
Ozaki "Yukio, 5
Paciflco (Shearer), 66
pacifists, civil rights of, 83
Palen, Frederick R, 67
Panama Canal, 8, 142
Papen, Franz von, 153
Paris Peace Conference (1918), 2
Paul-Boncour, Joseph, 42, 45, 46
Peace Action (journal), 83
peace organizations: and Washington Na-
val Conference, 9, 10; and progressive
movement, 25; and disarmament
policy, 30-31; radical, 31, 158; conser-
vative, 31-32, 158; liberal, 32-33; fol-
lowing failure of Geneva Naval Confer-
ence, 81-87; impact on U.S. naval bill
of 1928, 91-92, 94-95; impact on Lon-
don Naval Conference, 104-5, 118-23,
125, 129; activities following 1930,
146-49; publicizing of disarmament by,
158; effectiveness of, 158-59. See also
names of specific organizations
Peace Preservation Law, Japanese, 87
peace psychology, 25, 26
Pearl Harbor: U.S. fortification of, 53;
Japanese attack on, 65
Permanent Disarmament Commission,
152
Philippine Islands: and American secu-
rity, xi; defense of, 7, 8, 18, 110; pos-
sible Japanese attacks on, 11, 16, 137;
Stimson as governor of, 98; American
landings on, 142
Pickett, Clarence, 147
Poland, on Preparatory Commission, 43
Porter, Stephen G., 44
Pound, Rear Adm. A.D.PR., 55
power elites, 26
pragmatism, xii
Pratt, Rear Adm. William V: at Washing-
ton Naval Conference, 5, 6, 8; and
peace treaty with France, 85; and Lon-
don Naval Conference, 109, 110-11,
115, 127, 131, 137; and technological
innovations, 141, 142; as chief of naval
operations, 146; support for London
treaty by, 154; and Geneva Naval Con-
ference, 176 n 72
Preparatory Commission. See League of
Nations Preparatory Commission
preparedness. See military preparedness
Pringle, Rear Adm. J.R.P, 111, 127
progressive movement, 25
Prohibition, 135
public opinion: effect on policymaking,
xii, 157; effect on Washington Naval
Conference treaties, 9; and avoidance of
war, 19; expressed in pressure groups,
26-35, 80; definition of, 29-30; sources
of information about, 30; influence on
Kellogg-Briand Pact negotiations, 84;
impact on Hoover's policies, 121
public opinion theory, 26-29
222 INDEX
Rankin, Jeannette, 94, 147
Red Scare. See anticommunism
Reed, David A., 49, 94, 110, 115, 127,
132, 135, 138
Reeves, Capt. J.M., 54
Reuters news agency, 122
Richardson, Dorsey, 40
Richmond, Adm. Sir Herbert, 112, 195 n
35
Roberts, Walter, 43
Robinson, Arthur R. (senator from Indi-
ana), 138
Robinson, Joseph T (senator from Arkan-
sas], 114-15, 120, 124, 138
Rogers, Will, 67-68
Rome Conference (1924), 23
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 140-41, 155, 161,
162, 181 n44
Roosevelt, Theodore, 18, 173 n 15
Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr., 5, 6, 19, 170-71
n54, 181 n44
Root, Elihu, 9, 32, 135
Saburi Sadao, 48, 55, 58
Sacco, Nicola, 82
Sacco-Vanzetti case, 82-83
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 91
Saito Hiroshi, 127
Saito Makato: and Geneva Naval Confer-
ence, 48, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60; and ratifi-
cation of London treaty, 139; cabinet
formed following assassination of
Inukai, 153-54
Salisbury, Lord, 62, 79, 87, 88
Schleicher, Kurt von, 153
Schofield, Rear Adm. Frank H.: at Wash-
ington Naval Conference, 5, 8; and Ge-
neva Naval Conference, 51, 54, 59, 61,
62, 67, 69, 73, 76, 77; and outlawry of
war, 83; and London Naval Conference,
111; and ratification of London treaty,
137; and aircraft carrier design, 142;
and U.S. naval bill of 1928, 185 n 49
Schwab, Charles M., 9
Scott, James Brown, 85
self-defense, wars of, 85
Service Francaid de la Societe des Na-
tions, 42
Shanghai Incident, 151
Shearer, William B., 18, 19, 65-67, 103,
118-19, 158
Shidehara Kijuro: and Japanese coopera-
tion with the West, 22, 101, 144; as
noninterventionist in China, 38, 39;
and Geneva Naval Conference, 75; and
London Naval Conference, 126, 128,
132; disarmament policy of, 162
Shipstead, Henrik, 138
Shotwell, James T.: and Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 31, 82;
and peace treaty with France, 83, 85,
86; as a moderate, 105; and arms reduc-
tion petition, 119; and London Naval
Conference, 120; and effectiveness of
peace groups, 159
Simonds, Frank H., 60
Singapore, British fortification of, 22, 37,
53
Smith, Vice Adm. Aubrey, 55
Smoot-Hawley Act (1930), 144
Smyth, Capt. WW, 54, 110, 111
Snowden, Philip, 117
social coalitions, strength of, 27
Socialist party, U.S., 83, 147
social protest groups, xii
Society of Friends, 35
Soviet Navy, 23
Soviet Union, 96, 106, 162
Spanish-American War veterans' benefits,
135
special interest groups, xii, 30
Spee, Adm. Maximilian Johannes Maria
Hubert von (Graf), 12
Standley, Adm. William H., 154-55
Stearns, Frank, 181 n 44
Steed, Henry Wickham, 84
Stimson, Henry L.: and U.S. occupation
of Nicaragua, 78; as Hoover's secretary
of state, 97-98; negotiations with Brit-
ish, 100, 101, 102; and London Naval
Conference, 110, 114-16, 118, 124-27,
129, 130-31; and arms reduction peti-
tion, 120; health of, 131; and ratifica-
tion of London treaty, 136-37; and
World Disarmament Conference, 149,
150; and Manchurian Incident, 151
Stresemann, Gustav, 118
submarines: in French Navy, 6, 37, 42,
53, 54, 129; tonnage limits on, 6
Suetsugu Nobumasa, 140
Swanson, Claude, 49, 98, 135
Swopes, Herbert Bayard, 103
INDEX 223
Taft, William Howard, 97
Takahashi Korekiyo, 10, 21
Takarabe Takeshi, 115, 128, 139, 140
Tanaka Giichi, 38-39, 54, 60, 87, 96, 98,
101
Tardieu, Andre, 115, 117, 118
Thomas, Norman, 99
Tokyo Asahi, 54
Tokyo Hochi, 54
Tokyo Nicbi Nichi, 50, 127-28
tonnage limits, as measurement of naval
capacity, 6, 57, 99
Toyoda Teijiro, 55
trade routes, defense of, 15, 20, 33, 37,
53, 54, 72, 94
Trade Union Congress, 148
Train, Lt. Comm. Harold C, 40, 54, 111
Treadway, Alan, 93
Treaty of Locarno (1925), 1, 39, 42, 47,
62, 84, 124, 128, 156, 162
Treaty of Versailles, 1, 2-3, 23, 65, 132,
135, 152, 161, 162
Union Theological Seminary (New York),
147
United Nations Disarmament Council,
163
United States: support for disarmament
in, 1, 4, 156, 162; as military threat to
Japan, 5; sphere of naval influence of, 7,
32; peace psychology in, 25; domestic
structure of, 28, 157; foreign policy in-
terests in, 29-30; naval bill of 1928 in,
86, 91-96; isolationists in, 94. See also
United States Navy
United States Army: size of, 24
United States Congress: naval appropria-
tions by, 16-20, 34, 35-37, 86, 90, 91-
96, 131, 140-41, 154-55; and public
opinion, 30; peace resolutions in, 83-84;
investigation of William Shearer by, 103;
and ratification of London treaty, 135-38
United States Navy: expansion of, 5-6;
cruisers in, 11-14, 36-37, 44, 52-53, 86,
101, 108, 141-42; congressional appro-
priations for, 16-20, 34, 35-37, 86, 90,
91-96, 131, 140-41, 154-55; organiza-
tions supporting, 33-34; strength of, 120
VanKeuren, Capt. A.H., 109-10
Vanzetti, Bartolomeo, 82
verification issues, 161
Villard, Oswald Garrison, 77, 91, 94
Vinson, Carl, 140-41
Vinson-Tfammel Act (1934), 141, 142
Violette, Adm. Hector, 88
Wakatsuki Reijiro: and naval appropria-
tions, 38; and Geneva Naval Confer-
ence, 48, 54; and London Naval Confer-
ence, 115,126,127; and ratification of
London treaty, 139, 145; influence of
Washington Naval Conference on, 159
Wakeman, Samuel W, 66-67
Wales, Henry, 66
Walsh, David I., 185 n 49
Walsh, Thomas, 94, 98
War Plan Orange, 11-12, 110, 171 n 58
Washington Naval Conference (1921-22),
xi, 1; reasons for, 3-4; delegations to,
4-6; treaties agreed upon at, 6-11, 40,
56, 159; opposition to treaties of, 8; ap-
proval of treaties of, 9-10; and treaty
cruisers, 11-16; success of, 77-78
Washington Post, 71, 103
Watson, James E., 135
Wellesley, Sir Victor, 88, 89
Wertheimer, Mildred, 91
White, William Allen, 147
Wilbur, Curtis, 19, 49, 74, 91
Wiley, Adm. H.A., 137
Williams, Lt. Comm. E.M., 189 n 18
Williams, Wythe, 56, 66, 67
Wilson, Hugh R., 49, 54-55, 69, 72, 76,
99, 153
Wilson, Woodrow: idealism of, xii; and
disarmament policy, 2, 3; refusal to
convene disarmament conference, 4;
and U.S. entry into World War I, 33;
and ratification of Versailles treaty, 135;
and public opinion, 173 n 15
Women's International League for Peace
and Freedom (WILPF), 9, 33, 82, 83,
92-95, 119, 148
Women's Peace Crusade, British, 119
Women's Peace Society, 9
Women's World Disarmament Commit-
tee, 9
Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 32
Woolley, Dr. Mary E., 148
World Alliance for International Friend-
ship through the Churches, 83, 91
224 INDEX
World Court, 31, 32, 82, 85, 86, 98, 119, Yamamoto (Japanese admiral), 154, 155
147 Yamanashi Katsunoshin, 128, 140
World Disarmament Conference Yarnell, Capt. Harry E., 110, 137
(Geneva, 1932), 147-48, 149-54 Young, Owen, 153
World Peace Foundation, 9, 32 Young Plan (for war reparations), 117


